Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

Bob53

Well-Known Member
One needs to keep in mind the entirety of the ADF and the capabilities of Australia's overall battle system both to gauge the ability for a hostile to conduct such a strike, as well as what options Australia would have both during the strike and in the aftermath of such a strike.

There are only a handful of countries which have the strategic reach to really be able to launch a conventional strike against Australia's northern bases, and even fewer of them have the resources needed to land and sustain a force in Australia's Far North. With that in mind, the only reasonable reason why bases in the north would be targeted which comes to my mind would be to deny Australia the ability to either operate further north of mainland Australia, and/or make ferry operations to an area of conflict in the ASEAN/SE Asia, SCS or ECS or Korean peninsula more difficult.

Unless such a strike was launched from waters near the target, Australia would have the opportunity to detect the inbound strike from potentially very far away, and could also possibly determine who launched the strike prior to it getting to the target(s).
Your comment doesn’t make sense... unless launched from waters near the target we would have opp to detect? How? If subs send missle to targets from let’s say 800kms out to sea ....what would we do? An hrs flight time...assuming we detect on launch which I doubt...we would send what assets from where to do what ....assuming they arrive on point within an hr or 2 of launch...all they can do is begin searching .... and hope to get lucky. We have the best technology but no where near enough assetts to cover enough area enough of the time.

They do not need to land to restrict Australia’s capacity to respond to anyone in any significant manner. A handful of countries have the capacity but it only needs one wanting to show “the Australian side” a lesson. With the exception of the Cold War, every large military build up of the last 200 years has preceded a significant war. Our white paper can’t come quick enough. Neither can extra subs or long range sea, air and land based strike capacity. My guess is we will see in the next whitepaper +refuelling capacity + long range land based strike+ long range ship and air strike weapons + accelerated sub program+ Possible additional squad of F35 or commitment to longer range Unmanned strike +
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
In 2000 Australia was effectively self sufficient in oil and petroleum production (we traded different oil products but over all it was about even).

We have since closed:
Clyde Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)
Port Stanvac Refinery - Wikipedia (SA)
Kurnell Refinery - Wikipedia (NSW)

All that is left is in WA:
Kwinana Oil Refinery - Wikipedia (WA)

NZ also has one refinery.

Australia has a number of oil and gas fields (~4000 billion cubic metres) around it, and absolutely massive coal reserves, Australia also has significant shale reserves (58 billion barrels). We don't have much easy and cheap crude oil anymore.

Australia doesn't have to be oil deficient. Some countries have coal to oil capabilities (South Africa comes to mind). Its not just about transportation oil, but the whole petrochemical chain that comes with it, road tar, plastics, paints, thinners, fertilizers, lubricants etc. Once oil isn't used for personal transport these other uses will still have to be filled.

The only logical place for strategic fuel reserves currently is WA. However, It would seem logical to establish a coal to x capability on the east coast (which has tremendous amounts of coal) and have some small scale refining capability. Logical site for this is a ex-powerstation with attached coal mine. As electric, coal, water infrastructure would already be in place. While often energy expensive, solar/wind are very cheap sources and these could be used almost for free during peak production periods. This could also be located a significant distance from the coast, making it a more difficult military target. You could also then have some disperse storage/delivery capability connected by pipeline. IMO government should do an evaluation of this and either rule it in or out.

Military fuel use is fairly insignificant. Australia has a small military and a small number of high expense platforms. Particularly for the Airforce. Fuel security is a greater issue for the wider industrial and commercial and transportation sectors. In a crisis, you would imagine the government would reserve supply for the military and emergency services.
The posts relating to fuel reserves are polluting the RAAF thread.
I posted a govt review in the ADF general thread which covers all this in detail, maybe we need to move posts over there.
For the record, we have four refineries, Altona, Geelong, Lytton and Kwinana.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Your comment doesn’t make sense... unless launched from waters near the target we would have opp to detect? How? If subs send missle to targets from let’s say 800kms out to sea ....what would we do? An hrs flight time...assuming we detect on launch which I doubt...we would send what assets from where to do what ....assuming they arrive on point within an hr or 2 of launch...all they can do is begin searching .... and hope to get lucky. We have the best technology but no where near enough assetts to cover enough area enough of the time.

They do not need to land to restrict Australia’s capacity to respond to anyone in any significant manner. A handful of countries have the capacity but it only needs one wanting to show “the Australian side” a lesson. With the exception of the Cold War, every large military build up of the last 200 years has preceded a significant war. Our white paper can’t come quick enough. Neither can extra subs or long range sea, air and land based strike capacity. My guess is we will see in the next whitepaper +refuelling capacity + long range land based strike+ long range ship and air strike weapons + accelerated sub program+ Possible additional squad of F35 or commitment to longer range Unmanned strike +
Okay, there seem to be three themes to this which should be addressed.

I shall address the military build up comment first. I would need to check to see how accurate the comment about conflicts following large military buildups over a 200 year period excepting the Cold War era, but a few key points come to mind. One of the first being that the Cold War era took up a significant portion of that time span, having effectively started during WWII (just when exactly is something which could be debated) and continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. My takeaway from this, given that nearly a quarter of the time you indicated is covered by the Cold War, that the idea of a military buildup automatically meaning and/or preceding a conflict is untrue. There would also be the question of just which country is engaging in a buildup of military capabilities and what really does constitute a buildup as opposed to a rather natural expansion of capabilities as a nation expands in terms of trade, population and economic/tech capability.

The second regards some questions about the scenario on which the concerns seem to revolve around. Firstly, who is launching such a strike and why? Secondly, is Australia already actively involved in a conflict and if so, where? One of the realities is that such a strike against mainland Australia would be an act of war, unless Australia was already involved in a conflict against the launching nation. With that in mind, hitting one of Australia's northern 'bare bases' would have a comparatively minimal negative impact upon Australia's ability to engage in a conflict since the base might get heavily damaged, but the IMO more difficult to replace portions of the ADF, the expensive and time consuming pieces of kit like the P-8, F-35, tanks and warships and especially the trained pilots, systems operators, crew and troops would be not effected. Also, if Australia is not already involved in conflict, then an attack which would draw Australia in would also most likely draw in Australian allies unless they were already actively involved.

The third key piece suggests to me that due consideration to Australian surveillance capabilities is not being given, and therefore an incorrect concept of both Australia's situational awareness, but knowledge of what would be the battlespace in and around mainland Australia, and the subsequent impact of Australian awareness. With Australian systems like JORN, there is a real potential for Australia to detect the launch of LACM's fired from a sub 800 km away. Detection of such a launch would provide several options to Australian forces since the strike would likely take an hour or more to reach the target, although Australia would likely not be able to determine the target until the LACM strike was much closer to the target. One likely option would be for ADF assets to be directed to investigate the area around where the launch site was. Depending on what assets were available and deployed, it would be quite possible for the launching sub to still be relatively nearby. I readily admit this is just a WAG on my part, but I would guess that a launching nuke sub would still be within ~20 n miles of the launch site an hour after the launch. If the launch was from a diesel-electric sub, it would likely be even closer to the launch site after an hour. Another thing which would likely be occurring is that Australia would start working diligently to determine the target of the strike once it was identified as such, and then once likely targets were determined having facilities evacuated and/or defended depending on what seemed to be the best options available. Again, with an hour or possibly more notice, Australia might even be able to intercept the inbound missiles depending on what the missile flight path was and where Australia had fighters deployed. Australian forces would also likely be put on a higher level of readiness than 'normal' if Australia was not already involved in conflict.

Now I am not saying that a nation could not or would not launch an attack against Australia, but again there are only a handful of countries which could really contemplate doing so, and there would need to be a pressing reason for them to do so in terms of what advantage or gain would a striking nation get for doing so. Otherwise the launching nation becomes embroiled in a war with Australia and likely Australia's allies as well.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Probably because LRASM can take out ships.
They are all, in general terms, one and the same, LRASM being an updated version if you like.

Biggest problem I see with it is that is does not fit internally for the JSF, a deal breaker I would think !

My personal thoughts would be to look at what Kongsberg is offering :)

Cheers
 

SteveR

Active Member
They are all, in general terms, one and the same, LRASM being an updated version if you like.

Biggest problem I see with it is that is does not fit internally for the JSF, a deal breaker I would think !
g :)

Cheers
I am afraid I have to support Ngat on tis. The AGM-148B JASSM-ER can only take out fixed or slightly adjusted targets with IR sensor. The AGM-18C LRASM has TTN data link for target co-ordinate update and a BAE ESM sensor to home on radars on moving ships. The JSM for the F-35A when launched from height has a range up to 300nm which matches LRASM, but there has been no JSM launched from Naval vessels, whereas LRASM has been tested in that mode - the JSM's cousin the NSM is a naval weapon. So do we buy different missiles for RAAF and RAN, or for F-18F and F-35 given that the LRASM is about to be qualified for USN Shornets?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
They are all, in general terms, one and the same, LRASM being an updated version if you like.

Biggest problem I see with it is that is does not fit internally for the JSF, a deal breaker I would think !

My personal thoughts would be to look at what Kongsberg is offering :)

Cheers
The LRASM is specifically designed for maritime strike and has a larger warhead and longer range than the Kongsberg JSM which is what the RAAF and Norway are having integrated with the F-35. LM took quite a while to develop the AGM-158C LRASM, so I don't think that even generally it's one and the same with the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, similar maybe.
 

SteveR

Active Member
The LRASM is specifically designed for maritime strike and has a larger warhead and longer range than the Kongsberg JSM which is what the RAAF and Norway are having integrated with the F-35. LM took quite a while to develop the AGM-158C LRASM, so I don't think that even generally it's one and the same with the AGM-158B JASSM-ER, similar maybe.
Behind the paywall of the following:

https://aviationweek.com/defense/lockheed-increase-range-lrasm

the article states: "though based on the JASSM-ER, the LRASM’s additional sensor dramatically reduces maximum range." The modification is supposed to get back to the objective range. Perhaps the drag or weight of the ESM sensor has reduced the range.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Okay, there seem to be three themes to this which should be addressed.

I shall address the military build up comment first. I would need to check to see how accurate the comment about conflicts following large military buildups over a 200 year period excepting the Cold War era, but a few key points come to mind. One of the first being that the Cold War era took up a significant portion of that time span, having effectively started during WWII (just when exactly is something which could be debated) and continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. My takeaway from this, given that nearly a quarter of the time you indicated is covered by the Cold War, that the idea of a military buildup automatically meaning and/or preceding a conflict is untrue. There would also be the question of just which country is engaging in a buildup of military capabilities and what really does constitute a buildup as opposed to a rather natural expansion of capabilities as a nation expands in terms of trade, population and economic/tech capability.

The second regards some questions about the scenario on which the concerns seem to revolve around. Firstly, who is launching such a strike and why? Secondly, is Australia already actively involved in a conflict and if so, where? One of the realities is that such a strike against mainland Australia would be an act of war, unless Australia was already involved in a conflict against the launching nation. With that in mind, hitting one of Australia's northern 'bare bases' would have a comparatively minimal negative impact upon Australia's ability to engage in a conflict since the base might get heavily damaged, but the IMO more difficult to replace portions of the ADF, the expensive and time consuming pieces of kit like the P-8, F-35, tanks and warships and especially the trained pilots, systems operators, crew and troops would be not effected. Also, if Australia is not already involved in conflict, then an attack which would draw Australia in would also most likely draw in Australian allies unless they were already actively involved.

The third key piece suggests to me that due consideration to Australian surveillance capabilities is not being given, and therefore an incorrect concept of both Australia's situational awareness, but knowledge of what would be the battlespace in and around mainland Australia, and the subsequent impact of Australian awareness. With Australian systems like JORN, there is a real potential for Australia to detect the launch of LACM's fired from a sub 800 km away. Detection of such a launch would provide several options to Australian forces since the strike would likely take an hour or more to reach the target, although Australia would likely not be able to determine the target until the LACM strike was much closer to the target. One likely option would be for ADF assets to be directed to investigate the area around where the launch site was. Depending on what assets were available and deployed, it would be quite possible for the launching sub to still be relatively nearby. I readily admit this is just a WAG on my part, but I would guess that a launching nuke sub would still be within ~20 n miles of the launch site an hour after the launch. If the launch was from a diesel-electric sub, it would likely be even closer to the launch site after an hour. Another thing which would likely be occurring is that Australia would start working diligently to determine the target of the strike once it was identified as such, and then once likely targets were determined having facilities evacuated and/or defended depending on what seemed to be the best options available. Again, with an hour or possibly more notice, Australia might even be able to intercept the inbound missiles depending on what the missile flight path was and where Australia had fighters deployed. Australian forces would also likely be put on a higher level of readiness than 'normal' if Australia was not already involved in conflict.

Now I am not saying that a nation could not or would not launch an attack against Australia, but again there are only a handful of countries which could really contemplate doing so, and there would need to be a pressing reason for them to do so in terms of what advantage or gain would a striking nation get for doing so. Otherwise the launching nation becomes embroiled in a war with Australia and likely Australia's allies as well.
Putting both the politics and history aside for now, my point is that AU has too few air bases that can support F35 ops and those bases are too far apart due to the limited range of the F35 and our limited refuelling capacity. And that with modern weapons it is not beyond the capacity of an opponent a render a runway or fuels stores, inoperable for a period of time All the assumptions you have made in this scenario assumes there may be P8 in the air or with crew and weapons at immediate availability to be on station within the scripted time frames. To do that a P8 would have to be in the air and within 1500kms with enough fuel on board to get there and start searching a box in the ocean that is growing exponentially..400sq kms in the first hr, 1600sq kms in the 2nd hr, 3600sq kms in the 3rd hr and so on. Edinburgh is 2000+ kms from the WA coast. It also assumes that all surveillance assets are flawless and that we would detect a missle on launch. I had that assumption too until a few years ago that a large slow moving airliner disappeared from the face of the earth in the region I am referring to and it then dawned on me exactly how large of an area we are talking about and how difficult it is to monitor and search once you get close to 1000kms off the coast.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Putting both the politics and history aside for now, my point is that AU has too few air bases that can support F35 ops and those bases are too far apart due to the limited range of the F35 and our limited refuelling capacity. And that with modern weapons it is not beyond the capacity of an opponent a render a runway or fuels stores, inoperable for a period of time All the assumptions you have made in this scenario assumes there may be P8 in the air or with crew and weapons at immediate availability to be on station within the scripted time frames. To do that a P8 would have to be in the air and within 1500kms with enough fuel on board to get there and start searching a box in the ocean that is growing exponentially..400sq kms in the first hr, 1600sq kms in the 2nd hr, 3600sq kms in the 3rd hr and so on. Edinburgh is 2000+ kms from the WA coast. It also assumes that all surveillance assets are flawless and that we would detect a missle on launch. I had that assumption too until a few years ago that a large slow moving airliner disappeared from the face of the earth in the region I am referring to and it then dawned on me exactly how large of an area we are talking about and how difficult it is to monitor and search once you get close to 1000kms off the coast.
By not addressing the who or the why, then any threat matrix is essentially trashed.

By focusing on just the potential ability of a limited number of nations to launch a standoff strike against Australia to take out an airfield (or multiple fields) that ignores all sorts realities on what the causes would need to be for a nation to launch such a strike, and of at least equal importance, what the effects of doing so would likely be.

Taking the scenario a step further in a direction which IMO would make greater strategic sense would be for the targets of the strike to be RAAF Bases Williamtown, Amberley and Tindal, since that might provide the attackers the ability to not only damage RAAF runways, but damage or destroy RAAF combat aircraft. Why worry about Australia having 'only 15' RAAF bases around the country and therefore being vulnerable to attack which could limit F-35 operations, when the hypothetical attacker could instead directly attack the RAAF fighter and strike fleets and potentially damage or destroy Australia's ability to engage in air combat operations? After all, Australia could potentially just start operating the F-35's in a wartime situation from civilian airfields that are of the proper size.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Putting both the politics and history aside for now, my point is that AU has too few air bases that can support F35 ops and those bases are too far apart due to the limited range of the F35 and our limited refuelling capacity. And that with modern weapons it is not beyond the capacity of an opponent a render a runway or fuels stores, inoperable for a period of time All the assumptions you have made in this scenario assumes there may be P8 in the air or with crew and weapons at immediate availability to be on station within the scripted time frames. To do that a P8 would have to be in the air and within 1500kms with enough fuel on board to get there and start searching a box in the ocean that is growing exponentially..400sq kms in the first hr, 1600sq kms in the 2nd hr, 3600sq kms in the 3rd hr and so on. Edinburgh is 2000+ kms from the WA coast. It also assumes that all surveillance assets are flawless and that we would detect a missle on launch. I had that assumption too until a few years ago that a large slow moving airliner disappeared from the face of the earth in the region I am referring to and it then dawned on me exactly how large of an area we are talking about and how difficult it is to monitor and search once you get close to 1000kms off the coast.
@Bob53 You might have all these bright ideas, but who's going to pay for them and what other capabilities are you going to give up to pay for them? Your F-35 and P-8 are part of a system - they are subsystems of a system and that is how the ADF and others work now. It's not just about one capability or one platform, but multiple capabilities and multiple platforms working across multiple domains, along with logistics, people and how the whole lot interacts and works together to achieve the successful mission outcome. You have to look at it at the micro, meso and macro levels separately and together simultaneously. Like I said it is a system of systems.

People are taking time trying to explain basic concepts to you and you don't appear to be learning and start regurgitating previous arguments that you have used. We have seen this heaps of time before on here, and frankly it gets monotonous making for grumpy Def Pros and grumpier Moderators. We have no problems guiding / helping people who are willing to learn, but when they revert to regurgitating their original arguments, we go into grumpy mode. So I strongly suggest that you evaluate what people have been saying to you, think about it and understand the reasons why they are saying what they say.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
@Bob53 You might have all these bright ideas, but who's going to pay for them and what other capabilities are you going to give up to pay for them? Your F-35 and P-8 are part of a system - they are subsystems of a system and that is how the ADF and others work now. It's not just about one capability or one platform, but multiple capabilities and multiple platforms working across multiple domains, along with logistics, people and how the whole lot interacts and works together to achieve the successful mission outcome. You have to look at it at the micro, meso and macro levels separately and together simultaneously. Like I said it is a system of systems.

People are taking time trying to explain basic concepts to you and you don't appear to be learning and start regurgitating previous arguments that you have used. We have seen this heaps of time before on here, and frankly it gets monotonous making for grumpy Def Pros and grumpier Moderators. We have no problems guiding / helping people who are willing to learn, but when they revert to regurgitating their original arguments, we go into grumpy mode. So I strongly suggest that you evaluate what people have been saying to you, think about it and understand the reasons why they are saying what they say.

Sorry that I’m not sticking with the script if I point out the absence of logic in an argument and flawed assumptions (like F35As can operate from civilian airfields...maybe for about 5 minutes) that always seem to point to a favourable outcome for the good guys. If we all have to agree here then boot me out.

They are not my bright ideas. I am rehashing from Hugh White, Paul Dibb, Marcus Hellyer, Malcom Davis etal. And I’m not a child and understand what an eco system of platforms looks like. I do not have military experience but I do have 35 years experience in complex broad scale logistics in both the maritime and land domains so understand what it takes to get complex kit and the bodies to operate long distances into stinking hot, dusty, muddy & difficult locations and keep them supplied, maintained and effective.....and none of my experience has been while someone is really trying to stop you or while trying to hide movement from a potential adversary. All which I am certain, add several more layers of complexity. I am also aware of the very small things that can and often do go wrong with even moderately complicated machinery that can keep the job from being performed to design.

As to the chances of the scenario I put forward happening ....low ....it was never intended to be scenario for today. I should of said what if there is a cyclone that cuts the roads in every direction..... but is a theoretical circumstances against the rules here? .... but someone thinks we may be heading for darker times....why are we having another Whitepaper? Because regional and global security circumstance have changed rapidly downward and some one above my pay grade thinks we need to have a re think. And I suspect the white paper will not say we are spending too much on defence. I think it will determine that we need additional capabilities in our North and that we need to spend more or re focus.

What am I suggesting we give up? I’m not. If it’s up to me there is more $ and we borrow at 1% and lock it in for 10 years and use a chunk of it on National road rail and other infrastructure which may include a few more bare bases and use another chunk of it to start churning out more engineers and scientists.

Maybe my point has been poorly made ...I have been making the point that getting the right systems to theatre isn’t as simple as some members here seem to think.

Here is some articles that reference some of the points I had been making.

Australia’s Northern Surveillance

Projecting power with the F-35 (part 1): How far can it go? | The Strategist
Projecting power with the F-35 (part 2): going further | The Strategist
[URL="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/projecting-power-with-the-f-35-part-3-operational-implications/"]Projecting power with the F-35 (part 3): operational implications | The Strategist
[/URL]




 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
@Bob53 - Marcus Hellyer’s analysis is well made and you have been supporting that over a number of posts, but;
For me the analysis is too one dimensional, it concentrates only on AirPower as a means of projecting power or defending the Remote areas.
There is not enough context, why and by whom are important questions.
What about the role of the RAN, including it’s submarines?
How about advanced intel and the subsequent preparation time for the ADF to predeploy both forces and support assets?
I think he confuses the role of the F35, he wishes for it to provide an enduring presence at the limits of its capability when in truth that will be provided by surveillance assets (which he only briefly mentions) and the F35’s will provide the reactive force.

Hellyer’s points are well presented however there is more to his scenarios that are not considered.

AirPower is not my area of expertise so others please feel free to zap me.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Sorry that I’m not sticking with the script if I point out the absence of logic in an argument and flawed assumptions (like F35As can operate from civilian airfields...maybe for about 5 minutes) that always seem to point to a favourable outcome for the good guys. If we all have to agree here then boot me out.

They are not my bright ideas. I am rehashing from Hugh White, Paul Dibb, Marcus Hellyer, Malcom Davis etal. And I’m not a child and understand what an eco system of platforms looks like. I do not have military experience but I do have 35 years experience in complex broad scale logistics in both the maritime and land domains so understand what it takes to get complex kit and the bodies to operate long distances into stinking hot, dusty, muddy & difficult locations and keep them supplied, maintained and effective.....and none of my experience has been while someone is really trying to stop you or while trying to hide movement from a potential adversary. All which I am certain, add several more layers of complexity. I am also aware of the very small things that can and often do go wrong with even moderately complicated machinery that can keep the job from being performed to design.
First of all we have no intention of giving you the boot because you have not yet done anything to warrant us thinking such action. Green ink is used to guide people and / or to make a point without getting into warnings and real cranky areas. Sometimes we may use terse language to reinforce a point. We don't have a script that everybody has to follow, except the rules which we expect people to follow. I apologise if I have offended you.

Now I do see that you have done research which is great, and when you post reference such research with links in your posts so that the rest of us know that:
  • you have done some research which is really good,
  • that you are giving some thought to what you are posting about and,
  • you are not plagiarising.
At the top of the Air Force and Aviation Threads we have some fixed threads two of which you should have a read of if you already haven't.
I would also suggest that you have a read back through the various threads taking a note of the the more strategic multi domain posts to defending large areas / homelands. You would also have to use Mr Google quite a bit in this as well.

Finally, don't worry, I was a bit of a pillock when I first started here and was growled at by the Moderators more than a few times. Even survived an encounter with Preceptor which required multiple changes of the underdaks afterwards :D
As to the chances of the scenario I put forward happening ....low ....it was never intended to be scenario for today. I should of said what if there is a cyclone that cuts the roads in every direction..... but is a theoretical circumstances against the rules here? .... but someone thinks we may be heading for darker times....why are we having another Whitepaper? Because regional and global security circumstance have changed rapidly downward and some one above my pay grade thinks we need to have a re think. And I suspect the white paper will not say we are spending too much on defence. I think it will determine that we need additional capabilities in our North and that we need to spend more or re focus.

What am I suggesting we give up? I’m not. If it’s up to me there is more $ and we borrow at 1% and lock it in for 10 years and use a chunk of it on National road rail and other infrastructure which may include a few more bare bases and use another chunk of it to start churning out more engineers and scientists.

Maybe my point has been poorly made ...I have been making the point that getting the right systems to theatre isn’t as simple as some members here seem to think.

Here is some articles that reference some of the points I had been making.

Australia’s Northern Surveillance

Projecting power with the F-35 (part 1): How far can it go? | The Strategist
Projecting power with the F-35 (part 2): going further | The Strategist
Projecting power with the F-35 (part 3): operational implications | The Strategist
Great that you "... have 35 years experience in complex broad scale logistics in both the maritime and land domains so understand what it takes to get complex kit and the bodies to operate long distances into stinking hot, dusty, muddy & difficult locations and keep them supplied, maintained and effective." I've highlighted this because it emphasises too other posters that you know what you are talking about in that subject area. I would suggest adding it o your profile, if you already haven't.

I would suggest that you have a look through this site Second Line Of Defense, because it is quite a good resource and has quite in depth discussions on the RAAF and ADF fifth domain approaches. It is well worth the time.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Maybe my point has been poorly made ...I have been making the point that getting the right systems to theatre isn’t as simple as some members here seem to think.
A few things to consider. The first being that there are only two things guaranteed in life, and these are death and taxes respectively.

The second is that a number of DT members have, through various experiences, have some idea of what it can take to get kit into remote areas, and IMO the more difficult part is then being able to sustain operations in/from the remote areas. The Far North of Australia being an area which would be particularly challenging due to the lack of population centres and resulting lack of infrastructure over long distances. IIRC a number of the regional communities have to have fuel shipped or barged in, since there is no sufficiently efficient overland route to bring fuel in by either road or railroad. I mention this because if Australia find it has to sustain operations in the Far North for whatever reason, the limited options available for resupply have a very real potential for causing problems, and this is the case whether the need for operations is causing by a security threat, combat ops, tectonic activity or a tropical cyclone. Having additional forward operating bases pre-fabricated and stocked with fuel might alleviate the situation to a small degree, OTOH it might not make any difference whatsoever.

Using a tropical cyclone as an example, if one were to cause damage sufficient to disable a base, if there were other bases nearby (nearby being relative to the Far North...) they too could be similarly impacted. Also, even if a base was not disabled, if the normal resupply routes were damaged or cut, that would negatively impact the ability of the ADF to sustain operations from that base and other nearby facilities. The basic gist of this being that just constructing additional facilities in the North would not really solve the potential problem.

Now, this all comes back to considering the entirety of the ADF and the overall capabilities of Australia's battle system which I have mentioned previously. I bring this up again because having looked at the linked articles again, one covers portions of Australia's civilian maritime domain awareness capability and the Australian Border Force (ABF) and the other three really seem to focus on drawing F-35 range rings on a map, which brings to mind another group of Australians interested in "Air Power"... While these articles do touch on some other areas, they largely seem to gloss over the capabilities of important Australian defence capabilities in maritime surveillance and strike as well as broad area aerial/maritime surveillance and also Australian defence systems which collect and integrate the information from various sensing systems to provide a common operating picture over a broad area for decision makers. IMO these systems really are just as important as the combat systems, because these are what detect and relay potential threats, potentially allowing Australia to concentrate the proper forces in the correct areas to achieve outcomes beneficial to Australia. One other thing I noted with the last three articles was the focus on maintaining an F-35 aloft for extended periods of time at long distances away from the mainland. Realistically that should not be something that Australia attempt to do regularly, since that really was not a mission which the F-35 (or really any fighter-sized aircraft) was designed for. For that matter, Australia has a number of other systems which are intended to provide coverage in such a situation. A case in point being that an aircraft like the P-8 Poseidon has a much greater capability for flying to a distant station and then loitering for a significant duration before returning to base.

As for the notion of a new White Paper, that is not a bad idea, since a good chunk of it would be a review of current and future potential as well as probable threats to Australia, along with what the future security situation is projected to be. Depending on what is expected, there could be changes made to Australian defence expenditures, as well as a change in focus across the ADF as a whole, as well as changes made to Australian kit and force composition.

Me being me though, absent a more concrete threat scenario, I do not really see anything which would justify the expenditure of tens if not hundreds of millions of AUD$ or more to build more 'bare bases' in the North. Nor do I see anything which would make it advisable to establish a major RAAF base in the North, given that there is not really any major population centre which could have such a base built near.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
Sorry that I’m not sticking with the script if I point out the absence of logic in an argument and flawed assumptions (like F35As can operate from civilian airfields...maybe for about 5 minutes) that always seem to point to a favourable outcome for the good guys. If we all have to agree here then boot me out.

They are not my bright ideas. I am rehashing from Hugh White, Paul Dibb, Marcus Hellyer, Malcom Davis etal. And I’m not a child and understand what an eco system of platforms looks like. I do not have military experience but I do have 35 years experience in complex broad scale logistics in both the maritime and land domains so understand what it takes to get complex kit and the bodies to operate long distances into stinking hot, dusty, muddy & difficult locations and keep them supplied, maintained and effective.....and none of my experience has been while someone is really trying to stop you or while trying to hide movement from a potential adversary. All which I am certain, add several more layers of complexity. I am also aware of the very small things that can and often do go wrong with even moderately complicated machinery that can keep the job from being performed to design.

As to the chances of the scenario I put forward happening ....low ....it was never intended to be scenario for today. I should of said what if there is a cyclone that cuts the roads in every direction..... but is a theoretical circumstances against the rules here? .... but someone thinks we may be heading for darker times....why are we having another Whitepaper? Because regional and global security circumstance have changed rapidly downward and some one above my pay grade thinks we need to have a re think. And I suspect the white paper will not say we are spending too much on defence. I think it will determine that we need additional capabilities in our North and that we need to spend more or re focus.

What am I suggesting we give up? I’m not. If it’s up to me there is more $ and we borrow at 1% and lock it in for 10 years and use a chunk of it on National road rail and other infrastructure which may include a few more bare bases and use another chunk of it to start churning out more engineers and scientists.

Maybe my point has been poorly made ...I have been making the point that getting the right systems to theatre isn’t as simple as some members here seem to think.
I agree with the above two. But, in addition to that...

Many of those names are out of date, sorry. And unfortunately, ASPI seems to be slipping in quality. That recent three-parter was the type of "analysis" I expect from a school student. Too simplistic, too one-dimensional and too platform focused. As for Dibb and White - if they were dog's they'd have got a green needle by now. Especially White's recent work. I like Davis, and have helped with some of his work in the past, but even he falls into the trap of platforms = strategy.

I appreciate your experience with civilian logistics, a field that we sorely need to actually learn from. But you are missing the key point:

Why are we fighting in northern (especially western) Australia?

It isn't pretty to say, but why do I need to stop an assault on the shore anywhere between Perth and Gladstone? Landing at Geraldine? Cool - that doesn't hurt Australia. Darwin? Casualties, but it doesn't hurt. Most of our population, industry and key areas lie between Adelaide and Brisbane - that's what is important.

There is so much nothing out there that it's just too hard to fight up there and not worth the cost. Let REDFOR have extended lines of communication - and then allow the Collins / Attack / F-35 / long-range strike platforms to feast. Do you know how much fuel a battalion of T-80s chews? Or their spares? the log chain will be so long and spindly that it'll make the German Army in the east in 1942 look solid and well supplied. You advance 2000 km from the NW shelf and what have you got? Nothing. Except 2000 km of supply chain (on top of the SLOC you need to keep open). Even the American's would struggle with that. This is the number 2 problem with putting bases in the north. Just keeping them supplied from the major ports in Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide is too hard - even with the rail links.

Now, offshore operations with our forces is different. So the pretty range rings of ASPI show that we can't strike everywhere. That's why we have more platforms than a F-35 with bombs. It's a Joint Force, not an Air Force. You know what can kill a REDFOR aircraft 550 miles from Tindal? A LAND 19-7b battery. Or HMAS Brisbane. You know what can hit a ship 600 nm from Townsville? Sub's or major fleet units. Gosh, depending where it is a K9 / HiMARS may even have a shot. Like many on this board, you are focused on the kit. The kit is easy - I can buy fighters, ships or tanks at the drop of a hat. What is more important is the bits that glue all the kit together and the people. If we are clever, there are ways to avoid needing a F-35 at 550 nm. With the recent rediscovery of information warfare, other non-kinetic options or a decent DFAT policy, we will actually have many options.

Beyond that, some other points. The number 1 problem with putting bases in the north are the people. I love Darwin and would go back in a heartbeat - except there are no jobs there for my partner and the schooling isn't as good as it is in the ACT, so that'll cost my kids something. I don't want to pay that price. Furthermore, my rank generally has me move on every two years. A soldier may spend 5 - 10 years in one location. How well do you sell that? Getting people to stay in Darwin, Cairns and Townsville is hard work. Where is another population centre at least that big to put another base? They are barely large enough to support our forces now - there is no other place for a base.

We aren't getting another White Paper at the moment, nor are we changing the Defence Budget. I actually don't think there is a need for the former (it'd help sure, but other than time, there is nothing that has fundamentally changed). As for the Budget - I challenge the department to start spending it appropriately and smartly before we get a raise. We are the only department that has a budget for 20 years (normally its 12 months, maybe 4 years) yet we stuff up constantly.
 

Wombat000

Active Member
Excellent discussion going on.
Without derailing that momentum, I note casual mention of extending bare base options.

Bare bases = pre-prepped REDFOR air-bridge opportunities.

Agree or disagree?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Excellent discussion going on.
Without derailing that momentum, I note casual mention of extending bare base options.

Bare bases = pre-prepped REDFOR air-bridge opportunities.

Agree or disagree?
Generally, I would say, "no." My reasoning is that the bare bases are a long way from much of the rest of Australia, and aside from Indonesia, are even further away from everyone else who might try and seize one of the bare bases. There are few nations which might be able to contemplate landing troops to try and seize one of the bases, and fewer still (perhaps even only one) which could potentially support and resupply the troops at a seized base.
 
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