Thanks for sharing your thoughts but we would appreciate a more sophisticated discussion on regional geo-political considerations that what is currently presented. Please read our threads on the
South China Sea and the
Indo-Pacific.
Your item 1 - There is a lot of discussion raging in other forums about lifting defence spending quick to 3% GDP then move towards 4%. The following tweet gives you some indication of that evolving conversation -
Philip Eagle on Twitter
Your item 4 -
Philip Eagle on Twitter
Really? By defence professionals at the pointy end of the stick? You are asking to change the defence budget of your country to over 38% of all governmental spending. Within 2-5 years into such a plan, such spending will reduce your country’s credit rating and fail to deliver the capability you wished for. You need a realistic phased ramp up plan that has the support of professionals to deliver relevant high end and incremental capability that can be sustained (with an understanding of the raise, train and sustain cycle) and not just a sugar rush.
Edit: You claim to be trained as an Accountant. Have you done the maths and the economic implication of such a proposed move on such an increase in defence spending? Any analysis of alternatives to proposed incremental defence spend (with an understanding of the trade-offs in build drum beat or industrial capacity expansion without incurring a ‘valley of death’ for a continuous build program)? Do you have the trained manpower for the new equipment? How do you grow your existing people? What about the technology maturity for a new capability?
but I can assure you that there is widespread activity across the western world
I suspect you really don’t understand what we have written in this forum on geopolitics and acquisition planning (and in particular the relevant threads that we have cited as a starting point, with your wish list discussion).
My fellow professionals have raised their displeasure with the quality of this discussion and I am giving you a heads up. Kindly consider reading the recommended threads. In the 2014 to 2016 time frame, a few of us looked forward to 2030 and I even offered a 15 year perspective (till 2026) on developments. China's emerging military capability development and island building efforts in the South China Sea exceeded all prior expectations.
One of my previous contributions included the following wish list:
My list of equipment-in-being, ASAP
1 - Order at least 50 more F35's & F/A18F's and base a permanent 2nd air-force in Malaysia/Singapore quickly.
2 - Order at least 24 F35B's and quickly acquire and/or modify platforms to make them effective.
...
4 - Build a new brigade to permanently occupy bases across Malaysia/Singapore + the equipment to support the structure best determined by the Army. As part of that, bring Indonesia into the tent.
...
8 - Add at least 2 more Oiler/Replenishment vessels to the naval mix.
9 - Bulk up other enablers that would be required with the increased front line capability.
Further expansion of my ideas covered this line of thinking:
1 - The most important relationship we have to lock down by 2020-21 is the reformation of the 5 Power Defence Agreement into a 6 Power Defence Agreement by bringing in Indonesia as a full and active partner.
2 - We have to make it known to the Australian people and our regional friends that we will be kicking into the defence mix another $10-15 billion per annum, starting 2020-21 and we will be willing to assist the Asian 6PDA partners by contributing capital funds for rapid capability improvements, including our own.
3 - We will need to develop more robust and more regular 6PDA exercises and widen the exposure to bring in Northern & Western Australian range scenarios into the mix. This could become a western facing "Talisman Sabre" type of exercise, initially without US engagement, however reserving the right to add the USN into the proceedings later into the decade.
4 - Vietnam and the Phillippines could be invited to become associates of the 6PDA, with a future pathway to join as full partners.
Beyond the problems with your wish list, you can’t expand the FPDA without agreement by all five powers. Do you know about the claim by the Philippines on Sabah? Malaysia will never agree to add them into the FPDA.
- On 5 March 2013 in Operation Daulat, the Malaysian Government commenced military operations against over 100 armed Filipino gunmen, from the Tausug community, to end the stand-off in Lahad Datu. In violation of Malaysian sovereignty, on 12 February 2013, the Filipino Tausug gunmen invaded two kampungs, in Sabah; and displaced the local residents from their homes. The ambush and killing of Malaysian security forces deployed in the security cordon (by these Filipino Tausug gunmen) compelled the Malaysian Armed Forces to commence clearing operations in a number of areas with wheeled armour supported by artillery and CAS. As at 12 March 2013, 97 suspects, including women, were arrested in connection with the Lahad Datu incident under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, along with the deaths of 56 Filipino Tausug gunmen, one unidentified teenager, eight Malaysian policemen, and one Malaysian soldier.
How does your proposed defence investment plan enable Australia to make effective military contributions (to support the security of maritime South East Asia)? Further, any realignment or increase of Australian forces in Singapore or Malaysia must contribute in a way that is operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Let me list four other points to illustrate why your geopolitically naive plan for FPDA expansion fails the basic politically sustainable test:
One, as I mentioned in another thread, the FPDA as an organisation is increasing lacking in relevance to matters relating to the South China Sea, as UK is engrossed with Brexit and Malaysia has engaged in acts of renewed hostility directed at Singapore and managing this troubled peace, is all that can be hoped for in 2019 to 2021. In Oct 2018, Dr M said although Malaysia is a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), with the five countries deciding to work together, it does not mean that Malaysia has to follow their policies. "We can have our own (defence) policies," he said. The FPDA, signed in 1971, brings together Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Dr Mahathir also said that he would not like to have foreign countries having a military base in Malaysia. "We want to be free from any involvement of other countries," he said (Read more at
Dr M: Malaysia wants to be independent, does not want military alliances - Nation | The Star Online). Do you understand Malaysian internal domestic issues and why they do not want to be seen as aligned to the US?
Two, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). Beyond the 2013 Kuang Ta Hsing No. 28 killing of a fisherman (affecting Taiwan and Philippine relations), other reported incidents include the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat on 19 October 2011 (which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy). The sinking of a Filipino fishing vessel in Reed Bank and abandonment of its distressed crew by a Chinese vessel on 9 June 2019 led the Philippines to raise the matter in international bodies. Do other FPDA members want to be associated with a country full of trigger happy idiots under the same intelligence and security umbrella?
Three, the Philippines, is not really serious about taking the incremental and progressive steps necessary to build military capability for deterrence in the face of their stated threat matrix. In the third period mentioned in my prior 2016 post, theoretical ship building plans of a weak power, with its limited defence budget (and tiny fleet - relative to their threat matrix), no longer matter. What matters is the build rate for new hulls and these hulls will be shagged from conducting routine patrols, everyday, during that period. Anything less than 1 new hull, per year, for the Philippines (aka 5 new vessels), will make them a joke. The Pinoys are still lost at sea in terms of a continuous build programme, despite the 2016 contract to supply two vessels between the Philippine Department of National Defense, and Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) with the future BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) launched in May 2019.
Four, there is limited or no space in Singapore to house Australian fighters or significant numbers of Australian military personnel (i.e. no value to the host, as our Army when mobilised is more than 2x bigger in divisions available for local or forward defence), and there is little or no interest in Vietnam to join the FPDA.
