Worst Commanders in History

[LancerMc]

Powell new the writing was on the wall and he left before President Bush would have to fire him.

Though its not to say the its seem others in the Bush Administration were trying to force him out.

I was disappointed to see him go, though I wish he would run for President in 2008, but thats for a different forum.

 

[radiosilence]

If you had read on you would have seen:



Powell had no intention of staying, he quit. If you want to believe the political semantics of the Bush administration's attempt to save face then be my guest... I won't be so gullible.

The caller was not President Bush but Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and he got right to the point."The president would like to make a change

If this ^ is not firing someone you tell me what is?


The point of the matter is he was ask to step down, hence he was purged. Btw here is another quote just a little below the one you are using.

Senior Powell aides were convinced that the secretary anticipated an invitation to stay, and they were equally certain that he intended to accept

 

[FutureTank]

Zhukov was a highly successful commander and was "purged" as you put it after the war by Stalin. So in actuality it is "logical" that Stalin would do so.

No, Zhukov was purged before the war. The order of execution was never carried out. Not all successful commanders were a threat to Stalin. All ambitious or those perceived as disloyal were.

Was Powell actually "purged" or did he quit from disgust with an administration that he saw as "untruthful"? I think Powell's military record did have something to do with his decision to leave, .......It makes one think he saw the current conudrum that far back and maybe even beyond.

Powell was an election choice, a successful black military officer. He was not of the inner circle of the Republican Party, and look where they put him...the State Department! The DoD and the State are often in a greater conflict with each other then with enemies of US! Can anyone imagine what it was like for an ex-general to 'command' the State Department?!

Don't forget Senate and Congressional races and failed presidential bids.

Yes, and there is a reason so few were elected. Most of Soviet citizens were just as disinterested in the Communist Party in 1941. The Party membership was miniscule as a proportion of the population, and not all officers were in the party, even in senior ranks.

Is the Soviet leadership responsible for Hitler's bad decisions ???

Yes

Was the Soviet military command responsible for the civilians who worked endlessly east of the Urals to produce the T-34 in large numbers?

Yes

Did the Soviet military command value life like those in their western counterparts ?

Yes

....by throwing wave after wave of human attacks like it was WWI all over again?

It seems to me that this is a very general statement. Exactly how many instances of these 'wave' attacks were there? Oh , and I would like to remind you that war did not change much since 1918 by 1941. It may have strategically through use of tanks and aircraft, but on the tactical level in infantry vs infantry combat there was not much change.

There is a reason less emphasis is placed on the Soviet command and for good reason. History has a way of actually being intepretted correctly.

Ah yes, Soviet commanders were uneducated and lacked discipline. They shared this with their troops. They loved to throw away lives. Russian tankers were slaughtered in their hundreds by single Panther and Tiger tanks. german infantry was super-trained and always prevailed in combat. German operational methods were superior. German weapons were superior.
They just lost.
It doesn't work like that.
Firstly expereince is best education. What a soldier learns in one week of combat takes a year to teach in peacetime.
Significant numbers of Soviet troops had seen combat in Civil War, Spain, against Poland, Finland and Japan. Soviet and German officers trained together in the 20s and 30s. Soviets read widely, and had a doctrine not dissimilar to Germany's. they had bette weapons because they were often simpler to manufacture. They understood tat modern war was not won on tactical level but at the operational and strategic level.
On a tactical level after summer of 1942 the quality of Soviet tactics begins to improve, and by Spring of 1943 they are very much the equals of Germans (who had lost a significant number of the veteerans of Poland and France by then). In 1944 Soviet casualties declined by over 200% compared to 1941, while German casualties easily equalled those of 1942. In the last 6 months of the war Germany was in a similar position to USSR in 1941. Sure there were Allies in France, but they were the least of their worries. In 1944 Hitler purged his officers. The society had been purged long ago. Factories were churning like never before under Speer. So what happened?

Please don't give me a history lesson.
On average officers serving in the Red Army were no less able then their German counterparts. Intelligence is rather evenly spread. Besides the bullet is not so clever as to kill only the stupid on either side. No officer WANTS to kill their troops because they constitute the source of his authority as an officer! War is hell as they say, and sometimes there is no way out but to just attack and hope for the best. No one wants to get killed. Many Germans got killed regardless of their uber-soldaten. Were they individually bad on the day of their death? they just died because their officers failed to provide for every contingency, or they only prepared their positions for mortar fire and not 152mm how., or they run out of ammo, or their own aircraft stafed them by mistake, or any number of things that happen in combat without respect for expereince, rank or nationality.

Cheers
greg

 

[FutureTank]

Yes, I would agree that Powell saw it coming. He is actually a very astute man and did not make it to his post by accident of fate. He was convinced to join the Administration, but found work at the State very different to Pentagon. It was a clash of culture, and this was on top of the culture of Bush's Republicanism. I think Powell would have quit if he wasn't pushed as he says in his book, but it speaks volumes of the man that he lasted the whole first term. Certainly one of the best American leaders serving possibly one of the worst American Presidents.
Irony

 

[merocaine]

The Russian military's preformance in WW2 is a wierd subject a strange mixture of heroism, stupidity, and cold realism. No other army should the same capasity to absorb punishment and keep on going. Althought the first years fighting showed up the glaring short commings of the Sov armed forces, they learned fast, and by the end of the confilct surpassed the Germans as the most skilled proponents of manouver warfare on the planet.
They had there fair share of dud commanders at the start of the conflict, but by the end of the war, they were a match for the best of the Germans.



The lessons of world war 2 are still with the armys of today, the British and Americans still belive in super heavy tanks, and domination of the air as the path to victory, as they did in the 40's. The Russian's in smaller fast tanks and overwhelming numbers. This still seems to be the basis of most debates on this forum.

 

[FutureTank]

I would like to note that neither Afghanistan, nor Chechnya produced significant command failures in the eyes of either Soviet or Russian commentators, and General Lebed from 14th Army in Dnestria actually became a popular political figure.
This is an interesting transition in command quality assessment that may be worth further study and correlation with expereince of other states like the French for example, or the Israelis.

 

[Big-E]

No, Zhukov was purged before the war. The order of execution was never carried out. Not all successful commanders were a threat to Stalin. All ambitious or those perceived as disloyal were.

I was speaking of his dismissal after the war... he was dismissed due to his threat to Stalin. The fact that Stalin did it earlier is just another example of that.

Powell was an election choice, a successful black military officer. He was not of the inner circle of the Republican Party, and look where they put him...the State Department! The DoD and the State are often in a greater conflict with each other then with enemies of US! Can anyone imagine what it was like for an ex-general to 'command' the State Department?!

I have always been an admirer of the man. I thought he was a rather well balanced SECSTATE. His decision to leave was defintely a loss to the administration and it's credability to the public. Bush knew that when he was busy trying to justify the faulty intel. The reason the world bought the story was for one reason, Powell delivered it to the UN. Without the man's credability Bush didn't have a leg to stand on. His dismissal was a matter of semantics. It was clear he was leaving and it was played in the press that Bush was disatisfied when in fact Powell was the one who was disatisfied with the way he was used in the UN.

Yes, and there is a reason so few were elected. Most of Soviet citizens were just as disinterested in the Communist Party in 1941. The Party membership was miniscule as a proportion of the population, and not all officers were in the party, even in senior ranks.

Well you did say they had an aversion to politics, deciding to run and actually winning isn't really that different. You don't run to lose, you run to win. As far as joining the party it had not to do with being political, it had to do with survival. To be honest you would have to be stupid not to join the party given the advantages if you where given the opportunity to join. It was the only way to protect your position in that society.

Yes

Wow, I didn't know Soviet command had a mind control device that told Hitler to be a dumbass.
Yes

So it was Soviet command that saved those factories from Hitlers lack of long range bombers.

Yes

The battle of Rzhev 1942,

"The whole terrain was brown with the overcoats of advancing Russian soldiers..We lay between smouldering piles of rubble and our officer gave orders that we were to hold our fire until the enemy was within 20 meters. We did and when we finally opened up the Russians fell in rows, piling up into a great heap of dead. Most of that first-wave had come forward without weapons - cannon fodder - to use up our ammunition. THe 2nd wave was like the first except that a few more of them had rifles. We shot them all down. Then came the 3rd, 4th and 5th waves...."

Page 79, Das Reich by James Lucas (Cassell Paperbacks 2004)

The Battle of Psel,

"The Totenkopf made a night-time raid to seize a key hill above the Psel but it was driven back. The Soviets kept up their pressure on the right flank of Hausser's corps, sending repeated human-wave attacks against the 167th Infantry Division that had just relieved the Totenkopf. Thousands of Russian infantrymen, many of them press-ganged civilians, were mown down by well-aimed artillery fire that was called down within a few hundred metres of the German frontline."

Page 55, Great Battles of the Waffen SS by Peter Darman, Grange Books 2004
[/QUOTE]

I would like to remind you that war did not change much since 1918 by 1941. It may have strategically through use of tanks and aircraft, but on the tactical level in infantry vs infantry combat there was not much change.

I agree that for all other nations it did change, but not for many of the Soviet officers from WWI. The purges of Stalin left the ranks filled with old political allies in command who were unwilling to adapt to the ideas of blitzkrieg and the proper use of motorized divisions. Many commanders would have infantry advance without the T-34s and rather do it in seperate waves rather than having infantry support the tank and vice versa. It is these commanders that are responsible for actions like that mentioned from Das Reich. These commanders who fought under the Tsar never could get over the mentality of cannon fodder. It was part of their doctrine.

Ah yes, Soviet commanders were uneducated and lacked discipline. They shared this with their troops. They loved to throw away lives. Russian tankers were slaughtered in their hundreds by single Panther and Tiger tanks.

Yes they were...

"Almost like clockwork, at 0630 hours, bothe Leibstandarte panzers and the Soviet XXIX tank corps were waved forward by their commanders.....Some 60 tanks - a whole brigade of Soviet XXIX tank corps - were heading straight for them....At the extreme limit of their range - the 50 or so Waffen SS tanks started ti pick-off the Soviet tanks. Romistrov had briefed his commanders not to stop to trade fire with the Germans but to charge at full speed to make it more difficult to hit and to allow them to get into a position to hit the enemy tanks at close quarters on their more vulnerable side armour. The charge of the T-34s were a death ride. The Russian crews followed their orders to the letter, but by 090 hours the steppe was littered with burning hulks. The Leibstandarte tank crews had destroyed their enemy for almost no loss thanks to their long range gunnery skills. "

Page 62... ibid

Please don't give me a history lesson.

If you don't want one don't give one.

On average officers serving in the Red Army were no less able then their German counterparts. Intelligence is rather evenly spread. Besides the bullet is not so clever as to kill only the stupid on either side. No officer WANTS to kill their troops because they constitute the source of his authority as an officer! War is hell as they say, and sometimes there is no way out but to just attack and hope for the best. No one wants to get killed. Many Germans got killed regardless of their uber-soldaten. Were they individually bad on the day of their death? they just died because their officers failed to provide for every contingency, or they only prepared their positions for mortar fire and not 152mm how., or they run out of ammo, or their own aircraft stafed them by mistake, or any number of things that happen in combat without respect for expereince, rank or nationality.

If you want to know who had the best whatever then base it on casualty figures. I know it is rather simplistic, but hey, it really is that simple. And looking at CCCP figures compared to the Third Reich it is clear. It is also important to note that the Soviets were only fighting in the west, Germany was all over the place. If Hitler had no other commitments Moscow would have fallen.

 

[eckherl]

Not bucking for early promotion by extra messages, but felt this was on subject but to be kept separate.

Has anyone assessed Iraqi commanders during 2003 war?
It seems to me the performance of Iraq's military was not in accordance with Soviet doctrine, and neither was their use of the systems they purchased (which by the way included West European systems also).

I also note that the requisite for holding a high echelon command in the Iraqi Army required loyalty to Party and Saddam personally rather then military skill. While loyalty to party was also required in the Soviet Union, the vast majority of its officers and NCOs were in the service because they wanted to be. Ironically there was less influence of the party in the forces because performance was usually assessed on technical ability. Besides there was a long history of conflict between the party and the military in USSR.

Has anyone made a study of appointments in the US military based on party membership? When I was in Washington at a fairly prominent gathering, a majority of the officers there were very hopefull of the Republican victory the next day. That was November 8, 2000.

I posted somewhere in a thread on what makes a great commander a number of criteria. It seems I forgot to add party loyalty

Cheers
Greg

Look - I do not know if we conducted any studies on Iraqi officers, even though they tried to use Soviet tactics on the ground they failed, it was just not the issue of them not knowing how to use their equipment, we also controlled the skies and airwaves and that also helped in their demise, if we went to war with Russia there isn`t anybody with in the Armor branch that feels we would have a cake walk, we would have to fight for the skies, land and sea, then for boot throw in electronic warefare. General Powell was a soldiers General, I have met him and have the outmost respect for this man and his abilities. I don`t know what you have against my military and I really don`t care, if officers have political ambitions so be it, in this country they have that right, people on this forum put in their viewpoints and you seem not to like it, or think we are all full of crap, you have said some things that I really could challenge you on but I would rather discuss it in a rather polite manner with you and everyone else who wants to join in.

 

[FutureTank]

I don`t know what you have against my military and I really don`t care, if officers have political ambitions so be it, in this country they have that right

I think my problem with the US DoD is that they let politicians make dumb decisions. It seems that in a democracy a military professional should be able to have the public forum just like a medical professional. If a scientist can come out and say smoking is bad for the country, the general should also have this ability. This doesn't seem to happen in US. Nor are there that many military professionals in 'seats' of national political decision-making influence, or even in state politics. There was one in Bush Administration, but was used as a politica pawn.

As I see it, all societies have conflicts going on at any one time, they are just different in kind. There are environmental, societal, political, economic and military conflicts. I am not singling USA intentianally, but only because Powell came up in the conversation. However there used to be an expression "commanders of industry". Now they are often chairmans of the board, or faceless industry lobbies. The environmental concerns are well represented and visible, and every sort of social concern is very well represented these days in democracies. However when one thinks of representation of military scape, only the military industry comes up.

It seems to me that a quality of a great commander is also about interpreting defence policy to the population, but this seems to be a taboo.

Other then that I think the US design and procurement process is rather slow and bloated to benefit manufacturers first, and troops later. I suspect this is also a political rather then military's problem.
I could be wrong of course.

 

[FutureTank]

The purges of Stalin left the ranks filled with old political allies in command who were unwilling to adapt to the ideas of blitzkrieg and the proper use of motorized divisions..... Many commanders would have infantry advance without the T-34s and rather do it in separate waves rather than having infantry support the tank and vice versa..

I think I made the point that the purge of 1937 was not based on military ability, and not all able military officers were threatened by it.
Looking at the organization of the RKKA in 1941 it is easily seen that the reorganization belatedly WAS following on the ideas of Triandifillov and Tuchachevsky's groups, and the field manuals available emphasize integration of combined arms. The TO&Es are available and can be seen to be as complex, if not more so, as the German formation structures.
However losses early in the war and their replacement with reservists and civilian 'managers' created a temporary doctrine vacuum.

If you want to know who had the best whatever then base it on casualty figures. I know it is rather simplistic, but hey, it really is that simple. And looking at CCCP figures compared to the Third Reich it is clear. It is also important to note that the Soviets were only fighting in the west, Germany was all over the place. If Hitler had no other commitments Moscow would have fallen.

I do think its simplistic as a measure of command ability.
However, if you choose to go down that path, please consider the following points.
1. The German accounting used for casualties. All Jews, communists and suspected partisans were considered enemy combatants, and added to casualty lists.
2. RKKA was on offensive from day one of the war, conducting a fighting retreat for 6 months, and then an offensive which lasted until May 1945 in Europe, and later an offensive against the Japanese in August 1945. Any force which is on the offensive is expected to sustain greater casualties. It seems to me the offensive against Japanese easily compares with the German effort against the Commonwealth troops in North Africa. Please consider the nature of combat on Germany's Eastern and Western theatres. From 1941 Soviet offensives were conducted as FRONT 'wave' in the sense that as one ended, another begun down the front, so they were continuous (or at least that was the desired effect).
3. In 1941 Rommel had a total of two German panzer divisions, both converted from infantry divisions by the addition of two tank battalions to each. Given German logistic difficulties on the Eastern Front in winter, and nature of combat around Moscow, I don't think they would have significantly contributed to German operations. I'll say nothing of Italians.
Of course there were other German troops all over the place, but they were there because of decisions made well before the war with USSR. IF Hitler had attacked USSR in 1939 rather then going West, would he have succeeded? It seems an interesting thread on its own.
4. I have come to disregard anything that comes from memoirs written by SS just as I disregard anything written by Communist party workers who claim brave communists killing Germans by the hundreds in a clever ambush.
I also think its inappropriate to discuss WW2 tactics in this thread, so will focus on the one commander mentioned

Rotmistrov was and experienced and over all successful tank commander. The particular tactic he tried to use probably was the only one available in the circumstances. It may seem like a charge to the grave for us now, what with 1000hp+ engines, stabilized guns and all sorts of gadgets available to crews, but in 1943, over open terrain, with effective gun range of a few hundred metres there is little one can do. I remind tankers here that they are descendants of cavalry, and should remember that cavalry were known to make charges in their time which left regiments with empty ranks and horses with blood covered saddles. No one should think that Rotmistrov was having a stupid moment. Nor should this description of a 'slaughter' be taken without larger context. He commanded the 5th Tank Army with hundreds to tanks. He also had air units under direct support. The engagement described is a small part of the overall operation by the Army (within the Front operations) that lasted under an hour. However at Poniry the German position was turned and forced German offensive to halt (and what were they doing waiting for Soviet tanks to attack?). In 1944 Rotmistrov was promoted to Marshal of tank troops.
Now consider this. Imagine if in 1991 the Iraqi Army chose to attack the Allies without knowing that its tank park is made up of M1s and Challengers (air component aside)? And once they discovered the M1s, what would you do in their place? It seems to me this is typical of German commentary on the Eastern Front of selective tactical description, focusing on the successes. Most all armies engage in this exercise, so I try not to get too much into 'Wehrmacht worship'.
It sems to me defining good command also has to do with the commander being able to make hard decisions.

 

[FutureTank]

Big-E

"Wow, I didn't know Soviet command had a mind control device that told Hitler to be a dumbass."
Not mind control, but this brings to mind another quality of a good commander - the ability to understand how his opponent thinks. Stalin had a very large file on Hitler (revealed only recently). He, and his immediate staff, understood how Hitler thought. It seems that Hitler either didn't understand this, or ignored it. In asense they were eventually able to 'manage' Hitler's decision making. It seems that some senior German officers DID understand this, which is another interesting ability of a good commander.

"So it was Soviet command that saved those factories from Hitlers lack of long range bombers"
Yes. The Soviet command had to think in strategic terms. There was no reason to think that HAD Germany defeated UK, or eveninvaded it, it would notdevelop strategic bombers at a later stage. Factories however are not like bombers, and require relative permanency in their positioning.
Maybe I misunderstood what you meant by your original question?

 

[eckherl]

I think my problem with the US DoD is that they let politicians make dumb decisions. It seems that in a democracy a military professional should be able to have the public forum just like a medical professional. If a scientist can come out and say smoking is bad for the country, the general should also have this ability. This doesn't seem to happen in US. Nor are there that many military professionals in 'seats' of national political decision-making influence, or even in state politics. There was one in Bush Administration, but was used as a politica pawn.

As I see it, all societies have conflicts going on at any one time, they are just different in kind. There are environmental, societal, political, economic and military conflicts. I am not singling USA intentianally, but only because Powell came up in the conversation. However there used to be an expression "commanders of industry". Now they are often chairmans of the board, or faceless industry lobbies. The environmental concerns are well represented and visible, and every sort of social concern is very well represented these days in democracies. However when one thinks of representation of military scape, only the military industry comes up.

It seems to me that a quality of a great commander is also about interpreting defence policy to the population, but this seems to be a taboo.

Other then that I think the US design and procurement process is rather slow and bloated to benefit manufacturers first, and troops later. I suspect this is also a political rather then military's problem.
I could be wrong of course.

I am suspect on why the current administration had given General Powell his position even though I know that he could handle it and did what he could when he wasn`t head butting with Donald Rumsfield who was most likely responsible for Powell leaving. You do not need to tell me about how slow we are implementing new weapons designs, we have been screaming for a new HEP round for our tanks for quite a long time, it`s not like we cannot use it. Please do not think that the Army has a bunch of liars in it, my fellow brothers have it bad enough and they get treated like crap and are expected to put their lives on the line which they are willing to do for their country. Go after the politicians they are the ones who decieved my country.

 

[eckherl]

I think I made the point that the purge of 1937 was not based on military ability, and not all able military officers were threatened by it.
Looking at the organization of the RKKA in 1941 it is easily seen that the reorganization belatedly WAS following on the ideas of Triandifillov and Tuchachevsky's groups, and the field manuals available emphasize integration of combined arms. The TO&Es are available and can be seen to be as complex, if not more so, as the German formation structures.
However losses early in the war and their replacement with reservists and civilian 'managers' created a temporary doctrine vacuum.


I do think its simplistic as a measure of command ability.
However, if you choose to go down that path, please consider the following points.
1. The German accounting used for casualties. All Jews, communists and suspected partisans were considered enemy combatants, and added to casualty lists.
2. RKKA was on offensive from day one of the war, conducting a fighting retreat for 6 months, and then an offensive which lasted until May 1945 in Europe, and later an offensive against the Japanese in August 1945. Any force which is on the offensive is expected to sustain greater casualties. It seems to me the offensive against Japanese easily compares with the German effort against the Commonwealth troops in North Africa. Please consider the nature of combat on Germany's Eastern and Western theatres. From 1941 Soviet offensives were conducted as FRONT 'wave' in the sense that as one ended, another begun down the front, so they were continuous (or at least that was the desired effect).
3. In 1941 Rommel had a total of two German panzer divisions, both converted from infantry divisions by the addition of two tank battalions to each. Given German logistic difficulties on the Eastern Front in winter, and nature of combat around Moscow, I don't think they would have significantly contributed to German operations. I'll say nothing of Italians.
Of course there were other German troops all over the place, but they were there because of decisions made well before the war with USSR. IF Hitler had attacked USSR in 1939 rather then going West, would he have succeeded? It seems an interesting thread on its own.
4. I have come to disregard anything that comes from memoirs written by SS just as I disregard anything written by Communist party workers who claim brave communists killing Germans by the hundreds in a clever ambush.
I also think its inappropriate to discuss WW2 tactics in this thread, so will focus on the one commander mentioned

Rotmistrov was and experienced and over all successful tank commander. The particular tactic he tried to use probably was the only one available in the circumstances. It may seem like a charge to the grave for us now, what with 1000hp+ engines, stabilized guns and all sorts of gadgets available to crews, but in 1943, over open terrain, with effective gun range of a few hundred metres there is little one can do. I remind tankers here that they are descendants of cavalry, and should remember that cavalry were known to make charges in their time which left regiments with empty ranks and horses with blood covered saddles. No one should think that Rotmistrov was having a stupid moment. Nor should this description of a 'slaughter' be taken without larger context. He commanded the 5th Tank Army with hundreds to tanks. He also had air units under direct support. The engagement described is a small part of the overall operation by the Army (within the Front operations) that lasted under an hour. However at Poniry the German position was turned and forced German offensive to halt (and what were they doing waiting for Soviet tanks to attack?). In 1944 Rotmistrov was promoted to Marshal of tank troops.
Now consider this. Imagine if in 1991 the Iraqi Army chose to attack the Allies without knowing that its tank park is made up of M1s and Challengers (air component aside)? And once they discovered the M1s, what would you do in their place? It seems to me this is typical of German commentary on the Eastern Front of selective tactical description, focusing on the successes. Most all armies engage in this exercise, so I try not to get too much into 'Wehrmacht worship'.
It sems to me defining good command also has to do with the commander being able to make hard decisions.

Questions for you - who is Nikolai Yezhov and what were the two nicknames that were given to him.
Who was Nikolai Vasilyevich Krylenko.

 

[FutureTank]

Questions for you - who is Nikolai Yezhov and what were the two nicknames that were given to him. Who was Nikolai Vasilyevich Krylenko.

Considering that you got the names from Wikipedia, why would you want my knowledge? I don't have a lot of knowledge of the purges outside of its effect on my immediate family. Sorry

 

[eckherl]

Considering that you got the names from Wikipedia, why would you want my knowledge? I don't have a lot of knowledge of the purges outside of its effect on my immediate family. Sorry

You will never see me at that site, to much misinformation for me. Sorry Just wanted to get your take on these two.

 

[FutureTank]

Go after the politicians they are the ones who decieved my country.

I'm not in your country, so can hardly influence the outcomes. However it seems to me that the American public needs to be aware of the impact of waging war by political expediency.

The 'Cold' War lasted 70 years, and was inspired by a difference in interpretation of economic theory.

The war on 'Terrorism' is inspired by far more basic and entrenched beliefs that had started some 1300 years ago, and only 'took a break' since decline of the Ottoman Empire 200 years ago (give or take a decade).

The current conflict, if it remains a military conflict, is going to be a very long one.

 

[FutureTank]

Just wanted to get your take on these two.

I'm not sure this is within the thread, but my 'take' is that the 1937-39 purge was not an isolated historical example of elite restructuring in a society following a 'shock'.

Essentially this is a much larger manifistation of the trauma expereince for individuals. People deal with trauma in different ways and so do nations.

Some people deal with trauma by 'structuring' their world. They eliminate any expereince they dislike by misrepresenting its significance to themselves. They also shut out any people around them who do not fit the 'required' role or behaviour in their perception of 'safety'. Trauma victims also change behaviour to justify wants and needs. Some go into austerity mode, while others become reclusive and negligent.

Something similar happened to US as a result of Depression in the late 20s, to Germany about the same time, and to Japan in the 50s, to China following end of Imperial rule, to France in 1780s, etc., etc., etc. Most of the global states are quite trauma-laden, and have been trying to deal with it for centuries.

In many cases there is trauma upon trauma compounding the problems of development and national maturation which leads to external conflicts as much as internal conflicts.

In case of Stalin, we have a case of a personality which was probably denied positive expression in childhood, traumatised in early adulthood, and sought to deal with these by means all too well known now. As it happens Stalin was a 'case' within a 'case' on national scale.

When people 'rate' commanders, the generally fail to do detailed psychological assessment of the individuals in question to see how they became 'bad' or 'great'. Many 'great' commanders had deep-seated personality disorders and suffered from psychological trauma, not least because of their military expereince.
Even considering the everyday concept of stress, military officers expereince way and above what the average manager expereinces. In a job where a decision even if correctly made is likely to cost someone their life, the comparison of not preparing the report for a superior on time just doesn't measure up. Consider the management 'styles' of exacutives after corporate takeover. Consider the number of executives that send their busineses bankrupt or worse go to jail every day.
If commercial activity was reported in military terms the media would be reporting on a major intense combat operations with MAJOR casualty rates.

Alexander the Great is a case in point because he is usually rated as one of the greatest in history, at least of Europe.
However consider this behaviour "The Greeks regarded the gesture as the preserve of deities and believed that Alexander meant to deify himself by requiring it. This cost him much in the sympathies of many of his countrymen. Here, too, a plot against his life was revealed, and one of his officers, Philotas, was executed for treason for failing to bring the plot to his attention. Parmenion, Philotas' father, who had been charged with guarding the treasury at Ecbatana, was assassinated by command of Alexander, who feared that Parmenion might attempt to avenge his son.
Several other trials for treason followed, and many Macedonians were executed. Later on, in a drunken quarrel at Maracanda, he also killed the man who had saved his life at Granicus, Clitus the Black. Later in the Central Asian campaign, a second plot against his life, this one by his own pages, was revealed, and his official historian, Callisthenes of Olynthus (who had fallen out of favor with the king by leading the opposition to his attempt to introduce proskynesis), was implicated on what many historians regard as trumped-up charges. However, the evidence is strong that Callisthenes, the teacher of the pages, must have been the one who persuaded them to assassinate the king." Add to this the need to purue his enemies tirelessly and name cities after hiself. Consider the childhood expereince, and early maturity (in battle at 16), as well as homosexuality.

 

[Big-E]

I think I made the point that the purge of 1937 was not based on military ability, and not all able military officers were threatened by it.

Actually you didn't. When you tried to correct me on Zhukov you only illustrated the point I made that successful officers were a threat and were on his choping block. It is not like Stalin just stopped getting rid of these generals in 37'. He did it before, throughout, and after the war. He just didn't put them to death on a large scale.

Looking at the organization of the RKKA in 1941 it is easily seen that the reorganization belatedly WAS following on the ideas of Triandifillov and Tuchachevsky's groups, and the field manuals available emphasize integration of combined arms. The TO&Es are available and can be seen to be as complex, if not more so, as the German formation structures.
However losses early in the war and their replacement with reservists and civilian 'managers' created a temporary doctrine vacuum.

If that's what the manuals say that doesn't mean command followed. All one has to do is read the reports of human waves reminiscent of the WWI veterans that implemented them. I'm not making this stuff up. But you do illustrate something VERY important to this and is a prime example of wasted lives. As Confucius once said: "To lead untrained men to war is to throw them away." The forced conscription of millions of "untrained" and "unarmed" men did take place during the initial losses which lead to even more unessecary losses down the road.

I do think its simplistic as a measure of command ability.

I suppose but it was also a measure of equipment, training, and tactics which you had sarcasticlally mentioned with: "

german infantry was super-trained and always prevailed in combat. German operational methods were superior. German weapons were superior."

Every other method is so subjective it really isn't worth examining in any certainty. The TRUE casualty figures tell a story amongst themselves.

However, if you choose to go down that path, please consider the following points.
1. The German accounting used for casualties. All Jews, communists and suspected partisans were considered enemy combatants, and added to casualty lists.

Yeah, #1 is rather offensive to my sensibilities. I am not a neo-nazi. I go by strict military casualties, not civilians and especially not by Jewish concentration deaths in my analysis. There where 10,700,000 military casualties of the CCCP during WWII.

2. RKKA was on offensive from day one of the war, conducting a fighting retreat for 6 months, and then an offensive which lasted until May 1945 in Europe, and later an offensive against the Japanese in August 1945. Any force which is on the offensive is expected to sustain greater casualties. It seems to me the offensive against Japanese easily compares with the German effort against the Commonwealth troops in North Africa. Please consider the nature of combat on Germany's Eastern and Western theatres. From 1941 Soviet offensives were conducted as FRONT 'wave' in the sense that as one ended, another begun down the front, so they were continuous (or at least that was the desired effect).

Well that's interesting, mind telling me why casualty rates actually went down towards the end of the war? This posturing is absurd looking at casualty per year. They took much more casualties on the defensive then they did offensively.

3. In 1941 Rommel had a total of two German panzer divisions, both converted from infantry divisions by the addition of two tank battalions to each. Given German logistic difficulties on the Eastern Front in winter, and nature of combat around Moscow, I don't think they would have significantly contributed to German operations. I'll say nothing of Italians.
Of course there were other German troops all over the place, but they were there because of decisions made well before the war with USSR. IF Hitler had attacked USSR in 1939 rather then going West, would he have succeeded? It seems an interesting thread on its own.

If Rommel was there with his Corps, Moscow would have fallen. Not so much from his troops but from the man himself. He was a GENIUS. If Hitler's assasination plot had been succesful it would have been interesting to see what Fuhrer Rommel would have done. There were many more commitments than just North Africa. Garrison and forward deployed forces for invasion were postioned throughout Fortress Europe. If he hadn't wasted the Luftwaffa in the BoB many more air assets would have been available.

4. I have come to disregard anything that comes from memoirs written by SS just as I disregard anything written by Communist party workers who claim brave communists killing Germans by the hundreds in a clever ambush.
I also think its inappropriate to discuss WW2 tactics in this thread, so will focus on the one commander mentioned

How convenient... These books aren't one big love fest of Nazi Germany, they're first hand acounts that have the good as well as the bad. You can see from the wording that respect is paid to loyalty and honor the Soviets displayed on the way to certain death. They were still soldiers fighting a war and there is respect for them and their experiences. If you disregard my war time experiences simply because of my politics you are being rather myopic.

Rotmistrov was and experienced and over all successful tank commander. The particular tactic he tried to use probably was the only one available in the circumstances. It may seem like a charge to the grave for us now, what with 1000hp+ engines, stabilized guns and all sorts of gadgets available to crews, but in 1943, over open terrain, with effective gun range of a few hundred metres there is little one can do. I remind tankers here that they are descendants of cavalry, and should remember that cavalry were known to make charges in their time which left regiments with empty ranks and horses with blood covered saddles. No one should think that Rotmistrov was having a stupid moment. Nor should this description of a 'slaughter' be taken without larger context. He commanded the 5th Tank Army with hundreds to tanks. He also had air units under direct support. The engagement described is a small part of the overall operation by the Army (within the Front operations) that lasted under an hour. However at Poniry the German position was turned and forced German offensive to halt (and what were they doing waiting for Soviet tanks to attack?). In 1944 Rotmistrov was promoted to Marshal of tank troops.

I illustrate the bold... The fact he was promoted simply illustrates the mentallity of the RKKA and their tolerance of human wave tactics.

It seems to me this is typical of German commentary on the Eastern Front of selective tactical description, focusing on the successes. Most all armies engage in this exercise, so I try not to get too much into 'Wehrmacht worship'.
It sems to me defining good command also has to do with the commander being able to make hard decisions.

There are several published works available that illustrate the Eastern Fronts hardships and loss on the German side. It is not suprising that they have stories of utter slaughter as almost 11 million enemy combatents died. It is true I only listed the Soviet examples but their are examples of the Wehrmarcht taking a pounding in these books, especially towards the end of the war. It is one thing to make hard decisions, it is another to waste lives.

 

[Big-E]

Not mind control, but this brings to mind another quality of a good commander - the ability to understand how his opponent thinks. Stalin had a very large file on Hitler (revealed only recently). He, and his immediate staff, understood how Hitler thought. It seems that Hitler either didn't understand this, or ignored it. In asense they were eventually able to 'manage' Hitler's decision making. It seems that some senior German officers DID understand this, which is another interesting ability of a good commander.

Your joking... right? Did you forget the actual invasion? nfloorl:

 

[FutureTank]

Did you forget the actual invasion? nfloorl:

Stalin could not belive that Hitler attacked regardless of being prepared for it. Most German officers (despite wartime and post war propaganda) did not consider Wermacht prepared for war with USSR.