ANZAC 2.0
The ANZMIN+2 of February 2024 speaks of seamless integration and great commonality between the ADF & NZDF. What I am discussing here is army focussed because the NZ Army has to be restructured and refurbished with the help of the Australian Army under
Plan ANZAC. The NZ Army will align to Australian Army doctrine. This also means that the NZ Army will most likely acquire and operate the same platforms as the Australian Army. It is my contention that Plan ANZAC will become ANZAC 2.0, or we could call it ANZAD (Australia NZ Army Division) which is the intention of Plan ANZAC. I shall use ANZAD because that is closer to the intention and reduces confusion with ANZAC.
This restructuring and refurbishment of the NZ Army offers the rare opportunity to fully introduce a new capability for both armies. It is my suggestion that the NZ component of ANZAD be used to form an ANZAD Littoral Warfare Brigade (LWB) using the US Marine Corp (USMC) and UK Royal Marines (RM) for assistance in the standing up and initial training. Such a force is now a necessity because the Asia Pacific has two large archipelagic systems and other island nations. Using WW2 as an example, the Pacific War between Japan and the Allies, was basically an island campaign. A large future conflict between the PRC and an allied coalition would cover the same territory.
The LWB would be a NZ Army component and the specialist amphibious warfare regiment. Platoons / companies from the various RARs would be phased through for familiarisation in order to widen the knowledge base of basic amphibious skills, across the broader Australian Army. Historical the USMC and RM are light forces, and the USMC has recently embarked upon an A2AD doctrine in order to support the USN sea control doctrine of distributed lethality. To this end the USMC has divested itself of its armoured forces. Whilst this new doctrine has some advantages, it does not necessarily meet Australian and NZ requirements.
How ever the LWB is structured, it will require fire support etc., when ashore. To this end it is suggested that the NZ Army has the following capabilities:
- M-10 Booker
- Redback IFV
- Boxer CRV
- AS9 Huntsman SPG
- M142 HIMARS
- Bushmaster Vehicles
- Rheinmettall MAN HMV mounted NSM
- UAV & UGV
The M10 Booker has commonality with the M-1 Abrams currently used by the Australian Army. Crew can be trained on one and operate the other without the need for new training. The Redback is required because although the US Army vehemently denies that the Booker is a light tank, it is a light tank. As such sending tanks into combat without infantry support is suicidal and stupid. This is one very important lesson of the current Russo-Ukrainian War where Russian forces have used tanks to attack Ukrainian forces without the prerequisite infantry support, resulting in Ukrainian ATGM teams, and others, destroying them with relative ease. The American term “shooting fish in a barrel” is an apt description. The Redback is a tracked vehicle that can keep up with tanks, whereas a wheeled vehicle will struggle in some situations.
The Boxer is used in Australian service as a Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) whereas in NZ Army service it would replace the current NZLAV. Both the Huntsman and HIMARS are included to provide long range fire support. One quarter of the Redbacks and Boxers need to be fitted with Rheinmetall 30mm air defence turrets. The Russo-Ukrainian War clearly shows the requirement for air defence, both gun and MANPAD because of the prolific use of UAVs in the conflict, both for ISR and FPV strike missions. Serious consideration also has to be given to longer range SAM capability, preferably vehicle mounted NASAMS.
Land based Maritime A2AD is something that the both the Australian and NZ Armies should seriously consider. It is a good defence from maritime encroachment and the NSM (entering service with the RAN) does have a truck mounted variant. It could be a component of the LWR. The Ukrainians have had considerable success using land based maritime A2AD, and USVs, against the Russian navy in the Black Sea.
The LWB would not be so much a light infantry force, but lean more towards a medium combined arms force, yet be able to respond quickly. It could include raiding units based on the RM example. All of its personnel should be trained to the same syllabus as RM recruits before they undertake their specific branch / trade training. It would conduct its training and be based in NZ, with battalion equivalent detachment being permanently based in Australia. The M-10 Bookers, and Redback IFVs, would be form an Armoured Regiment. The Huntsman SPG, HIMARS, NASAMS unit, and NSM unit would form an Artillery Regiment. Both of these regiments would be NZ based, train with their Australian equivalents, and deploy along with infantry from the RNZIR and logistics units etc., as the Littoral Warfare Regiment (LWR), being constituted of companies from the various regiments and battalions. The LWR shall have no fixed number of companies, with the number and type of companies deploying being dependent upon the overall requirements of each deployment. This gives the Command flexibility.
Previously I would have suggested a helicopter component, however evidence from the Russo-Ukrainian War suggests that helicopters struggle to survive on the modern battlefield because of modern air defence capabilities. Even fast jets are struggling to survive anywhere near the contact line. In Ukraine attack helicopters are reduced to lobbing unguided rockets at enemy positions using a quick zoom fire, near the top, then an equally quick bank and drop to ground level returning to base at very low level. Transport helicopters are reduced to providing logistics flights behind the lines and rarely venture near the contact line. However, the LWB should have a UAV & UGV component with a wide variety of UAV and UGV including FPV kamikaze drones. The LWB should follow the Ukrainian example in the types of and how such vehicles are used. Correspondingly, both defensive and offensive EW capabilities are a necessity.
Our potential enemy in the Pacific will have relatively few, if any, of the issues that the Russians are currently displaying in Ukraine and will be far more technically capable because of better education and motivation of its personnel. They also have newer and more capable equipment, are better trained, are politically motivated, and more importantly, they will be actively learning lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War. This makes them inherently dangerous. Their army is structured along US lines, and they use a doctrine that is similar to US doctrine. They have seen the inherent weaknesses in the Soviet and Russian force structures, doctrine, and command philosophy. This and the Pacific geography are why I believe that the Australian and NZ armies require a dedicated specialised littoral warfare brigade.
