Communist tactics in Korean War

[Grand Danois]

Regarding the 500,000 I was talking about. I was wrong. It was more.

Gunzinger, A. p.3 The air front played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany. Allied air attacks forced Germany to dedicate vast amounts of manpower and resources to continental air defense, reducing the Germans’ ability to fully support land operations. By 1944 over 800,000 Germans were committed to air defense, including the crews of about 54,000 antiaircraft guns; furthermore, a million Germans were engaged in repairing damage caused by air strikes. In fact, Germany dedicated more forces to air defense than it deployed to counter the Allied campaign in Italy. The air war also caused a significant shift in Germany’s resource priorities. In 1944 more than half of Germany’s industrial base was working to satisfy the Luftwaffe’s needs. Albert Speer, architect of the German war economy, estimated that 30 percent of artillery, 20 percent of heavy ammunition, and over 50 percent of electronics production were dedicated to air defense, depriving frontline ground forces of critical antitank munitions and communications equipment. Production of antitank guns was halved in favor of building more antiaircraft guns.

History of the Luftwaffe during World War II - Defense of the Reich 1940-45

 

[Grand Danois]

This is actually a interesting read regarding tactics of Soviet Armies inferred from the Manchurian Campaign:

The Soviet Army Offensive: Manchuria, 1945
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA History

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE SOVIET ARMY OFFENSIVE: MANCHURIA, 1945
1. Purpose: To create interest among students of modern
warfare to study a relatively unknown Soviet campaign in
Manchuria, 1945.
2. Thesis: The Soviet offensive in Manchuria during August
1945 provides an excellent model of current Soviet Army
tactics for students of modern warfare.

[...]

• I am noting that the Japanese got spanked severely by Zhukov in 1939, so the Japanese knew they where in trouble.

With a sizeable force already in Mongolia, the Soviet
Union assigned command of the Soviet forces to General
Georgi K. Zhukov on 2 June 1939. [15-156] While the
escalating border clashes continued, General Zhukov began a
stealthful force build-up along the Khalkin-Gol River. In
the 1904 Sino-Soviet War, Russia learned a bitter lesson
over its inability to maintain superior forces at the end of
a 4000 mile long logistics trail. [15-154] With the Trans-
Siberian railroad incomplete, Russia was unable to reinforce
and resupply Czarist troops by land or sea. [15-154] Zhukov
was determined to launch a crushing offensive against the
Japanese, but not before achieving a sizeable force ratio in
his distinct favor. Facing 30,000 Japanese soldiers.
Zhukov built his forces up to 35 infantry battalions and
over 57,000 men under rigorous security and deception
measures. [4-9]. He achieved a force ratio of 4:1 in tanks
and 2:1 in aircraft. [15-156] Although the front was
located 400 miles from the nearest railroad, he ensured
everything was trucked in during darkness. By late June, the
Soviets established air superiority in air battles involving
200 to 300 aircraft. [15-157] When he attacked the Japanese
on 20 August 1939, he achieved complete tactical surprise
and by 3l August, had driven back the Japanese with classic
double envelopment tactics using armor and heavy
concentrations of artillery. When the cease-fire took
effect on l6 September 1939, the Japanese had suffered a
phenomenal 75% casualties with over 17,000 men killed or
wounded. (13-15] The Soviets reported 9,284 killed or
wounded at the battle's end.

• The Japanese realize their inferiority to the extent that they even sign a neutrality pact:

The devastating effectiveness of Russian armor at
Nomonhan swayed Japanese sentiment to build up their tank
forces to ten divisions. However, at the start of the
Pacific War, they had yet to activate a single tank
division. As evidenced by the vicious defense of the
Japanese Army in the Pacific Islands during World War II,
the border clashes only reinforced the value of the
indomitable Samurai fighting spirit--fight to the death.
War-fighting concerns in other theaters of the world and
these rapidly escalating combat actions between the Soviets
and the Japanese in Manchuria lead to the signing of the
Neutrality Pact of 1941.

• Even though the USSR had 40 divisions already in theatre they had to reinforce them in order to beat the 24 IJA divisions in Manchuria.

In April 1945, the Soviets abrogated the Neutrality
Pact and commenced a massive redeployment effort which
doubled the Soviet forces in the Far East to 80 divisions.
During the months of May-July 1945, more than 40 infantry,
tank and mechanized divisions plus artillery and combat
support units were transferred from the European theater to
the Far East.

• Evaluation of the threat the Kwantung Army posed.

The threat which kept 40 Soviet divisions, including
two tank divisions, from the European front was the
Kwangtung Army. In existence since 1919, the Kwangtung Army
was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]
Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.
By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.

• But the presence of 40 divisions are more about long term goals.

Despite the relative security of the Neutrality Pact
with Japan and the war raging on her European doorstep, the
Soviet Union held forty divisions on it's Manchurian border
to counter the offensive threat posed by the Kwangtung Army.
[10-25] Stalin was determined to eventually enter the war
against Japan to achieve several strategic objectives in the
Far East. He wished to reestablish Russian influence, rail
and base rights in Manchuria, consolidate the Soviets'
position in Mongolia and ensure Soviet presence and
influence in the Northern Pacific. By the eviction of the
Japanese, Stalin would pre-empt any western presence in the
North Asian contineent and seize the entire Sakhalin
peninsula and Kurile Islands from Japan [8-174].

• Etc.

Due to the extreme reduction in strength and armaments,
the Kwangtung Army adopted a new operations plan in May
1945. It called for a delaying action along the border,
withdrawal to subsequent prepared defensive lines and
finally to a stronghold area in southeastern Manchuria for a
final defensive action approximately 650 kilometers from the
northern and western borders. [10-34]
The Kwangtung Army believed that the terrain, long
distances involved and determined Japanese resistance would
weaken the attacking Soviet forces by the time they reached
the final defensive positions and their advance would be
stopped and possibly subjected to a decisive counterattack.
In this plan only one-third of the Japanese Army would be
positioned on the border and the remainder deployed in
depth. [10-34]
In order to prevent the Russians from discovering their
alarming weakness in Manchuria, the Kwangtung Army mobilized
reservists and new recruits to form new divisions and
brigades to maintain the appearance of a formidable fighting
force. In early July 1945, the Kwangtung Army was expanded
from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions.
Unfortunately for the Kwangtung Army, more than one-fourth
of its entire combat force was mobilized only ten days prior
to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9
brigades). [4-63] One of two very weak tank brigades was
not formed until July 1945, and both brigades were far
removed in south central Manchuria. [9-63]

• Basically a Sitzkrieg until 1945 when Stalin decides to void the Neutrality Pact and attack
  
  
• No fighting until after the European War is over.
  
  
• Maskirovka!
  
  
• Cheers!

 

[eckherl]

This is actually a interesting read regarding tactics of Soviet Armies inferred from the Manchurian Campaign:

• I am noting that the Japanese got spanked severely by Zhukov in 1939, so the Japanese knew they where in trouble.

• The Japanese realize their inferiority to the extent that they even sign a neutrality pact:

• Even though the USSR had 40 divisions already in theatre they had to reinforce them in order to beat the 24 IJA divisions in Manchuria.

• Evaluation of the threat the Kwantung Army posed.

• But the presence of 40 divisions are more about long term goals.

• Etc.

• Basically a Sitzkrieg until 1945 when Stalin decides to void the Neutrality Pact and attack
  
  
• No fighting until after the European War is over.
  
  
• Maskirovka!
  
  
• Cheers!

Yep - Stalin and Truman really had their poker faces on with this last act of WW2