Civilian Militia Effectiveness

[Chino]

So-called "hillbilly" militias have proven to be extremely effective against regular army units.

Mujahideen/Talibans, Viet Minh/Viet Cong, Hamas, PLO etc...

Time and again, they have been proven near impossible to eradicate by military means alone. Kill one militia fighter, 5 of his friends and relatives sign up etc...

In fact, it has been written that proliferation of small arms for civilian militias in the 20th century have completely changed the rules of warfare. Any unpopular invader is sure to face long and determined civilian resistance making occupation a difficult business.

Add to that the proliferation today of communications devices like phones and internet.

...

Avoiding to fight the way your enemy expects you to fight is a sound military tactic and one which good militias have practiced with great results.

A civilian militia seldom face down a regular army unit unless the odds are overwhelmingly in their favour. But that's no meansure of its effectiveness (or not). A civilian militia is best for harassing role by tying down a great number of enemy troops. Intel gathering. And also subversion of the population - which usually regular army units fail to do well. Militias are also invaluable as guides as they have good local knowledge.

They don't "win" military victories in the classic sense. But that's not what they should set out to do. When the VC made the mistake of Tet Offensive, they were nearly wiped out.

 

[Chino]

A military force can soak up casualties, a civilian force is essentially screwed until it builds itself up to a military level...

History and current events have shown that a (invading) military force cannot absorb casualties like a determined (defending) civilian militia can.

The militia is fighting for their "justice" and "survival" etc etc and it recruits readily from the patriotic home population.

The invading military is fighting for ... hmm... what? And they recruit from a civilian population back home that usually don't want to die invading another country.

 

[Chino]

Fourth, the weapons brandished by a civillian militia in time of war wouldn't stay only civillian guns for long. One of my friends is NYPD, and they gave him an M-4 to use if the situation warrants it.

That's right.

The only widespread use of shotguns in recent insurgency would be the Maoist peasants of Nepal. (And they won!!!)

Anyway, forget .22 and shotguns: all famous insurgencies were armed with military grade weapons from the Vietnam War 40 years ago till now in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

[kato]

History and current events have shown that a (invading) military force cannot absorb casualties like a determined (defending) civilian militia can.

I don't mean absorb as in fighting morale.

I mean soak it up as in they can have soldiers wounded and return them to the front line within weeks or months whereas a civilian force will have definitive problems soaking up any wounded. A wounded civilian fighter will be either captured or dead within days, there will not be any Medevac, or a MASH waiting for him behind the front lines. In modern combat, that's an important statistic - as over 90% of all casualties will be wounded, not instant death.

 

[Gremlin29]

I still think a critical component of this discussion centers on how the invading force handles dealing with irregular forces. The VC were so effective in VN because they did not even remotely adhere to any rules of warfare, nor did they show any regard for casualties/POW's. They routinely executed entire villages if they appeared to by sympathetic to ARVN or US troops. They were able to wage a campaign of terror against their own countrymen making them reluctant, to cooperate with ARVN or even US troops. Same goes for Iraq/Afghanistan. Captured US troops can look forward to having their heads sawn off on TV, captured insurgents will be jailed, and even have the chance at a trial. Heck, some of them have been released and recaptured or killed fighting again.

 

[Feanor]

What happened to the tanks?

@Feanor, is the Border Guard liaised to the MVD?

The border guard I believe are FSB. The tanks were handed over to the MoD as far as I know. Probably scrap by now, as they were iirc T-62s.

 

[kato]

Tanks aren't that unusual, especially if the unit is considered for wartime combatant roles. The German Border Guard used to have Saladins with 76mm guns, the French Gendarmerie has ERC90 and VBC90 with 90mm guns.

 

[Feanor]

True. It's just that when I heard the words militia, what came to mind were the state militias in the US. So compared to them, the MVD would be a big step forward.

 

[bruceedwards]

Using the VC and Taliban as examples of militia resisting superior, professional forces it seems the militia have a number of clear advantages:

1. They can soak up large casualties (and they need to!) as new recruits are plentiful.

2. They have no ROE - and can be as ruthless as they wish.

3. They can hide in the civilian population if required.

4. They have no vulnerable 'soft spots'. No (or minimal) supply lines, forward operating bases, airstrips.

Of course, these advantages can be viewed as disadvantages - casualties are bad, being ruthless can sour your support, hiding in the populace can make the populace a target, and no supply lines also means you are hungry and short of ammo.

But the point remains - until a Militia hits a 'tipping point' with regards to training and equipment, it will remain resistant to the tactics and weapons that have evolved to fight a larger, more static foe.

A militia may not stop an invasion outright, but it can make the occupation a nightmare.

 

[Feanor]

Except that they do have supply lines. Afghan insurgents get lots of supplies from Pakistan, just like the VC got supplies from North Vietnam, and ultimately the USSR. I think one of the reasons that the Iraqi insurgency was relatively unsuccessful (other then not having a real base) was that it did not have major outside suppliers. Though Iran certainly tried.

 

[kato]

I've actually read some of those "militia manuals" (of US militia groups, on the internet) a couple years ago, and they frankly have me shaking my head at all of them.
Carlos Marighella's Minimanual Urban Guerilla for example makes a lot more sense, since it actually goes into the details and problems faced, presenting a workable solution for both defensive and offensive application. And one that's actually adaptable and extendable while not relying on non-quantified values such as "the patriotic feelings of the population that will support us" (brrr).

 

[StingrayOZ]

They do have supply lines. But they are different. Militas have no problem buying or operating a black market. Each unit can be funded not from a central pool but from what ever they can get (legally or illegally or both). Stashes are often made of cheap and important items (food and small arms) or captured or found (UXB's). There is often no predefined front, so fight can be moderated to the supplies.

We now have militas building there own missiles and explosives. I suprised there we haven't seen more advanced versions. Using a phone, game console remote, a few industrial IC's and propellant/explosive made from agricultural or common industrial supplies you could make a very advanced guided missile to shoot targets on the ground, air or over the horizon.

Look at the bomb problem in Iraq. Things are getting developed and improved.

Those that operate in a milita can often find medical attention in local civilian hospitals. if your shot, shoot a few locals and go in with the group.

Subduing conquered lands has been an eternal problem. If a populace really doesn't want you there, you aren't going to be able to win.

 

[kato]

We now have militas building there own missiles and explosives.

Like? IEDs in Iraq maybe, and they seem to tend to take a page out of established manuals often. Missiles, perhaps UAVs? Like Hamas or Hisb'allah? Both of which aren't really militias anymore, at least since the 80s, but well-established nation structures with military components.

Those that operate in a milita can often find medical attention in local civilian hospitals. if your shot, shoot a few locals and go in with the group.

Err, the first thing an occupation force will do is have an eye on any and all hospitals.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Well whats a milita and whats not? Is it something that is a paramilitary force not lead by the head of state of that nation.

Err, the first thing an occupation force will do is have an eye on any and all hospitals.

But it does get to a point where your milita isn't made up of males ages 15-35 but of old men and women and gets a little confusing..

 

[Humanoid]

They do have supply lines. But they are different. Militas have no problem buying or operating a black market. Each unit can be funded not from a central pool but from what ever they can get (legally or illegally or both). Stashes are often made of cheap and important items (food and small arms) or captured or found (UXB's). There is often no predefined front, so fight can be moderated to the supplies.

This is true. Supply lines don't apply in the traditional sense to a guerrila militia. If say I, and a group of fellow locals, were to say, plan an attack, or a sabotage attempt within fifteen miles of my home, there is no need for a supply line. And if we are to be under the impression that every town would do a lot of it's own work, then a militia-man/skirmisher, would only have to operate within small distances of his place of residence. This virtually would eliminate supply lines. Because lacking uniforms, covering faces, and the like, makes a 'skirmisher' just another civilian in a supermarket or public place.

The benefit of being unorganized, is that there are relatively few prominent leaders for the occupation forces to root out and publicly execute etc. and if the operating group is different on each operation, it means there isn't a roster sheet with the names of fifteen saboteurs convinietly available for an insider to happen upon.

Also, another benefit of being unorganized, is that intel would be incredibly hard to gather on the movement making suprise raids more viable. Ambushes on small convoys would be ideal if IED's were employed effectively etc. If this were to occur, the invaders would have two options, move in large convoys, costing them more resources, or spreading themselves thin to secure more area making them vulnerable to attacks on their soldiers themselves.:nutkick

 

[Chino]

Except that they do have supply lines. Afghan insurgents get lots of supplies from Pakistan, just like the VC got supplies from North Vietnam, and ultimately the USSR. I think one of the reasons that the Iraqi insurgency was relatively unsuccessful (other then not having a real base) was that it did not have major outside suppliers. Though Iran certainly tried.

Would like to point out the Tamil Tigers and Nepali Maoists - 2 of the oddest, maybe the loneliest insurgent movements, one being on the island of Sri Lanka and the other in the isolated mountains of Nepal.

I could be wrong but both these groups get little to no outside help in terms of arms supply etc and rely entirely on their own ingenuity to secure arms.

Yet both scored spectacular military successes against better armed and organised government forces. The Tamil Tigers even sent the Indian Army packing (no offense intended) by inflicting heavy casualties on them, IIRC...

And the Tigers themselves absorb pretty heavy casualties. And even without 100% support from the Tamil population, they fight on and on.

Again goes to show, a popular insurgent movement is nothing to scoff at. The Chicom won the fight for one of the largest and most populous countries on earth.

 

[Chino]

The Viet Minh - predecessor of the Viet Cong - militarily defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in a conventional set-piece battle.

There's no "rule book" and what separates a true blue military from a rag tag insurgent group can easily get blurred.

A people's militia can sometimes just be a conventional army without the uniforms.

And...

The Karens and other Burmese insurgent groups at the height of their power, HAD uniforms and badges etc.

And then there's China during the "Warlord" era pre-KMT. Some of them were armed, equipped and trained just like any true "armies" and some had officers graduating from foreign (Japanese or German) military academies.

They collect taxes (esp opium) and openly bought weapons with these money.

 

[bruceedwards]

They do have supply lines!

Yep, I somehow completely forgot about the Ho Chi Minh trail etc. (Note to self: Do not post when tired).

I guess I should have rephrased it as: They are not as reliant on supply lines as set-piece armies.

I know I'm pointing out the obvious, but the lack of centralisation and standards creates another advantage/disadvantage scenario. They are unpredictable and hard to kill with one method of warfare, but lacking a consistent plan and structure most militia struggles devolve into bleeding the enemy to death.

 

[Todjaeger]

With regards to a civilian 'militia' being effective, it is dependent on how well the members train and operate together, what sort of equipment and logistical support the have, and how they are employed.

If one were to look at nations with large scale conscription and organized reserve/homeguard/milita forces (Israel and Switzerland come to mind) then these nations could likely rapidly call up forces capable of low-level conventional or unconventional ops in fairly short order. A country like the US, which in addition to the regular volunteer forces has the Reserves and various state Guard units, these can be somewhat different from Reserve units in other nations because (at least in the Reserves) the personnel are essentially former members of the regular forces who are just completing their terms of service. Also, the units also engage in regular, large scale deployments alongside and in concert with regular forces. This has been the case in Iraq, as well as during GWI and back in the 80's with exercises like ReForGer. As such, the equipment types used by the Reserve units is most often the same as that used by regular units and therefore the units are suitable for conventional ops.

Now, if one is talking about use of civilian/non-military personnel... This situation becomes quite different and complex, particular if the 'militia' is formed as an adhoc force during a time of crisis. While such a force would likely prove useless for conventional ops, guerrilla warfare waging attacks by partisans could prove quite effective in 'occupying' and ocuppying enemy. Pardon the pun.

In a case like this, the equipment already available to the civilian population could be turned into various weapons, IEDs, etc. Also various non-military organizations like local law enforcement/police, or First Responders like Fire and EMS, could provide people with potentially applicable skills and training that could be useful or adaptable into partisans.

As for the US, it is hard to say whether or not it would prove effective. IIRC there are something like 900 million (yes, million) firearms in private ownership within the US. It works out statistically to there being roughly 3 for every man, woman and child within the country. From a pratical matter, many or most of the weapons are unsuitable for use in combat (a Ruger 10/22 is a nice gun, but not something I want to shoot someone with unless I just want to annoy them). Also the statistics are somewhat skewed as many of the privately owned guns are owned by the same people, meaning that while many households will own no firearms, those that due can often own more firearms than the statics indicate. This does make some sense though when one considers the different types and uses of various civilian fire arms (hunting of small or large game, various bird guns, target shooting as well as self-defence). A great deal would depend on the will of the local populace vs. that of the occupying force. Something I will need to ponder a bit.

-Cheers

 

[Feanor]

Well if you close off all the borders leading into a territory, where will the insurgency get their weapons? Assuming you can rely on your own troops not to sell theirs, that would cut supply lines.