Comparison of RN and MN amphibious capability

[kato]

Note: I'm cutting this from a post of mine in the Royal Navy Discussion thread, since i'm sorta interested in a separate discussion on this.

What's turns out different in the end is that France has a offensive strike power projection capability (through CdG)*, while the RN's own carriers are geared more towards a supporting role, be it ground support with Harriers or helo transport. The RN "compensates" that through having a far larger amphibious force; on a closer look though the RN is geared towards a large "heavy" landing and support capability in amphibious operations, while the MN - especially with the Mistrals - emphasizes an "light"/"fast" intervention/airborne role with other units geared around supporting/supplanting these and providing a limited "heavy" capacity.

Expanding a bit on the later issue:
- The standardized RN ATG consists of 4 ships and employs 18-20 medium helicopters and 1450 troops (warload: 2400, surge: 2900) plus 12 LCVP and 6 LCM; less if an Invincible is in the auxiliary LPH role.
- The standardized MN ATG consists of 2 ships and employs 25-30 helicopters and 950 troops (warload: 1400, surge: 1900) with 2 LCAC and 10 LCM (or alternatively 14 LCM).
- The RN (+RFA) has a maximum capacity of up to 32 medium helicopters aboard its 8 large amphibious ships (hangar space for 12, all aboard Ocean only).
- The MN has a maximum capacity of 40 medium helicopters aboard its 4 large amphibious ships (hangar space for 40; with light helicopters over 75).
- The RN has a prepared "backup", "second/third wave" capability, both with the LSLs in the ATGs, and the Point class.
- The MN does not have such a capability at all, nor the forces prepared for it. French marine forces are meant to be shipped in within a minimal number of LPD trips.

Draw your own conclusions from the above.

---

* - note that while the MN also has solid plans to extend such offensive strike capability with the FREMM AVT and Scalp Naval, the RN only has some diffuse plans yet (C2) which might not include a strike capability after all; the CVF will be a return to such capability for the RN though.
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[kato]

The Royal Navy side

A bit more on that, taking most info from Richard Beedall's Navy Matters.

A Royal Navy Amphibious Task Group would typically consist of Ocean, one of the Albion LPDs, and two Bay class LSD(A).

The aviation component of this task group would be entirely housed aboard Ocean, since the other ships do not possess hangars (but can support typically two medium or one heavy helo each from their flight decks).
This aviation component consists of twelve medium transport helicopters - Sea King HC.4 or EH101 Merlin - and six attack helicopters - Lynx AH.7, Gazelle AH.1 or Apache WAH-64D.

The amphibious component (landing craft) of this taskforce consists of :
- Aboard LPH: 4 LVCP (on davits); 2 Grifton hovercraft
- Aboard LPD: 4 LCU Mk 10 (dock); 4 LVCP Mk 5 (on davits)
- Aboard LSD(A): 2 LCU Mk10; 4 LCVP; 4 Mexeflote powered rafts (total on both ships; used in "second wave")

Each LCU Mk10 can carry a load of up to 70 tons; typical load: one MBT or four large trucks or two Bv-206 with 120 troops.
Each LCVP Mk5 can carry a typical payload of 2 tons consisting of 35 troops or two light trucks.

The combined loadout of the ships in a ATG maxes out (by space) at around 450 light vehicles and trailers, although it will typically be far less in order to carry MBTs and other armoured vehicles (due to weight). This is the equivalent of about 3500 lane meters btw.
The entire ATG can carry a single armoured battalion along with its supplementary unarmoured vehicles and guns into a warzone in theory, along with a unspecific number of supporting airborne commandoes from the LPH.

In typical operations, the LPH and LPD would vertically and horizontally insert their troops, with the less-frontline-capable LSD(A)s waiting behind the horizon to provide a second wave after moving in.

 

[swerve]

Elsewhere I totted up the MNs dedicated amphibious tonnage as ca 95000: that was a slip of the fingers, accidentally double-counting. It's actually around 75000 tons, vs 120000 for the RN.

In both cases, this ignores training ships & other vessels which could be pressed into use to support amphibious landings, but adding them in favours the RN even more.

 

[swerve]

...
In typical operations, the LPH and LPD would vertically and horizontally insert their troops, with the less-frontline-capable LSD(A)s waiting behind the horizon to provide a second wave after moving in.

If needed, the Point-class ro-ros would be called up to support, their role being to bring in reinforcements & supplies after a harbour or sheltered anchorage had been secured.

 

[kato]

The Marine Nationale side

The Marine Nationale would have a amphibious task group of only two ships in comparison - one Mistral LHD and one Foudre LPD.

Both ships can support aviation with full hangar and flight facilities.
The LHD would typically house twelve medium transport helicopters - NH90, Super Puma - and four attack helicopters - Tiger - making it comparable to Ocean in that regard. A larger mix of lighter helicopters such as Gazelles can also be included in the airgroup. The LPD would typically carry and support either two heavy transport helicopters - Super Frelons - or four medium or light helicopters - NH90, Gazelle, Super Puma.

The amphibious component of the MN is larger since the Foudre class is basically built around a huge well deck housing LCUs with load carried in them.
It typically consists of:
- Aboard LHD: 4 LCU or 2 LCAC
- Aboard LPD: 10 LCU and 2 LCVP

Originally, the LPDs were also built to support a large LSM (350t payload) along with four LCU (or two LSMs), but the LSMs have been retired.
The French LCU are somewhat smaller, but with a 56t payload still capable of carrying French MBTs.

Internal operations are also different; the British rely on pass-through driving with forward and aft ramps on the LCUs for loading, while the French use elevators and cranes load their LCUs inside the LPD.
The French loading concept deals with the fact that other vehicle storage aboard is primarily for lighter vehicles. Tanks and other heavy vehicles are typically stored inside the LCUs themselves during transfer.

The French amphibious troops are primarily built around a pre-packaged force; a regiment comprising among other things 22 MBTs, 44 light tanks, and 230 other vehicles and trailers, a force roughly equivalent to that capable of being transported by the RN ATG.
The intention is that the MN ATG can typically transport at least half of the equipment of this regiment, or alternatively the LPD alone can transport it in three trips.
There is no real "second wave" capability (or a "third wave" with the Point class) in the Marine Nationale amphibious concept.

 

[kato]

If needed, the Point-class ro-ros would be called up to support, their role being to bring in reinforcements & supplies after a harbour or sheltered anchorage had been secured.

Indeed, the Point class would pretty much provide the reinforcements to the landed troops.

In my opinion, one main difference seems to be the basic mindset.

The Royal Navy emphasizes the capability to land and support a large number of troops, including reinforcing them. The speed of this landing isn't as emphasized as with the MN, although a smaller share of troops could be inserted just as fast.

The Marine Nationale nowadays emphasizes a large single-assault force, as well as - in comparison to the number of ships - a large proportion of vertical insertion.
The mindset behind the LPD multi-trip regimental transport seems to be that there are basically two primary kinds of operations - a fast strike with overwhelming force, or a comparably slow buildup without much opposition.
The French forward-deployed light LSTs operate with similar conditions - there's a prepackaged company which would deploy in a single landing for intervention or strike purposes from these ships, but no immediate reinforcement beyond that.

The difference presumably comes from different experiences - the Royal Navy had to perform in a amphibious environment in a drawn-out war far away (Falklands), while the French typically operate in environments where their "modus of operation" is a better-suited one.

 

[kato]

Disposition of Marine Nationale amphibious assets (since people tend to mix the BATRALs etc in):

Permanently deployed:
Mediterranean: 1 CTS LSM (Gapeau), 1 EDIC700 LST
Pacific Ocean: 2 BATRAL LSTH
Indian Ocean, ocean: 1 BATRAL LSTH
Indian Ocean, coast: 1 EDIC700 LST

For minor deployments:
1 BTS LSDH (Bougainville) - currently Indian Ocean
1 BATRAL LSTH - currently in the Caribbean

For major deployments:
2 BPC LHD (Mistral)
2 TCD LPD (Foudre)
2 CDIC LSM (large transports for Foudre class)

As I unterstand it, the EDIC in the Mediterranean primarily serves training purposes, while Gapeau is used in a utility role.
The BATRALs in the Indian and Pacific Ocean serve as prepositioned intervention packages with forward-deployed Marine forces, same with the EDIC in Djibouti.
The BATRAL available for minor deployments is currently used as part of a anti-drug taskgroup, as well as for joint amphibious exercises in the region.
Bougainville is used to ferry Gendarmerie patrol craft between the Indian Ocean and France, and will be retired in June actually.

Note that there is one factor playing with the "small" transports too - the forward-deployed stuff all can support helicopters. The smaller ships without flight decks stay within cover of FAF bases.

These smaller transports do not really play into "French amphibious capacity" at all. The only light LSTs available for deployments at all is Francois Garnier, the BATRAL currently in the Caribbean, and potentially Gapeau, a larger 1100-ton sister to the EDIC large LCTs / small LSTs. Francois Garnier has been used on other deployments before, e.g. in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean (along with CdG); notable is that the LST never operates jointly with the large amphibious ships MN in these deployments though, but is merely there to provide a taskgroup with light amphibious and limited (harbour-independant) coastal logistics support.