The Watcher
New Member
Good for Iran, I guess!
From the beginning, Iran's decision to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) latest stipulations on its nuclear research program was an attempt to politically outmaneuver Washington. Tehran agreed to temporarily cease its uranium enrichment program and to allow for more stringent inspections of its nuclear facilities. The Bush administration has been pushing for international pressure to be placed on Iran in the hopes of stunting the country's nuclear research program. Washington fears that Iran's growing nuclear knowledge and sophisticated nuclear facilities will allow the country to develop nuclear weapons, a scenario that would greatly increase Iran's power potential in the Middle East and Central Asia.
On the face of it, this outcome looks to have worked in Washington's favor, but the latest set of demands by the IAEA are much too weak to have any significant effect on Iran's nuclear research program. The stipulations that Iran agreed to are considered temporary, as is only too evident by statements made in Tehran shortly after its decision to comply with the IAEA. Hassan Rowhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, assured observers that Iran's suspension of its enrichment program "could last for one day or one year; it depends on us."
Diverging interests
The differing geopolitical interests in Europe and in the United States can best explain why the IAEA promoted such a watered down set of demands. Unlike the United States, the European Union does not consider Iran to be a "rogue state." The European Union has important diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran; it is Iran's biggest trading partner, especially the E.U. states of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. This growing relationship explains why these three countries sent their foreign ministers to help negotiate Iran's decision to comply with the IAEA.
Additionally, Russia does not want Iran to be weakened by the United States, since Washington is already encroaching on Russia's southern border in Central Asia. If Washington were able to orchestrate a change of government in Tehran -- one that complied with American interests rather than Russian interests -- it would cause a further deterioration in Moscow's security environment across its southern border. Furthermore, it would allow Washington to have increased influence in the rich oil and gas areas of the Caspian Sea -- an outcome that Russia would like to avoid.
These geopolitical differences explain why the European Union intervened and fostered an agreement that would place temporary, rather than permanent, limits on Iran's nuclear research program.
Concern in Washington
Washington's fear over Iran developing nuclear weapons is not contrived. Washington is attempting to preserve the current power balance in the Middle East and Central Asia. If Iran were to become a nuclear-armed state, it would greatly increase the Persian country's foreign policy leverage. A nuclear-armed Iran, coupled with its already sizeable military, would greatly increase the country's defensive capabilities and limit the ability of rival states to threaten Iran's territorial and governmental integrity; moreover, it would also prove more difficult to check Iran's regional ambitions. Indeed, this is why the leadership in Tehran has been so keen on furthering its nuclear research program.
Iran has demanded that it be able to enrich uranium for the purposes of providing fuel to its nuclear reactors, a process necessary for the development of nuclear energy. Enriching uranium is also a process, however, that can be used to provide nuclear material required for the production of nuclear weapons. Because Iran has the legal right to control the entire nuclear fuel cycle for the purposes of peaceful nuclear research, the United States has been trying to bind Iran to an agreement where Tehran would only import enriched uranium, rather than enrich it independently. This would allow greater transparency of Iran's nuclear research program and make it more difficult for Iran to covertly develop nuclear arms.
With the agreement designed by the European Union, this stipulation was not proposed. Now, the only legal way to prevent Iran from enriching uranium is for international observers to prove that the country is using the uranium for nuclear weapons, rather than for research and energy purposes. Finding proof to make a case against a country that may be secretly developing nuclear weapons has always proved difficult.
Take, for instance, Israel, which began a covert program to develop nuclear weapons in 1952. When U.S. weapons inspectors visited Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor in the 1960s, they were unable to detect that Israel was secretly developing nuclear weapons. According to the Federation of American Scientists, in order to hide their nuclear weapons program, Israeli engineers had installed "false control room panels and [placing] brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility."
Viewed in this context, the agreement between the European Union and Iran may only delay Iran's development of nuclear arms. If inspectors fail to find that Iran has a covert nuclear weapons program -- which is likely -- then the country will eventually be allowed to enrich uranium and handle all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Regional implications
Then, in recent days, Rowhani continued to assert Iran's nuclear mandate: "Our decision to suspend uranium enrichment is voluntary and temporary. Uranium enrichment is Iran's natural right, and [Iran] will reserve for itself this right. … There has been and there will be no question of a permanent suspension or halt at all." Rowhani continued: "We want to control the whole fuel cycle. … Today, we can produce centrifugal parts ourselves. We possess the technology."
Therefore, as long as the European Union and other significant states that have influence in Tehran -- such as Russia -- are unwilling to unite with Washington's desired hard-line policy towards Iran, the leadership in Tehran may be able to outmaneuver Bush administration policymakers and come closer to their goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Source: PINR
From the beginning, Iran's decision to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) latest stipulations on its nuclear research program was an attempt to politically outmaneuver Washington. Tehran agreed to temporarily cease its uranium enrichment program and to allow for more stringent inspections of its nuclear facilities. The Bush administration has been pushing for international pressure to be placed on Iran in the hopes of stunting the country's nuclear research program. Washington fears that Iran's growing nuclear knowledge and sophisticated nuclear facilities will allow the country to develop nuclear weapons, a scenario that would greatly increase Iran's power potential in the Middle East and Central Asia.
On the face of it, this outcome looks to have worked in Washington's favor, but the latest set of demands by the IAEA are much too weak to have any significant effect on Iran's nuclear research program. The stipulations that Iran agreed to are considered temporary, as is only too evident by statements made in Tehran shortly after its decision to comply with the IAEA. Hassan Rowhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, assured observers that Iran's suspension of its enrichment program "could last for one day or one year; it depends on us."
Diverging interests
The differing geopolitical interests in Europe and in the United States can best explain why the IAEA promoted such a watered down set of demands. Unlike the United States, the European Union does not consider Iran to be a "rogue state." The European Union has important diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran; it is Iran's biggest trading partner, especially the E.U. states of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. This growing relationship explains why these three countries sent their foreign ministers to help negotiate Iran's decision to comply with the IAEA.
Other regionally significant countries, such as Russia, are also unwilling to support a hard-line U.S. policy towards Iran. In contrast to U.S. strategy, Russia is currently building a nuclear reactor in the city of Bushehr in southern Iran. Moscow also has provided massive supplies of military equipment to Tehran, such as MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter bombers, T-72 tanks, and Kilo class attack submarines. Moscow is pursuing the prospect of building more nuclear reactors and facilities in Iran, a development that would help Russia earn much-needed financial capital. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov summarized Moscow's commitment to Iran, recently saying in a CNN interview, "I see no grounds for imposing sanctions against Iran. On the contrary, if it carries out its obligations to the IAEA, the world community, on the basis of international agreements, is obliged to assist Iran in developing its nuclear program for peaceful aims."
Additionally, Russia does not want Iran to be weakened by the United States, since Washington is already encroaching on Russia's southern border in Central Asia. If Washington were able to orchestrate a change of government in Tehran -- one that complied with American interests rather than Russian interests -- it would cause a further deterioration in Moscow's security environment across its southern border. Furthermore, it would allow Washington to have increased influence in the rich oil and gas areas of the Caspian Sea -- an outcome that Russia would like to avoid.
These geopolitical differences explain why the European Union intervened and fostered an agreement that would place temporary, rather than permanent, limits on Iran's nuclear research program.
Concern in Washington
Washington's fear over Iran developing nuclear weapons is not contrived. Washington is attempting to preserve the current power balance in the Middle East and Central Asia. If Iran were to become a nuclear-armed state, it would greatly increase the Persian country's foreign policy leverage. A nuclear-armed Iran, coupled with its already sizeable military, would greatly increase the country's defensive capabilities and limit the ability of rival states to threaten Iran's territorial and governmental integrity; moreover, it would also prove more difficult to check Iran's regional ambitions. Indeed, this is why the leadership in Tehran has been so keen on furthering its nuclear research program.
Iran has demanded that it be able to enrich uranium for the purposes of providing fuel to its nuclear reactors, a process necessary for the development of nuclear energy. Enriching uranium is also a process, however, that can be used to provide nuclear material required for the production of nuclear weapons. Because Iran has the legal right to control the entire nuclear fuel cycle for the purposes of peaceful nuclear research, the United States has been trying to bind Iran to an agreement where Tehran would only import enriched uranium, rather than enrich it independently. This would allow greater transparency of Iran's nuclear research program and make it more difficult for Iran to covertly develop nuclear arms.
With the agreement designed by the European Union, this stipulation was not proposed. Now, the only legal way to prevent Iran from enriching uranium is for international observers to prove that the country is using the uranium for nuclear weapons, rather than for research and energy purposes. Finding proof to make a case against a country that may be secretly developing nuclear weapons has always proved difficult.
Take, for instance, Israel, which began a covert program to develop nuclear weapons in 1952. When U.S. weapons inspectors visited Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor in the 1960s, they were unable to detect that Israel was secretly developing nuclear weapons. According to the Federation of American Scientists, in order to hide their nuclear weapons program, Israeli engineers had installed "false control room panels and [placing] brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility."
Viewed in this context, the agreement between the European Union and Iran may only delay Iran's development of nuclear arms. If inspectors fail to find that Iran has a covert nuclear weapons program -- which is likely -- then the country will eventually be allowed to enrich uranium and handle all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Regional implications
Tehran has watched as Washington increased U.S. influence in the entire region; first by establishing military bases in Afghanistan, and second by establishing them in Iraq. This explains why Tehran has been unwilling to compromise on the future of its nuclear research program. Shortly after agreeing to the European Union's provisions, Rowhani was quick to assert that Iran would remain sovereign over all aspects of its nuclear research program. Rowhani stated, "We believe that stopping enriching uranium is totally unacceptable and we think nobody agrees with [doing] that in Iran."
Then, in recent days, Rowhani continued to assert Iran's nuclear mandate: "Our decision to suspend uranium enrichment is voluntary and temporary. Uranium enrichment is Iran's natural right, and [Iran] will reserve for itself this right. … There has been and there will be no question of a permanent suspension or halt at all." Rowhani continued: "We want to control the whole fuel cycle. … Today, we can produce centrifugal parts ourselves. We possess the technology."
Therefore, as long as the European Union and other significant states that have influence in Tehran -- such as Russia -- are unwilling to unite with Washington's desired hard-line policy towards Iran, the leadership in Tehran may be able to outmaneuver Bush administration policymakers and come closer to their goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Source: PINR