Role of rifle fire/heavier small arms/other weapons

EmperorNortonII

New Member
I'm hoping that the title doesn't set off any mods "vs thread" alarm, since this isn't American vs Russian or M-1 vs T-80, but I apologize if this does fall under that umbrella, somehow.

I remember reading *somewhere* about the number of deaths inflicted by infantry rifles compared to heavier assets, and how rifles tend to be used (soldier self-defense being mentioned) compared to heavier weapons (machine guns, mortars, etc).

What I'm wanting is some sort of break-down showing cause of death on one side of any recent conflict which breaks down estimated deaths from infantry rifles compared to heavier small arms, and maybe comparing those to artillery, aircraft, etc. Does anyone know anywhere a person can go to read about such things?
 

PCShogun

New Member
I believe the common answer is that of all casualties, 50% or more were caused by artillery; about 10% were caused by machine guns; 2%-5% by rifle fire; and 1% or less by hand grenades, bayonets, knives, and unarmed combat combined. Another way to look at it is by reviewing the causes of combat wounds; 62% Fragment, 23% bullets, 6% burns, 3% blast, and 6% other.

However, the numbers can change radically when you look at individual conflicts. In Vietnam, Fragments accounted for 38.9%, bullets 23.8%, and booby traps 27.7%

In the Falklands, where naval and land forces participated, Fragments caused 40%, bullets 38%, and burns were 18%. (Naval casualty rates are primarily from Blast and burn.)

On land, it is estimated that 10% of the infantry, mostly machine gun crews, mortar crews and snipers, will inflict 90% of the casualties caused by infantry battalions; and that 50% or more of the riflemen will never fire their weapon. Modern infantry often relies heavily on locating enemy forces, and keeping them engaged while calling in artillery, armour, or air support.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
World wide small arms are responsible for the majority of casualties in conflicts. That having been said, lots of conflicts are fought by parties that don't know how to, or don't have access to, combat vehicles or artillery.
 

winnyfield

New Member
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/putting-taliban-sniper-fire-in-context/
...From early last June [2009] through April 3 [2010] of this year, 478 American service members were struck by hostile gunfire in Afghanistan and 59 of them died of their wounds. This works out to a lethality rate of about 12.3 percent — a very low proportion by historical standards. (During much of the 20th century, roughly one in three American combatants struck by bullets in battle died.)...
US DoD keeps data via Defense Casualty Analysis System
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I need to read your referenced article but would bet it is because of the more prominent use of body armor which reduces most hits to extremity wounds, which are obviously more survivable.
Yup. Another link is the vast improvements that have been made to medical care at all levels.

Better equipment and training to individuals and first responders (corpsmen and medics) to stabilize injuries so they survive until the helo can provide CASEVAC, surgical teams and shock/trauma units in theater, and regular transport flights out to hospitals for higher level continuing care.
 

Lt. Fred

New Member
Yup. Another link is the vast improvements that have been made to medical care at all levels.

Is that part of the reason there has been such a higher wounded/death ratio in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to Vietnam? I've often been told that the Iraqis just can't shoot well (which I was a little skeptical of). And/or that urban warfare is less likely to kill you than jungle warfare.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Is that part of the reason there has been such a higher wounded/death ratio in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to Vietnam?
When making comparisons across, three countries, with vastly different terrain, in different time periods, and each with a different geo-political context, the onus is on you to set the context for the attempt at a comparison.

If you shared with us the sources that you use to inform your opinion/question, we then have at least some basis to provide some pointers to help inform your attempt to join the discussion.

However, you have not done so. Therefore, we are not sure how to help. If we go into too much detail and focus on the basics, it would appear condescending. But if we don't, you can't get to correct wrong assumptions (which are often deeply held). At that point, it become less pleasant. Please help us, help you - for that to happen, you need to read and provide sources.

You can start by a google search on the term, METT-T, which stands for Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops & Time Available. You need to read up on METT-T, to understand the planning process for war. To understand the level of medical support, you need to read up on the vast improvements to the current medical care provided in Role-3 medical facilities at major bases (even when contrasted with medical care provided in 1991 Gulf War). Advances in medical science that has been translated into medical care provided, has enabled injured victims that would have died in the past to live. See the BBC documentary series on Frontline Medicine: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8rKzUk1wPg"]Frontline Medicine- episode 1- Survival - YouTube[/nomedia]

Concept of Levels of Medical Care provided from Role 1 to Role 4 levels (see FM 4-02.7)

Role 1. Care consists of care rendered at the unit level. It includes self-aid, buddy aid, and CLS skills, examination, and emergency lifesaving measures. Examples include the maintenance of the airway, control of bleeding, prevention and control of shock, splinting or immobilizing fractures, and the prevention of further injury. Treatment may include restoration of the airway by invasive procedures; use of IV fluids and antibiotics; and the application of splints and bandages. These elements of medical management prepare casualties for RTD or for evacuation to a higher role of care. Supporting medical units are responsible for coordinating the movement of patients from supported MTFs. The USMC Role I capabilities include only first aid (self-aid, buddy aid) and emergency care provided by a unit corpsman, battalion aid station (BAS), shock trauma platoon, and Marine wing support group. In the USAF, the first two roles of care (Roles I and II) are normally provided at a deployment location and emphasize self-aid and buddy care. Casualties become medical patients when a medical diagnosis and treatment sequence have been determined.

Role 2. Care includes physician-directed resuscitation and stabilization and may include advanced trauma management (ATM), EMT procedures, and forward resuscitative surgery. Supporting capabilities include basic laboratory, limited x-ray, pharmacy, and temporary holding facilities. Casualties are treated and RTD or are stabilized for movement to an MTF capable of providing a higher role of care. Ground or air movement is coordinated for transfer the patient to a facility possessing the required treatment capabilities. Role 2 is the first role where Group O packed red blood cells (Rh+-) will be available for transfusion. The medical battalion’s surgical company and the forward resuscitative surgery system are the only units in the USMC that provide Role II care.

Role 3. Care is administered that requires clinical capabilities normally found in a facility that is typically located in a reduced–level enemy threat environment. The facility is staffed and equipped to provide resuscitation, initial wound surgery, and postoperative treatment. This role of care may be the first step to restoration of functional health, as compared to procedures that stabilize a condition to prolong life. Blood products available may include fresh frozen plasma and Group A, B, and O liquid cells and may also include frozen Group O red cells and platelets. The USMC care at Role III and above is provided by other Services as determined by the JFC.

Role 4. In addition to providing surgical capabilities found at Role 3, this role also provides rehabilitation and recovery therapy. Definitive care includes the full range of acute, convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitation care and is normally provided in CONUS by military and the Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals, or civilian hospitals that have committed beds for casualty treatment as part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). On occasion, OCONUS military or allied/coalition and/or host nation hospitals approved by the CCDR as safe havens may also be used. This role may include a period of minimal care and increasing physical activity necessary to restore casualties to functional health and allow them to RTD or to a useful and productive life.
Further, in response to the Iraq/Afghanistan wars, a new improved 5.56x45 mm round was developed and introduced in 2010: US Army begins shipping improved 5.56mm cartridge. The new M855A1 round is sometimes referred to as "green ammo." The M855A1 has improved hard-target capability, more dependable, consistent performance at all distances, improved accuracy, reduced muzzle flash and a higher velocity.

I've often been told that the Iraqis just can't shoot well (which I was a little skeptical of).
Compared to who and what is the most common fire arm used?

The 7.62x39 mm calibre AK-47 (its proper designation is AKM) is not noted for benign characteristics that encourage marksmen-ship in insurgents. Prone to muzzle rise with iron sights (often not zeroed), the weapon is slightly harder to control - which leads to a perception of poorer marksman-ship of its users. Might be worth the effort to read an article by Anthony G Williams on 'Assault rifles and their ammunition' and watch the videos below:

(i) See this video: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G6BpI3xD6h0"]AK 47 vs M16 - YouTube[/nomedia]


(ii) For contrast, see this video on a 5.56mm bullpup (which has a 508 mm or 20 inch barrel - whose users regularly hit targets at 300m): [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-VCOjoY-ruU"]Shooting the Singapore Technologies SAR-21 - YouTube[/nomedia]​

Having said that there are numerous occasions where coalition troops in Iraq were shot by accurate aimed fire - keep in mind that some of the insurgents were former members of Saddam's Republican Guard and some of the insurgents were trained as foreign fighters before coming into Iraq. Some were just plain religious zealots (whose role was to wear suicide vests) but some of these guys were skilled and hardened fighters.

William F. Owen said:
Recent articles in Jane’s Defence Weekly and followed up by the popular press, suggested that the UK and NATO-standard small arms round of 5.56mm is under-performing on current operations, to the extent that a case for replacement can be made. This argument again highlights a vast field of woolly thinking and opinion that has traditionally informed infantry equipment decisions in the UK...

...Anyone with any experience of the AKM firing 7.62mm x 39 knows it cannot engage effectively at the ranges the L-85 or L-86 can. Essentially, if the enemy is equipped with AKM as individual weapons and PKM as a section/platoon weapon, then:
• British Army IWs and LSWs outrange the AKM in terms of ballistic performance, accuracy and optics.
• The L7 GPMG matches or exceeds the effective range of PKM, by virtue of better training and employment if nothing else.​
Based on this understanding, it is hard to see where the problem is. Range is not an issue and, even if it were, it would be ludicrous to base lack of performance on one relative criterion found in one theatre. To assume we will not be involved in a major jungle conflict is symptomatic of the same wisdom that assumed operations somewhere like Afghanistan were equally unlikely. To base the need on the equally dubious assertion that so-called ‘asymmetric warfare’ demands more capable infantry weapons is to quote opinion unsupported by logic or data...

<snip>
Do read William F. Owen's article (a small portion of which is quoted above) as a starting point and this was a topic we discussed in DT about 3 years ago. He sees it as a framing issue in 'True but Irrelevant: Small Arms Performance in Afghanistan (click to see full article)' and notes that:

"The crux of the argument to replace 5.56mm rests on framing the imagined problem at the section level, thus promoting the idea that infantry capability is somehow tied to section weapons. This is a popular but unfounded and rather new idea. Autonomous section capability has been recognised as largely irrelevant in every serious shooting war, with platoon, company and battlegroup weapons always being more decisive."​

I'm of the view that you don't have agree with everything he says but what he says and his reasoning needs to be seriously considered. Further at other occasions, he has also clarified the following:

"Having now talked to lot of UK guys back from A'stan, I have to say I am very un-surprised at what they actually say, which is that personal weapons are really just for self defence and under 200m and what does the killing is platoon weapons/section weapons, like GPMG, LRR and Projected HE. In other words all the lessons from the past 60 years hold true."​

In most cases, infantry sections and platoons have their firepower augmented by weapons sections carrying variants of the 7.62x51 mm general purpose light machine guns for fire support. These slightly heavier weapons are used for fire support and to provide suppression in the event of contact with the enemy. For more information, see this link on "Infantry weapons of the Vietnam war". There is also an old 2009 thread on "Future weapons/equipment and their impact on the structure of infantry units", which may contain useful information.

To add to your discussion, we need to talk a little about weapons capabilities versus defined military roles. This is for the benefit of civilians participating in this forum. Since this is a defence forum we should not think like main-stream media and call everyone with a scoped rifle a 'sniper'. As the price of optics goes down and having longer ranged weapons (like the British L129A1 7.62 mm sharpshooter rifle or the M14 EBR, with a Leupold 3.5–10X power scope for the US Army) issued to modern infantry, it is easy to get confused over a weapon capability (which is increasing with better optics and calibre of bullet used) and actual defined military roles. For example, a sharpshooter (SS) or designated marksman (DM) is still performing a traditional infantry role (the US Army deploys in Afghanistan with two DMs with M14EBR in each section).

A sniper team (operating in teams of up to six) on the other hand has a different military role and is trained to operate way ahead of the main force, to insert deep in hostile enemy territory to seek out high value targets (like senior commanders/political leaders). The effect of a sniper is to harass the enemy in his areas of sanctuary, forcing the enemy to develop counter measures and investing in resources to deal with such a threat. A sniper team is differently trained for a planned role that a SS/DM cannot perform. IMO, observation, evasion and escape are core skills for a sniper and his ability to engage at long range is a collateral benefit. A sniper's ability to operate deep in hostile territory and observe is just as valuable.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
And/or that urban warfare is less likely to kill you than jungle warfare.
They are both dangerous in different ways - which is why armies train their units to operate in different terrain (and terrain is a consideration in METT-T). In both cases and even before the shooting starts, the IEDs planted by the insurgents need not be on the floor and can be planted in buildings (with the whole building rigged to blow), street lamps, walls, trees, soil mounts, and other less obvious locations like garbage or leave heaps. In jungle terrain, the Vietcong are noted for building hard to find booby traps with no metal content in them. Insurgents in Iraq have engaged coalition forces in close combat in urban terrain, with extensive use of IEDs in an attempt to channel coalition forces into kill zones.

In jungle warfare, especially operations in primary forests (where you cannot see the sun in the sky because of the thick-jungle canopy), the jungle itself is always trying to kill you, even if you are not being hunted by an enemy in a closed environment where visibility is limited. Terrain features like ridge-lines, sources of clean drinking water, means of resupply of ammo and food become important considerations as part of military operations in primary and secondary tropical forests. Below is the National Geographic video of Singaporeans at jungle confidence training in Brunei's primary forests: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AcjQX7wHeE"]Ep 13: A Bird in Hand (Every Singaporean Son II - The Making of an Officer) - YouTube[/nomedia]


If you watch the above video, you will get what I mean about the jungle being a closed terrain. What a lot of people don't realise is how hard it is to find the enemy in the jungle. I can provide you with a 6 figure map grid reference to junction of two secondary jungle trails. Most proficient armies can hide a platoon of over 30 men to dominate area; and even if you are allowed to search in the day, and given an hour, you as a civilian will have a hard time finding the fighting positions of over 30 men - it is just very hard to see clearly in even secondary jungles. In jungle warfare, both insurgents and armies have to blend into the jungle. Below is a National Geographic video of cadets at training in the jungle, and in one of the training missions, they transit from the jungle into an urban environment. The video starts with insertion of the cadets by two Chinooks. You can see the mistakes being made as they try to conduct an appreciation of the situation under simulated fire; but they will learn from their mistakes, as it is only a training course. [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5Sa4aIKnIY"]Ep 20: The Final Test (Every Singaporean Son II - The Making of an Officer) - YouTube[/nomedia]


In urban warfare, threats can appear in all directions. Appreciation of the situation is difficult, with the insurgents trying their best to blend in with the local population. Understanding the human terrain becomes another dimension - which means cultural sensitivity and local language skills is important. You cannot fight an insurgency in an urban environment without understanding the people or tribes that live in that urban area (who may or may not be the enemy). Unfortunately intelligence/data driven discussions on counter-insurgency warfare is boring. Intelligence/data driven approaches mean creating alliances to win over local populations. Thereafter, an army operating in this type of area, get to fight what General Charles C. Krulak (see his 1999 article on "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War") calls the three block war (see this 2004 article, " Afghanistan: Winning A Three Block War" for some background).

If you read the above 2004 article by the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, the narrative of the war in Afghanistan is very different from what you see in the main-stream media. While the generals running wars are not always right (and the enemy also gets a vote), if you took the trouble to find out the details, the media, often engages in reporting that distorts the actual situation on the ground. If you read news reports on the latest suicide attacks, you will NOT know that the character of many suicide attacks in Afghanistan is very different from that of Iraq. In Iraq, even groups of little children were fair game, whereas, in Afghanistan, the attacks are often aimed at harder targets, like the army, police or government officials (and much less directed at just civilians, though civilians are still often collateral damage in these suicide attacks). Which is why you can have incredible pictures emerging from Jalalbad of an Afghan Army EOD expert disarming the suicide vest worn by a captured insurgent to save his life. If you just read mainstream press reports, you will not understand the ethnographic map of Afghanistan, which naturally affects the pattern of the insurgency on the ground. The conventional media wisdom is to focus on reporting the fighting in Pastuns areas, but what is missed is that not all Pastun tribes support the insurgency. The common media narrative is that the US surge in Afghanistan will fail and the coalition efforts there are futile, or at least just as futile as the efforts of the Soviets of the past. But this sort of fast food media narrative, is just very incomplete and not intended to do justice to the actual efforts made.

There is a cultural difference in the way the insurgencies is conducted in Iraq versus Afghanistan. There is also a vast difference between the Afghan insurgency faced by the Soviets, in contrast to the insurgency faced by ISAF. I would agree that the journey to the ANA lead had not been easy. During 2012 at least 1,170 ANA troops were killed, along with 1,800 Afghan police who lost their lives to insurgent attacks. However, there is hope and as Brian Glyn Williams said at page 177 of his 2012 book:

"Although it is tempting to compare the Soviet experience with that of the United States and its Coalition allies... it should be noted that there are vast differences between the two wars. The Soviets, for example, did not have the support of the Tajiks, Hazaras, and a vast swath of the Pastuns... In the 1980s the Hazara lands were a hostile neutral zone, and the Tajik and Pastuns lands were up in arms against the Soviets. Today, by contrast, the Panjsher Valley and areas north of Kabul are comparatively safe areas for U.S. and NATO troops... the Soviet conscript army of roughly one hundred thousand was forced to fight in many areas (for example, the Panjsher, Shomali Plain, Taloqan, Jalalabad, Kabul environs, Herat) where the United States and its allies do not fight today..."​

As Maj. Gen. Robert "Abe" Abrams said in a US Department of Defense News Briefing held on 13 March 2013:

"In the contentious districts of R.C. South, Zhari, Panjwayi and Maiwand, today you see a blanket of Afghan flags flying over the compounds of a people that are confident in the capacity and capability of their security forces. The ANSF are becoming increasingly independent... They continue to develop an air mobile capacity through the Afghan Kandahar Air Wing that is capable of conducting limited offensive and sustainment operations, and with an intelligence fusion capability, enabled by an extremely broad and deep human intel-gathering network... For example, there are over 300 counter-IED awareness instructors spread across the Afghan national security forces here, training front-line soldiers and police officers basic action upon observation and location of IEDs. The Afghan forces found and cleared rate has dramatically improved as a result over the last two years to almost 70 percent consistently.

In June of 2012, there were eight ANSF EOD teams validated for independent operations. Today, there are 38 total validated across their force. Fire support and artillery integration is an important part of ANSF development. They have 21 of 32 of their D-30 howitzer sections manned and certified; 11 of those 21 were certified in the last three months. Recently, one of those sections had their first successful fire mission in support of Afghan troops in contact, an incredible confidence-builder for the ANA and an equal demoralizer for the enemy.

The ANSF are adequately manned, and we have three U.S. security force assistance brigades here that provide 83 advisory teams across all the pillars, man-to-man coverage, as I call it, at every kandak (army unit) or battalion level and all the brigade headquarters..."​

Please have a look at the sources provided and we hope you will enjoy watching the videos and reading the articles provided, as you grow in your knowledge base on the fundamentals of warfare. Beyond my gratitude to the usual countries (eg. Australia, Brunei, Germany, India, Thailand, Taiwan, United States and New Zealand) that host training facilities for the conduct of annual exercises for the Singaporean Army, as a Singaporean, I am also really grateful that the US Army Pacific has sent combat veterans, who served in Afghanistan (for training exercises like Ex. Lightning Strike and Ex. Tiger Balm, with the links to pictures provided), to help our conscript army refine the level of proficiency in small arms tactics.
 
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Lt. Fred

New Member
If you shared with us the sources that you use to inform your opinion/question, we then have at least some basis to provide some pointers to help inform your attempt to join the discussion.
I have to admit that I have no real idea why this is the case, in any rigorous sense. That is to say, why soldiers are so much more likely to be wounded then killed. It also seems like an extremely hard question to answer.

From a brief look at some of the literature (Death and Injury Rates of U.S. Military Personnel in Iraq from Military Medicine, 2010) the facts seem fairly conclusive. To quote the abstract:

... a greater proportion of troops wounded in Iraq survive their wounds. Before the surge in troop levels that began in early 2007, the survival rate was 90.4% in Iraq as compared to 86.5% in Vietnam.
I've also read another semi-academic source assign most of the credit for this reduction to improved medical procedure (Casualties of war- Military Care for the Wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan in New England Journal of Medicine, 2004). Well, that seems a fair enough conclusion, but I think it deserves a little more study!

There are a few reasonable explanations for why wounded/dead casualty ratios are way higher in 2003 than in 1969.

  • The Viet Cong/NVA were better at fighting than the Iraqi insurgents, so they were more likely to kill Americans
  • The US army had learnt from its mistakes in Vietnam and therefore fought more effectively. There were better trained junior commissioned officers or SOP was superior, or something like that.
  • The M4, SAW et al is better than the M16, M60 et al. The 2003 American kit was better than the 1969 American kit.
  • Americans spent more time in tanks than on foot
  • Better body armour reduced the number of dead Americans but increased the percentage of wounded ones
  • Better medical care did the same thing
  • The type of fighting was more likely to result in injuries and less likely to result in deaths

Why does this matter? Partly just because it's interesting, and I like to apply ideas from economics to other areas of life. But it also has a practical purpose. Imagine you run a somewhat effective third world army that has an extra billion to work with. What do you spend it on: better training, better guns, better doctors, or armour? That would also help you work out the best kind of medical care to provide to your soldiers.

I think the last explanation isn't good. Compare the Second Fallujah and Hue, which were reasonably similar in the sense that they were fought in big cities against a determined foe fighting from house-to-house and not launching hit and run raids (admittedly, there is one major difference in that a lot more of the casualties were caused by booby traps, not gunfire, in Fallujah).

The wounded/dead rate in Fallujah is 5.8
The wounded/dead ratio in Hue is 7.33

There were actually more people killed per wounded in Fallujah! I wasn't expecting that! Though it is possible that this is because the definition of wounded is broader now. Obviously there were much fewer casualties overall, also. It's also a back-of-the-envelope calculation, so it's very far from academic.

It's almost certainly a bit of everything. But how much of a bit? How the hell do you work this out? Has anyone tried? I've had a look, and I can't see that anyone has, in a public journal. Maybe this sort of stuff is classified? I'll try to do some more research and see, and come back with a future post.




NB: I apologise for being brief and non-academic in the previous post. I am a newbie, I'm still learning and I beg indulgence.

Edit to add: thankyou for all those links! That was extremely generous of you, and I've waded my way through most of them (I'll probably try to watch that medical one in a break tomorrow, though I often don't like TV documentaries). Once again, thankyou so much for being considerate to the new guy.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
NB: I apologise for being brief and non-academic in the previous post. I am a newbie, I'm still learning and I beg indulgence.
As my fellow Australian moderators would say, no worries mate. I intervened in this thread not because of what you posted. Rather, we as members of the Mod Team often try to steer some promising threads not only to raise the bar of discussion, but to encourage further thinking.

With regard to specific battles in the Vietnam War, like the battle Khe Sanh, there is a pinned thread that discusses a part of it, here. The examples discussed are full scale conventional battles in jungle terrain (that is quite unlike the insurgencies in Iraq).

Please note that we welcome all, including laypersons and current or former military/industry professionals. Our forum focus is not primarily academic (we are much less stringent), unlike the professionally focused Small Wars Council (i.e. the forum portion of the Small Wars Journal - I am a big fan of SWJ). Our goal, as Moderators is to encourage discussion; but heated discussion can lead to conflict. One method used by the Mod Team to manage, is to encourage the provision of sources, as it tends to lead to better discussions and cause less fiction among members in the thread.

Edit to add: thankyou for all those links! That was extremely generous of you, and I've waded my way through most of them (I'll probably try to watch that medical one in a break tomorrow, though I often don't like TV documentaries). Once again, thankyou so much for being considerate to the new guy.
It's my pleasure to interact with a member who reads not only the posts but the links. Your effort is noted and appreciated by members of the Mod Team.

One important change on the battlefield that we have not discuss thus far is the development of modern body armour (with SAPI or ceramic plate inserts that are designed to stop rounds from the AKM). Modern body armour (especially those meeting or exceeding NJI type III or IV standards) is not of the same effectiveness of the flack jackets of the Vietnam era. We note that there is also a change in the effectiveness of helmets. The 2002 issued Advanced Combat Helmet is only designed to stop 9mm rounds but the new Enhanced Combat Helmet being tested is designed to stop 7.62 mm rifle rounds, not just 9 mm (see 'Sgt. Daniels’ Miraculous Helmet & The Body Armor Revolution' for details).

I have to admit that I have no real idea why this is the case, in any rigorous sense. That is to say, why soldiers are so much more likely to be wounded then killed. It also seems like an extremely hard question to answer.
Atul Gawande, M.D in his 2004 article, 'Casualties of War — Military Care for the Wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan' noted:

"U.S. homicide rates, for example, have dropped in recent years to levels unseen since the mid-1960s. Yet aggravated assaults, particularly with firearms, have more than tripled during that period. The difference appears to be our trauma care system: mortality from gun assaults has fallen from 16 percent in 1964 to 5 percent today.

We have seen a similar evolution in war. Though firepower has increased, lethality has decreased. In World War II, 30 percent of the Americans injured in combat died. In Vietnam, the proportion dropped to 24 percent. In the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, about 10 percent of those injured have died. At least as many U.S. soldiers have been injured in combat in this war as in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, or the first five years of the Vietnam conflict, from 1961 through 1965 (see table). This can no longer be described as a small or contained conflict. But a far larger proportion of soldiers are surviving their injuries

It is too early to make a definitive pronouncement that medical care is responsible for this difference. With the war ongoing and still intense, data on the severity of injuries, the care provided, and the outcomes are necessarily fragmentary. But from the data made available for this report and discussions with surgical teams that have returned home, a suggestive picture has emerged. It depicts a military medical system that has made fundamental — and apparently effective — changes in the strategies and systems of battle care, even since the Persian Gulf War."​

Cheers and enjoy posting.
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Just to add.

The last few Land Warfare Conferences I've attended have had specialist discussions which were focused on advances made in recent years on treating and recovering soldiers in the field.

One included a session run by a Dr out of Walter Reed who discussed the advances in bionics as well as smaller issues such as the changes to triage in the field were using a special gauze elevated recovery opportunity by close to 150%

truly some fascinating capability exists....
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Just to add.

The last few Land Warfare Conferences I've attended have had specialist discussions which were focused on advances made in recent years on treating and recovering soldiers in the field.

One included a session run by a Dr out of Walter Reed who discussed the advances in bionics as well as smaller issues such as the changes to triage in the field were using a special gauze elevated recovery opportunity by close to 150%

truly some fascinating capability exists....
GF, do you remember the name of the special gauze, or what type it was? I ask because on the civilian EMS/trauma side of things there are a number of developments which have either been added to the protocols or are being considered for addition.

Some of them, like tourniquets had been a part of the first aid or emergency medicine years (like decades) ago but had been removed because the improper use was found to cause more harm than good. However with the creation of products like the Combat Application Tourniquet and the use of it and similar sorts of devices by the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the resulting medical science, the use of tourniquets has re-entered first aid training and emergency medicine. It is likely this knowledge and application, along with the experience military doctors and staff have gained treating treating wounded soldiers and Marines and then either retained as they became civilians or shared with their civilian counterparts which helped save so many traumatic amputation victims after the Boston Marathon bombing.

One of the other areas where companies are pushing for additions to medical protocols is to allow the use of or at least trials for blotting agents or clotting sponges or gauze like this. The idea being that with the use of occlusive agents, arterial or deep venous bleeds can be quickly stopped before the traumatic injury patient can exanguinate. This is again based off medical technologies and devices developed for use by military combat medics and naval corpsmans, which have also started to be fielded by tactical medics that are attached to or part of law enforcement SWAT or Emergency Response/Hostage Rescue teams.

-Cheers
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
GF, do you remember the name of the special gauze, or what type it was? I ask because on the civilian EMS/trauma side of things there are a number of developments which have either been added to the protocols or are being considered for addition.
Its not in the session notes, so I'll have to see if there is a reference within the Conf Vids

just have to see if I can hunt down any conf vids

I vaguely recall that it had something to do with lowering rejection rates under high trauma triage
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I remember reading somewhere that the US was sending surgical teams into the field in Iraq to stabilise the wounded before evacuation. I cannot remember the stats referenced but basically soldiers were surviving and even making full recovers from what would have been fatal injuries in previous wars.

On the firearms side of things , 5.56mm rifles have been / are being replaced by 5.56mm carbines in many militaries while 7.62x51mm Battle Rifles, DMRs and Minimis (Maximi), in addition to grenade launchers of various types and other new weapons are being deployed to supplement them at section and platoon level. This could actually make the replacement of 5.56 carbines with an intermediate calibre PDW, smaller, lighter weapons more effective out to 300m than a short barrelled 5.56mm, a reasonable proposition. FN, H&K and Knight's Armaments have been pushing intermediate calibre PDWs as a suitable replacement for 5.56mm carbines in military service for a few years now, maybe it is time?
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
GF, do you remember the name of the special gauze, or what type it was? I ask because on the civilian EMS/trauma side of things there are a number of developments which have either been added to the protocols or are being considered for addition.
I'd imagine it would be the QuikClot hemostatic guaze. Much better than the old style rigid hemostatic bandages that really did more harm than good.
 

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
There are a few reasonable explanations for why wounded/dead casualty ratios are way higher in 2003 than in 1969.

  • The Viet Cong/NVA were better at fighting than the Iraqi insurgents, so they were more likely to kill Americans
  • The US army had learnt from its mistakes in Vietnam and therefore fought more effectively. There were better trained junior commissioned officers or SOP was superior, or something like that.
  • The M4, SAW et al is better than the M16, M60 et al. The 2003 American kit was better than the 1969 American kit.
  • Americans spent more time in tanks than on foot
  • Better body armour reduced the number of dead Americans but increased the percentage of wounded ones
  • Better medical care did the same thing
  • The type of fighting was more likely to result in injuries and less likely to result in deaths
This list reduces the death/wounded ratio to individual issues and fails to take into account the hugely different operational nature and level of intensity of the two wars. The standard enemy unit in Iraq was a cell (2-5 combatants) and in VietNam was a company (80-100 combatants). In Iraq the insurgents only ever overran one or two coalition units (no more than fire team level) yet in VietNam significant numbers of sections, platoons and even companies were overrun by the enemy. The combat power of Iraqi insurgents was based around IEDs jet the VietNamese deployed everything up to massed mortars and HMGs inside South VietNam in what was considered an insurgency. These are strong reasons why the Vietnamese were able to cause more deaths because their attacks were more catastrophic.
 

My2Cents

Active Member
I think the last explanation isn't good. Compare the Second Fallujah and Hue, which were reasonably similar in the sense that they were fought in big cities against a determined foe fighting from house-to-house and not launching hit and run raids (admittedly, there is one major difference in that a lot more of the casualties were caused by booby traps, not gunfire, in Fallujah).

The wounded/dead rate in Fallujah is 5.8
The wounded/dead ratio in Hue is 7.33

There were actually more people killed per wounded in Fallujah! I wasn't expecting that! Though it is possible that this is because the definition of wounded is broader now. Obviously there were much fewer casualties overall, also. It's also a back-of-the-envelope calculation, so it's very far from academic.

It's almost certainly a bit of everything. But how much of a bit? How the hell do you work this out? Has anyone tried? I've had a look, and I can't see that anyone has, in a public journal. Maybe this sort of stuff is classified? I'll try to do some more research and see, and come back with a future post.
I suspect what you are seeing is the effect of better body armor. This would convert the majority of torso hits to unreported bruising.

http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/publications/2579/DSTO-TN-0510.pdf
 

Juice

New Member
Also, advanced trauma facilities, for example at Camp Bastion in Afghan are now capable of saving tier three casualties who wouldn't have had a chance in the Vietnam era. Battlefield medicine has made far greater strides since Vietnam than small arms or body armor. CASEVAC these days is also excellent.
 

HTV-3X

New Member
I dont think PDWs are the answer for an infantryman. Im not in the military, and not an defense expert. But, I have talked to numerous current/former combat vets and like to think I know more than the average person about firearms. Though by far that knowledge is largely in the realm of long range bolt action rifles as that is what is the most enjoyable area in my opinion as far as actual shooting. Id have to agree that as far as conventional forces, MGs, mortars, artillery, etc is doing the majority of the killing. You are the expert after all. However, to purposefully handicap the soldier with a weapon that they cant reasonably be expected to hit a target farther than 200 yards away is unnecessary. For a team of doorkickers, sure. Though it works there because mainly theyre going to drop in, kick their door down, and put 20 rounds into the face of their target(s) from 5 feet. A fully-automatic .22LR would work just as well, reliability of rimfire primers notwithstanding.

From what Ive seen, the MP7 has largely already been put into widespread use by the various high-speed units of our military. And for their specific purpose, it fits perfectly. Another role I think the MP7 would work great in is with tank crews, pilots, etc. Personally, Id rather have a Mk. 18 CQBR for room clearing, but thats moreso because I just about know the AR15 platform inside and out. However, I did get a chance to shoot a PS90 16" carbine and at 300 yards on steel plates with 40gr V-Max, it was barely audible and not impressive in my opinion. I have seen the ballistic gel tests, and they were impressive, but after 150yd or so, its going to be a downgrade.

And yes, traditionally, infantry units really never got many kills or hits period beyond 200 yards give or take. As that is getting right up close to the MPBR of the round. But from what Ive seen and heard from conversations with vets, insurgents in Afghanistan for the most part know the capabilities of their weapons very well. They pretty much never come closer than 600 yards, usually more so around 800-1200 yards if the terrain allows. And although, for the insurgents, hits are obviously quite sporadic at that range, even with the PKM; if we handicap our troops with PDWs that have, at best, the accurate range of a 7.62x39 AK, our hits will also be just as sporadic. Sure, 600-700 yards is about as far as a capable marksmen can reliably make hits with a 18-20" AR and 77gr MatchKings, but they may as well not even waste the ammo if armed with a PDW and shooting at that distance or greater. Atleast with the 5.56, they can send rounds down range, have a much higher probability of connecting, and if they do connect have a much higher probability of incapacitating the target. At that distance, a PDW round will be well below transonic and tumbling/keyholing wildly making hits nothing but luck.
 
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