U-214 SSK problems

orko_8

New Member
It seems Brazilians either like risks or trust in Type 214 (translated by google, not of much quality but one can easily get the point what they say):





NAVY OF BRAZIL chooses Submarine U214 Classroom without AIP

Defense @ Net publishes the position of the Navy of referring Brazil to the decision of acquisition of the future classroom of submarines. The chosen model and the reasons of the choice. Also the definition on an controversial point that is the adoption or not of a propulsion system auxiliary (AIP).

A small comparative table on the main differences between the submarines Tupi Classroom (Classroom 209 - IKL 1400) and the futures is presented U214 Classroom.

In attention its message, the Navy of Brazil clarifies:

1) Already the submarine model is defined: Scorpène (France), U212 or U214 (Germany)?

Reply: The selective process adopted by the Navy of Brazil (MB), for the choice of a new submarine: to be acquired by means of construction in the country, it resulted in the election of Project IKL U 214, of the HDW (to see note 1).

In view of the convenlência to prevent the duplicity of logistic costs to support submarines of different origins - what it would occur. fatally. if project of another manufacturer was chosen - and considering the vultosos investments carried through for the Navy " throughout the two last decades, in different conotadas goals to the submarines Tupi Classroom and, more recently, in the construction of the Tikuna, associates to the culture and the technology assimilated in this period for ours technician (engineers and laborers) and crews (official and squares) in relation to the constructive, logisticos processes, of maintenance and operation of these ways, respectively, the MB understood that it would have to keep the standardization of models IKL - HDW, of origin German.
(to see note 2)

2) the chosen model will be equipped with Advanced system of propulsion, as the AlP, in the case of the submarines German?

Reply: The Navy decided for proieto of IKL 214 without AIP. The reasons that had led to such decision are of essentially logistic order. The spite of some undeniable operational advantages presented by the system, that allows to the submerged navigation low the speed, for about ten days, without necessity of atmospheric air, the MB very considsiderou high custos' of attainment, operation and maintenance of this system. taking the one that the reason cost/benefit was not justified.

But to illustrate, the system demand, to each recharge, fifteen tons of liquid oxygen and about two tons hydrogen to 99.9999% of pureness, in the gaseous state, represents. for this gas, volume equivalent the eight truck-tank. Beyond the natural difficulty in the attainment. it would have problems for the transport until the submarine, rank that the hydrogen is considered dangerous load. Also; to transfer the gases of I propagate it of supply for edge; one is necessary

Infrastructure for the recharge of the blisters of storage of submarinoj what it would make impracticable the restocking is of Rio De Janeiro, in the hypothesis to have availability of these gases in other ports. Finally, a sailed nautical mile with AIP costs the equivalent US$ 43 (forty and three dollar); with diesel, US$ 6 (six dollar).


Notes Prohibited @ Net

Note 1 - The company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems was formed with the fusing of the activities of the following shipyards:

Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) Kiel, Blohm + Voss - Hamburg, Nordseewerke - Emden, and the Kockums, Sweden and the Hellenic Shipyards, Greece. As 75% of the actions belong to the German group ThyssenKrupp has activities of management had been assumed by the group, the others 25% belong to the group One Equity Partners (OEP).

Term IKL is the initials of the office of engineering “Ingenieur Kontor Lübeck”, that it projected the classroom of U209 submarine. Term IKL1400 to characterize inside better of more than 63 submarines produced inside of classroom 209 was adopted as standard since years 60 until the moment (2006).

Note 2 -. The attainment of new submarines was enclosed initially in the Program of Reaparelhamento of Marinha (PRM) Revision 1979. From now on the studies for the determination of the type of submarine had been initiated to be acquired, that they had resulted, after evaluation of the existing alternatives, in the election of submarine IKL-209-1400 of German origin, projected for the firm Ingenieur Kontor Lubeck (IKL), as being that one that better took care of in such a way to the desired profile of operation as the planned technological evolution.

In 1982 the Navy signed two contracts technician with Consórcio Ferrostaal/Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) of Germany that foresaw the construction of two identical submarines, the first one in shipyard HDW in Kiel and as in the Armory of Navy of Rio De Janeiro (AMRJ). In 1984, after the conclusion of the referring negotiations to the financial part of contracts, these had become effective, initiating itself thus, in this exactly year the construction of the Tupi submarine (S30) in Germany. Later, in 1985, one third contract for the attainment of more two submarines was signed, that equally would be constructed in the Armory of Navy of Rio De Janeiro, then indicated by the Navy, as the construction shipyard in Brazil. Also the Tikuna (S34) in AM
http://www.defesanet.com.br/zz/mb_u214.htm





Management and Quality - 1/12/2006 10:09

Navy of Brazil confirms option for submarine manufactured in Germany
Representative of the Center of Communication denies insatisfação of Greeks and details the lead nuclear program in Brazil

The quarrel on nuclear submarine IKL-214 started in blog of the journalist Nassif Luis and arrived until the Brazilian Navy. According to the press of Greece, country that acquired four units, the equipment presented primary defects in the tests carried through after the delivery of the first unit. The news article of the Brazil Project entered in contact with the Center of Social Communication of the Navy, that answered in less 24-hour.

It enters the main points of the interview for email with Captain-of-Sea-and-War and Diretor of the CCSM, Pablo Mauricio Farias Alves, prominence for the confirmation of that Brazil intends to acquire the submarine in question. The representative of the Center of communication denied that the Greeks are unsatisfied with the equipment and affirmed that Brazilian military had followed the first tests in Greece.

The director of the CCSM confirms that proposals of French shipyards had been studied, but the Brazilian Navy opted to the manufactured one in Germany, to prevent the duplicity of logistic costs. In the last reply, the representative details the nuclear program lead by the Navy of Brazil, with costs and perspectives. He confers the interview and he comments:

Brazil project: Exists some definition on the purchase of submarines on the part of the Brazilian Navy?

Center of Social Communication of the Navy: In 1982, the MB contracted German trust HDW-FERROSTAAL, for the construction of four submarines of conventional propulsion (diesel-electric). The first one was constructed in Germany, in shipyard HDW (model IKL-209-1400), baptized of Tupi, and the others three, of the same classroom, called Tamoio, Timbira and Tapajó, had been constructed in the AMRJ. Later, in 1995, new contract was signed, adding plus a submarine, the Tikuna. Having finished the construction it Tikuna, imposed it construction of new submarine, duly warned, on the other hand, if to lose a qualification so hardly reached e, for another one, to be without perspective of renewal of the ways.

Considering the convenience to prevent the duplicity of logistic costs, to support submarines of different origins, - what it would occur fatally, if project of another manufacturer was chosen, and considering the vultosos investments carried through for the Navy, throughout the two last decades, in different conotadas goals to the submarines Tupi Classroom and, more recently, in the construction of the Tikuna, associates to the culture and to the technology assimilated in this period for ours technician (engineers and laborers) and crews (official and squares), in relation to the constructive, logistic processes, of maintenance and operation of these ways, respectively, the MB understood that it would have to keep the standardization of models IKL-HDW, German origin.

PB: Which model is in study?

CCSM: Before if deciding for the project of the IKL-214, the HDW, the MB it also studied the project of the Scorpène submarine, of company ARMARIS, France. In the truth, throughout all the process, the MB was negotiating with two alternatives, having, to the end, concluded that the proposal of the HDW was the one that most took care of to its necessities.

PB: Exists some financing approved for this acquisition?

CCSM: In the target of the Program of Reaparelhamento presented for the Navy, specifically how much to the construction and modernization of submarines, it has a proposal, in the Commission of External Financings - COFIEX of the Ministry of the Planning, Budget and Management, of operation of credit with German institutions for the construction of a conventional submarine and the modernization of the five existing ones, of classroom TUPI and TIKUNA, to be done (construction and modernization) in the Armory of Navy in Rio De Janeiro. The financing is offered by ABN AMRO Bank, covered for the safe from credit of the German government “HERMES”.

The construction proposal foresees that the delivery of the submarine will have to be concluded in up to seven years after the signature of the commercial contract. How much to the modernizations, for the first submarine it would have a duration of four years and for the four excessively it would occur, sequentially, in two years, for each one.

PB: The U-214 model, manufactured in Germany, presented serious problems and therefore, according to the local press, was denied by the Navy of Greece. The Navy of Brazil has knowledge on some of these defects?

CCSM: Greece contracted, next to the HDW, the construction of four submarines IKL-214, having been first one, the HN Papanikolis, constructed in the shipyards of the HDW, in Kiel, Germany, while the others three will have to be constructed in the shipyard of Skaramanga, in Greece. Regarding to the alluded problems technician, the official information received by the Navy of Brazil (MB), as much of the HDW how much of the Navy of Greece, they disclose a sufficiently different picture of that one propagated in some Greek and Turkish periodicals or in the Internet.

The Navy of Greece informs that she is satisfied with the submarine and that problems technician appeared during the tests of sea had been cured content it. The HDW, in official document, related the appeared problems and the adopted solutions. It stands out to notice that the reason of being of the tests of sea the one that are submitted the ships is exactly to identify eventual defects of construction, being usual the sprouting of discrepancies, that the construction shipyard is obliged to repair. Contractual disposals establish indemnities for defects that if do not obtain to correct, since that, for its sum, they do not compromise the security or the operationalization of the way in question.

In November of 2005, when the Papanikolis submarine met come alongside in the port of Kristiansand, during its tests of sea, a representation of the MB, composed of submarinistas and engineer-naval officers, it visited the ship and it had the spoon chance the impressions of the Greek officer assigned to command it. It was all compliments to the quality and the performance of the submarine. Difficult to understand as, shortly afterwards, it could have start to present so primary and elementary problems, as vibration of periscope in the insignificant speed of three we (5,5 km/h), among others.

Answering objective to the question, the MB, throughout all the process, adopted - and it continues adopting - all the cabíveis steps, to inquire itself well about the facts, also, keeping contact with the Navy of Greece, beyond, evidently, with the construction shipyard. What it happens is that, in the case, the real facts do not condizem with what it comes being spread, mainly, in the Internet.

PB: E on the French option, exists some counterpoint?

CCSM: After withheld analysis of the projects technician and the presented commercial proposals, comparing its respective advantages and disadvantages, the Admiralty concluded that, of the strategical and operational point of view, the submarines took care of to the requirements of the Navy. However, in view of the convenience of if preventing the duplicity of logistic costs, to support submarines of different origins, and considering the vultosos investments carried through for the Navy throughout the two last decades, in different conotadas goals to the submarines IKL, associates to the culture and the technology assimilated in this period for ours technician (engineers and laborers) and crews (official and squares), in relation to the constructive, logistic processes, of maintenance and operation of these ways, the Admiralty, in 11 of November of 2005, it ratified the standardization of projected submarines according to methods and processes of origin German, of line IKL-HDW, for job in naval operations in the Navy of Brazil.

Question of reader of blog: Who is responsible for the project of nuclear submarine TUPÍ? it has how much time is in development? how much already it was invested in this project?

CCSM: For clarity and precision in the information, is necessary to clarify, of beginning, that never had a “project of construction of the nuclear submarine” as presented in the question. As said, it does not have, - nor never it had -, a “project of construction of the nuclear submarine”; it exists a nuclear program lead by the Navy of Brazil (MB), made up of two great projects: the Project of the Cycle of the Fuel and the Project of the Laboratory of Geração Nucleus-Electric (LABGENE). In the Project of the Cycle of the Fuel, the technology already practically is dominated.

How much to the LABGENE, project that aims at the development and the construction of a nuclear plant of generation of electric energy, its workmanships of assembly are in progress. After only developed these projects and cheated success in the operation of this nuclear plant, conditions will be created so that, in the future, having decision of government for such, it can be given to beginning to the elaboration of the project and construction of a submarine with nuclear propulsion, or nuclear submarine of attack (SNA).

The first phase, that represented, in the reality, a technological jump, was reached by the MB in the end of the decade of 1980, with the enrichment of Uranian in laboratorial scale, what it means the virtual domain of the technology. However, from then on, the arcado Navy was not counted more with enough resources for the development of the program, having, throughout last almost the 20 years, with considerable parcel of its reduced budget, to keep the program, as a whole, in vegetative state practically, limited little more than what the preservation of the knowledge (human resources).

The only way to prevent the loss of everything what e was invested, mainly, of what it was reached, is the transformation of the program of the Navy in a national project, with guarantee of continued allocation of resources. For in such a way, the great Ministry of the Defense and Navy have fact efforts, in the direction to transmit this necessity to them parliamentarians and to the public opinion, by means of the promotion of visits to its nuclear installations, presentations and lectures.

Of the beginning of the Nuclear Program of Marinha (PNM), in the end of years 70, until the moment, 1.1 billion had been invested to a US$ total. To conclude the LABGENE, the expenditure throughout the years, the ending of the fuel cycle and the ending of the infrastructure require a volume of resources of the order of R$ 1.1 billion (of Reals).
http://www.projetobr.com.br/Content.aspx?Id=923
 

contedicavour

New Member
If indeed all of this is confirmed, Brazil is proving wise not to waste limited defence budgets on SSNs. The argument over running costs of AIP subs is also well made, although IMHO a bit short-sighted especially if one day Brazilian SSKs had to operate in littoral environments where hiding underwater for several days could be key.
What I haven't found in the article though is the industrialization of the U214s : I'd expect them to be built locally in Brazil.

cheers
 

Turk

New Member
AIP is very new technology and U214 is very new submarine too so that's why it has got lots of errrors.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
AIP is very new technology and U214 is very new submarine too so that's why it has got lots of errrors.
AIP is not new technology - its been around in contemp subs for over 25 years.

There are also at least 3 different but basic types of AIP to consider.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro

rickusn

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
And my point was which you didnt address.:

Where do you come up "with over 25 years"?

In fact with the lone exception of Swedens Naken(commissioned in 1980 and converted to AIP 1987-1988 and recommissioned in 1989)(18 years) its been about at most 12 years since Swedens Gotland went into trials in 1995 although not accepted into full service until 1999.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
And my point was which you didnt address.:

Where do you come up "with over 25 years"?

In fact with the lone exception of Swedens Naken(commissioned in 1980 and converted to AIP 1987-1988 and recommissioned in 1989)(18 years) its been about at most 12 years since Swedens Gotland went into trials in 1995 although not accepted into full service until 1999.
the RAN was running AIP trials with the swedes in the mid/early 80's out in deepwater sections of the Port River.

that would make it approx 22 years.

AIP was dropped from the RANs agenda as it didn't demonstrate performance gains.

Its most certainly not on the current Collins Future Replacement Programme.
 

rickusn

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
"the RAN was running AIP trials with the swedes in the mid/early 80's out in deepwater sections of the Port River."

On which "contemp" and or "deployed assets" submarine was this?

I find no references of it in the available literature only the Nacken which I referenced above.

Any reasonable person would conclude that AIP except for experimental purposes was first operationally deployed in the mid-1990's(12 years) and not before. The Naken notwithstanding. But even that would only be 18 years at best.

"AIP was dropped from the RANs agenda as it didn't demonstrate performance gains."

Im well aware of this but AFAIK it was not considerd for inclusion in the original Collins class design but was included in the design for the 7th and 8th units which were not built and as a backfit plan for the first six units that was shelved in 1996 because trials with the first-of-class Collins showed superb "submerged endurance" along with minimal snorkel "indiscretion rates".

Another fact is that Swedish Gotland design ordered in 3/1990 wasnt changed until 9/91 to include the Stirling AIP which began trials in 7/95, delivered in 9/96.

My whole point is that your "over 25 years" statement is way off irregardless of how you try to spin it.

But of course your right even though the facts dont back your assertions.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Im well aware of this but AFAIK it was not considerd for inclusion in the original Collins class design but was included in the design for the 7th and 8th units which were not built and as a backfit plan for the first six units that was shelved in 1996 because trials with the first-of-class Collins showed superb "submerged endurance" along with minimal snorkel "indiscretion rates".

7 and 8 were still Mk 1 designs.

The original Collins design included provision for AIP. The AIP units are still sitting on pallets in the No 2 shed at ASC. One has been provided to an ally for test and development purposes. The space for the AIP sub-systems has been allocated to supp storage space. Its typically used for Specops stowage.

7 and 8 were abandoned because there was some serious consideration to purchasing Upholders as a bleed in squadron. This was because there were so many problems stemming from No 1. We also didn't want anymore involvement or an extension of the base build contract with Kockums

I'm not sure why any glowing report of No1 would be taken seriously, it was earmarked for destruction as the swedes had stuffed up their part of the construction to the point where a destruction order was in consideration. As it was it had to be rebuilt in the bow area. From that point on there was no more swedish welding accepted on subsequent boats. In fact No 1 sounded like a train underwater, so that report is so inaccurate that its not funny. It wasn't fixed acoustically until a local australian company devised specialised signature management solutions which have now been also provided to 3 of our allies.

But, what would I know, I was only on the project. ......

edit: I was wrong on the AIP initial trial dates though.

as for the sig management tech, none of that is in the public domain either, but if you have currency, you'll be able to establish what period the USN and NAVSEA looked at the tech via your own contacts.

The same tech was also used to fix up problems with the Visby (when it was doing a US eval tour). Ironically, we were fixing acoustic probs for the swedes who were announcing to all and sundry that they had a stealth boat in service. There's some black humour in there if you look hard enough.
 
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zewok

New Member
the GReek navy will not have the choice, they will be obliged to accept the submarine even if they encounter many problem and don't have an operationnal submarine.

see here three double u.corlobe.tk/article4736.html

HDW reputation is mainly based on bribes and manipulation. Not from the quality of their actual boats....
 

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
And why is that so? What is so bad about their boats?

And your Link is in French. Could you please give an english one ore translate it? :)
 

zewok

New Member
And why is that so? What is so bad about their boats?

And your Link is in French. Could you please give an english one ore translate it? :)
make a translation with google. In few words, German politics threat to not work with greek shipyard for their future project, this will imply 1800 unemployement in this shipyards
 

zewok

New Member
Comparison between Scorpene AIP and U214 AIP.

First the Scorpene is feet with Diesel MESMA. The Scorpene have approximately the same autonomy than the 214 (in the paper, we will discuss about it later) and a greater autonomy than the U212 (and by far).

Diesel MESMA operates with pure oxygen and diesel (the same that the diesel engine).
Fuel Cell (FC) operates with pure oxygen and pure hydrogen.

MESMA is very easy to refuel, in all bases you have diesel fuel and it’s just necessary to have a truck to fill the submarine with oxygen.
FC AIP needs oxygen (like MESMA) but also pure Hydrogen. To refuel the submarine you need to have some quay equipment (to fill the hydride, you must provide some cold energhy, the reaction is exothermic) so the submarine can’t refuel in all bases he have just 1 base (this reduce the operational interest of the submarine)
The hydrogen must have a very very high purity 99, 9999 % (even in France this quality is difficult to find), if you don’t use this quality you will damage the hydrides (poisoning) and decrease the hydrogen capacity. Such amount of hydrogen is very difficult to provisioned an is very expensive (here we speak of many trucks)

To make this refuelling, it takes at least 2 days for the hydrogen and several hours for the oxygen (you can’t refuel in the same time hydrogen and oxygen).
For MESMA AIP, you need only several hours (5 to 7).

MESMA technologies is known since 50 years on the French nuclear submarine and all the intervention can be made on the quay and require little maintenance and it can be made by everyone. Life duration of such technology is several thousand of hours.
FC technology is very new, life duration of the fuel cell is very limited (1000 h so 4 patrols, the fuel cell run with pure oxygen, this is very bad for the life duration). This technology means that the countries who buy such a system are totally dependant of the constructor. So all the 1000 h the price of the fuel cell replacement will be several hundred of thousand dollars.

To embark 2 tons of hydrogen, it’s necessary to have at least 100 tons of hydrides (so you can remove all the lest of the submarine….Ohh what?? Greek submarine is too heavy of at least 100 tons???? It’s very strange).
This implies that the boat can not be re-equilibrated in function to his mission and operational requirement; you can’t modify the architecture of the submarine during his life duration.

To desorbs hydrogen from a metal alloy, you must provide some thermal energy (the reaction is endothermic). So the process is very slow, you cannot make what you want with the AIP. The fuel cell provides hot water to warm the hydride so the system run in closed cycle. When the hydride is almost empty, it’s very difficult to maintain the pressure necessary to feed the fuel cell, at this moment, the power of the system is reduced and you can’t run at maximum power (don’t be following….)

MESMA power is regulated with the flowrate of diesel, you just have classical pump. You can run at maximum power from the first to the last hours.





Concerning the autonomy of the fuel cell AIP HDW gives a value considering that the total amount of the hydrogen in the hydrides is consumed. In practice, the pressure will necessary remain above the feeding pressure of the fuel cell (around 2 bar) you have a big parts of the hydrogen which can’t be consumed, so submarine autonomy will be less important that what it’s proposed by HDW

More information on another day
 

orko_8

New Member
HDW reputation is mainly based on bribes and manipulation. Not from the quality of their actual boats....
Dear zewok,

Bribes and manipulation cannot explain 62 active/ordered/building Type 209 boats around the world in 14 navies. Type 209 families of submarines, from Type 209/1100 "Glavkos" class which entered service in ca. 1971 to the latest version Type 209/1400PN which was ordered by Portugal in 2004 clearly shows the success of the design and HDW, IMHO. I don't know what were the roles bribe, manipulation or political threats in those sales, but if there is such an export history, one must look at "other possible factors", am I wrong?

Possible factors such as design, building and operational experience maybe..

Type 209, along with Kilo, Daphné and Oberon classes is one of "the four horsemen of SSK's", I think. The countries which designed and built those boats, i.e Germany, Russia (ex USSR), France and UK have some submarine design and operating experience from WWII. As we all know, German navy's and shipbuilding industry's experience with submarines are more than "some", which without doubt has great contribution in the export success of this country's submarine designs in the post WWII era.
 
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