The Watcher
New Member
And now proliferation
By Shaukat Qadir
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For the average Pakistani, which includes me, Pakistan’s nuclear programme remains shrouded in secrecy. Still, one can draw certain logical conclusions
For the average Pakistani, which includes me, Pakistan’s nuclear programme remains shrouded in secrecy. Still, one can draw certain logical conclusions. We stand accused of assisting three, perhaps four countries — North Korea, Iran, some have added Iraq and now also Libya — and some surmise that we might have been prepared to assist Saudi Arabia too. Before considering each country, it is essential to trace some of the history of our nuclear programme.
It is now a known fact that serious work on Pakistan’s nuclear programme began in 1972, during ZA Bhutto’s time. There is also little doubt that during his tenure it remained under the control of the elected government. He also frequently referred to it as the “Islamic bombâ€, which caused considerable excitement among many Muslim-majority countries, particularly Libya. It is also rumoured, and may well be true, that Bhutto received financial assistance for this programme from both Saudi Arabia and Libya. He also enjoyed a special relationship with both these countries.
When Zia-ul-Haq took over and hanged Bhutto, in the face of pleas for mercy from many countries — including Saudi Arabia and Libya — he annoyed both these countries. It was with considerable effort that he mended fences with Saudi Arabia and, later, enjoyed a special relationship with the kingdom. But he made no effort to placate Libya or its leadership and, with the passage of time, Libya and Pakistan drew further apart. It was also in this period that the nuclear programme came under the control of the military. However, the scientists, particularly AQ Khan, enjoyed almost total liberty: they had access to unlimited funds, no control or accountability, just so long as they delivered. It was also in this period that Pakistan became nuclear-capable in 1986, though it was three years later that Bush senior, then-United States president, refused to certify that Pakistan was not proceeding further in its nuclear programme and slapped sanctions under the Pressler amendment.
Now let us consider each country: firstly, North Korea. There is little doubt that we received some assistance from North Korea in our missile programme. Therefore, as a quid pro quo, it would not be surprising if we had been of some assistance to them. However, to the best of my knowledge, ours is a uranium-based programme while North Korea’s is a plutonium-based one. Consequently, our assistance could be theoretical rather than practical. Even so it would not surprise me if we were guilty of proliferating to the North.
In the case of Iran, as earlier mentioned, our relationship soured, our policies in Afghanistan did not help either and in due course we became almost adversarial in Afghanistan, with Iran, India, and Russia supporting the Northern Alliance and Pakistan, USA, and Saudi Arabia supporting the Taliban. At no stage since 1979-80 until Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali’s visit to Iran a few months ago, has there been an improvement in our relationship. Had we been guilty of proliferating to Iran, there would have been an immediate warming of our relationship. It is on this fact that I base my conclusion that if we did indeed assist Iran, it could only have been possible through individual scientists looking for lucre. Similarly, to even consider Pakistan assisting the programmes of Iraq or Libya appears to be totally baseless to me, since neither of these countries enjoys the kind of relationship that could warrant such a risk by any Pakistani establishment.
Perhaps the only country the Pakistani establishment could institutionally consider assisting in a nuclear programme is Saudi Arabia. But there is no evidence that this might have happened. And there is no point in speculating about it in the absence of any evidence. Those who are being so liberal in making such accusations would do much good to consider some basic facts rather than arguing on the basis of suppositions.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)
By Shaukat Qadir
LINK
For the average Pakistani, which includes me, Pakistan’s nuclear programme remains shrouded in secrecy. Still, one can draw certain logical conclusions
It is ironic that the US is now the guardian of non-proliferation, the one country not only to have used this weapon, but also the one that has proliferated the most, with active assistance to the UK and Israeli programmes and tacit assistance to the French and South African programmes. During the cold war, scientists, and even top intelligence agents, were frequently bought and sold by countries on both sides of the iron curtain. But if scientists from a third-world Muslim-majority country are allegedly found to be saleable, it is totally unacceptable. The country, rather than the individuals, must be held accountable!
For the average Pakistani, which includes me, Pakistan’s nuclear programme remains shrouded in secrecy. Still, one can draw certain logical conclusions. We stand accused of assisting three, perhaps four countries — North Korea, Iran, some have added Iraq and now also Libya — and some surmise that we might have been prepared to assist Saudi Arabia too. Before considering each country, it is essential to trace some of the history of our nuclear programme.
It is now a known fact that serious work on Pakistan’s nuclear programme began in 1972, during ZA Bhutto’s time. There is also little doubt that during his tenure it remained under the control of the elected government. He also frequently referred to it as the “Islamic bombâ€, which caused considerable excitement among many Muslim-majority countries, particularly Libya. It is also rumoured, and may well be true, that Bhutto received financial assistance for this programme from both Saudi Arabia and Libya. He also enjoyed a special relationship with both these countries.
When Zia-ul-Haq took over and hanged Bhutto, in the face of pleas for mercy from many countries — including Saudi Arabia and Libya — he annoyed both these countries. It was with considerable effort that he mended fences with Saudi Arabia and, later, enjoyed a special relationship with the kingdom. But he made no effort to placate Libya or its leadership and, with the passage of time, Libya and Pakistan drew further apart. It was also in this period that the nuclear programme came under the control of the military. However, the scientists, particularly AQ Khan, enjoyed almost total liberty: they had access to unlimited funds, no control or accountability, just so long as they delivered. It was also in this period that Pakistan became nuclear-capable in 1986, though it was three years later that Bush senior, then-United States president, refused to certify that Pakistan was not proceeding further in its nuclear programme and slapped sanctions under the Pressler amendment.
In the post-Zia era, the military retained control over the nuclear programme with little interference from the frequently interrupted elected governments, while AQ khan and company continued to enjoy the same degree of liberty they did earlier. But this began to change after Gen Waheed Kakar became the COAS. It was perhaps in this period until Gen Waheed took over that proliferation from Pakistan was most likely, perhaps with the connivance of the military leadership, though not institutionally; or perhaps the military just chose to look the other way.
Now let us consider each country: firstly, North Korea. There is little doubt that we received some assistance from North Korea in our missile programme. Therefore, as a quid pro quo, it would not be surprising if we had been of some assistance to them. However, to the best of my knowledge, ours is a uranium-based programme while North Korea’s is a plutonium-based one. Consequently, our assistance could be theoretical rather than practical. Even so it would not surprise me if we were guilty of proliferating to the North.
In the case of Iran, as earlier mentioned, our relationship soured, our policies in Afghanistan did not help either and in due course we became almost adversarial in Afghanistan, with Iran, India, and Russia supporting the Northern Alliance and Pakistan, USA, and Saudi Arabia supporting the Taliban. At no stage since 1979-80 until Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali’s visit to Iran a few months ago, has there been an improvement in our relationship. Had we been guilty of proliferating to Iran, there would have been an immediate warming of our relationship. It is on this fact that I base my conclusion that if we did indeed assist Iran, it could only have been possible through individual scientists looking for lucre. Similarly, to even consider Pakistan assisting the programmes of Iraq or Libya appears to be totally baseless to me, since neither of these countries enjoys the kind of relationship that could warrant such a risk by any Pakistani establishment.
Perhaps the only country the Pakistani establishment could institutionally consider assisting in a nuclear programme is Saudi Arabia. But there is no evidence that this might have happened. And there is no point in speculating about it in the absence of any evidence. Those who are being so liberal in making such accusations would do much good to consider some basic facts rather than arguing on the basis of suppositions.
The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)