ADF General discussion thread

Bob53

Well-Known Member
I would have to agree with you. The problem with turning the Army into USMC lite effectively is that it is not a true like for like transformation. That is because the USMC still has the US Army to provide heavy capabilities and act as a replacement force. There is also all of the other capabilities that the US Navy provide (amphibious lift, logistics etc) which the RAN does not have in abundance. Plus there is the USMC combat aviation which the RAAF can't and doesn't replicate.
That Marines usually go first if there is an assault. Does that mean if there is a pacific war our Army will be first echelon on the beach?
 

Armchair

Active Member
Take for instance the USMC decision to disestablish it's Tank capability, apparently in the belief that if (when) the USMC needs armoured support, that can be supplied by the US Army who still retains tanks.
I am not sure that is their thinking in relation to the western Pacific theatre. The USMC is not (or should not be) planning on the arrival of US Army tanks to defeat the PLA. That is because the US does not expect to have secure SLOCs to deploy and sustain armour en masse and the PLA does not have secure SLOCs to deploy armour en masse beyond Taiwan (and probably not even that far).

Armour for the ADF would still be decisive in a range of scenarios but the ADF would have even bigger problems than the US sending it very far in that theatre.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
To me it looks like we are building the capability to deploy armour within our region to provide overmatch.

The continuing program towards a top level armoured combat engineering capability look very much like what was developed by the end of WWII.

What I would be looking out for is an announcement on the acquisition of Typhon. It would be interesting to see if it could be integrated into the ADFs new air defence missile capability.
 

south

Well-Known Member
The LR AD system is going to be operated by the RAAF, the problem with that is, the RAAF has zero institutional experience in operating SAMs, there are no units that could be converted, not even a Corps of SAM operators. They are going to have to build this capability totally from scratch. In this regard they are even further behind the 8-ball than Army is with HIMARS, Army will convert RAA personnel to operate them.
While the RAAF haven’t operated a SAM in recent memory, they do have significant relevant experience. The RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group, using Wakulda already fuse information from ground and air based sensors, linked through tactical and strategic data-links, to provide the Australian Recognised Air Picture. Of the three services Air Force also has the greatest depth of knowledge of Air Defence/ADIZ structure, design and implementation, and retains most of the ADF’s experience in operating Command and Control/Battle Management for those missions. Significantly, it has exercised these concepts the joint environment with the RAN employing surface based SAMs. The humans operating these systems already perform a much of the mission you describe, with the only real exception lack of organic means to engage a target.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
To me it looks like we are building the capability to deploy armour within our region to provide overmatch.

The continuing program towards a top level armoured combat engineering capability look very much like what was developed by the end of WWII.

What I would be looking out for is an announcement on the acquisition of Typhon. It would be interesting to see if it could be integrated into the ADFs new air defence missile capability.
The large acquisition of medium and heavy landing craft will certainly support the notion that we "are building the capability to deploy armour within our region to provide overmatch."
It will be interesting as the what the structure of the Littoral Lift Groups look like.

Are they to be just a marine transport group. "Floating trucks"!
Or will they more of a integrated marine combat force in structure.
If so what does that look like.

This will be an interesting space to watch.


Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
While the RAAF haven’t operated a SAM in recent memory, they do have significant relevant experience. The RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group, using Wakulda already fuse information from ground and air based sensors, linked through tactical and strategic data-links, to provide the Australian Recognised Air Picture. Of the three services Air Force also has the greatest depth of knowledge of Air Defence/ADIZ structure, design and implementation, and retains most of the ADF’s experience in operating Command and Control/Battle Management for those missions. Significantly, it has exercised these concepts the joint environment with the RAN employing surface based SAMs. The humans operating these systems already perform a much of the mission you describe, with the only real exception lack of organic means to engage a target.
It will be very interesting to see if the ADF eventually gets Typhon and if so, how it is integrated.

It's basically a truck / trailor based Mk-41, more complex than that I know, but in essence it will provide a mobile land based potential to launch anything that is currently integrated with the Mk-41.

Hooking into the RAAF led air defence environment could result in a distributed air defence system, able to engage and provide a level of defence against China's substantial.area denial and strategic missile threat.

Going forward Typhon will likely introduce other missiles already integrated or being integrated with Mk-41. This could include SM-3, and PAC-3 (double packed I believe), in addition to the current SM-6 and Tomahawks used in the strike role.

Quad pocked ESSM Block 2 with its active homing would be a no brainer.

Like you said, the people and the integrated systems already exist. They can be grown further and just need the sticks to throw.
 
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Armchair

Active Member
To me it looks like we are building the capability to deploy armour within our region to provide overmatch.
Yes but with the proviso that the way it is being built might limit the effectiveness of the capability (as discussed in the Australian Army thread, issues include: maintaining readiness, training in the wet season, integrating with reserves, retention in Townsville, concentrating entire mechanized capacity in one brigade and the total mass and balance of that brigade).
 

TScott

Member
It will be very interesting to see if the ADF eventually gets Typhon and if so, how it is integrated.

It's basically a truck / trailor based Mk-41, more complex than that I know, but in essence it will provide a mobile land based potential to launch anything that is currently integrated with the Mk-41.

Hooking into the RAAF led air defence environment could result in a distributed air defence system, able to engage and provide a level of defence against China's substantial.area denial and strategic missile threat.

Going forward Typhon will likely introduce other missiles already integrated or being integrated with Mk-41. This could include SM-3, and PAC-3 (double packed I believe), in addition to the current SM-6 and Tomahawks used in the strike role.

Quad pocked ESSM Block 2 with its active homing would be a no brainer.

Like you said, the people and the integrated systems already exist. They can be grown further and just need the sticks to throw.
It's not a truck/trailer is it?

It's containerized in a 40ft shipping container footprint

Correct me if im wrong, but isn't the truck simply a large haul truck with the required load and size for the 40ft container, nothing too special at all? It looks like some generators etc to power the container module in front of the containers on the truck body.

With the naval test firing on the Independence Class from just the Typhon containers themselves?

There's advantages to it being permanently on a truck obviously, but theoretically, it (the container) could just be dumped in a jungle somewhere with a diesel generator?


See below

1713760085216.png


1713760399137.png
 
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AndyinOz

Member
100m aid package foe ukraine. Very surprised to see us letting go the RBS-70 given our extremely limited AD options.
I am assuming that is due to thinking that NASAMS is or can be brought online as a replacement for the RBS-70 quickly without too big of a gap so that gifting them to Ukraine is seen as being do-able.
 

SammyC

Well-Known Member
I remember that Sweden donated a lot of their RBS70 stock earlier in the conflict, so our RBS70 holdings likely match the Ukrainian existing logistics and training. So a useful contribution, albeit a bit of an older system now.

Also like what Andy said, NASAMS isn't that far away
 

Lolcake

Active Member
I am assuming that is due to thinking that NASAMS is or can be brought online as a replacement for the RBS-70 quickly without too big of a gap so that gifting them to Ukraine is seen as being do-able.
Understand, but Nasams are not exactly as mobile or subtle as manpads. Not a big fan of this move.

I can only assume the propellants are near the end of their shelf life as they have been around for a fair while. If that were the case then this move makes sense. But I don't see any replacement in any of the recent press/review releases.
 
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OldTex

Well-Known Member
As I understand it, the new requirement is to be able to project land force in Australia’s immediate region (replacing the previous effective mission of generating under equipped battle groups for west Asian contingencies). Both sides in a potential major conflict in the Pacific seek to be able to deny access to hostile surface ships (increasingly relying on land-based maritime strike to do that but also submarines, sea mines and land based air). Denial of access ensures that massed armoured formations in a Pacific war are unlikely because the ships to lift and sustain those troops won’t be committed until the seas are safe (a particularly pressing problem for Australia with limited escorts).

Australia is acquiring some of the capabilities to participate in such a denial strategy. I guess the change can be understood in this way. The previous plan envisaged a regiment of SPHs supporting the (continent-based) manouevre of combined arms battlegroups, the new plan is centred around batteries of long range strike missiles on islands with the infantry protecting them.
If the ADF, and Army in particular, is to be focused on A2/AD using long range land based antiship missiles enabled by littoral manouevre utilising organic vessels (LMV-M and LMV-H), one question is how are all of these vital assets going to be protected? The valuable and limited assets will need protection from a range of land and air based threats (maritime threats would be covered by the AShMs themselves).

If 2 AShM launchers (and associated resupply vehicles) are forward deployed then at least SHORAD and perhaps even VSHORAD launcherswould need to be colocated or close by. The number of valuable and limited assets have now increased at each position (making that position more likely to be targetted). For protection against ground based threats to both the AShM launchers and SHORAD, and to protect the entry and exit points plus the logistic position, it would start to require at least a CT (reinforced inf coy) provided with indirect fire support (most likely mortars).

The risk is now to the littoral manouevre vessels as the position can be reduced by cutting it off from effective resupply and sustainment. It would be unlikely that even Tier 2 warships (be they patrol frigates or whatever is eventually procured) will be available as escorts. In this case the LMVs would have to either operate unprotected or the role may fall to whatever MWVs (PBs and OPVs) that can be released.
 

Armchair

Active Member
If the ADF, and Army in particular, is to be focused on A2/AD using long range land based antiship missiles enabled by littoral manouevre utilising organic vessels (LMV-M and LMV-H), one question is how are all of these vital assets going to be protected? The valuable and limited assets will need protection from a range of land and air based threats (maritime threats would be covered by the AShMs themselves).

If 2 AShM launchers (and associated resupply vehicles) are forward deployed then at least SHORAD and perhaps even VSHORAD launcherswould need to be colocated or close by. The number of valuable and limited assets have now increased at each position (making that position more likely to be targetted). For protection against ground based threats to both the AShM launchers and SHORAD, and to protect the entry and exit points plus the logistic position, it would start to require at least a CT (reinforced inf coy) provided with indirect fire support (most likely mortars).

The risk is now to the littoral manouevre vessels as the position can be reduced by cutting it off from effective resupply and sustainment. It would be unlikely that even Tier 2 warships (be they patrol frigates or whatever is eventually procured) will be available as escorts. In this case the LMVs would have to either operate unprotected or the role may fall to whatever MWVs (PBs and OPVs) that can be released.
I suspect the ADF investment is to participate as a component in a broader allied network to provide protection. The minor warfare vessels don’t have the capacity to protect (they would need to be escorted) so they are not part of the solution (and are being cut).

I agree that the sovereign capability to participate in this strategy is a long way off.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I suspect the ADF investment is to participate as a component in a broader allied network to provide protection. The minor warfare vessels don’t have the capacity to protect (they would need to be escorted) so they are not part of the solution (and are being cut).

I agree that the sovereign capability to participate in this strategy is a long way off.
Consider the larger implications of what you seem to be suggesting is the gov't objective of a "focused force" which would require allied participation to be effective (potentially, it still might fail even if the focus were actually correct).

There is a reason why I have repeatedly referred to the apparent strategy as a DDoA strategy. If the realignment of ADF capabilities is to make the ADF into a component of an allied/coalition force, then it would seem the GotD is ceding, not only for now but also a good bit into the future and future gov'ts, Australia's ability to act independently. It would also seem that the GotD is limiting potential options to respond for future gov'ts, particularly when whatever is occurring is not the (seemingly) narrow range of scenarios that current force focus seems to be considering.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The answer is the integration of land based air defence within the fires brigade, as well as the increase of major combatant numbers by eight.

Remember, for the first time in over 25 years the number of majors is being planned to increase, and doing so quite significantly. The individual capability of even the tier 2 majors will dramatically increase.

The capability of the Army's air defence is also increasing, as is the ADFs over all air defence and surface strike capability.

Add to this the pivoting of the infantry in particular, but the ADFs brigades in general, to a more amphibious structure, able to deploy with and protect the long range fires.

Don't forget the massive leaps in capability in surveillance and situational awareness.

This mission set is the reason why the ADF is now only getting one, instead of three hardened brigades.

I'm not saying it's right or wrong but this is what the DSR is indicating.
 

old faithful

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If the ADF, and Army in particular, is to be focused on A2/AD using long range land based antiship missiles enabled by littoral manouevre utilising organic vessels (LMV-M and LMV-H), one question is how are all of these vital assets going to be protected? The valuable and limited assets will need protection from a range of land and air based threats (maritime threats would be covered by the AShMs themselves).

If 2 AShM launchers (and associated resupply vehicles) are forward deployed then at least SHORAD and perhaps even VSHORAD launcherswould need to be colocated or close by. The number of valuable and limited assets have now increased at each position (making that position more likely to be targetted). For protection against ground based threats to both the AShM launchers and SHORAD, and to protect the entry and exit points plus the logistic position, it would start to require at least a CT (reinforced inf coy) provided with indirect fire support (most likely mortars).

The risk is now to the littoral manouevre vessels as the position can be reduced by cutting it off from effective resupply and sustainment. It would be unlikely that even Tier 2 warships (be they patrol frigates or whatever is eventually procured) will be available as escorts. In this case the LMVs would have to either operate unprotected or the role may fall to whatever MWVs (PBs and OPVs) that can be released.
The reenforced infantry company would really need to be the size 2 RAR or close to it, you are looking at 5 Platoons plus logistics for it to provide any long term defence, and even a Company of that size is short if it were to provide standing patrols and send out clearing patrols and fighting patrols. Then you have the fatigue and boredom to contend with when a company is deployed long term with not much to do. I really dont like this idea of the shore based anti ship missile, it can work both ways, you can use them to "channel" the enemy into a kill zone, or the enemy can make you deploy and re deploy all over the place, stretching your logistics and playing with moral.
 
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