Capabilities of Ground based Air defence.

Ozzy Blizzard

New Member
The effect on the serbian ground forces of the allied air offensive was minimal. I've spoken to people that were on the ground in Kosovo and observed the Serb withdrawal, bombing from 20000 ft is fine if you want to hit a bridge or other infastructure but against cammed up armoured vehicles and troops not so much.
The effects on the ground during ODS disagree with you. The majority of the sorties launched during the 4 week air campaign in 1991 were directed against dug in armored formations, bombing from 10k+ft primarily Mk84's with radar assistance, rather primitive by 2009 standards. The effects were massive. That is a fact. I have a great RAND report on the effectiveness of high altitude bombing during ODS, i'll have to get it from work tomorrow.

I don't think it was so much the political context, as the fact that the allies knew they were going to lose planes to effective low level air defences.
That statement is in effect self contradicting. Acceptable losses are determined by political leadership. The politicians were unwilling to loose aircraft when they knew the political objectives could be achieved with minimal risk from high altitude, in which they succeeded in achieving. Surely your not claiming that NATO airforces were not capable of operating in the serbian airspace at low altitude i.e. the losses would have been operationally unsustainable. Remember this air formation was intended to penetrate East Germany, the most dense and heavily populated SAM belt history has yet seen at low altitude en mass. If there was an imperative i doubt NATO would have had serous trouble dealing with a second rate, tactical, GBAD centric ADS.


I'm afraid I'd have to dispute this, There were minimal signs of destroyed Serb equipment when the ground forces entered Kosovo, and it was one of the first things they looked for. The serb withdrawal was in good order and they were still combat effective.
Yes but ODS says otherwise. The real question is which scenario is more more representative of an asymetric air campaign. Serbia was limited in length, had a limited political objective and crucially did not have a large land based element. The Iraqi army was forced to deploy to counter the threat of coalition units deployed on its borders and an inevitable land invasion. Even though the serbs were deployed in Kosovo they did not have to deploy in battle order in order to meet an armored thrust. The Serbs had the opportunity to disperse and camouflage their armored formations to some extent, and the terrain aided in this process. If there had been an armored corps poised to roll on Belgrade (and more time) the results of the air campaign would have been much more impressive.

If a major first tier superpower was really serous about fighting an asymetric war you could bet there would be a significant threat of a ground invasion and enough time to give any deployed units the proper treatment from air power prior to the initiation of ground operations ala ODS.

I'd dispute this as well, Iraq purchased some of the most capable Air defence equipment, but their operation of it was inept. They were very much into buying equipment and ignoring training, maintainance, and deployment issues.
The Iraqi IADS was more dense, technologically capable and integrated than anything western air forces had seen since Hanoi. Without a shadow of a doubt Iraqs IADS in 1990 was significantly more capable than the largely tactical ADS NATO faced in Serbia, in aggregate terms the threat was far more lethal. Even if in some cases assets were poorly employed, aggregate capability was far greater.


My original arguement is that to construct the most effective air defence with minimal budget ground based systems are the answer. Fighter jets like large naval units are a prestige symbol. Typically militaries will starve other less glamourous arms of funding in order to keep a handful of jets in the air. Say a nation outlays $2 billion on 30 fighter jets, factor in training maintainance, they'll soak up the defence budget. How many are going to be servicable at any one time and as for maintaining a QRF keeping planes fully armed and fueled ready to go is a nightmare.
Fighters provide air defense at a theater level, even the most super duper GBAD systems can not do that. Therefore in spending all of your money on GBAD without an airborne element there is in fact a false economy. If you were to procure GBAD assets to simultaneously defend the engagement envilope of a single fighter you would have to buy dozens of systems. Even if you blew a whole heap of cash on a few S-300 PMU's or PATRIOT's they are all LOS limited, so you would need a larger number of low altitude tactical SAM or AAA systems. An average fighter should be able to intercept a threat some 400nm+ from the point of launch (much more with AAR), that equates to a defended area of some 600,000 odd square miles. Even if you didnt have to defend every square mile with GBAD, to match the coverage every possible target at a theater level would have to be within the engagement envilope of a high altitude, high end, expensive radar guided SAM (aka S-300) and a low altitude tactical system. The cost of that would be much greater than a pair of fighters sitting on alert 5. This flexibility is why nations like Australia have invested so heavily in airborne air defense and have almost no GBAD.


Additionally I see a fundamental flaw in the strategic paradigm behind that statement. Whats the point of having an ADS? Or a military in fact? Hopefully it is to deter a conflict, and if there is one to defeat the other combatant. GBAD is a wholly defensive asset. It will not aid you in winning a war, it will just go some way to prevent you from losing one. In combination with other offensive assets such as tac air it can be very effective, but alone it is simply
a way to prolong the inevitable.

Ground based air defence is easy to integrate into a small military to medium sized military. Once the initial outlay for the equipment, modern missiles have built in test systems for ease of maintainance, built in simulators for training, are easy to store and deploy at short notice. Modern systems have good performance in an ECM enviroment, frequency agile they can still be jammed but at shorter range, most systems also have a passive form of tracking and guidance.
Obviously tactical level GBAD is going to be cheap and easier to implement that tactical air, its also far less capable. Its a wholly subjective decision.

As for modern systems performance vs a tier 1 threat? Well for long range radar guided systems unless you have state of the art ECCM, those systems are going to suffer when facing a tier one EW capability. Remember the problem with facing a tier one threat is they will always have much greater resources than the defender, and will without exception enjoy EW superiority (i.e. better ECM than defending ECCM). Relatively immobile wireless data-links at the battery level are very vulnerable to current gen ECM, and without integration radar guided SAM's are extremely vulnerable to tier one DEAD capability. This has been seen over and over again with asymetric air campaigns. Once those few high capability high altitude systems are gone you hand the enemy control of the airspace over your units, and if you have to deploy to meet a ground threat you are going to get slaughtered, aka the republican guard units deployed around Baghdad during OIF.

Talk about a rock and a hard place....

As far as I'm concerned the function of a military is to defend the territorial integrity of the nation, not projecting power abroad,
First of all that is totally subjective. And second it is the exact opposite stance of most western militaries, which are all geared towards power projection rather than territorial defense. Protecting the nations interests through power projection is in real terms often the primary objective of the military.

In any case offensive capability is often the primary method territorial integrity is maintained through deterrent, and tactical air power is going to provide much greater deterrent than wholly defensive GBAD. Thus offensive capability is often more effective at doing just that.

and you should aim to get the most effective military for the least cost.
True, as long as it achieves the goals you have set it. If the primary goal is defeating potential adversaries than only acquiring GBAD in place of air power is no way to achieve that. Again its a false economy saving money on something that wont do the job you have set it.

Bear in minds that if a small nation is invaded, its military will most likely be fighting alongside their permanent bases. If they manage to deploy before an attack their logistics will probably consist of multiple dispersed, cammed up supply dumpss, so huge logistical trails won't really be a feature.
Which nation are you thinking of? Iraq fits this scenario perfectly and they still needed to move large amounts of supplies out to the deployed formations, even within their own borders. Even Notrh Korea would need to move huge amounts of supplies to support high intensity operations, even defensive operations. How are you going to sustain a counter offensive without mobile supply? Realistically by foreword deploying all of your supplies and not relying on flexible logistical trains you limit yourself to a static defense, which is about as useful as the proverbial mamory glands on a bull in a contemporary conflict.

It's true a first tier air power will be able to pummel a small nation. But with good GBAD its fighter will need to stay within an ECM bubble, and take other measures to defend itself which will degrade their offensive power.
Really? Is that the way asymetrical air campaigns have been conducted in the real world during the last 20 years? Small packages conducting limited strike operations throughout the campaign in little ECM bubbles? Sadly no. The reality is that the only packages needing heavy ECM support are the initial waves on day one, that will kick the door in and decapitate and dislocate the IADS through striking C4ISR infrastructure, and then eliminate the high altitude SAM threat through DEAD operations. During ODS and OIF this phase lasted between 48 & 72 hours. After that coalition air power was able to strike, from altitude, anywhere at will and the capability of low altitude, tac SAM's had little effect on the campaign. Once the IADS is decapitated and destroying the high value, high capability, high altitude and usually comparatively rare systems becomes significantly easier. That has been the historical trend when tier one air power comes up against a GBAD centric (I)ADS, after 2~3 days the attacking power can strike at will, the only problem is identifying the targets which becomes much easier when the enemy ground forces maneuver to counter your own ground advance.
 

lastdingo

New Member
ODS was a VERY special case because
- the Iraqis deployed in featureless open terrain (which simplified target detection and attack extremely)
- the Iraqis were quite incompetent
- the Iraqis had few effective ManPADS
- there was only fair weather

Most inhabited regions are extremely unlike the desert region of Kuwait and west of Basra.
Kosovo is the better (and more recent) example, albeit not perfect.


And it's logically impossible to reply "Yes but ODS says otherwise. " in a context that was entirely about Yugoslavia.
 

Ozzy Blizzard

New Member
ODS was a VERY special case because
- the Iraqis deployed in featureless open terrain (which simplified target detection and attack extremely)
- the Iraqis were quite incompetent
- the Iraqis had few effective ManPADS
- there was only fair weather

Most inhabited regions are extremely unlike the desert region of Kuwait and west of Basra.
Kosovo is the better (and more recent) example, albeit not perfect.

1. yes, but the units were dug in a well camouflaged. Plus the ISR capability was more primitive.

2. The Iraqies had just come out out of a 10 year war with Iran. They were not incompetent, even if some employment was less than expert.

3. ManPADS have NOTHING to do with an altitude restricted air campaign. How many ManPADS have a 10k ft engagement sealing?

4. In both ODS and OIF air operations were halted for more than 12hrs at a time, totally due to poor weather. That never occurred in Kosovo.

And it's logically impossible to reply "Yes but ODS says otherwise. " in a context that was entirely about Yugoslavia.
In case you didn't notice we were having a general discussion about asymetric air campaigns, not Kosovo specifically. Perhapse you should actually read the thread before commenting on the context and the logical impossibility of my comments.
 

lastdingo

New Member
1. yes, but the units were dug in a well camouflaged. Plus the ISR capability was more primitive.
Camouflage is next to impossible in a desert. You can merely conceal. Even subterran fiberglass communication lines were spotted on aerial photography and cut with bombs.

2. The Iraqies had just come out out of a 10 year war with Iran. They were not incompetent, even if some employment was less than expert.
They were and are extremely incompetent. The Iraqi army fought the 1980-1988 Gulf War with the state of the art of 1917 (actually, even a bit worse than that in many regards).
The war of 1980-1988 was in a very different terrain against an enemy with a rather weak air force anyway.

3. ManPADS have NOTHING to do with an altitude restricted air campaign. How many ManPADS have a 10k ft engagement sealing?
"ceiling". Many ManPADS and crew-portable ADS have a good effective ceiling, in excess of 10k ft. The officially published figures aren't the real ones.

4. In both ODS and OIF air operations were halted for more than 12hrs at a time, totally due to poor weather. That never occurred in Kosovo.
You're joking, right?
Even wikipedia knows about the poor weather over the Balkans.
The quantity of sorties was very much reduced, attacks were hindered by cloud cover.
The same story as in WW2 - European weather reduces the maximum effect of air power very much.

I shouldn't have changed my text from "almost exclusively fair weather" to "only fair weather" - damn.

In case you didn't notice we were having a general discussion about asymetric air campaigns, not Kosovo specifically.
Well, you wrote misleadingly and the misleading text added an unfair opposition to the quoted text. He wrote specifically about Kosovo in the quote, and quotes are the relevant context.
 

Twister

New Member
It's true that Iraqi AD was better than Serbian AD during 1st Gulf War but what Iraqi AD missed out is failed in management of it.

With low moral of their soldier and the uncomfortable relation between Shias (majority) and Sunnis (the government), contribute major failure of Iraqi Armed Forces including Iraqi AD.

Both cases finnaly rely on not just on AD aset and IDS alone, but also human factor.
 

shrubage

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #26
There were some interesting points raised above, like Lastdingo I have to question how valid an example ODS is. Key points from that war were the location, open desert, huge dug in, yet very poorly concealed armoured formations located off main highways just to make sure the coalition couldn’t miss them. The most important point however is the sheer incompetence of the Iraqi army. Saddam Hussein thought that he could buy an army of the shelf, and ignore training and maintenance.

In the case of Serbia you had a collection of outdated systems, they had however developed indigenous repair facilities which also allowed for some local modifications, exactly the mentality the Iraqis lacked. They had well trained crews and they had prior warning of the attack.

Something that was also remarked upon by several people I talked to that witnessed the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo was how good their fieldcraft was. It takes skill to cam up large amounts of armoured vehicles and discipline to live under cam nets for long periods of time; they were also adept at constructing decoys. All concepts, that again were completely alien to the Iraqis. As Twister wrote above 'the human factor' Their low level air defence was never properly neutralised even though they did regularly turn their radars on, something that’s been downplayed by western air forces. Systems like the SA 13 were anyway completely passive. Bombing from above 10000 ft is fine if you’ve already got the target located.

So what did Serbian GBAD achieve, on the face of it they only shot down a single F117 with a locally modified SA 3 (no small thing). However the host of UAVs they shot down hurt the coalitions target acquisition, they forced the attacking planes to higher altitude, and they made sure the apache (an extremely overrated piece of kit) never even appeared.

The bombing of Serbia and ODS do have something in common and that’s the negligible effect of their respective Air Forces. I know of a single incident of a Mig 25 shooting down an F 18 but apart from that the Iraqi air force had no effect, their GBAD was the only source of resistance to the air attacks. In the case of Serbia their Mig 29s did make suicidal sorties against the coalition with the loss of 5 Mig 29s.

So what should a small nation do for Air defence, buy flashy jets which suck the defence budget dry but look good at flying shows, or modern GBAD that will at least give their ground forces a chance should the unthinkable ever happen.
 

Ozzy Blizzard

New Member
Camouflage is next to impossible in a desert. You can merely conceal. Even subterran fiberglass communication lines were spotted on aerial photography and cut with bombs.
Camouflage is more than possible in the desert if the asset is stationary. In fact it was quite difficult for coalition ISR assets to identify dug in tanks and APC's in 1991. Within a week they resorted to "tank plinking", using LANTIRN equipped strikers to attack the units during the early evening, because the amour cooled slower than the surrounding countryside. If you think the whole thing was a bunch of tanks painted bright red sitting around in the open your kidding yourself.


They were and are extremely incompetent. The Iraqi army fought the 1980-1988 Gulf War with the state of the art of 1917 (actually, even a bit worse than that in many regards).
The war of 1980-1988 was in a very different terrain against an enemy with a rather weak air force anyway.
Point is they had 10 years combat experience.

In any case their IADS was sound of concept and form. It was far more lethal than what NATO found in Serbia PERIOD. Using generic claims of incompetence will not alter this fact.



"ceiling". Many ManPADS and crew-portable ADS have a good effective ceiling, in excess of 10k ft. The officially published figures aren't the real ones.
Ah right this inside knowledge hey?:rolleyes:

Your right a 2~5kg IR guided missile conceptually designed for low altitude (primarily ant helo) work is going to be able to identify and effectively target tac air doing M.6 at 10k+ft and achieve the intercept? Are you kidding me?

You're joking, right?
Even wikipedia knows about the poor weather over the Balkans.
The quantity of sorties was very much reduced, attacks were hindered by cloud cover.
The same story as in WW2 - European weather reduces the maximum effect of air power very much.

I shouldn't have changed my text from "almost exclusively fair weather" to "only fair weather" - damn.
The fact is you severely underestimated the effect of the weather on ODS and OIF. During ODS the whole coalition air campaign was stopped for 72 hours, every single sortie, every single asset was grounded due to a sandstorm. Everything came to a screeching halt. Nothing of that magnitude happened over serbia, even if cloud effected strike results.

In any case could is becoming less of an issue, with moder SAR technology and J-series weapons, low cloud is no longer a hindrance to target acquisition and PGMs. Thus even today wheather of that sort would have less of an impact. A massive sandstorm however

Well, you wrote misleadingly and the misleading text added an unfair opposition to the quoted text. He wrote specifically about Kosovo in the quote, and quotes are the relevant context.
He used Kosovo as an example of the validity of GBAD during asymmetric air campaigns, I used ODS. They are both perfectly valid examples of an asymetric air campaign. This was not a specific discussion on Kosovo, it was a discussion on this type of conflict where Kosovo was used as an example but clearly you cant tell the difference.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Additionally I see a fundamental flaw in the strategic paradigm behind that statement. Whats the point of having an ADS? Or a military in fact? Hopefully it is to deter a conflict, and if there is one to defeat the other combatant. GBAD is a wholly defensive asset. It will not aid you in winning a war, it will just go some way to prevent you from losing one. In combination with other offensive assets such as tac air it can be very effective, but alone it is simply
a way to prolong the inevitable.
Ozzy something to keep in mind, GBAD can be used offensively because their engagement range can stretch over enemy air space. I think I've brought the example up before, Chinese S-300 system actually cover practically all the airspace over the Taiwan straight, skimming on the coastline of Taiwan proper. An S-400 deployment (if it's stated range is accurate) would give them reach over Taiwan proper. I actually agree with your overall point. The real problem is that we're considering a 3rd tier power fighting a first tier power. In that context, neither fighters nor SAMs are going to prevent the inevitable.

A much more interesting scenario would be to look at a situation of comparable powers, one of which invested in primarily the airforce, while the other spread out investment over airforce and GBAD, and see whether a combination of advanced GBAD and airborne asset is more effective that solely airborne assets. Because if datalinked to friendly aerial assets, the GBAD can deny airspace much more effectively, and SEAD becomes far more complicated.
 

shrubage

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #29
Camouflage is more than possible in the desert if the asset is stationary. In fact it was quite difficult for coalition ISR assets to identify dug in tanks and APC's in 1991.

Camming up and digging in a vehicle in the desert is entirely possible, but it takes well trained and motivated troops (living in dug in cammed up positions is hard work). The Iraqi army was neither I think you should beware of air power advocates attempting to big up the skill levels of the Iraqi army. The Iraqis dug in their armour in huge poorly camouflaged formations just off MSRs just so the coalition couldn't hope to miss them.

Point is they had 10 years combat experience.
Their 10 years of experience was utterly irrelevant. 10 Years of showing the world how not to fight a war. if anything it was a hindrance forming fatal bad habits. It smacks of the stories the public was told about the battle hardened determined Iraqis when desert shield was forming.

In any case their IADS was sound of concept and form.
Their IADS was bought off the shelf from foreign nations with Petrodollars. It was beyond the capacity of the Iraqi military to maintain, train , operate and command such a system or even fully appreciate its capabilities.

It was far more lethal than what NATO found in Serbia PERIOD. Using generic claims of incompetence will not alter this fact.
True it was potentially more lethal, but you're dazzled by the technical specifications and are forgetting the human element. If the Serbian military had the same equipment as the Iraqis my money would be on them having ridden out the air assault. True you had a collection of outdated systems; they had however developed indigenous repair facilities which also allowed for local modifications, exactly the mentality the Iraqis lacked. The F117 that was downed was shot down by an obsolete SA 3 that had been modified by indigenous industry; in turn the crew changed their procedures by operating the radar on a longer wavelength circumventing ECM and the F117s radar absorbent properties. I've worked with the Iraqi military and even now such military skills are beyond their comprehension.


Ah right this inside knowledge hey?:rolleyes:

Your right a 2~5kg IR guided missile conceptually designed for low altitude (primarily ant helo) work is going to be able to identify and effectively target tac air doing M.6 at 10k+ft and achieve the intercept? Are you kidding me?
The SA 13 is essentially an enlarged version of the SA 14(forgive me for using Nato designations) manpads. I believe this might be what lastdingo was referring to. It has a stated ceiling of 15000 ft but these systems have been modded by the Serbs and with good crews I'm willing to bet that ceiling could be extended.

Incidentally the South African Umkhonto missile is another IR guided missile but with twice the range and the option for course correction from a radar. The Thales ADATS is a completely passive tracking system for use with various systems. In future conflicts a bombardment such as the one against Serbia may become a far riskier business.

An S-400 deployment (if it's stated range is accurate) would give them reach over Taiwan proper.
Another example of this was I believe the attempt by the Greek Cypriot government to deploy S300 systems. This nearly resulted in renewed conflict. I've heard that in the case of actual deployment the Turks planned to use ground based artillery against them.
http://cns.miis.edu/research/cyprus/decision.htm
 

lastdingo

New Member
"Your right a 2~5kg IR guided missile conceptually designed for low altitude (primarily ant helo) work is going to be able to identify and effectively target tac air doing M.6 at 10k+ft and achieve the intercept? Are you kidding me?"

You're kidding yourself. There's no such thing as a "2~5 kg IR guided missile".
A little bit more comprehensive knowledge of SAM systems would tell you that ManPADs are in excess of 10 kg.

A little bit more thorough reading would have told you that I wrote about ManPADS and "crew-portable" systems. That includes systems like Starstreak, Bolide and RBS90.

Get yourself a copy of Jane's Land-based Air Defence.
The official maximum effective altitude/maximum engagement altitude pecs range from "2,300" to "5,000+ m". 10k ft is about 3,300m.

There are also some IR-guided AD missile systems that can engage much, much higher without any assistance by radar. Those systems aren't so well-known because the US and Russia prefer radar guidance for non-portable AD systems.
Mica, Aster/SAMP, SAVA, Pantsir, PL-9C and even the old Chapparal system, for example.

------------------

About camouflage; it's not camouflage if you've got a netting over your tank that makes your enemy wonder whether there's a tank of a stack of fuel drums below. That's concealment.
Camouflage is when the enemy doesn't recognize that there's something of relevance at all.
That's why I wrote that camouflage is pretty impossible in a desert (at least against a competent and well-equipped adversary). Concealment in desert = works if stationary. Camouflage: Forget about. The terrain lacks features (except in mountainous deserts).
All artificial things of relevant size are easily recognized as irregularity even with the naked eye.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Iraqi's did a pretty good jon camouflaging their their jets in the desert by burying them in sand. :rolleyes: :D
 

Twister

New Member
In open terrain like desert, camo has a great effect if done correctly. But in case of Iraqi during Gulf War, their camo still not good enough because their moral to fight already down.
 

Viktor

New Member
No. It's not possible. The first tier power can bring assets to the table that would be more then any GBAD-based IADS could handle. Jamming, stand-off munitions, and VLO, are just a handful of ways to negate the SAMs.
Well I agree with you that modest state can not repel pirst class airforce but still It can cause them a lots of troubles.
Remember now you have sytems that are mobile and can fire while in move (so you can forget about destroying those with stand-off missiles) .. secondly you will not know due to its mobility its location until it turns on its radar by witch time all can be late. Secondly you can not jamm laser guided missiles like RBS system or systems witch have redudant guidance like radar/IC/optical ... and third there are simply not enought stealth planes even in US so you can count those on.

Imagine 30-50 TOR-M1/RBS/Pancir-S1/or some other constantly changing location and poping out here and there with its lethal missiles .. shothin down you planes and stand-off missiles intended for military objects or infrastructure ...
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Exactly. They can cause damage, and raise the cost of the operation in terms of casualties but ultimately can't affect the outcome.
 

Twister

New Member
At least their present can be detect easily, can cause no confidence to their enemy air operation.

This strategies being used successfully by Serbian GBAD during NATO air raids and bu Mujahiddin during Soviet invasion.
 
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