Australian Army Discussions and Updates

Nurse

New Member
HIMARS? I mentioned that platform as a good idea for the army some years ago and got shot down by the defence pros. Rather that using it for salvo rockets, I was thinking about the idea of launching small diameter bombs and/or SAMs, as part of an intergrated land/air doctrine. Bare in mind though, that artillary needs lots of munitions to make it worthwhile, which in turn requires a solid supply line to bring lots of those munitions to the area of operation.

Is there any plan to acquire HIMARS for the army?





That is a surprise! This sort of vehicle is exactly what is required. Hopefully the ADF will see fit to acquire them in good numbers.

The project is a live one. Will HIMARS win it? Who knows? May just end up going the way of Land17 though especially with the (probable) change of govt.

The Twitter thread mentioned 50 for just the amphibious Lynx. Some say that’s far too small a number to warrant the cost of development ie who else will buy it.... Land 400 phase 3 is looking for 450 IFV’s-probably including the amphib’s.

Cheers
 

t68

Well-Known Member
That is a surprise! This sort of vehicle is exactly what is required. Hopefully the ADF will see fit to acquire them in good numbers.
I'd like to know how they intend to make the KF41 swim in the surf without major mods, I doubt taking the turret off will suffice
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
HIMARS? I mentioned that platform as a good idea for the army some years ago and got shot down by the defence pros. Rather that using it for salvo rockets, I was thinking about the idea of launching small diameter bombs and/or SAMs, as part of an intergrated land/air doctrine. Bare in mind though, that artillary needs lots of munitions to make it worthwhile, which in turn requires a solid supply line to bring lots of those munitions to the area of operation.
There
Is there any plan to acquire HIMARS for the army?




That is a surprise! This sort of vehicle is exactly what is required. Hopefully the ADF will see fit to acquire them in good numbers.
There is a requirement for a MRL System in the 2016 DWP and lack of alternatives that will mean either HIMARS or Australia develops a system around either a Land 400 or Land 121 Vehicle.
There is also a version of NASAMS being developed for the Australian Army and a req for a longer range SAM is in the DWP.
 

foxdemon

Member
The Twitter thread mentioned 50 for just the amphibious Lynx. Some say that’s far too small a number to warrant the cost of development ie who else will buy it.... Land 400 phase 3 is looking for 450 IFV’s-probably including the amphib’s.

Cheers
50 is a good start. It depends on how much the army finds they are using those vehicles. If they get used all the time and the fleet is getting worn out, we can just build more of them.

Apart from ship to shore, I can see this lighter version being employed to deal with various operational requirements in monsoon conditions. In E Timor, only the M113s had any useful mobility when the place got real soggy. So all those infantry units using PMVs would need to draw on the amphib pool for transport.

I’m sure the turreted version would do fine in the monsoon also, being tracked. But it would be somewhat heavier and wasteful in stabilisation scenarios or for forward logistics.

Comparable vehicles would be the FV-206, SG Bronco, Russian MTLB.
 

foxdemon

Member
For what exactly? And what numbers are you thinking would make this worthwhile?
For what? As a substitute for PMVs in the terrain and climate that requires tracked mobility. So I can see them being used for more than just landing troops on the beach.

50 vehicles is enough to lift a battalion. So how many would ultimately be needed depends on how many light infantry battalions the army might want to have tracked mobility for in the decades ahead. Given that the circumstances they would be useful is in monsoonal conditions, and that otherwise PMVs would do for mobility for light infantry, the ultimate number wouldn’t be that big. Maybe a few hundred.

As with all these number issues, it depends on what happens in the world. The geopolitical environment will influence how large or small the ADF will be. The important thing is the vehicles are being built in Australia, so more can be built if needed. For now, best to stick with the plan. I am not suggesting any change in proportions to the total 450 vehicle project.
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
For what? As a substitute for PMVs in the terrain and climate that requires tracked mobility. So I can see them being used for more than just landing troops on the beach.

50 vehicles is enough to lift a battalion. So how many would ultimately be needed depends on how many light infantry battalions the army might want to have tracked mobility for in the decades ahead. Given that the circumstances they would be useful is in monsoonal conditions, and that otherwise PMVs would do for mobility for light infantry, the ultimate number wouldn’t be that big. Maybe a few hundred.
So you’ve gone from a small number of protected amphibious vehicles as ship to shore connectors to support the amphibious capability, to buying a few hundred to mechanise multiple infantry battalions? That’s a pretty good return on investment for Rheinmetall for a single CGI rendering.

I won’t put too much faith in this vehicle until it actually exists in the flesh and has been tested. The history of developmental amphibious vehicles hasn’t been too good lately. I doubt even rheinmetall will spend the money necessary to fully develop one for an order of 50 vehicles, and the Army isn’t going to be too keen to pay for a developmental vehicle.

Besides all that, an amphibious vehicle like this actually wouldn’t be too good in the jungle. The extra size needed to provide the bouancy for an amphibious vehicle doesn’t lend itself to travelling down narrow jungle tracks. If you want a small, mobile tracked vehicle for use in complex physical terrain that doesn’t need the combat weight of the IFV, then buy a vehicle that is suited to that, not one designed for driving off a ship onto a shore. Hell, you might as well just keep some AS4s in service.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
For what? As a substitute for PMVs in the terrain and climate that requires tracked mobility. So I can see them being used for more than just landing troops on the beach.

50 vehicles is enough to lift a battalion. So how many would ultimately be needed depends on how many light infantry battalions the army might want to have tracked mobility for in the decades ahead. Given that the circumstances they would be useful is in monsoonal conditions, and that otherwise PMVs would do for mobility for light infantry, the ultimate number wouldn’t be that big. Maybe a few hundred.

As with all these number issues, it depends on what happens in the world. The geopolitical environment will influence how large or small the ADF will be. The important thing is the vehicles are being built in Australia, so more can be built if needed. For now, best to stick with the plan. I am not suggesting any change in proportions to the total 450 vehicle project.
I realise there should be more than a one liner; but I've already highlight my view on an amphibious AFV. It's a waste of time and money for the ADF. On top of this below, don't think that amphib = all terrain (noting ASLAVs get just as stuck in the north in the wet as any other vehicle....):

We don't need a maritime / amphibious Brigade. It's questionable if we even need 2 RAR as it is, but who am I to question removing a unit....

The vast majority of landings conducted, ever, have been done with regular Army units. Read Kainmbla's war diary from 1944/45; the majority of units she takes are Army units - some of who Kanimbla is the first time they have seen a boat, landing craft or ship. They do rehearsals along the way. Aphibious is just another dlievery method.

Also, people really need to understand Beersheba / Keogh. They are raise-train-sustain organisations, not warfighting organisations. The Brigade we need will be assembled from 1 / 3 / 6 / 7 / 16 / 17 and others with the C2 element drawn from 1 / 3 / 7. This means that any of our units needs to be able to conduct amphibious operations (emphasised by our region). So a marine Bde would actually undermine our overall flexibility and capability (especially as, generally speaking, marine units are not as capable as land focused units).

Strike one against an amphibious AFV.

With this in mind, it flows that the forces do not need to be amphibious - rather the "bits" that move forces from the ships to the land need to be capable. They need to be able to carry lots and quickly. But they are fundamentally simple, and hence cheap to upgrade as technology increases. It is easier to upgrade a ship-to-shore connector (despite the ADFs best attempts to do otherwise) than an entire AFV or land mobility capability. Fundamentally, a ship-to-shore connector is more flexible than an amphibious vehicle, as it can move more "stuff" in a given period of time. The amphib can swim ashore (yay!), the landing craft can move a better vehicle, then do all it's stores and support in wave 2, 3 and 4.

Strike two against an amphibious AFV.

Now, tactically we need to move from the ship to the land as fast as possible. It either gets more stuff ashore, or allows us to strike from over the horizon and hence keep the ships safer. Amphib vehicles will never move fast. K-21 speed = 3.8 kt; LCM-8 = 9 kts. More than twice as fast. And LCM-8's are slow. LCM-1E go 50% faster again. And if we want to go crazy, a LCAC is 40+ kt. They are all exemplars - but anything that is a displacement hull (which an AFV is the best example of) is slower than other options like planning or hovercraft.

Strike three against an amphibious AFV.

"But Boxer is too big" I hear the cry. "It can't deploy as well". Noting that protection drives size, pending a change in armour technology or better integration of unmanned elements, all AFVs are going to be about the same size for a given protection level. But an amphib needs even more space for flotation. So pick one, an amphib has to be less protected (despite facing the same threats) or bigger (with consequences for tactical movement and deployment in confined areas like a LHD or C-17).

Strike four against an amphibious AFV.

Finally, the cost. We plan on running five 'armoured' fleets: Hawkei, Bushmaster, Boxer, IFV and M-1. They are in addition to three B-vehicle fleets. These things are expensive, and we want to add a sixth? "But it'll be smaller and cost less" I hear. You need a minimum fleet size, look at M-1. So your 40 may not be enough. So your sustainment costs will either be higher, or you cut the other fleets.

Strike five against an amphibious AFV.

tldr: Purchasing an amphib AFV goes against historical knowledge, reduces tactical, operational and strategic flexibility, undermines the basis of the Australian Army's structure, is too big, costs too much and will struggle on the battlefield, taking more losses.

Overall, it's a great example of kit fetish over needs analysis.
 

buffy9

Well-Known Member
I realise there should be more than a one liner; but I've already highlight my view on an amphibious AFV. It's a waste of time and money for the ADF. On top of this below, don't think that amphib = all terrain (noting ASLAVs get just as stuck in the north in the wet as any other vehicle....):
I believe there are merits to a protected amphib vehicle, even if it's primary role is for the protected mobility of 2RAR's security platoons (I believe four PLs exist, two for each PLF).

A security PL can be inserted by small boats, RHIBs, LLC or helicopter depending on what you want from them. These are all good mobility and deployment platforms, but like the amphib vehicle in your argument, they have limits.

I think the idea behind the desired amphib is a mobile platform that can be used in an undeveloped, security environment. All it takes is for an insurgent threat with knowledge of the terrain and small arms to inflict unreasonable casualties - even if their target is higher quality. This is especially true in a jungle environment where there is no luxury of distance.

A vehicle like this can be useful for helping to secure a small urban centre with the PLF security platoons as the maneuvre element. It is a slightly more specific scenario, though we operate in an archipeligo/littoral region with a volatile nature.

The Goanna comes to mind as a viable asset. It was promoted at some stage, so there is at least some level of interest. The additional benefit of the Goanna is that it can be transported by C-130J, so the deployability of a platform to a location with a semi-decent airstrip is also on the cards (i.e. PNG Highlands).

I agree there are limits to amphib vehicles, but there are merits to them. I particularly agree to not using them in non-permissive or opposed landings, the capabilities of operational or tactical A2/AD or anti-armour weaponry is enough to dent access by amphibious ships or any kind of (modest) amphibious force. The use of larger amphibious platforms is also more limited, though I can see there use in the "megacity" environments a lot of defence thinkers see future conflict as.

They have uses in lower end and possibly assymetrical scenarios, not so much for serious higher end scenarios (unless used in massive landings, which is another topic). For Australia lighter amphibious vehicles such as the Goanna (an example) coule be useful - they are lighter and have good weight dispersion; alongside their ability as a protected/maneuvre element.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
According to the Australia’s Amphibious Concept (AAC) amphibious task force is required to insert two company groups by air and two by surface means within a 6-hour period of darkness, here is the heart of the problem that past sop required to land a force onshore and pause whilst to establish a firm hold on the beach. With the new AAC Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) it will not require the operational pause, but the surface manoeuvre force has to have the ability to operate within blue green and brown environment.

Whilst the LLC can operate in the blue and green, its the brown water environment that poses the biggest problem, this is where Army water transport comes into its own with the LCM-8 and LARC-V which can operate far better than pump-jet LLC and has the ability to act independently with full organic support faculties on board.

I think we have to look past the fact that the LHD will not act in isolation, Army water transport has to have the means of acting independently, it could be a point of Water transport using the an evolved Manoeuvre Support Vessel (Light) as the LCM-8 replacement and the BVS10 Goanna as a LARC-V replacement

Army awards billion-dollar contract for 100-foot landing ships

https://www.baesystems.com/en/download-en/20151109141738/1434554723012.pdf

http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/docs/240-Viner.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a447159.pdf
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
I believe there are merits to a protected amphib vehicle, even if it's primary role is for the protected mobility of 2RAR's security platoons (I believe four PLs exist, two for each PLF).

A security PL can be inserted by small boats, RHIBs, LLC or helicopter depending on what you want from them. These are all good mobility and deployment platforms, but like the amphib vehicle in your argument, they have limits.

I think the idea behind the desired amphib is a mobile platform that can be used in an undeveloped, security environment. All it takes is for an insurgent threat with knowledge of the terrain and small arms to inflict unreasonable casualties - even if their target is higher quality. This is especially true in a jungle environment where there is no luxury of distance.

A vehicle like this can be useful for helping to secure a small urban centre with the PLF security platoons as the maneuvre element. It is a slightly more specific scenario, though we operate in an archipeligo/littoral region with a volatile nature.

The Goanna comes to mind as a viable asset. It was promoted at some stage, so there is at least some level of interest. The additional benefit of the Goanna is that it can be transported by C-130J, so the deployability of a platform to a location with a semi-decent airstrip is also on the cards (i.e. PNG Highlands).

I agree there are limits to amphib vehicles, but there are merits to them. I particularly agree to not using them in non-permissive or opposed landings, the capabilities of operational or tactical A2/AD or anti-armour weaponry is enough to dent access by amphibious ships or any kind of (modest) amphibious force. The use of larger amphibious platforms is also more limited, though I can see there use in the "megacity" environments a lot of defence thinkers see future conflict as.

They have uses in lower end and possibly assymetrical scenarios, not so much for serious higher end scenarios (unless used in massive landings, which is another topic). For Australia lighter amphibious vehicles such as the Goanna (an example) coule be useful - they are lighter and have good weight dispersion; alongside their ability as a protected/maneuvre element.
Ok - you feel we can use it.

You use the BSV-10 as your example. It lacks the protection of even a Hawkei or Bushmaster. It will be destroyed easily from any threat, including rudimentary IEDs (that will be present in every military operation from now onwards). It's no more mobile than anything in the inventory. It goes at all of 2.2 kts in the water, slowing the assault.

Permissive environments? Hawkei or Bushmaster.

So the BSV-10 can't fight on the water. It barely fights on land. And you 'feel' giving up IFVs or CRVs is sensible?

I'll take the realism of budgets, threats, future operating environments and actual force analysis over feels. If push comes to shove, an LLC can move a CRV or IFV ashore faster, it can fight better and it will survive. The BVS-10 - can't and won't. I'm happy to be wrong, but you didn't address a single point in the quoted post.
 

buffy9

Well-Known Member
We don't need a maritime / amphibious Brigade. It's questionable if we even need 2 RAR as it is, but who am I to question removing a unit....

The vast majority of landings conducted, ever, have been done with regular Army units. Read Kainmbla's war diary from 1944/45; the majority of units she takes are Army units - some of who Kanimbla is the first time they have seen a boat, landing craft or ship. They do rehearsals along the way. Aphibious is just another dlievery method.

Also, people really need to understand Beersheba / Keogh. They are raise-train-sustain organisations, not warfighting organisations. The Brigade we need will be assembled from 1 / 3 / 6 / 7 / 16 / 17 and others with the C2 element drawn from 1 / 3 / 7. This means that any of our units needs to be able to conduct amphibious operations (emphasised by our region). So a marine Bde would actually undermine our overall flexibility and capability (especially as, generally speaking, marine units are not as capable as land focused units).

Strike one against an amphibious AFV.

With this in mind, it flows that the forces do not need to be amphibious - rather the "bits" that move forces from the ships to the land need to be capable. They need to be able to carry lots and quickly. But they are fundamentally simple, and hence cheap to upgrade as technology increases. It is easier to upgrade a ship-to-shore connector (despite the ADFs best attempts to do otherwise) than an entire AFV or land mobility capability. Fundamentally, a ship-to-shore connector is more flexible than an amphibious vehicle, as it can move more "stuff" in a given period of time. The amphib can swim ashore (yay!), the landing craft can move a better vehicle, then do all it's stores and support in wave 2, 3 and 4.

Strike two against an amphibious AFV.

Now, tactically we need to move from the ship to the land as fast as possible. It either gets more stuff ashore, or allows us to strike from over the horizon and hence keep the ships safer. Amphib vehicles will never move fast. K-21 speed = 3.8 kt; LCM-8 = 9 kts. More than twice as fast. And LCM-8's are slow. LCM-1E go 50% faster again. And if we want to go crazy, a LCAC is 40+ kt. They are all exemplars - but anything that is a displacement hull (which an AFV is the best example of) is slower than other options like planning or hovercraft.

Strike three against an amphibious AFV.

"But Boxer is too big" I hear the cry. "It can't deploy as well". Noting that protection drives size, pending a change in armour technology or better integration of unmanned elements, all AFVs are going to be about the same size for a given protection level. But an amphib needs even more space for flotation. So pick one, an amphib has to be less protected (despite facing the same threats) or bigger (with consequences for tactical movement and deployment in confined areas like a LHD or C-17).

Strike four against an amphibious AFV.

Finally, the cost. We plan on running five 'armoured' fleets: Hawkei, Bushmaster, Boxer, IFV and M-1. They are in addition to three B-vehicle fleets. These things are expensive, and we want to add a sixth? "But it'll be smaller and cost less" I hear. You need a minimum fleet size, look at M-1. So your 40 may not be enough. So your sustainment costs will either be higher, or you cut the other fleets.

Strike five against an amphibious AFV.

tldr: Purchasing an amphib AFV goes against historical knowledge, reduces tactical, operational and strategic flexibility, undermines the basis of the Australian Army's structure, is too big, costs too much and will struggle on the battlefield, taking more losses.

Overall, it's a great example of kit fetish over needs analysis.
Point 1 regarding a dedicated marine BDE - I agree, we simply don't have the manpower.

Point 2, I also agree. However a SSC can not move vehicles through all littoral environments (i.e. Reef, submerged sand bank). Additionally the vehicles you mentioned are all wheeled, with the exception of the IFV which will be large and weigh a considerable amount - too much to be an effective ATV. That is why I used the Goanna as an example - a lighter tracked vehicle able to penetrate poor littoral environments and capable of navigating narrow jungle tracks better than a CRV or IFV.

Point 3 I agree with, the Goanna (and other amphib vehicles) are slow. However it can also be deployed at more tide levels and into "brown water" environments. I agree it is an issue, but not enough to dismiss it. That being I also did not recommend the vehicle in a non-permissive environment, directing it more towards "volatile" contingencies in the South Pacific or Timor-Leste. An ARE can be deployed with an engineer support force with protection provided by Goanna and the PLF security PL - not requiring a dedicated combatant element from the ARE. This is an example.

Point 4 on protection. The BvS10 and Bronco have been used on deployments in Afghanistan and Somaliland, both hostile areas of operations. Whilst not ideal their protection levels can be improved with addon armour, counter-IED technology and RWS. IEDs can be used in any threat environment sure, but there are ways to counter this. As evidenced by the several nations who use it (including the British in Afghanistan), it is not a deal breaker. Whilst not the Goanna, I'd take a look at the Bronco 3 and it's respective upgrades to enhance protection.

Point 5 is maintenance and sustainment. I honestly don't know how defence plans to maintain all these major land fleets over the coming decades, particularly with a developing local supply chain. However defence seems quite alright with at least considering the prospects with such a vehicle, indicating they are at least open to the procurement of these systems and their continued maintenance.

It is worth noting that defence only considered this as a sort of optional extra as part of the RFT for Land 400 Phase 3. I agree it is a nicety, but I also agree it has flaws.

As noted in the pdf provided by t68, there is at least some greater level of mobility with regards to the Goanna as well as merit to the future replacement of the LARC-V (an unprotected, amphibious logistic vehicle).

https://www.baesystems.com/en/download-en/20151109141738/1434554723012.pdf

I never advocated for giving up the use of CRV or IFV. Like I said I see it only in a low-intensity environment where guerrilla, insurgent, criminal or militia groups can operate - their potential in Timor-Leste, PNG, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands or Vanuatu something worth considering in addition to the terrain and littorals.

And when I say I how I "feel" regarding the choice, I did lay out why - even if basic. I did not advocate for giving up IFV or CRV and I agree maintenance costs could be an issue, but not a deciding factor - as with protection.

It isn't perfect, but I see it's uses in a low-end assymetrical environment. My main point was that the Goanna has key merits and value that can make it an asset, not that it is an ideal platform for the ADF. I can see how it may have been seen that way.

To summarise I disagree with the suggestion amphibious vehicles are of little to no use. Yes IFV and CRV are better in nearly everyway, but they are heavy vehicles designed for a high threat environment - their threat environment drives their protection level. This is the same with the PMV and PMV-L, again a low to mid-end environment with limited protection.

I see the Goanna as a niche, low-end role. Regardless I stand by my point.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
Hell, you might as well just keep some AS4s in service.
Genuine curiosity.
Is this a throw away line or would you seriously advocate such a plan.
With the number of spare hulls for parts I assume the cost of ownership of a couple of troops would be low.
But would it be worth maintaining for such a niche role.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Hoping this doesn't happen.

What would we use them for - if the plan is for an opposed landing I think we need a new plan.

I would rather see a focus on how we get Abrams, IFV, Boxer, Bushmaster, Hawkeii ashore with a high quality SSC.

Regards,

Massive
We have a manoeuvre warfare based doctrine and you wonder what a Protected Amphibious Vehicle that doesn’t require the support of a dedicated SSC, would be used for?

Landing 2RAR (Amphib) based PLF while the SSC’s are dedicated to landing the heavier elements, I would imagine...

There are lots of scenarios where we might not be facing a classic ‘opposed’ landing, yet might find an armoured manoeuvre force that can get ashore and start occupying an enemies attention, while the rather slow and cumbersome SSC’s do their work, a very useful capability to have.

So, basically pretty much the exact same reason every other serious player who intends to develop a credible amphibious warfare capability that can do more than a spot of HADR and administrative landings, has them...

Seems they are not overly popular here, but Army has a requirement for them, so... (shrug)...
 

Raven22

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Hell, you might as well just keep some AS4s in service.
Genuine curiosity.
Is this a throw away line or would you seriously advocate such a plan.
With the number of spare hulls for parts I assume the cost of ownership of a couple of troops would be low.
But would it be worth maintaining for such a niche role.
It wouldn’t necessarily advocate it, but it is certainly possible. I’ve not paid too much attention lately, but the pre-KEOGH plan for Land 400 Phase 3 had the AS4 ALVs, and possibly the mortar carriers, soldiering on alongside the new IFVs. Automotively the AS4s are excellent and they’ve had pretty easy lives since the upgrade, so there would be nothing but money stopping the AS4s continuing to serve into the 2030s.
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
With regard to the need for light tracked armor to operate in the jungle, I decided to read more on the last time the army did it on large scale.
It appears that many thought the Centurion too large and heavy to operate in a jungle enviroment.
But after initial trials proved a success more were deployed. They apparently could push through where the M113 could not.
Its armor protection and firepower are credited with saving many lives.
There may be some Defpros with better knowledge of this.

Now compare the Centurion to a modern IFV like the Lynx.
Both are similar dimensions, the Lynx is 10 tonnes lighter and has twice the horsepower.
With this greater power coupled with a more modern design, one would expect greater mobility in all terrain.
I would not rule out the use of an IFV in the jungle.
 

Hazdog

Member
Can anyone tell me what happened to the old army tanks when the Abrams were adopted? I would be very interested to know what they are doing now.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Can anyone tell me what happened to the old army tanks when the Abrams were adopted? I would be very interested to know what they are doing now.
If I recall some of the old centurions were used ( Without Turrets ) in the mining industry were they were converted to some sort of logistics vehicle.
As to the Leo's, I know some have been used as target practice but for the remainder of them I can not say.
Apparently a shot from the current Abram's MBT will comfortably pass clean through the former tanks.
Suggest it's nice to have that extra twenty tonnes of armoured weight now days.

Regards S
 
Top