Capabilities of Ground based Air defence.

shrubage

New Member
Have recent advances in short and medium reached the stage where a country with a relatively modest defence budget could stave off air attack by a first tier air power ?.I’m thinking in particular of conflicts such as the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the first gulf war.

With modern Medium range systems such as the RBS 23 (http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bamse/) appearing on the market, could a small to medium sized country develop a ground based air defence network that could protect against an air campaign of similar intensity to the above examples?.
 

Feanor

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Staff member
No. It's not possible. The first tier power can bring assets to the table that would be more then any GBAD-based IADS could handle. Jamming, stand-off munitions, and VLO, are just a handful of ways to negate the SAMs.
 

Ozzy Blizzard

New Member
No. It's not possible. The first tier power can bring assets to the table that would be more then any GBAD-based IADS could handle. Jamming, stand-off munitions, and VLO, are just a handful of ways to negate the SAMs.
Agreed. A first tier air power would not have any trouble with a medium sized GBAD centric (I)ADS. Remember as always offensive and defensive technology are both moving foreword, but tier one powers will always have access to more advanced capabilities across the spectrum. That in addition to the mass large air powers bring to theater means a medium sized/dense IADS is going to have real trouble with a tier one power.
 

shrubage

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My understanding is that even a nation with limited funds would be able to equip itself with systems such as the south african Umkhonto, swedish RBS23 and russian SA 11, and the command and control systems to allow them to be integrated. I'm excluding systems such as patriot and the S300 on purely cost grounds.

All these systems are state of the art use a variety of guidance systems, and were designed to take into account heavy ECM enviroments and anti radiation missiles. Surely they would be a better investment than a handful of fighters that would probably never make it into the air.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
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"Never make it into the air" depends mostly on the standoff distance between detection and airbase, obviously.
Any (Western) QRA worth its money will be combat-ready at 20k feet in under 5 minutes after an alert.

If you have a (relatively) large amount of territory to protect, a fighter squadron will always be more cost-effective.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think you're changing the question. Your original question was whether a small country can protect itself effectively from a first tier power with GBAD. The answer is no. It can't. It can't protect itself from a first rate power PERIOD. Regardless of whether they're GBAD-centric or has an effective airforce, it simply can't handle even the attrition, never mind the capability overmatch that a first-tier power brings to the table.

But as to whether which one would me more effective or advisable in general, for example against other secondary and tertiary powers, it is indeed more effective to have at least a single fighter squadron.
 

der_Master

New Member
Not to mention the fact that the ground based anti air defences could easily be identified by satellite and then taken out by tomahawk cruise missiles. Following that the B-1s and B-2 bombers would just clear up what’s left.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
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Errm, that's why modern air defense is pretty mobile ... and moves around. A lot. You won't find a SAM site where it was on the satellite pictures from 6-8 hours earlier.

NATO actually fired off a relatively serious percentage of its stockpile of HARM in 1999. Iirc something like 30% for Germany, for example.
 

Twister

New Member
As long as the GBAD manage wisely, it's not a big problem at all.

With various MANPADS and light LML SAM nowadays, it's hard to says.

Even Soviet stuck during fighting with Afghan Mujahideen.
 

Feanor

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Staff member
Errm, that's why modern air defense is pretty mobile ... and moves around. A lot. You won't find a SAM site where it was on the satellite pictures from 6-8 hours earlier.

NATO actually fired off a relatively serious percentage of its stockpile of HARM in 1999. Iirc something like 30% for Germany, for example.
Modern GBAD is extremely mobile. Even a high-end system like the S-300 has a deployment time of 5 minutes. The problem is that it simply can't survive long term against a protracted air war, without it's own air support. That's not to say GBAD is useless, but you need a combination of GBAD and fighters, datalinked into a single IADS.
 

nevidimka

New Member
Modern GBAD is extremely mobile. Even a high-end system like the S-300 has a deployment time of 5 minutes. The problem is that it simply can't survive long term against a protracted air war, without it's own air support. That's not to say GBAD is useless, but you need a combination of GBAD and fighters, datalinked into a single IADS.
I have an issue with IADS. Having it is all nice as you get the big picture and use your defenses effectively. But what if the opponent effectively jam/fool your IADS? Then your laid bare for an attack 24/7 without any defences isnt it?
 

Twister

New Member
Agree..

IADS or SAM alone can't give a significant factor of effective GBAD. To ensure GBAD fully effective even with small or moderate equipment or asset, both asset and manpower should matching.

Even USAF F/A-117 can be taken down by Serbian GBAD lead by Dani, a good example of manpower, IADS & SAM collaboration.
 

shrubage

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I think the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo might strengthen the case for ground based air defence. While the bombing hit the countries infrastructure hard, its effect tactically on the serbian military was minimal.

Serbia had a comprehensive if outdated ground based air defence system which while causing relatively few casualties to the attacking air forces did effectively neutralise a large portion the attack by forcing them into high altitude bombing. I would suggest that facing latest generation SAM systems, an air campaign of that magnitude would suffer high casualties.
 

Twister

New Member
Agree.

GBAD has proven to be better if all elements in good cooperation, Asset, IADS & manpower.

GBAD also proven to be important for any Armed Forces of the world since it's has proof itself during WWII, Vietnam Wars, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan & Serbian Conflict.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo might strengthen the case for ground based air defence. While the bombing hit the countries infrastructure hard, its effect tactically on the serbian military was minimal.
That's because the campaign was relatively short in length, and not nearly as intense as for example ODS. In ODS a much (by an order of magnitude) more capable Iraqi IADS was torn to shreds by a superior air campaign. The simple matter of fact is that 1) GBAD alone is not enough and 2) an IADS includes airborne components as well as GBAD.

Serbia had a comprehensive if outdated ground based air defence system which while causing relatively few casualties to the attacking air forces did effectively neutralise a large portion the attack by forcing them into high altitude bombing. I would suggest that facing latest generation SAM systems, an air campaign of that magnitude would suffer high casualties.
Serbian SAMs were silent for most of the time. Their IADS was hardly an IADS. It was more like a number of separate SAM units, rather then a thoroughly networked and centralized system.
 

shrubage

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That's because the campaign was relatively short in length, and not nearly as intense as for example ODS. In ODS a much (by an order of magnitude) more capable Iraqi IADS was torn to shreds by a superior air campaign. The simple matter of fact is that 1) GBAD alone is not enough and 2) an IADS includes airborne components as well as GBAD.

Serbian SAMs were silent for most of the time. Their IADS was hardly an IADS. It was more like a number of separate SAM units, rather then a thoroughly networked and centralized system.
The low intensity of the campaign owes much to the fact that low level bombing missions weren't carried out due to fears of casualties from serbian air defence systems. Especially passive systems such as the SA-13. That you do not consider the serbs to have had a proper IADS makes the achievement all the more impressive.

In the case of the first gulf war, it was never going to be a case that the Iraqi air force for all the money that had been invested in it could put up any serious resistance. The majority of coalition aircraft lost were to GBAD. Even though the Iraqies did have state of the art systems their handling of them was poor.

I would still suggest that for a nation of modest means to build defences against air attacks such as the examples given, fighter aircraft would be a waste of money. Expensive to purchase with huge maintainance requirements, flying from a few fixed locations, they would be overwhelmed by superior numbers.

For the price of a single squadron of modern jet fighter an IADS could be built, based around systems such as the 35mm skyshield, Umkhonto IR, RBS 23 and SA 11 all modern designs built to operate in a heavy ECM enviroment.
 

Ozzy Blizzard

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The low intensity of the campaign owes much to the fact that low level bombing missions weren't carried out due to fears of casualties from serbian air defence systems. Especially passive systems such as the SA-13. That you do not consider the serbs to have had a proper IADS makes the achievement all the more impressive.
Bombing at high level was not due to the serbian GBAD being so capable it denied that airspace to NATO, it was simply to keep casualty levels as low as possible. NATO knew they didnt need to risk low altitude stuff, and would have remained at high altitude even if serbian GBAD was limited to AAA. NATO defiantly could have effectively operated at low altitude and sustained higher loss rates, but they achieved the operations objective without taking the risk. The fact that NATO remained at altitude doesn't say much about the capability of GBAD, it says more about the political context of the campaign.

In any case remaining at high altitude can still have significant results. The vast majority of the ODS campaign, interdiction missions, were restricted to remain above 10k ft, and then coalition aircraft were using dumb weapons bombing via radar. The effects on dug in ground formations were massive. The Iraqi army in Kuwait was systematically annihilated. With the right ISR assets, enough mass, enough time and an all (or mostly) PGM assault the attacking air froce wont need to move to low level to have devastating effects, and the majority of GBAD systems will not be able to have any effect. All that needs to be dealt with are the usually small number of radar guided high altitude SAM systems and the tier one power owns the airspace.


In the case of the first gulf war, it was never going to be a case that the Iraqi air force for all the money that had been invested in it could put up any serious resistance. The majority of coalition aircraft lost were to GBAD. Even though the Iraqies did have state of the art systems their handling of them was poor.
Iraq still had one of the most capable IADS on planet earth, and it was smashed in 3 days.

The Iraqi air force had been built to fight Iran, and was reasonably capable at doing that. It was not intended to take on the most capable air power on the planet. A modern air force would have a similar effect in terms of losses in the opening stages of an asymmetric conflict. It would get smashed yes, but the losses inflicted could be comparable to high end IADS.

Anyway unless you have one specific tier one power vs little tier three threat Fighters are invaluable. Fighters are intended to dominate battle-space and in any other range of scenario's that don't include massive superpowers bearing down on you they are indispensable. How are you supposed to dominate battle-space with a purely defensive weapon system? Short answer, you cant.

I would still suggest that for a nation of modest means to build defenses against air attacks such as the examples given, fighter aircraft would be a waste of money. Expensive to purchase with huge maintainance requirements, flying from a few fixed locations, they would be overwhelmed by superior numbers.

For the price of a single squadron of modern jet fighter an IADS could be built, based around systems such as the 35mm skyshield, Umkhonto IR, RBS 23 and SA 11 all modern designs built to operate in a heavy ECM enviroment.
If the primary threat was a major superpower bearing down on you then i agree, but if the military concerned plans on waging any other campaigns or improving the nations soft power then an IADS alone doesn't do all that much for you.

In any case the little (I)ADS isn't going to stop the tier one power dominating the airspace above your deployed units and interdicting your supply lines at will.
 

shrubage

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Bombing at high level was not due to the serbian GBAD being so capable it denied that airspace to NATO, it was simply to keep casualty levels as low as possible. NATO knew they didnt need to risk low altitude stuff, and would have remained at high altitude even if serbian GBAD was limited to AAA.

NATO defiantly could have effectively operated at low altitude and sustained higher loss rates, but they achieved the operations objective without taking the risk
The effect on the serbian ground forces of the allied air offensive was minimal. I've spoken to people that were on the ground in Kosovo and observed the Serb withdrawal, bombing from 20000 ft is fine if you want to hit a bridge or other infastructure but against cammed up armoured vehicles and troops not so much.

The fact that NATO remained at altitude doesn't say much about the capability of GBAD, it says more about the political context of the campaign.
I don't think it was so much the political context, as the fact that the allies knew they were going to lose planes to effective low level air defences.


The effects on dug in ground formations were massive.
I'm afraid I'd have to dispute this, There were minimal signs of destroyed Serb equipment when the ground forces entered Kosovo, and it was one of the first things they looked for. The serb withdrawal was in good order and they were still combat effective.


Iraq still had one of the most capable IADS on planet earth, and it was smashed in 3 days.
I'd dispute this as well, Iraq purchased some of the most capable Air defence equipment, but their operation of it was inept. They were very much into buying equipment and ignoring training, maintainance, and deployment issues.


Anyway unless you have one specific tier one power vs little tier three threat Fighters are invaluable. Fighters are intended to dominate battle-space and in any other range of scenario's that don't include massive superpowers bearing down on you they are indispensable. How are you supposed to dominate battle-space with a purely defensive weapon system? Short answer, you cant.
My original arguement is that to construct the most effective air defence with minimal budget ground based systems are the answer. Fighter jets like large naval units are a prestige symbol. Typically militaries will starve other less glamourous arms of funding in order to keep a handful of jets in the air. Say a nation outlays $2 billion on 30 fighter jets, factor in training maintainance, they'll soak up the defence budget. How many are going to be servicable at any one time and as for maintaining a QRF keeping planes fully armed and fueled ready to go is a nightmare.

Ground based air defence is easy to integrate into a small to medium sized military. Once the initial outlay for the equipment, modern missiles have built in test systems for ease of maintainance, built in simulators for training, are easy to store and deploy at short notice. Modern systems have good performance in an ECM enviroment, frequency agile they can still be jammed but at shorter range, most systems also have a passive form of tracking and guidance.

If the primary threat was a major superpower bearing down on you then i agree, but if the military concerned plans on waging any other campaigns or improving the nations soft power then an IADS alone doesn't do all that much for you.
As far as I'm concerned the function of a military is to defend the territorial integrity of the nation, not projecting power abroad, and you should aim to get the most effective military for the least cost.

In any case the little (I)ADS isn't going to stop the tier one power dominating the airspace above your deployed units and interdicting your supply lines at will.
Bear in minds that if a small nation is invaded, its military will most likely be fighting alongside their permanent bases. If they manage to deploy before an attack their logistics will probably consist of multiple dispersed, cammed up supply dumpss, so huge logistical trails won't really be a feature.

It's true a first tier air power will be able to pummel a small nation. But with good GBAD its fighter will need to stay within an ECM bubble, and take other measures to defend itself which will degrade their offensive power.
 
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lastdingo

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Modern air defences can do their job even without co-operation with air combat assets.

Long-range AD is meant to be a component of air war, not to fight on its own - there are strong synergy effects in the cooperation with fighters and AEW. AD can still do its job on its own, though.

'Doing the job' isn't the same as to defeat enemy air power, that's the key.

AD shall reduce the effectiveness of enemy air power, and that's easily possible if it remains a high threat.

Modern air attack can form strike packages of fighter patrols, bombers, jamming aircraft, AEW&C and anti-AD aircraft (SEAD mission, 'wild weasels') to minimize losses.
That's in itself much inferior in attack capability to a bomber-only force.

It's also quite impossible to keep such an integrated air attack on for 24/7.
This means that no full-time coverage is possible. That's already a huge achievement by the AD as unit movements would be safe during much of the day (the AD needs to be able to tell other forces about the air situation for a good exploitation of this achievement).

Another achievement can be to prevent air attacks at low altitudes. This protects targets very well that cannot be spotted easily, like single vehicles.

Certain air assets are entirely useless in areas with effective AD, even during strike package presence. That would be many drones like Predator/Reaper, transport planes and gunships. Helicopters wouldn't dare to fly high.

AD can also deny the use of certain attack modes and technologies, like neutralization of satellite navigation systems in air attack munitions and thereby worsened accuracy.

AD (in its widest sense) can furthermore reduce the accuracy of attacks with decoying and concealment. The classic decoy technologies flare, smoke and chaff as well as radar jammers can protect high-value point targets against some incoming air attack munitions. Jamming can also prevent the use of datalink.

AD can intercept munitions, motivate the waste of munitions and destroy many drones (like CL289, Sperwer) - this attrition can degrade the enemy's capabilities over time.

Anti-air measures of all troops can reduce air attack efficiency by concealment, camouflage, deception, early warning and dispersion. This works especially well in complex terrain and when there's no ground combat nearby.
Note: It is NOT illegal to hide in cities full of civilians. A correct reading of the laws of war tells that it's only prohibited to use civilians more actively as shields, like herding them to a powerplant or bridge or to move them without any other purpose on trains. It was common and entirely normal to garrison forces in cities, even rather close to the front.


Overall, a proper AD is extremely useful against a superior air power. This is true even without killing any or many planes. The Serbs did quite fine with obsolete material. The Kosovo Air War also showed that against a AD without fighters, the bombers 'always penetrate' - it's easy to bomb and hit large static targets like depots, bridges, factories and power plants. No AD can defend such easy targets satisfactorily.



The best AD equipment to resist a superior air power that has enough SEAD capability is likely
- IR sensors coupled with laser beam rider missiles (range less than 10 km)
- IR sensors/laser range finder fire control coupled with autocannons 30-40mm (range less than 4 km, weapon of choice against drones in the kg range and against nearby stand-off munitions)
- anti-air missiles with active radar seeker, infrared seeker and/or passive radar seeker (no requirement for radar illumination)
- IR, UV and passive radar sensor network with cable communication (independent of civilian communications infrastructure and jammable radio comm)
- multiple AD control nodes
- redundant area coverage (clustering)
- proper camouflage, concealment and deception equipment for point targets (anything from tank up to power plant)
- there is a barrage balloon technology for blocking areas against helicopters (based on kevlar cables that would wrap up on rotors).
- radars for detection and intercept of stand-off munitions (even anti-radar missiles can now be intercepted with proper AD missiles) with command-guided missiles
- radar as lure for enemy SEAD and to create a false situation picture
- finally, we'll see that micro air vehicle UAVs will make shotguns popular. This has been publicly ignored as AD by almost everyone afaik.

Semi-active radar guidance is about the worst of all (and one of the most simple guidance technologies, therefore very widespread) against a SEAD force.




Almost all guidance principles can somehow be countered (only laser beam rider guidance and -for attackers- intertial guidance are not susceptible to practical soft kill), just like fuzes (only hit-to-kill munitions without fuze aren't susceptible to any kind of soft attack on fuzing - even laser prox fuzes can be fooled by nearby decoys).
This applies to the offensive party as well as to the defensive party.
 
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