Philippine Navy Discussion and Updates

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
There are news reports that the Philippine Navy (PN) intends to order 2 more new corvettes, that costs 28 billion pesos (roughly US$535.87 million), with Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) as a follow up order in a G to G deal. Defense Secretary Lorenzana made the announcement during the welcome ceremony for the Navy’s newly-acquired ship, BRP Conrado Yap (PS-39), a former Pohang-class vessel (Read more: Philippines to buy two new corvettes from South Korea). Defense Secretary Lorenzana said while the country is yet to sign a contract with HHI for the two flight 2 corvettes, the PN is recommending that HHI construct these ships for commonality. The prior two Jose Rizal vessels are being constructed by HHI for PHP18 billion, is expected to be delivered by next year, with the lead ship, BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150), expected by April 2020 and the second ship, BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151), by September 2020. Further, these two flight 2 Jose Rizal vessels will cost more, with financing provided by the South Korean Government.

In addition, the Koreans will transfer 2 more 2nd hand Pohang-class corvettes to the Pinoys. In this case, the PN spent Php250 million to refurbish the BRP Conrado Yap (formerly known as the ROKS Chungju) with the Korean government paying for the drydocking works at STX Shipyard. It is only ship in the PN with a mounted ASW sonar, and would serve train sailors on ASW skills again. The 2nd hand corvette was formally handed-over to the Philippine government, and commissioned with the Philippine Navy on 5 August 2019 at Jinhae Naval Base in South Korea.

A blogger, MaxDefense has updated his resource page for the Del Pilar-class Upgrade Project of the PN, as the Notice of Award (NOA) has been formally awarded (see: Del Pilar-class (Frigate) Upgrade Project of the Philippine Navy ~ MaxDefense Philippines). The NOA on 6 August 2019 is in favor of Hanwha Systems Co. Ltd. The same company integrating the sensons and supplying the Combat Management System for the Jose Rizal-class corvettes — both flight 1 and 2. MaxDefense also noted that Hanwha's Naval Shield Baseline 3 is not ready until mid or late 2020s. So if the 2 follow on PN corvette order is awarded to HHI, under the G to G deal, he expect it to use a derivative based on Baseline 2 that are to be used on the 2 Jose Rizal-class vessels.

But I note that while the Hanwha Systems' Naval Shield Integrated Combat Management System is used in the 2 Jose Rizal-class corvettes and the Del Pilar-class OPVs, when the PN is already operating another system (namely, the Saab 9LV Mk.4 Compact Combat Management System), on aboard the BRP Emilio Jacinto (PS-35). This lack of standardisation of Combat Management System is a problem going forward.

I hope that for the PN's upcoming 6 OPV acquisition project, they will not select yet another Combat Management System (but begin the process of standardisation).
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Philippine Marine Corps conduct first ship-to-shore amphibious landing from Tarlac-class SSV
Ridzwan Rahmat, Singapore - Jane's Navy International
10 September 2019
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Philippine and US marines drive a Philippine assault amphibious vehicle onto BRP (LD-602) in Subic Bay, Philippines, in late-August. Source: USMC
Key Points
  • The Philippine Marines Corps has carried out the service's first-ever landing operation with amphibious assault vehicles from a Tarlac-class ship
  • The operation validates the service's ability to undertake operations from the Philippine Navy's strategic sealift vessels
The Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) has conducted its first-ever ship-to-shore amphibious landing operation involving the service's Korean-made amphibious assault vehicles (KAAVs) and a Philippine Navy Tarlac-class strategic sealift vessel (SSV).

The operation was carried out as part of an amphibious assault vehicle subject matter expert exchange activity with the United States Marines Corps' (USMC's) 3rd Marine Division.

This activity took place from late-August until early-September, and has been done to prepare both services for Exercise 'Kaagapay Ng Mga Mandirigma Ng Dagat (Kamandag) 3' - a annual bilateral training activity between the PMC and the USMC.


Complete article at: Philippine Marine Corps conduct first ship-to-shore amphibious landing from Tarlac-class SSV | Jane's 360

Well, this is an important development. This training shows that the Philippine Navy now is capable in more and better power projection on its islands and surrounding sea.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
MaxDefense has reported on the leisurely procurement of the future BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151) for the Philippine Navy, that was launched on 10 Nov 2019 by HHI — in contrast to China’s breakneck speed at procuring and building its numerous frigates, destroyers and carriers (including CV16 and CV17). The lead ship, BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150), is expected to be delivered by April 2020 to the Philippine Navy and the second ship, BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151), by September 2020. See: The Hyundai HDF-2600 Jose Rizal-class Frigate of the Philippine Navy - Philippine Defense Resource

Janes has also reported that South Korean shipbuilder HHI and the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND) have signed an agreement to expand collaboration on meeting the future requirements of the Philippine Navy. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed on 8 November at the launch ceremony of the PN’s second HHI-constructed José Rizal-class frigate in Ulsan, South Korea. The first-in-class vessel was launched by HHI at the same location in May 2019. In a press release to publicise the launch, South Korea’s military procurement and export agency – the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) – said HHI and the DND also signed an MOU that “reaffirms [the two sides’] commitment to defence co-operation and [to prepare] opportunities to increase the possibility of future orders [of naval vessels]”.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
So, actually with being able to perform such operations, can we say that the Philippine Navy has become a green navy? Specially they also have a tanker, BRP Lake Caliraya AF-81, with two more of the class to come.

Philippines Navy sends a naval force to Mid-East to evacuate OFWs
No, the Pinoys are so incompetent in naval operations that it is not wise to see them as a green water navy — they are finally retiring WWII or such other obsolete vessels this year. Right now, I see their navy as a poorly manned coast guard, pretending to be a navy. My apologies to competent coast guards for comparing the incompetent Philippine Navy to them. On the plus side, on 17Jan 2020, a contract was awarded Mitsubishi Shipbuilding to design, build, and deliver 2 94-meter Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRVs) for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The contract has an amount of JPY 14,550,000,000.00.

On the negative side, the Philippine Navy (PN) is set to decommission 22 vessels in 2020, in a move to save on maintenance costs. Outgoing Flag Officer in Command (FOIC) Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad, who will retire on 3 Feb 2020 said that the “aging” vessels are already expensive to maintain that they need to be put out of service. Empedrad announced that the ships due for retirement from the PN in 2020 include: patrol ships BRP Quezon (PS-70); BRP Miguel Malvar (PS-19); BRP Magat Salamat (PS-20); BRP Pangasinan (PS-31); landing ships BRP Laguna (LS-501); BRP Benguet (LS-507); and BRP Mangyan (AC-71). All four remaining patrol killer medium crafts and 11 patrol boats would also be out of the fleet this year, he said.

Only if the Philippine Navy are able to acquire and operate the following:

2 more corvettes, 2 more LPDs, 6 new OPVs and 4 new Shaldag PCs,
would I consider them a green water force. See an extract of following guest comment by AJ Heredia, on the problems within the PN, that was shared on 30 Jan 2020 at Max Montero‘s Facebook page:

“<snip>...

No where is this more evident then the following vignettes:

As part of the Obama Maritime Security Initiative, the Philippines received under grant two advanced Sea Giraffe Air and Surface Search radars, intended for installation on Del Pilar and Alcaraz. The Philippines has had possession of these radars for at least two years now. Yet, the Del Pilars have been run hard, as mentioned before, and had no Yard Availability Scheduled to a) improve their future availability and readiness, and b) install the Sea Giraffes, which would improve their Capabilities.

As a result, when the OFWs in the Gulf situation became paramount, Task Group 82 headed to the Gulf, one of the most dangerous waterways today. In the lead? Alcaraz, without a capable Air and Surface Search radar that would at least inform them of potential threats. This is what happens when you make availability a priority - you pay a price in readiness and capability.

Readiness - well, here's another vignette. In Exercise Sama-Sama 2019, PS-17 Bonifacio attended, and met up with the crew of the US Coast Guard Cutter Stratton. Why is this a lesson in Readiness? Recall that Boni is the last of the three cutters acquired by the PN, which means they've had "type experience" in the the vessel type since 2014 when Del Pilar was acquired. In addition, before each ship was sailed home by a Philippine Navy crew, they received a year's worth of training at Alameda in California, where the ship was turned over by the US. So with that in mind, why did Bonifacio show up for Sama-Sama, having gone to sea with none of it's fire-fighting and flooding pumps operational (a Material Safe to Sail condition), and required assistance from Stratton to maintain and rebuild those pumps, as well as troubleshoot basic problems that had degraded their Gas Turbine and Diesel engines? How is it that the latest crew of the of the most recently acquired cutter didn't even know how to perform any of these tasks.

Related to the above - the cultural boogeyman of the Philippine Navy - inadequate "deck" knowledge to maintain the assets they have. Buying new ones or new used ones doesn't change the equation if you can't keep them running.

How about buying new ships? Well, aside from the poor track record of the Duterte Administration, it's important to note that every last new vessel project Max identified as potential replacements to the decommissioned 22 ships is nothing but a paper exercise right now. How's that?

None of those projects - Corvette, more LPDs, OPVs and Shaldag PCs, have been awarded. And even if they were, the magic project phase that really is the best indicator that it will succeed is the "Notice to Proceed (NTP)". This means the supplier can begin production of the goods/deliverable. This also assumes there is not a pre-planning period that further delays steel being cut, which did happen during the Jose Rizal class as the design itself had to be finalized and approved.

The Shaldags are likely the project that will move if the quickest from paper to hull rolling off the dock, but only four of them would be built.

...

The Offshore Combat Fleet learned this lesson first-hand, when a Navigational Error put Del Pilar hard aground on Hasa-Hasa Shoal. With one incident, 33 percent of the Navy's then-premier combat ships was rendered unavailable. There's word that the shaft replacement may take more time than originally projected. Lesson: if you have too few an asset, one single operational incident has a disparate impact on all three operational aspects.

Then there's the rationale of the Navy in allocating activities that optimize remaining availability, readiness and capability. Turning again to Del Pilar, the Navy for some unfathomable reason, decided even after the Shoaling incident, to continue upgrades and improvements on Del Pilar. At that time, there was no guarantee how long she would be out of service. Yet the decision continued to start teh Sea Giraffe upgrade on her, instead of immediately shifting the installation to Bonifacio. Again, because of the need to have Availability over Capability and Readiness, they're upgrading a Pier Queen, who may never leave port again...

<snip>”
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Looks great, with those stealthy OTO Melara 76 mm gun, AK-630 and 30 mm guns on a RWS. But the first two LPDs (BRP Tarlac LD-601 and BRP Davao del Sur LD-602) are still unarmed. On another discussion forum, the poster claims that a contract has been signed, but as far as i know, the PN only planned two more vessels, just on the wishing list.

 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Philippine Navy’s (PN) patrol frigate, the BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS 16) has returned to the southwestern Indian port of Kochi for repairs after a fire broke out in its main engine room on 7 May 2020, while en route back to the Philippines. In a statement the PN said the frigate was able to return to Kochi "under its own power and unassisted".

Excluding the Marine Corps, the PN has about 17,500 sailors. It is a large organisation that lacks organisational discipline and naval war fighting capability. The fire was caused by a leakage of lube oil that hit a hot surface. This incident once again demonstrate their incompetence in naval operations — despite the training and assistance provided to them by the Americans. I hope they can fix the BRP Ramon Alcaraz quickly and avoid such reoccurrence in their fleet by better maintenance practices over time.


Updated Statement on the fire incident aboard BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS16)

BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS16) was able to return to the Port of Cochin, India unassisted and is currently moored there. It undergoes damage assessment and systems evaluation in connection with the fire that broke out at the main engine room of the vessel with lube oil leakage as the apparent cause. Based on initial assessment, one of its main engines must undergo necessary repair to ensure the sea worthiness of the ship and safety of its crew prior its return voyage to the country.

The vessel will stay put to fully restore its operational status with the assistance of the United States Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Coordination is being made with NAVSEA and JUSMAG Philippines to work out with the repair requirements needed by the ship. PS16 was acquired from the US and still under the technical support program with them. Repair and restoration period is pegged at 21 days in consideration of the restraint due to COVID-19 but it may be shortened...
<snip>
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The PN was trained by the US Coast Guard to fix hydraulic leaks as a safely hazard to guard against. USCG press release - reproduced in full to demonstrate PN incompetence in naval operations — despite the training and assistance provided by the Americans.

Nov. 27, 2019
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area
Contact: Coast Guard Pacific Area Public Affairs
Office: (510) 437-3319
After Hours: (510) 333-6297
[email protected]
Pacific Area online newsroom

Return to the 378’: USCGC Stratton engineers collaborate with Philippine navy aboard cutter in common

When Coast Guard Cmdr. Matthew Gans learned about a unique opportunity for he and a team of his of engineers to work aboard a Philippine navy ship for a few days, his eyes lit up like a kid on Christmas.

This was a chance to share knowledge with the crew aboard BRP Andres Bonifacio (PS 17), formerly USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719), a 378-foot High Endurance Cutter.

Gans knew that the United States had decommissioned the ship in early 2016 and the Philippines acquired it under the Excess Defense Articles and the Foreign Assistance Act.

As the current engineer officer aboard Coast Guard Cutter Stratton (WMSL 752), a National Security Cutter out of Alameda, California, Gans was eager to call upon his 13 years of engineering experience aboard 378s.

Now in Puerto Princesa, Philippines, Stratton’s crew would work with Philippine navy and coast guard members the week of October 14-21, 2019, during Maritime Training Activity Sama Sama. The military exercise, now in its third year, is designed to promote regional security cooperation, strengthen partnerships and enhance maritime interoperability.

Over the course of four days, Gans and his team of 15 Stratton engineers worked side by side with their Philippine counterparts, troubleshooting mechanical issues long common to the 378 fleet.

Electricians and machinery technicians resolved issues preventing the main gas turbines from starting, corrected hydraulic leaks, and chased down and corrected various complications with the main diesel engine. They demonstrated proper maintenance procedures and made recommendations to their Filipino counterparts based on Gans’ extensive experience.

“It was a pleasure to watch my crew systematically approach troubleshooting to identify and correct the long list of casualties,” said Gans. He said it was nice for some of his younger crew members to finally get to see what it was like to work on an older Coast Guard cutter.

“My crew used to poke fun at me for always relating my experiences back to 378-foot cutter life,” said Gans. “But since this experience they’ve been telling their peers how valuable the opportunity was and how much fun they had working on the Bonifacio.”

Stratton damage control members restored five out of six inoperable dewatering and fire pumps aboard the Bonifacio, which required a complete rebuild of two engines. They also provided extensive maintenance and firefighting training and tested firefighting systems aboard the cutter.

“This experience justified for me my insatiable desire to continue to return to sea, even after all these years,” said Gans. “Our friends in the Philippine navy who now own and operate the cutter are an amazing group of people and were the most gracious of hosts. They are extremely proud to have the Bonifacio in their inventory and have done their very best to continue to maintain and operate the ship. I hope we continue to have a strong Coast Guard presence in future exercises with the Philippines, and would enthusiastically advocate for a greater emphasis on these opportunities for sharing our engineering knowledge.”

The collaborative effort of the Bonifacio crew and Gans’ team from Stratton made up the Engineering Symposium component of the larger training exercise.

“Maritime Training Activity Sama Sama built on a decade’s long relationship between the United States and Philippines maritime services,” said Capt. Bob Little, commanding officer of Coast Guard Cutter Stratton. “During Sama Sama, we exchanged knowledge that enhanced our skills and ability to work together. The engineering work aboard the Andres Bonifacio was only one component of the larger exercise, but perhaps the best opportunity for building strong personal relationships.”

The U.S. Coast Guard has an enduring role in the Indo-Pacific, going back more than 150 years. The service’s ongoing deployment of resources to the region directly supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

“The United States is a Pacific nation,” said Vice Adm. Linda Fagan, the Coast Guard’s Pacific Area commander. “We have deep and long-standing ties with our partners in the region, and more importantly, we share a strong commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, governed by a rules-based international system that promotes peace, security, prosperity and sovereignty of all nations.”

As Gans and his crew hosted Andres Bonifacio crew members for a farewell visit and tour aboard cutter Stratton Oct. 20, he mentioned that this experience would have lasting impressions on Stratton’s engineers.

As he said goodbye and shook hands with his new Filipino friends that afternoon, it was clear Gans had made some impressions of his own.

-USCG-
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
Sadly, the Philippines seems to suffer from a lack of seriousness in its governance, & this shows up strongly in its navy. It looks as if three years after being handed over as a fully functional ship Andres Bonifacio (ex USCGC Boutwell) had been allowed to decay into a near derelict. Had any maintenance been done in those three years?
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Sadly, the Philippines seems to suffer from a lack of seriousness in its governance, & this shows up strongly in its navy. It looks as if three years after being handed over as a fully functional ship Andres Bonifacio (ex USCGC Boutwell) had been allowed to decay into a near derelict. Had any maintenance been done in those three years?
If the maintenance has been neglected it would be unusual for Philippines trained marine engineers who are widely dispersed through the merchant fleets of the world.
My own experience in employing these engineers in a large pearling operation has been a hugely positive one. After trying to recruit local Class 2 and 3 Engineers with no success we employed them on 457 visas. They were competent and conscientious which seems the same experience as that of USCG Cmdr Matthew Gans above.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
BZ to the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force (IAF) for rendering assistance to the injured sailor from BRP Ramon Alcaraz (PS-16), as they transfer him to better medical facilities in India via an IAF An-32 transport aircraft.
Sadly, the Philippines seems to suffer from a lack of seriousness in its governance, & this shows up strongly in its navy. It looks as if three years after being handed over as a fully functional ship Andres Bonifacio (ex USCGC Boutwell) had been allowed to decay into a near derelict.
Agreed.

The Philippine Navy (PN) was gifted with 3 Hamilton-class cutters (known as the Del Pilar-class in the PN) but I suspect that only 1 of the 3 cutters remain operational. And is the Andres Bonifacio is the only ship that remains operational? If it is operational part of it is thanks to the 2019 efforts of the US Coast Guard.

The PN flagship BRP Gregorio Del Pilar after running aground in the Spratly Islands August 2018 is still not repaired and will not be back at sea till the 2nd quarter of 2021. One of the ship's two variable pitch propellers was damaged along with its propeller hub following its grounding off Hasa-Hasa Shoal in August 2018. A replacement propeller hub was ordered from the US to replace the one damaged in the grounding is expected to arrive in July 2020; and they seem to have no urgency and insufficient maintenance and operating budget allocated to keep their Del Pilar-class operational to conduct the necessary patrols.

BZ to the PN.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
If the maintenance has been neglected it would be unusual for Philippines trained marine engineers who are widely dispersed through the merchant fleets of the world.
My own experience in employing these engineers in a large pearling operation has been a hugely positive one. After trying to recruit local Class 2 and 3 Engineers with no success we employed them on 457 visas. They were competent and conscientious which seems the same experience as that of USCG Cmdr Matthew Gans above.
Indeed. The Philippines produces large numbers of determined, hard-working & talented people, but its dysfunctional politics makes it hard for many of them to apply their talents in their home country.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Philippine Navy’s (PN’s) José Rizal frigate/corvette left on 18 May 2020 en route for the Philippines. The frigate (that is armed like a corvette), was launched on 23 May 2019. The 107.5 m long vessel is the first of two of the class built in Korea, and is expected to arrive in the Philippine province of Zambales on 23 May 2020 – after which an official acceptance ceremony is set to be held.

The second frigate/corvette of the class, which will be named Antonio Luna has been scheduled for delivery to the PN around October 2020. Both vessels were ordered by Manila under a PHP16 billion (USD315 million) contract awarded to in 2016, with an additional PHP2 billion set aside for weapon systems and munitions, according to the state-owned Philippine News Agency (PNA).
Then PN chief Vice Adm. Ronald Joseph Mercado was unceremoniously relieved from his post in late December 2017 for insisting on Tacticos Thales as the Combat Management System (CMS). However, the PN’s selection of the Hanwha System’s Naval Shield as CMS has been surrounded by controversy, much of it centered on whether the ship's data link system is what was agreed upon when the contract was signed with Hyundai Heavy Industries.
Many in the local Philippine defense discussion community have charged that the data link system which has been installed is in violation of the terms of the contract. While the above issues are serious, the practical reality is that the PN is desperate for hulls with some endurance to conduct the needed patrols in the South China Sea to augment their three ageing 62.6 m Jacinto-class patrol vessels (former Peacock-class vessels in UK service).

Along with the prior the delivery of the 88 m long "Pohang"-class corvette (renamed the BRP Conrado Yap) — the PN with the arrival of both José Rizal and Antonio Luna by Oct 2020 will once again have 3 ships to conduct long duration patrols, send for overseas missions or exercises (until all three 115 m long Del Pilar-class patrol vessels return to service in 2nd Quarter 2021).

I understand that BRP Andres Bonifacio is due to enter Keppel Subic Shipyard Inc. (KSSI) for dry docking and repairs, which means all three 115 m Hamilton-class cutters (known as the Del Pilar-class in the PN) will be unavailable at the same time in 2020. BRP Laguna (LS-501) a landing ship tank built in WWII (formerly USS LST-230) is also at dry dock and having some minor work done in KSSI.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
The delivery of the Philippine Navy’s latest frigate, BRP Jose Rizal. The ship set sail to Subic port in the Philippines on May 18 for its official commissioning. The 2,600 tons vessel with a maximum speed of 25 knots is the Philippine Navy’s first ever guided missiles frigate, but its still not yet equipped with any missiles, its still in the FFBNW-conviguration, so only armed with some guns. Hopefully this almost toothless advanced modern fregat will soon be completed with all the missing weaponsystems: one or two chinese anti-ship missiles, and its over.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
According to a Pinoy blogger, the acceptance of the Jose Rizal “may also be tied to other projects that the Philippine Navy (PN) is trying to close with the South Korean government.

One is obtaining soft loans to support the Corvette Acquisition Project which the DND and PN are pushing to be awarded to a Korean shipbuilder (most likely HHI).

The other is obtaining excess defense articles from the South Korean Ministry of Defense, which may include a second or even a third decommissioned Pohang-class corvette formerly used by the Republic of Korea Navy.

Allowing [Jose Rizal] to be accepted without too much question will give the DND and PN more bargaining power with the South Korean government for both proposed projects.”
BRP Jose Rizal... the Philippine Navy’s first ever guided missiles frigate, but its still not yet equipped with any missiles, its still in the FFBNW-conviguration, so only armed with some guns.
Minor correction. While Jose Rizal has missiles, it is the wrong type of counter-air-missile for a proper missile armed frigate or corvette.

These under armed Pinoy vessels are equipped with the Mistral VSHORAD Missile. IMO, the wrong type of missile to defend against anti-ship missiles and only effective against helicopters or other slow movers.
The 107.5m long ship is FFBNW for the MICA VL missile system. BRP Jose Rizal has empty space allocated to install a VL system— but it may take half a decade or more before the Pinoys get around to buying and installing a proper anti-ship missile defence capability on their BRP Jose Rizal class of corvettes.
Both Indonesia’s 105.11m long SIGMA 10514 Perusak Kawal Rudal (PKR) and Singapore’s 80m long Independence class vessels were launched without their respective VL MICA systems (as FFBNW) but both countries had these systems installed later (in a timely manner).
Hopefully this almost toothless advanced modern fregat will soon be completed with all the missing weaponsystems: one or two chinese anti-ship missiles, and its over.
The PN's Jose Rizal is wired and integrated with South Korea's SSM-700 Haeseong anti-ship cruise missile. The Pinoys just have to pay for the SSM-700 missiles.
It is also unlikely that the Pinoys will buy a Chinese anti-ship missile.
 
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Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Minor correction. While BRP Jose Rizal has missiles, it is the wrong type of counter-air-missile for a proper missile armed frigate or corvette.

These under armed Pinoy vessels are equipped with the Mistral VSHORAD Missile. IMO, the wrong type of missile to defend against anti-ship missiles and only effective against helicopters or other slow movers.
This is almost as bad as when the ROCs bought the LaFayette class FFs and could only put the near-useless Chaparral launchers on them.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 2: Thinking for a change

1. Pinoy press and bloggers are quick to blame others (in this case the Koreans and HHI) but none of them will point out the obvious failings for an illogical Pinoy decision to buy these very short ranged Mistral SAMs for a corvette or frigate.

2. The Mistral missile is only appropriate as last ditch defence for patrol vessels that operate under air cover of fighters or an air defence umbrella of missile armed corvette or frigate. It is sad that a nearly 25 year old design embodied in the Victory class has all the qualities needed for Green Water warfare, well armed without the frills, than the newer Jose Rizal — the latter related more to an old escort-style frigate now outdated in modern navies —Singapore’s ageing Victory class corvettes are equipped with the Barak point-defense missile system, Harpoon missiles and Scan-eagle UAVs for over the horizon maritime domain awareness.
This is almost as bad as when the ROCs bought the LaFayette class FFs and could only put the near-useless Chaparral launchers on them.
3. Agreed. The Philippines and Taiwan are both not serious about resourcing their respective navies — this is reflected in their illogical air defence sub-systems choices for their corvettes and frigates. I pity their sailors who have to fight the ship, should the need arise.

4. The Indonesian and Singaporean navies have shown the way forward (for the correct air defence sub-system that needs to be installed). I hope it will not take the Pinoys longer than 5 years to procure and install the VL MICA System for Jose Rizal, given that the VL MICA System is already in service with other ASEAN navies.
 
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Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Minor correction. While BRP Jose Rizal has missiles, it is the wrong type of counter-air-missile for a proper missile armed frigate or corvette.

These under armed Pinoy vessels are equipped with the Mistral VSHORAD Missile. IMO, the wrong type of missile to defend against anti-ship missiles and only effective against helicopters or other slow movers.
The 107.5m long ship is FFBNW for the MICA VL missile system. BRP Jose Rizal has empty space allocated to install a VL system— but it may take half a decade or more before the Pinoys get around to buying and installing a proper anti-ship missile defence capability on their BRP Jose Rizal class of corvettes.
Both Indonesia’s 105.11m long SIGMA 10514 Perusak Kawal Rudal (PKR) and Singapore’s 80m long Independence class vessels were launched without their respective VL MICA systems (as FFBNW) but both countries had these systems installed later (in a timely manner).

The PN's Jose Rizal is wired and integrated with South Korea's SSM-700 Haeseong anti-ship cruise missile. The Pinoys just have to pay for the SSM-700 missiles.
It is also unlikely that the Pinoys will buy a Chinese anti-ship missile.
Thank you very much for the correction!
Yes, VSHORADS/MANPADS are totally useless at sea, to take down sea skimmers and jetfighters/MPAs dropping their ordnance from far away at a high altitude.
It will be indeed only usable if a helicopter, piston engine aircraft or any other low and slow moving aircraft is that stupid to fly in a range less than 6 km from the ship.

This SIMBAD-RC is a naval remote controlled turret with Mistral missiles, does it use the Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device or the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar?
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 2: Setting the Context before details

5. The three most important variables to Pinoy national security: the US, China and Japan. Look at where the navies each of these 3 countries were ten years ago versus where they are now and it quickly becomes apparent how much more dangerous the world has become for the Philippines. The immediate adversary, the PLA(N) and its surface action groups has become more dangerous. The naval presence of a long-time ally has become unreliable. And the four escort flotilla of JMSDF is no longer a great threat lurking over the horizon viz-a-viz as the PLA(N). China’s surface action groups have a forward defence line established in the islands China controls in the South China Sea — and these militarised outposts are closer to Manila than Tokyo. Some in Japan have argued that the JMSDF needs a fifth escort flotilla, to enable it permanently to assign one flotilla to the Sea of Japan.

6. The Philippine Navy’s attempt at Modernization with the arrival of Jose Rizal is set within the context of the Philippine President Duterte having made a ‘China choice’ in his administration’s effort to develop stronger economic and diplomatic ties with China. The 3 other points to note for geopolitical context are as follows:

(i) Both US and China engage in coercive diplomacy in relation to disputes in the South China Sea. At various times, the Philippines has been subject to either of their efforts.​
(ii) Due to the May 2013 Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident, Philippines was subject to coercive diplomacy from Taiwan and it is a fact of life for many third world nations when a dispute in the South China Sea flares up.​
(iii) The Duterte initiated VFA termination on 11 Feb 2020, was called by US Defense Secretary Mark Esper as "unfortunate"; and takes effect in 180 days of the issue of such notice — this means no more US troops in country to assist the Philippines from 10 Aug 2020 onwards along with reduced levels of American aid — that is why the Pinoys are trying to get more ‘free-bees’ from Korea.​
This SIMBAD-RC is a naval remote controlled turret with Mistral missiles, does it use the Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device or the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar?
7. I believe the ship is equipped with Safran Paseo NS electro-optical device and that is used to cue the Mistral missile as a last ditch defence.

8. I am not sure but from pictures released, the ship seems to have the Selex ES NA-25X fire control radar installed on top of the bridge (to cue the Hyundai Wia K76L/62 76mm gun in air defence role). But the Selex ES NA-25X is pointing at the wrong sector to cue the rear mounted SIMBAD-RC, from what I can see but I am happy to be corrected.
 
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