The program is behind schedule, but for once it's not really Army OR DMO's fault. The Australian program has outstripped the French and German programs and has had to slow to allow them to catch up, as far as certification issues, etc are concerned.
That is very depressing information. I had thought that the Tiger would provide a quantum leap in capability and hopefully it still will, when it finally gets operational. I'm amazed though at the lack of armour for a helo that is expected to operate in high threat scenarios.The latest information concerning Air 87 can be found on the JSCPAA web site at -
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jpaa/defence/subs.htm
With your magenta enhanced spectacles on, read the ANAO Report - sadly this 'model acquisition project' is still the old model.
The hearing transcripts make for an interesting read. Looks like there is more to come in this regard.
What is intriguing from an operational perspective is that apart from armoured crew seats, the aircraft does not seem to have any other armour protection, even for vital components.
From a design perspective, it still has Kapton insulated wiring, the use of which was banned by DGTA shortly after the USN banned its use back in 1988.
Go figure.
OK, now I'm confused. Depending on who is Occum at the moment, you will remember that I used to work with a milspec cable and connector company in 2001. At that time we had just removed and marked for destruction a couple of km's of kapton insul cabling due to the DGTA directive.From a design perspective, it still has Kapton insulated wiring, the use of which was banned by DGTA shortly after the USN banned its use back in 1988.
Go figure.
You might, then, want to take a look at the wiring insulation being used in the MMRT aircraft.
Is this a particularly french position? I would assume that in the case of their (French) license built aircraft in the US (like the dauphin) that any reharness work would have to comply and have that harnessing gutted.
we did a sponsored documentary for Channel 9 at the time called "Fire in the Sky". There was a fair bit of supporting data provided by specialist cable companies and IIRC - Boeing came to the party as well.
interesting if some of that harnessing is routed through fuel tanks. (like the Mig-21's) We did advise the Indian vendors at the time that in our view, and superficially without a closer inspection, we thought that some of their mid air disintegrations were kapton degradation initiated. We did tell them to speak to their aviation and test engineers for a qualified opinion
I assumed that they would have been done (on any removed harnesses) based on the advice we got at the time re banning kapton from future US milspec installs. But, I wasn't sure if it had been done.
It's difficult to track exactly what they use, since particular wires may be used in limited areas only. The official Airbus view, for example, is that there's no such thing as good or bad insulation: there's appropriate & inappropriate insulation. What's good for one use may be lethal for another, & vice-versa. Airbus was, a while ago, using it for restricted areas, where they thought it safe.
The ARH program has so far fired a total of 8 "live" Hellfire II missiles. As I understand such things, this (along with captive carry tests etc) was sufficient to demonstrate the "full" and successful integration of the weapon with the aircraft.
I noticed similar "lack of armouring" on the anzac harpoon cannister mods.
Plus recent operational experience has shown the attack helos are quite vulnerable to small arms fire. The Apaches were handed tactical defeats in both Iraq and Afghanistan and were heavily damaged. They are heavily armoured birds which no doubt saved them and their crews, but what would have happened to our Tigers in that situation? We'd have lost a lot more.
IIRC that was AA artillery. As I understand it, Kerbala was a employment/doctrinal failure. Using attack helos for deep battle proved not to be a good idea.
