The Situation With Iran and the Strait of Hormuz

south said:

Not really true. Computer systems can predict low altitude coverage and gaps caused by terrain, it’s no secret it’s just physics.

For example:
Free Software Shows Radar Coverage

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I have a few issues with something like this. For one thing, such programs can make predictions on where there will be coverage and/or gaps, but real world RF propagation can very often different from what the models suggest. In addition to the quality of the program making a difference, so does the quality of the data set the program is using to create the model. In the end, there is nothing quite are reliable as the opportunity to setup and then test a system to determine propagation and coverage gaps.

For another, I mentioned that mobile GBAD systems are particularly susceptible, and realistically I doubt that a GBAD unit would have the time to determine where the coverage gaps would be when they setup in an area unless they are going to be in position for a period of time.

Todjaeger said:

I have a few issues with something like this. For one thing, such programs can make predictions on where there will be coverage and/or gaps, but real world RF propagation can very often different from what the models suggest. In addition to the quality of the program making a difference, so does the quality of the data set the program is using to create the model. In the end, there is nothing quite are reliable as the opportunity to setup and then test a system to determine propagation and coverage gaps.

For another, I mentioned that mobile GBAD systems are particularly susceptible, and realistically I doubt that a GBAD unit would have the time to determine where the coverage gaps would be when they setup in an area unless they are going to be in position for a period of time.

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Tools such as this are not onerous to run, plug in a coordinate for the location along with the antennae height and away you go.. I have limited reason to doubt the fidelity provided a quality terrain map. Which is not hard to achieve with the various mapping means available to national agencies these days - witness the fidelity of terrain database required for a system like Auto GCAS to work.

Likelihood that there is more impact to radar detection based on individual emitters sensitivity and clutter rejection than RF propagation.

Testing is all well and good - but tools like this give you the 99% solution at significantly smaller cost in a fraction of the time of getting real targets to fly a test.

Todjaeger said:

Some of this can and probably will be covered in a thread specifically about IADS, or Integrated Air Defence Systems, however there are several things which some people seem to need to have pointed out.

One of the first is that in order for something like a drone or a cruise missile to be detected by a radar system, the system needs to be on, pointed in the correct direction, and there needs to be a direct path between the two. If a drone or cruise missile is flying at a low altitude, then it can potentially cross a long distance while remaining below the radar horizon, which basically means the curvature of the earth would shield the approaching drone/missile from detection until it was either close to the intended target, or a radar system en route.

Secondly, Saudi Arabia is a large country, roughly 2.1 mil. sq. km, which means that it can be quite difficult to maintain radar coverage over the entire area, particularly given the relatively low population density and dispersal of population centres. As a result of this, I do not make the assumption that there is radar saturation coverage. There would likely be a significant amount of coverage near/around certain parts of Saudi Arabia, but I expect there are holes in that coverage as well.

Thirdly, the main strike location was in Abqaiq, which is ~50 km from the coast, which means that it is hardly in the middle of Saudi Arabia. To put some things into perspective, if a LACM was flying towards Abqaiq over the Persian Gulf at an altitude of 30 m, and there was a radar system in Abqaiq mounted 30 m above ground level, the radar system would likely not be able to detect the inbound LACM until it was within ~50 km of Abqaiq. That is also assuming that the conditions are perfect, the radar system is functioning correctly, the operators are competent, etc.

As for knowing the point of origin for the launch, unless there was some sort of ISR coverage of the launch location at the time of launch... then that it unlikely to be known. Instead we have an apparent vector, which strongly suggests that the Houthi claim is false given the location of their strongholds being in basically the opposite direction from where the strike came in from. IMO it would be far more likely that the strike was Iranian in origin, either launched directly by them, or by one of their other surrogates/proxies at their direction.

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I just want to add two more possible failure modes to this informative post.

Along with detecting the threat, the next problem is identifying. It is entirely possible that the Saudis detected the inbound weapons yet were confused or unable to react because they were unsure as the the origin or identity and thus held fire; particularly if there was no intelligence of a threat.

Further to that - even assuming the weapons were within a defensive engagement envelope - it is also possible that the unit responsible for defence did not have the requisite approval / delegation of approval to engage what was likely a fleeting target with low confidence of origin and/or identity.

It wouldn’t be the first time that confusion, ROE and/or delegation of authority (or lack of) have resulted in capability games when the technical means was suitable.

south said:

I just want to add two more possible failure modes to this informative post.

Along with detecting the threat, the next problem is identifying. It is possible that the Saudis detected the inbound weapons yet were confused or unable to react because they were unsure as the the origin or identity and thus held fire; particularly if there was no intelligence of a threat.

Further to that - assuming the weapons were within a defensive engagement envelope - it is also possible that the unit responsible for defence did not the requisite approval / delegation of approval to engage what was likely a fleeting target with low confidence of origin and/or identity.

Im sure it is being analysed as to what occurred in this case, but there are many more links in the chain that could have failed rather than just failure to detect.

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And considering the competency issues that the Saudis regularly display, it would not be surprising if this was indeed the point of failure.

On a side note, here's another look at Saudi GBAD around the strike locations.

Análisis Militares: Las defensas de la refinería saudí en Abqaiq (actualizado)

south said:

I just want to add two more possible failure modes to this informative post.

Along with detecting the threat, the next problem is identifying. It is entirely possible that the Saudis detected the inbound weapons yet were confused or unable to react because they were unsure as the the origin or identity and thus held fire; particularly if there was no intelligence of a threat.

Further to that - even assuming the weapons were within a defensive engagement envelope - it is also possible that the unit responsible for defence did not have the requisite approval / delegation of approval to engage what was likely a fleeting target with low confidence of origin and/or identity.

It wouldn’t be the first time that confusion, ROE and/or delegation of authority (or lack of) have resulted in capability games when the technical means was suitable.

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Thanks for mentioning that, as I had forgotten to include it. The task of identifying a radar contact can also be handled differently, depending on whether an IADS is primarily air or GBAD-centric. If a CAP or hot pad interceptor is available, they could potentially be tasked with getting a set of Mk I's to take a look. Getting a ground-based unit to do that is rather more difficult unless the radar contact is feeling particularly cooperative.

More material for an IADS discussion.

Feanor said:

And considering the competency issues that the Saudis regularly display, it would not be surprising if this was indeed the point of failure.

On a side note, here's another look at Saudi GBAD around the strike locations.

Análisis Militares: Las defensas de la refinería saudí en Abqaiq (actualizado)

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Ouch. A bit harsh on Saudi capability, are we? I don’t envy them, as the Iranian threats to their oil production has evolved. Given the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Iran no longer has to plan to seriously fight Iraq. This allows Iran to focus on giving their rival, Saudi Arabia a hard time (death by a thousand pin pricks).

Todjaeger said:

Thanks for mentioning that, as I had forgotten to include it. The task of identifying a radar contact can also be handled differently, depending on whether an IADS is primarily air or GBAD-centric. If a CAP or hot pad interceptor is available, they could potentially be tasked with getting a set of Mk I's to take a look. Getting a ground-based unit to do that is rather more difficult unless the radar contact is feeling particularly cooperative.

More material for an IADS discussion.

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Even the Japanese have difficulty tracking North Korean projectiles with different shapes and capabilities. Many of them flew below an altitude of 60 kilometers, lower than the altitude at which ballistic missiles typically travel. It was reported in the Japan Times in Sep 2919 that some of the missiles managed to escape detection by the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Aegis-equipped destroyer in the Sea of Japan as well as radar deployed in Japan and operated by the Air Self-Defense Force, the sources said.

According to the Defense Ministry in Tokyo and the South Korean military, the projectiles launched during the period included the KN-23, a new type of a short-range ballistic missile, a missile resembling the United States’ Army Tactical Missile and multiple launch rocket artillery. Among them, the KN-23, which is similar to an advanced ballistic missile manufactured in Russia, is capable of reaching Japan. The missile is known to have an irregular trajectory, the sources said. This increases the risk of leakage in any IADS.

OPSSG said:

Ouch. A bit harsh on Saudi capability, are we? I don’t envy them, as the Iranian threats to their oil production has evolved. Given the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Iran no longer has to plan to seriously fight Iraq. This allows Iran to focus on giving their rival, Saudi Arabia a hard time (death by a thousand pin pricks).

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I'm not sure what to say here. They have a defense budget bigger then Russia, and their primary threat is well known and has been their primary threat for a long time. Despite this their performance in Yemen, at the most basic level - platoon-company level mech and motorized formation tactics, has been atrocious. So considering that they can't get their sh*t together on such a basic level, is it wrong to suspect that there might be serious problems with their handling of a complex IADS, especially when dealing with difficult targets, coming from an unexpected direction?

If Saudi Arabia hired the Three Stooges to run their army, navy, and airforce, it would probably be an improvement.

Feanor said:

I'm not sure what to say here. They have a defense budget bigger then Russia, and their primary threat is well known and has been their primary threat for a long time. Despite this their performance in Yemen, at the most basic level - platoon-company level mech and motorized formation tactics, has been atrocious. So considering that they can't get their sh*t together on such a basic level, is it wrong to suspect that there might be serious problems with their handling of a complex IADS, especially when dealing with difficult targets, coming from an unexpected direction?

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I had an opportunity to train some Saudi Company Grade Infantry officers in company/platoon level tactics/maneuver etc. They lacked any sense of basic Field craft, soldiering, leadership etc. The larger issue was an inherent lack of desire or will to learn.

Ranger25 said:

I had an opportunity to train some Saudi Company Grade Infantry officers in company/platoon level tactics/maneuver etc. They lacked any sense of basic Field craft, soldiering, leadership etc. The larger issue was an inherent lack of desire or will to learn.

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I'm sure there is a major issue with the operational culture there. It can't not be a factor. Which is why I think this fundamental, principled, incompetence spreads to all branches of their military and I suspect played a major role in this failure, as it has in their previous lackluster efforts at dealing with Houthi missile and UAV strikes.

Feanor said:

I'm not sure what to say here. They have a defense budget bigger then Russia, and their primary threat is well known and has been their primary threat for a long time. Despite this their performance in Yemen, at the most basic level - platoon-company level mech and motorized formation tactics, has been atrocious. So considering that they can't get their sh*t together on such a basic level, is it wrong to suspect that there might be serious problems with their handling of a complex IADS, especially when dealing with difficult targets, coming from an unexpected direction?

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By the way, I agree with what you say. It’s just harsh enough for me to say ouch.

Are there any of you Gent's know on the deployment of Pakistan 'soldiers' that 'well you can say' contracted by Saudi's ?

Why Pakistan has troops in Saudi Arabia – and what it means for the Middle East

This bit old article seems suggesting Pakistani and Saudi armed forces cooperation include from time to time Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi.

Ananda said:

Are there any of you Gent's know on the deployment of Pakistan 'soldiers' that 'well you can say' contracted by Saudi's ?

Why Pakistan has troops in Saudi Arabia – and what it means for the Middle East

This bit old article seems suggesting Pakistani and Saudi armed forces cooperation include from time to time Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi.

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I can't add anything to it, but I know one thing that if the Pakistanis were running the Saudi IADS, the recent attack probably wouldn't been as successful. They do know how to run a fight.

ngatimozart said:

I can't add anything to it, but I know one thing that if the Pakistanis were running the Saudi IADS, the recent attack probably wouldn't been as successful. They do know how to run a fight.

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Do you want to take into consideration another data point?

The Abbottabad Commission, tasked with investigating the circumstances around Bin Laden's nine year residence, and subsequent death, in Pakistan, found not only that it had taken more than three hours for Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets to be scrambled to respond to a violation of Pakistani airspace. I think that all conventional IADS have weaknesses that can be exploited, especially if the party intruding has accurate intelligence. The Americans have accurate intelligence on Pakistan prior to the raid and the Iranians had accurate intelligence on Saudi Arabia prior to the attack.

For clarity, this is not to say anything bad on Pakistan — whose soldiers and military leaders are well trained and able to fight. Saudi Arabia values the Pakistani ability to fight; and do pay for them.

OPSSG said:

By the way, I agree with what you say. It’s just harsh enough for me to say ouch.

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There were statements that once the UAE basically pulled back from the war in Yemen, Saudis would be completely incapable of putting up any sort of significant fight.
U.A.E. Pulls Most Forces From Yemen in Blow to Saudi War Effort
The UAE begins pulling out of Yemen

“The only thing stopping the Houthis from taking over Yemen was the U.A.E. armed forces,” said Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute. “Now the glue that was holding Yemen together is being withdrawn.”

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The fact the Saudi leadership couldn't even get along with the UAE leadership speaks significantly. Also the quality difference between UAE and Saudi forces is extremely significant. There are some deep seated issues in Saudi society and Saudi Armed Forces that reduced its fighting capability very significantly (to essentially ineffective).

Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy -- but it's still not a threat to Iran

On the UAE.

Why Saudi Arabia and ‘Little Sparta’ still can’t defeat Iran in Yemen

Guzansky notes that in Yemen it is actually the UAE, and not the Saudis, doing the heavy lifting. The Saudis are primarily providing aerial support, he says, while the UAE has actual troops on the ground – albeit many of them mercenaries from countries like Sudan – constituting a fighting force to be reckoned with. The UAE has even “earned itself the nickname ‘Little Sparta,’” in the U.S. military, says Guzansky, citing current U.S. Defense Secretary and former U.S. Marines Gen. James Mattis as having “an admiration for what they’ve done – and what they can do.”

...

Additionally, and unlike the Saudis, the UAE has gained extensive operational experience in countries such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Bosnia. Its forces are led, at least in part, by former Australian Gen. Mike Hindmarsh, who is currently commander of the UAE Presidential Guard – a military division that includes both conventional and special-ops units, which are active in Yemen.

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Haaretz is a Israeli news paper, not usually a place where you would find a lot of praise for Arab military power.

Studying the Saudis should be compulsory, on what not to do. If anything, people are actually being kind to the Saudis. I actually think this conflict is entering its end game. But Saudi delusions seem to be getting in the way, they aren't really known for their grounded view of reality.

I think what is important is to have a balanced discussion, to tease out areas of concern in military capability gaps limiting choices and considerations for the parties in the dispute — hope to have stimulated discussions on the various angles to look at this issue and how to understand the attack on Saudi Arabia. Thank you all for making it fun to participate and easy to read.

Saudi Arabia has called on international and regional press repeatedly in recent days, holding real-time press conferences to discuss in detail the attack, oil production, and even displaying the remnants of the missiles and drones themselves. It is a change of approach for the opaque kingdom, which although it has always strived to receive better press in the West, has struggled to shake off its traditional aversion to transparency and has instead relied heavily on Washington-based public relations firms and lobbyists. And Saudi Arabia has been careful in its language, describing the attacks as “Iran-sponsored.” Riyadh and its surrogates have repeated that Saudi Arabia “does not want escalation” and “does not want conflict,” reminding the international community that its oil infrastructure is the single “most important energy source in the world.”

“I think you are now seeing a new, more judicious use of power and a much more thoughtful approach to things in Saudi Arabia now than you saw before,” says Ali Shihabi, a US-based Saudi commentator and analyst. If Saudi Arabia can do the hard work of building an international consensus and getting UAE to join their coalition, then they can have the option of striking back to preserve deterrence. If not, the US is not going to do the heavy lifting for them at the military and diplomatic spheres.

south said:

I just want to add two more possible failure modes to this informative post.

Along with detecting the threat, the next problem is identifying. It is possible that the Saudis detected the inbound weapons yet were confused or unable to react because they were unsure as the the origin or identity and thus held fire; particularly if there was no intelligence of a threat.

Further to that - assuming the weapons were within a defensive engagement envelope - it is also possible that the unit responsible for defence did not the requisite approval / delegation of approval to engage what was likely a fleeting target with low confidence of origin and/or identity.

Im sure it is being analysed as to what occurred in this case, but there are many more links in the chain that could have failed rather than just failure to detect.

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Great posts that cover the gaps in our discussion on IADS systems. Grateful for the input.

StingrayOZ said:

There were statements that once the UAE basically pulled back from the war in Yemen, Saudis would be completely incapable of putting up any sort of significant fight.
U.A.E. Pulls Most Forces From Yemen in Blow to Saudi War Effort
The UAE begins pulling out of Yemen

The fact the Saudi leadership couldn't even get along with the UAE leadership speaks significantly. Also the quality difference between UAE and Saudi forces is extremely significant. There are some deep seated issues in Saudi society and Saudi Armed Forces that reduced its fighting capability very significantly (to essentially ineffective).

Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy -- but it's still not a threat to Iran

On the UAE.

Why Saudi Arabia and ‘Little Sparta’ still can’t defeat Iran in Yemen

Haaretz is a Israeli news paper, not usually a place where you would find a lot of praise for Arab military power.

Studying the Saudis should be compulsory, on what not to do. If anything, people are actually being kind to the Saudis. I actually think this conflict is entering its end game. But Saudi delusions seem to be getting in the way, they aren't really known for their grounded view of reality.

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Thank you for the links on Saudi effectiveness and perspective on UAE. Really impressed with UAE and have been for years. Under the leadership of Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, the UAE embarked on the rapid modernization and expansion of its army. It first pursued an “Emiratization” of its armed forces by developing and promoting Emirati officers, strategists, pilots, and technicians – restricting foreign nationals to advisory roles. Abu Dhabi then boosted its military spending, buying up advanced systems and technologies from around the world, including a fleet of 72 F-16s, French Mirage 2000 jets, Patriot-3 missile systems, and Lockheed Martin’s THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile-defense systems.

UAE knows how to fight and it reflects in the way they spec their weapon buys, like the block 60: Here's What The Ball On The Nose Of UAE's Block 60 F-16E/F Desert Falcon Does

UAE is the ultimate counter point to the Saudis in terms of development and capability. One can't generalize about Arab militaries, as these two are chalk and cheese apart, and the were on the same "side" of the conflict.

The UAE has been on a genuine learning experience, done the hard yards, way more pragmatic and efficient in the way its gone about things. The Saudis on the other hand seem to go. I would argue because of the heavy lifting done by the UAE they are a bit more in touch why they should look for other-ways to resolve the conflict. UAE leadership seems to be with it so to speak. But even they struggle to have frank discussions and talk much sense into the Saudis in a situation with no military solution.

UAE loosens Saudi alliance to push peacemaker image

“The UAE wants to be seen as the small country that facilitates peace and stability rather than an appendage to a triumphant expansionist Saudi,” said a source familiar with the government’s thinking.

“It is in a way (putting) their interests first, because they think if you have an expansionist Saudi, it’s going to engulf them,” the source added.

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Plenty of lessons to be learnt for small and middle powers, trying to manage a larger and more powerful partner. Relationships aren't easy. You might achieve more being a capable small power than a bloated, confused, ineffective paper tiger.

I hope peace comes out of this, I hope there is support for the UAE in their pursuit of peace. Not everyone wants to see peace. Some people still have unrealistic expectations (both sides).

Tensions with Iran are not limited to its missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, directly or by proxy. This is because Iran’s two-track policy of :

• military entrenchment; and
• political and economic activity,

appears designed to make it a major player in Syria for the long term. The immediate US goal is to prevent more Iranian entrenchment, including by supporting Israeli air strikes and sanctions on Tehran. In the long run, Saudi Arabia and US hopes that any political settlement for the Syrian conflict will include the withdrawal of Iran’s direct and proxy forces. But Iran is unlikely to agree.

StingrayOZ said:

UAE is the ultimate counter point to the Saudis in terms of development and capability. One can't generalize about Arab militaries, as these two are chalk and cheese apart, and the were on the same "side" of the conflict.

The UAE has been on a genuine learning experience, done the hard yards, way more pragmatic and efficient in the way its gone about things. The Saudis on the other hand seem to go. I would argue because of the heavy lifting done by the UAE they are a bit more in touch why they should look for other-ways to resolve the conflict. UAE leadership seems to be with it so to speak. But even they struggle to have frank discussions and talk much sense into the Saudis in a situation with no military solution.

UAE loosens Saudi alliance to push peacemaker image


Plenty of lessons to be learnt for small and middle powers, trying to manage a larger and more powerful partner. Relationships aren't easy. You might achieve more being a capable small power than a bloated, confused, ineffective paper tiger.

I hope peace comes out of this, I hope there is support for the UAE in their pursuit of peace. Not everyone wants to see peace. Some people still have unrealistic expectations (both sides).

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Agreed. In Aug 2919, at his Mecca palace, Saudi King Salman took the unusual step of expressing “extreme irritation” with the UAE, his closest Arab partner. In the article you provide, the Saudi King’s comment appears to be evidence of a fissure in the alliance, which is led in practice by the king’s son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and the UAE de facto ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MBZ). In June 2019, the UAE scaled down its military presence in Yemen, leaving Riyadh with an unpopular war it had launched to neutralize the Houthis and prevent Iran from consolidating influence along the border. A senior Emirati official said the move was a natural progression due to a U.N.-sponsored peace deal in the western port of Hodeidah. IMO, UAE accepted there was no military solution and were sensitive to criticism of the humanitarian disaster and coalition air strikes that have killed civilians.

The difference between MBS and MBZ, is that the latter has an army that can execute plans and provide options to UAE, should the need arise. Without MBZ support, I predict that Saudi Arabia does not have confidence to strike Iran.

OPSSG said:

Do you want to take into consideration another data point?

The Abbottabad Commission, tasked with investigating the circumstances around Bin Laden's nine year residence, and subsequent death, in Pakistan, found not only that it had taken more than three hours for Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets to be scrambled to respond to a violation of Pakistani airspace. I think that all conventional IADS have weaknesses that can be exploited, especially if the party intruding has accurate intelligence. The Americans have accurate intelligence on Pakistan prior to the raid and the Iranians had accurate intelligence on Saudi Arabia prior to the attack.

For clarity, this is not to say anything bad on Pakistan — whose soldiers and military leaders are well trained and able to fight. Saudi Arabia values the Pakistani ability to fight; and do pay for them.

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Yes I would, however I wouldn't discount the possibility that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) may have had a hand in the delayed response of the PAF to the Bin Laden raid at Abbottabad. One possibility is that Bin Laden was becoming a burden and liability to them and maybe a way of expunging that was for the US to conveniently stumble across Bin Laden's location with the help of a local. We'll never know, but that possibility does exist. I would also agree that any IADS will have a weakness that can be exploited if it is discovered by an enemy.

OPSSG said:

Iran has lost all neutrals in this attack (even in the very, very, very unlikely event that Saudi Arabia does not retaliate via military force).

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OPSSG said:

The difference between MBS and MBZ, is that the latter has an army that can execute plans and provide options to UAE, should the need arise. Without MBZ support, I predict that Saudi Arabia does not have confidence to strike Iran.

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I am interested, but confused, about your view regarding whether Saudi Arabia is going to stike back. On the 23/9 you said is it very unlikely they won't. On the 26/9 it seems you have changed your mind?

FWIW I agree with your second assessment but not your first.