Brigade and Regiment

[eckherl]

Ths, all reforms of forces in the West were/are are political decisions based on budgetry expediency. Over time this has driven defence users to push technological developments to "do more with less", hence the improved C3I.

There has been discussion of comparative enhancement in firepower in numerous forums, and so I am less surprised now when I hear that a modern tank can engage targets at 4000m rather then 1500m, which is also not true.

It was a well known practice in WW2 for Red Army tank units to fire intirect during initial breakthrough phases, so they clearly can engage targets at beyond 1500m. What you meant was that modern tanks are a lot more accurate. However this accurace still depends on LOS. I hope you will not be shocked to find out that the places on the planet's surface where LOS of 4000m is commonly encountered also by some weird coincidence happen to be testing grounds for tank gunnery
The average LOS in Europe during Cold War (and continues to be for all I know) had been variously reported over the decades as being between 600m and 1100m. If anything this has been reducing due to increased level of urbanisation and utility structure enhancements. This by the way is a major reason why some Soviet MRDs were changed to 2xMRR+2 TRs structure. This is because infantry has greater short range fire density then tank units.

From this perspective it seems to me tank effectiveness has not really increased. This is another thread, but what has increased in the West is tank crew survivability. This is a direct design legacy from German WW2 practice, and isunrelated to tactical structuring of the units. Given different tank design philosophy, the Soviet tanks have not changed significantly other then enhance rate of fire, which is logical if one considers that the targets are better armoured and faster moving in still shorter distances (compared to the more flat terrain of Western Russia and Ukrainian stepps.

As for WW1, Australians have a somewhat different expereince then "developed along the know "dinosaur" line where both
sides collected large parties to shoot at each other - leading to even larger parties collecting, as there was now more targets". The Ausralians were fortunate to have a number of outstanding commanders and troops that did not believe in being led like sheep to the slaughter. Sir John Monash developed a tactic which used small parties used to raid German positions, and later combined arms tactics which ensured reduced casualties and placed less emphasis on the sort of tactics that caused dreadfull Allied casualties elsewhere.

What do you mean by "use templates prescriptive instead of descriptive"?

"hindsight is valueless and you can only
be right, if you can be wrong. You must have a theory that can be disproven - a theory that is right in every imaginable
circumstance is worthless. "
Probably another thread for analyst phylosophy. However I disagree. A theory is always disprovable. The realm of an analyst is to provide application not theory, which is the realm of the academics. Academics may study and correlate data to provide 'hindsight' as you say, but the analyst is paid for foresight not hindsight.

Does it matter if Sweden is a nation or not in future? If it is a part of EU, it seems to me this hardly matters. Howeverthis s really off topic.

Cheerseasa
Greg

As technology becomes available it is feasable to destroy more of the enemy with less troops, as far as modern tanks go, why is it not possible to hit targets at 4000 meters, could you possibly do this in a desert environment.

 

[FutureTank]

"chicken and egg" approach to capability

Obviously technology is related to how combat formations are structured.

Does technology become available to enable less troops with more combat capability,
or
as the forces are reduced in size they require more technology to retain their combat capability?

It seems to me that study of history will show the Western practice since 1930s to have been dominated by dependence on the political considerations, budgetry restraints, shortage of personnel and nuclear weapons.

Then there is the larger commercial environment which did not exist in the Communist countries. DoD providers in free market economies need to make a profit. It is in their interest to sell the most profitable product, and this is suplemented by 'value adding'. This was as true in Germany of WW2 as it is in US today regardless of differences in society and political systems.

Is the M-1 and effective tank because it can engage targets at 4000m? No it is not, because the engagement distance is limited to very rarely occuring terrains. So what makes it effective? It seems to me the effectiveness is in ensuring crew survival, because it is this 'commodity' which is scarce. Just like Germany, NATO armies have a deficit of personnel, and therefore designs need to preserve whoever is available because training replacements during Cold War scenarios was not an option.

The Soviet tanks only claim a 3000m effective range. However their design retains 4 personnel for the tank (as opposed to 6 for the M-1), retains relatively same PWR, and fuel consumption, and adds an increased, and more importantly sustained rate of fire. Moreover they retain an excellent hulldown capability so important in tactics. Curiously I have been told again and again that this design precludes gun depression which is somehow crucial to tactical success, but of course that is why the Soviet tanks also have gun-tube launched ATGWs. These can be launched UP to be guided down for a top attack.

And so we have the M-1, a true successor to the panzers, stuffed full of wonderfull enabling technology. No longer defending Germany and its NATO standard bridging (with signs), it faces terrains of the Third World where even recently built roadways are likely to be built with substandard materials by unqualified contractors. And to get to all these places so that democracy can take root, the US DoD needs lots of fuel. All sorts of fuels in the last decades of the oil era.

Just like there are all kinds of bridges, there are also all kinds of deserts. The deserts are not uniform in their terrain features. Nor do deserts form a large or significant part of the globe's surface. Most deserts are of no interest to militaries because they are uninhabited, lack resources and are a logistic trap. Even the desert in Kuwait and Iraq are not so uniform as to afford unrestricted and constant 4000m visibility. If they were, would the AH-64s have been sent in to initiate operations in the night?

Are you saying that for example the XM-1 was designed with desert terrain in mind? I suspect not. It was initially a US-German design project for defense of Europe. The fact that the M-1s ended up being used in a desert does not justify a design that seeks to achieve a 4000m target acquisition. I need not remind you why the M-60 was never sent to Vietnam The M-48 could not be improved for that combat environemnt. Still, someone sold the US Army the M-551s

So what will the future brigade look like? From the various future technologies online sites they are likely to be complex, expensive, and even fewer in number. In a developed world short of labour, finding service personnel is going to be a difficult and expensive task, and the designers are undoubtedly even now thinking about the perfect tank

Cheers

Greg

 

[eckherl]

Obviously technology is related to how combat formations are structured.

Does technology become available to enable less troops with more combat capability,
or
as the forces are reduced in size they require more technology to retain their combat capability?

It seems to me that study of history will show the Western practice since 1930s to have been dominated by dependence on the political considerations, budgetry restraints, shortage of personnel and nuclear weapons.

Then there is the larger commercial environment which did not exist in the Communist countries. DoD providers in free market economies need to make a profit. It is in their interest to sell the most profitable product, and this is suplemented by 'value adding'. This was as true in Germany of WW2 as it is in US today regardless of differences in society and political systems.

Is the M-1 and effective tank because it can engage targets at 4000m? No it is not, because the engagement distance is limited to very rarely occuring terrains. So what makes it effective? It seems to me the effectiveness is in ensuring crew survival, because it is this 'commodity' which is scarce. Just like Germany, NATO armies have a deficit of personnel, and therefore designs need to preserve whoever is available because training replacements during Cold War scenarios was not an option.

The Soviet tanks only claim a 3000m effective range. However their design retains 4 personnel for the tank (as opposed to 6 for the M-1), retains relatively same PWR, and fuel consumption, and adds an increased, and more importantly sustained rate of fire. Moreover they retain an excellent hulldown capability so important in tactics. Curiously I have been told again and again that this design precludes gun depression which is somehow crucial to tactical success, but of course that is why the Soviet tanks also have gun-tube launched ATGWs. These can be launched UP to be guided down for a top attack.

And so we have the M-1, a true successor to the panzers, stuffed full of wonderfull enabling technology. No longer defending Germany and its NATO standard bridging (with signs), it faces terrains of the Third World where even recently built roadways are likely to be built with substandard materials by unqualified contractors. And to get to all these places so that democracy can take root, the US DoD needs lots of fuel. All sorts of fuels in the last decades of the oil era.

Just like there are all kinds of bridges, there are also all kinds of deserts. The deserts are not uniform in their terrain features. Nor do deserts form a large or significant part of the globe's surface. Most deserts are of no interest to militaries because they are uninhabited, lack resources and are a logistic trap. Even the desert in Kuwait and Iraq are not so uniform as to afford unrestricted and constant 4000m visibility. If they were, would the AH-64s have been sent in to initiate operations in the night?

Are you saying that for example the XM-1 was designed with desert terrain in mind? I suspect not. It was initially a US-German design project for defense of Europe. The fact that the M-1s ended up being used in a desert does not justify a design that seeks to achieve a 4000m target acquisition. I need not remind you why the M-60 was never sent to Vietnam The M-48 could not be improved for that combat environemnt. Still, someone sold the US Army the M-551s

So what will the future brigade look like? From the various future technologies online sites they are likely to be complex, expensive, and even fewer in number. In a developed world short of labour, finding service personnel is going to be a difficult and expensive task, and the designers are undoubtedly even now thinking about the perfect tank

Cheers

Greg

It wasn`t a matter of how effective a M1 series tank is at 4000 meters, it was the fact that you felt that it wasn`t possible. You brought up the LOS issue and with modern optics and ballistic computers this debate will go on and on.You are correct that the M1 series tank wasn`t designed for desert operations but no other tank out there is, exception being Leclerc, Merkava, but they tend to do quite well, I know first hand that my M1A1 never let me down. Dont be fooled with the terrian in Kuwait or Iraq, a lot of tank crews were able to extend maingun ranges beyond 3000 meters. I am interested in your source that states Russian claims for effective maingun ranges, effective against which type of target?. If you want we can take this to one of the tank topics, again may I offer that we take it to the T-90 vs Western Tanks, I would like to discuss some of your other comments also.

 

[Ths]

Future Tank: I really don't know how to explain it to You!

 

[FutureTank]

I know first hand that my M1A1 never let me down. I am interested in your source that states Russian claims for effective maingun ranges, effective against which type of target?. If you want we can take this to one of the tank topics, again may I offer that we take it to the T-90 vs Western Tanks, I would like to discuss some of your other comments also.

I have no doubt the M1 has never let you down. However you would have to admit that is has never been tested in the environment it was designed for.

Nor are my looking for a debate on optics and gun data systems, etc. There is not much point in debating "my tank is better then your tank". Been there done that. The vehicles in question have followed different design philosophies guided by different procurement strategies to satisfy different doctrines in different times. They are 'fruits' of different not just trees, but orchards!

I don't know enough on the T-90. I don't think very many people who do. It is not of consequence because its acceptance into Russian service is limited so far, and is not expected to be used in a conflict with NATO. It seems that India so far has been the only quantity client. Do you expect to be fighting Indians? (I hope you are not a cav trooper )

My point is that what I presented to you is rarely understood by the very ardent M1 defenders/promoters, nor is this known by people who critique the Russian tanks. Generally this is based on the very limited and atypical for the US Army combat environment unless the US Army expects to be fighting Arab armies until end of service life for the M1 (but they just keep rebuilding them )

My greatest concern is that Australia has comitted to this vehicle, and its a 70s design expected to serve into the 40s...thats 2040s. I wonder how much diesel will cost by then.

I think Americans above all should be able to appreciate that Russians are very able tank designers if only because they were able to recognize America's own tank 'Eddison', Christi's genius and build on it. It seems to me the Russians have this appreciation already. I really hope the two never meet in combat.

The discussion of tank vs tank is inconsequential, neither you nor certainly I would influence multi-million dollar contracts to change anything. The Russians are well aware of changes in foreign tank designs. They recently dumped a round which was found to be below required level of performance at 2,500m. I think they are more realistic about engagement ranges then US Army....in general.

Of course I'm not a tanker.

 

[Waylander]

Of course normal engagements of mech forces in middle europe would take place at not often more than 1500m. Sometime more and sometimes just some hundred meters.

But as long as I know the M1 has been tested during development with middle europe as the main battleground but also with some emphasis on other ennironments like deserts. In the end much more than for example the Leo II has been tested and both tanks are children of the tank 70 project.

 

[FutureTank]

Can somone clue me in on how to insert an image into my ID?

I think testing has been part of German marketing strategy. Leo II has become the default Eurotank despite French and UK efforts. However Germans never expected to sell them outside Europe anyway.

As long as we are on the subject of units and formations, what do people think about the size of tank platoon when operation in support of infantry, and is there a place for a specialist fire support platform when tanks are integrated at say battalion group (infantry) level.

 

[Waylander]

Supporting infantry with tanks works well by using the platoon sized (4 tanks) units. These 4 tanks can also again been split into 2 tank packs.
The best is when you mix mech inf with tanks. The mech inf has the experience needed when working together with tanks.
At company level you just give up one platoon of mech inf for one platoon of tanks.
On the other side the companies with two tank and one mech inf platoon form the fist.
Normally the mech inf and the tanks should be used to work together if the army has a proper combined arms doctrine.
Mortars (120mm on M113, Wiesel 2, AMOS, etc.) are very good when implemented at btl level.
Not especially because of lethality but because of fast available light and smoke support and their speed. The question for atillery support at brigade and divisional level often enough takes too long.
Together with the new ammo for mortars they are even more versatile and usefull.

If you support light infantry I think you should addd the tanks at btl level to give the btl commander the ability to send the punch where it is needed most and attach them temporarly to the unit which needs it most.
You should not attach them permanently to a company because in the end the light infantry and the tanks do not fit well together while moving.

 

[eckherl]

I have no doubt the M1 has never let you down. However you would have to admit that is has never been tested in the environment it was designed for.

Nor are my looking for a debate on optics and gun data systems, etc. There is not much point in debating "my tank is better then your tank". Been there done that. The vehicles in question have followed different design philosophies guided by different procurement strategies to satisfy different doctrines in different times. They are 'fruits' of different not just trees, but orchards!

I don't know enough on the T-90. I don't think very many people who do. It is not of consequence because its acceptance into Russian service is limited so far, and is not expected to be used in a conflict with NATO. It seems that India so far has been the only quantity client. Do you expect to be fighting Indians? (I hope you are not a cav trooper )

My point is that what I presented to you is rarely understood by the very ardent M1 defenders/promoters, nor is this known by people who critique the Russian tanks. Generally this is based on the very limited and atypical for the US Army combat environment unless the US Army expects to be fighting Arab armies until end of service life for the M1 (but they just keep rebuilding them )

My greatest concern is that Australia has comitted to this vehicle, and its a 70s design expected to serve into the 40s...thats 2040s. I wonder how much diesel will cost by then.

I think Americans above all should be able to appreciate that Russians are very able tank designers if only because they were able to recognize America's own tank 'Eddison', Christi's genius and build on it. It seems to me the Russians have this appreciation already. I really hope the two never meet in combat.

The discussion of tank vs tank is inconsequential, neither you nor certainly I would influence multi-million dollar contracts to change anything. The Russians are well aware of changes in foreign tank designs. They recently dumped a round which was found to be below required level of performance at 2,500m. I think they are more realistic about engagement ranges then US Army....in general.

Of course I'm not a tanker.

Well I know that the U.S Army doesn`t over estimate it`s capabilities with the M1 series tank, but it is a good tank be it 1970`s design or not. No one that I have worked with ever has taken the Russians half at heart for their tank technology, they have good tanks also. As far as having realistic tank ranges the U.S and Russia are pretty much on par with each other, we pretty much use the 2000 meter rule for ammunition penetration capabilities, are we going to use that range in Central Europe, of course not, you hit it right when you stated most battlesight gunnery ranges will be within 800 - 1200 meters. I think that you may be under the impression that I am biased when it comes to Russia`s capabilities, and I think you would be quite surprised to know that the U.S Army is very relieved that there wasn`t a Warsaw Pact and NATO showdown because we stood a good chance of losing.

 

[riksavage]

Leopard - European Tank of Choice

It amazes me that the Leopard is the Europe tank of choice when it has never seen any tank on tank combat!

Russian 'T' models and the Challenger and M1 varients are the only modern heavy (55-65 tonnes) armoured vehicles, which have been involved in tank on tank engagements in the last 25 years, above and beyond peacekeeping missions.

 

[Ths]

Riksavage:
One of the explanations is that Germany ended the cold war with lots of tanks on their hands. Denmark got rid of their last Centurions by getting newly updated Leo 1's at a low price.
Then we got a rather favourable offer on the LEO2 as I understand it. Same at other places.

And another consideration: As I understand it the Leo's are comparatively easy to maintain.

 

[FutureTank]

It amazes me that the Leopard is the Europe tank of choice when it has never seen any tank on tank combat!

Obviously your analytical skills are not advanced enough to penetrate the Marketing-Kampfbetriebe

 

[FutureTank]

I think that you may be under the impression that I am biased when it comes to Russia`s capabilities, and I think you would be quite surprised to know that the U.S Army is very relieved that there wasn`t a Warsaw Pact and NATO showdown because we stood a good chance of losing.

I have been in other forums where opinion was rather bias and less informed, but I try not jumpt to assumptions about people I don't know. Helps me not to make an ass out of u and me

The Cold War really ended in 1958, just no one noticed, or pretended not to 1963 just confirmed it.

 

[FutureTank]

Brigade group

Supporting infantry with tanks works well by using the platoon sized (4 tanks) units. These 4 tanks can also again been split into 2 tank packs.
The best is when you mix mech inf with tanks. The mech inf has the experience needed when working together with tanks.
At company level you just give up one platoon of mech inf for one platoon of tanks.
On the other side the companies with two tank and one mech inf platoon form the fist.
Normally the mech inf and the tanks should be used to work together if the army has a proper combined arms doctrine..

Ok, so here you are talking about mobile (by whatever traction method) infantry. Given likely combat this formation is expected to be in, is there a place for a mix of IFVs with different combat capabilities (heavy IFVs from converted tanks, tracked IFVs and ligher wheeled IFVs), or should the formation be homogenously equipped?
IF the more heterogeneous make up of the formation is preferred, is there a place for a specialist heavy command variant to ensure greater survival of this function within the unit?

Mortars (120mm on M113, Wiesel 2, AMOS, etc.) are very good when implemented at btl level.
Not especially because of lethality but because of fast available light and smoke support and their speed. The question for artillery support at brigade and divisional level often enough takes too long.
Together with the new ammo for mortars they are even more versatile and usefull..

Is this comment referring to tank battalion or mobile infantry battalion?
Russians are introducing close support specialist vehicles into tank battalions at significant numbers.
Is it possible that evolution of the tank may turn towards a more hybrid design not reliant solely on the main gun?

If you support light infantry I think you should add the tanks at btl level to give the btl commander the ability to send the punch where it is needed most and attach them temporarly to the unit which needs it most.
You should not attach them permanently to a company because in the end the light infantry and the tanks do not fit well together while moving.

This is a very interesting comment. In the West, post WW2 use of tanks in light infantry operations has been very limited in the type of combat environment sense. I can't recall the French having any expereince, and the British either. For the US the expereince has been limited to either predominantly jungle or more recently MOUT. On the other hand Soviet doctrine sought to integrate tanks into airborne operations from the 60s, and this was also attempted with use of M551.
Israelis have however shown that even in conventional terrain engagements tanks and light infantry are still reliant on good communication for effective conduct of battle.
Is there a place for introducing design changes to MBTs that allow for even closer light infantry cooperation, including ride-on capability in the tankodesantniki way? The flanks of the M1 for example provide for 170cm of height to position additional ride-cells to enable light infantry to accompany tanks until dismount without restricting use of tank's main armament (probably requiring development of new hearing protection and shock wave deflection measures; probably restricting tank speed). Once dismounted, the same cells can act as RPG screens.

 

[eckherl]

It amazes me that the Leopard is the Europe tank of choice when it has never seen any tank on tank combat!

Russian 'T' models and the Challenger and M1 varients are the only modern heavy (55-65 tonnes) armoured vehicles, which have been involved in tank on tank engagements in the last 25 years, above and beyond peacekeeping missions.

Even though the LEO2 has not been to combat I would not think twice about using one in combat, it truly is a good tank even though it may have some shortfalls, but every modern tank that is out there also has shortcomings.

 

[Ths]

Though I'm continuing out of the sidetrack:

I don't think it matters very much which tank you have, because the west will not go to a real war with them. I'm not knocking Iraq and such engagements; but they are not life or death struggles for the west.

The important job is to maintain and develop the organisation and tactics - new weapons will be constructed and produced when the time comes.

Look at the development times for - say new fighters - they get longer and longer. Presumably because you need to use more tricks to achieve an improvement. When technology shifts the new weapons will be produced in a very short timescale.
So the trick is NOT to be caught with huge stocks of recently aquired - slightly outdated - equipment.

There are two developments - i.e. that I can see - netcentric warfare and modularisation - that can have an impact in a future real-war scenario.

So what you need is ability to use these advantages, and that is organisation and development of tactics.
During the cold war it was a question of having the better tank (whatever that might be in your tactical context) - today the focus has shifted to a higher level. That is rather old Leo1 tanks with netcentric warfare, than a few supertanks without netcentric warfare.
Rather a lot of frigates with container plug-in weapons than a few cruisers that each carry everything - including the kitchen sink. The focus has shifted from the mashine to the force, from the captain to the colonel.

Another significant shift is from the massive emphasis on heavy forces to (and not away from) a combination of light, medium and heavy forces. But that is another thread.

 

[Waylander]

@FutureTank

Ok, so here you are talking about mobile (by whatever traction method) infantry. Given likely combat this formation is expected to be in, is there a place for a mix of IFVs with different combat capabilities (heavy IFVs from converted tanks, tracked IFVs and ligher wheeled IFVs), or should the formation be homogenously equipped?
IF the more heterogeneous make up of the formation is preferred, is there a place for a specialist heavy command variant to ensure greater survival of this function within the unit?

The problem with many different systems is that you have a lot more different maintenance problems.
For normal combined arms battles a traditional tracked IFV is the best solution. Wheeled versions are not able to keep up with the tanks and are too vulnearble against enemy IFVs and heavy IFVs like the Israeli designs are more battle taxis or HAPCs than IFVs. The weapons are more for self defense while bringing the infantry to the dismount point and not for active fire support.
Having a heavy command unit is not that important. Leading from the front is a main aspect of mechanized warfare so the leader should have the same euqipment and abilities like the rest.
And when you have a normal HQ behind the lines from btl level upwards you don't need a heavy armored command vehicle but a group of APCs, trucks, jeeps, etc.

Is this comment referring to tank battalion or mobile infantry battalion?
Russians are introducing close support specialist vehicles into tank battalions at significant numbers.
Is it possible that evolution of the tank may turn towards a more hybrid design not reliant solely on the main gun?

It is for both. You normally never let a tank btl or mech inf btl act alone. You always mix them. In germany the mortar units are attached to the mech inf btls and then used by the mixed groups. For example my old armored brigade would have had 2 tank btls, 2 mech inf btls, 1 SP artillery btl, 1 combat engineer company and 1 company of armored scouts.
So they would form 4 mixed btls with every btl having its mortars while the artillery, engineers and scouts not being attached permanently to one unit.

I don't think that tanks are going to be more hybrid. Guns are still the best weapon if it is about AT capabilities. Be it penetration or vulnerability against active protection systems. If you would attach more weapons to a tank it would even getting heavier.

This is a very interesting comment. In the West, post WW2 use of tanks in light infantry operations has been very limited in the type of combat environment sense. I can't recall the French having any expereince, and the British either. For the US the expereince has been limited to either predominantly jungle or more recently MOUT. On the other hand Soviet doctrine sought to integrate tanks into airborne operations from the 60s, and this was also attempted with use of M551.
Israelis have however shown that even in conventional terrain engagements tanks and light infantry are still reliant on good communication for effective conduct of battle.
Is there a place for introducing design changes to MBTs that allow for even closer light infantry cooperation, including ride-on capability in the tankodesantniki way? The flanks of the M1 for example provide for 170cm of height to position additional ride-cells to enable light infantry to accompany tanks until dismount without restricting use of tank's main armament (probably requiring development of new hearing protection and shock wave deflection measures; probably restricting tank speed). Once dismounted, the same cells can act as RPG screens.

The thing is that normally light infantry is often used in terrain where you are just not able to operate heavy armor like heavy wood or mountains.
The Lebanon conflict showed that the IDF need a real IFV. They were just not able to attach real infantry support to their fast engaging tank packs. Tanks and light infantry just work good together while moving slowly like in MOUT operations or when being in a defense position with not much room for a mobile defense.

Why should you use tanks for transporting infantry? Use the IFVs designed for it. Using tanks for this would just result in them being restricted in using their full capabilities while IFVs don't have these restrictions while tranpsorting infantry and protect it better than any attached cells could ever do.

 

[eckherl]

@FutureTank



The problem with many different systems is that you have a lot more different maintenance problems.
For normal combined arms battles a traditional tracked IFV is the best solution. Wheeled versions are not able to keep up with the tanks and are too vulnearble against enemy IFVs and heavy IFVs like the Israeli designs are more battle taxis or HAPCs than IFVs. The weapons are more for self defense while bringing the infantry to the dismount point and not for active fire support.
Having a heavy command unit is not that important. Leading from the front is a main aspect of mechanized warfare so the leader should have the same euqipment and abilities like the rest.
And when you have a normal HQ behind the lines from btl level upwards you don't need a heavy armored command vehicle but a group of APCs, trucks, jeeps, etc.



It is for both. You normally never let a tank btl or mech inf btl act alone. You always mix them. In germany the mortar units are attached to the mech inf btls and then used by the mixed groups. For example my old armored brigade would have had 2 tank btls, 2 mech inf btls, 1 SP artillery btl, 1 combat engineer company and 1 company of armored scouts.
So they would form 4 mixed btls with every btl having its mortars while the artillery, engineers and scouts not being attached permanently to one unit.

I don't think that tanks are going to be more hybrid. Guns are still the best weapon if it is about AT capabilities. Be it penetration or vulnerability against active protection systems. If you would attach more weapons to a tank it would even getting heavier.



The thing is that normally light infantry is often used in terrain where you are just not able to operate heavy armor like heavy wood or mountains.
The Lebanon conflict showed that the IDF need a real IFV. They were just not able to attach real infantry support to their fast engaging tank packs. Tanks and light infantry just work good together while moving slowly like in MOUT operations or when being in a defense position with not much room for a mobile defense.

Why should you use tanks for transporting infantry? Use the IFVs designed for it. Using tanks for this would just result in them being restricted in using their full capabilities while IFVs don't have these restrictions while tranpsorting infantry and protect it better than any attached cells could ever do.

Good post Waylander

 

[Ths]

I agree very much with eckherl as Waylander is adressing a crucial aspect:

To maintain the mutual support of combined arms the different arms must be able to stick together without encumbring the other.

Light (or motorised) forces have high operational mobility, as they can get where they are going without waiting for their heavy luggage - and they can go places where the heavier forces cannot go without running out of supplies.
The disadvantage of light forces is that once in position, they cannot maneuvre in the face of armoured opposition. I.e. they have slight tactical mobility.

Heavy (or armoured) forces take a long time getting ready and and have a big logistic footprint. But if you need to kick the door in, there is no avoiding armour.

Medium (or mechanised) are somewhere in between.

One isn't better (or cheaper for that matter) than the other - they are different.

The trick is to deploy the light forces BEFORE the bad guys arrive, dig in and fight the bad guys from prepared positions.
When the mechanised arrive they are ready to deal with enemy break throughs - preferrably when the enemy's heavies run out of gas - and harrass the enemy's supply trucks.
When the armour arrive they break through the enemy's line and secure the breakthrough agains especially the enemy's medium force moving in to stop the rot.
Once the hole has been punched the mechanised move though the hole and drive like hell while avoinding enemy strongpoints - trying to secure bridges before they can be blown.
The motorised move in to secure the supply lines.

just a rough sketch.

 

[FutureTank]

@FutureTank
The problem with many different systems is that you have a lot more different maintenance problems.

So this is a challenge for engineering design in using modularity?

For normal combined arms battles a traditional tracked IFV is the best solution. Wheeled versions are not able to keep up with the tanks and are too vulnerable against enemy IFVs and heavy IFVs like the Israeli designs are more battle taxis or HAPCs than IFVs. The weapons are more for self defence while bringing the infantry to the dismount point and not for active fire support.

Yes, of course you are right here.

Having a heavy command unit is not that important. Leading from the front is a main aspect of mechanized warfare so the leader should have the same equipment and abilities like the rest. And when you have a normal HQ behind the lines from btl level upwards you don't need a heavy armoured command vehicle but a group of APCs, trucks, jeeps, etc. .

Maybe I wasn’t clear, but the intention s to protect the systems that make the ‘netcentric’ environment possible. It seems that transition to ‘netcentric’ environment is intended to reduce significance of “HQ behind the lines”, particularly where there are no ‘lines’. Is this a reasonable line of thinking?

It is for both. You normally never let a tank btl or mech inf btl act alone. You always mix them. .

Always?! There are many possible contingencies where balanced mixing will not be possible or desirable.

In Germany the mortar units are attached to the mech inf btls and then used by the mixed groups. For example my old armoured brigade would have had 2 tank btls, 2 mech inf btls, 1 SP artillery btl, 1 combat engineer company and 1 company of armored scouts.
So they would form 4 mixed btls with every btl having its mortars while the artillery, engineers and scouts not being attached permanently to one unit. .

What about the inclusion of the DFWS some manufacturers are marketing? The US has begun accepting the Gun System for Stryker Brigades, but I sincerely doubt its tactical utility, particularly when tanks are available.

I don't think that tanks are going to be more hybrids. Guns are still the best weapon if it is about AT capabilities. Be it penetration or vulnerability against active protection systems. If you would attach more weapons to a tank it would even getting heavier. .

This may be the case with tank designs from NATO countries, but Russian designs can easily accommodate multiple remotely operated turrets while still remaining in the ‘MBT’ margins by NATO standards (under 60t). For example the BMPT based on the T-90(72) chassis can manifest itself in future as a design with a main and an auxiliary turret and incorporating the AGLs as well as SAM systems. There is history of multi-turreted tanks, including from pre-WW2 German designs, and a hybrid tank such as this would alleviate the need for more infantry to be attached (for professional/volunteer armies).

Why should you use tanks for transporting infantry? Use the IFVs designed for it. Using tanks for this would just result in them being restricted in using their full capabilities while IFVs don't have these restrictions while transporting infantry and protect it better than any attached cells could ever do.

I was referring to Light Infantry which does not have such IFVs available to it, but may need to have local AO limited mobility when operating with tanks.