The JMSDF were recently happily doing exercises in the SCS with the submarine Kuroshio, ASW helicopter carrier Kaga and two other destroyers.
Japan Tests China's Red Line in S China Sea
South China Sea thoughts?
- Thread starter SpartanSG
- Start date
Japan Tests China's Red Line in S China Sea
FoxtrotRomeo999
Active Member
I am considering the strategic factors driving the SCS situation.
Existing International World Order China built the bases and lays claim to the SCS because it can ignore other views, laws and convention. However, China owes it's current position to the existing world order.
Existing International World Order China built the bases and lays claim to the SCS because it can ignore other views, laws and convention. However, China owes it's current position to the existing world order.
- The world is very connected ... sure we can trade with all sorts of regimes but we don't necessarily want them running the world.
- Is it in China's interest to weaken or change that order?
- Is it in the rest of the worlds interest to allow that order to be weakened or changed? The rest of the world has been remarkably tolerant of IP theft. The market of one billion still doesn't seem to be delivering great value for foreign investors.
- Is it in China's interest to consistently intimidate it's neighbours? They do remember and they do push back. Vietnam has got 6 x Kilo subs recently and the Philippines have actually gotten some surface ships. India is managing continued provocation in the Himalayas. Taiwan still exists.
- Is China demonstrably a large modern economy? Yes and it isn't going away.
- Can China afford to sustain it's level of spending? Probably not. As Chinese wages and costs increase, China becomes less attractive for offshoring and jobs and money go elsewhere.
- How does the bulk of the population (the one billion odd people who still are low skilled and low paid) feel about these spending priorities? This could lead to domestic unrest.
- It would be economic suicide for China if China threatens international shipping with it's new SCS bases. Even selective threats may bring unintended consequences.
- Sure, it can play games with other militaries (OK, I am naively assuming no-one wants a real conflict) but this is unlikely to provoke any opponent to directly attack these new SCS bases.
- Militarily, the Chinese may feel their Fleet is blocked/constrained in the same way that Russia's Pacific Fleet was before Russia occupied the Kurile Islands from Japan.
- Historically, recovering from the Century of Shame may well have real traction in China and play into their considerations.
There is some recent news that makes it look like tensions are some what easing at least between Australia and China.
Free navigation in South China Sea 'never a problem', Chinese Army officer says
This is what happened when a Chinese warship encountered the Royal Australian Navy off Darwin
The APEC summit is going to be an interesting one.
Abe is visiting Darwin, rumor is there is going to be an announcement, maybe the SFA between Australia and Japan? Or is it dead and buried.
A base in Manus and a SFA with Japan would give Australia significant projection points into the SCS. Combined with Australia's good standing with Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (among others).
Free navigation in South China Sea 'never a problem', Chinese Army officer says
This is what happened when a Chinese warship encountered the Royal Australian Navy off Darwin
The APEC summit is going to be an interesting one.
Abe is visiting Darwin, rumor is there is going to be an announcement, maybe the SFA between Australia and Japan? Or is it dead and buried.
A base in Manus and a SFA with Japan would give Australia significant projection points into the SCS. Combined with Australia's good standing with Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (among others).
You have to look at the situation through a Chinese cultural and historical lens, not a western lens when assessing it because if you don't your analysis will be fatally flawed. When you do, you most likely find that the assumptions that you originally reached are not valid.
China is the Middle Kingdom that sits between Heaven and the other kingdoms and domains of Earth. Therefore it has the a belief that, from time immemorial, it has right to demand and expect respect, tribute, loyalty and honours from all other kingdoms and nations on Earth. It's Emperors ruled at the pleasure of the Gods and when an Imperial Dynasty was overthrown, they had lost the Mandate of Heaven. That is why in my opinion the current CCP govt of China is a dynastic in all aspects, except that the crown is not passed by bloodline. At some stage in the future they too will lose the Mandate of Heaven and fall by the historical wayside, to be replaced by a new dynasty. Such is the history which is one of the building blocks of the culture of China.
To answer one question specifically, The Century of Shame does indeed have real traction in China and is a cornerstone plank in their defence planning.
FoxtrotRomeo999
Active Member
China is the Middle Kingdom that sits between Heaven and the other kingdoms and domains of Earth. But the PRC doesn't believe in Heaven! 
I still question whether the Century of Shame is a deeply felt feeling or just an excuse for certain actions? The Century of Shame rhetoric gets turned on and turned off subject to the current Communist Party interests. Every now and then, Hate Japan, Hate South Korea or Reclaim the Himalayas campaigns are quickly turned on for a tad then quickly turned off. How relevant is it to the majority of Chinese?
- In fact, some Chinese I know (ex-Hong Kong citizens) lament the PRC desecration of Chinese culture and history.
I still question whether the Century of Shame is a deeply felt feeling or just an excuse for certain actions? The Century of Shame rhetoric gets turned on and turned off subject to the current Communist Party interests. Every now and then, Hate Japan, Hate South Korea or Reclaim the Himalayas campaigns are quickly turned on for a tad then quickly turned off. How relevant is it to the majority of Chinese?
- Mind you, a young PRC citizen I used to work with was adamant they must reclaim Taiwan by force. Most other PRC citizens I have worked with have either not desired to discuss politics or have hoped for a peaceful resolution.
I think that it was Mao who once said that religion is the opium of the masses. However there are five officially state sanctioned religions:China is the Middle Kingdom that sits between Heaven and the other kingdoms and domains of Earth. But the PRC doesn't believe in Heaven!
- In fact, some Chinese I know (ex-Hong Kong citizens) lament the PRC desecration of Chinese culture and history.
I still question whether the Century of Shame is a deeply felt feeling or just an excuse for certain actions? The Century of Shame rhetoric gets turned on and turned off subject to the current Communist Party interests. Every now and then, Hate Japan, Hate South Korea or Reclaim the Himalayas campaigns are quickly turned on for a tad then quickly turned off. How relevant is it to the majority of Chinese?
- Mind you, a young PRC citizen I used to work with was adamant they must reclaim Taiwan by force. Most other PRC citizens I have worked with have either not desired to discuss politics or have hoped for a peaceful resolution.
- Buddhist Association of China
- Chinese Taoist Association
- Islamic Association of China
- Three-Self Patriotic Movement (Protestant)
- Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association
You will find that PRC citizens are usually very loath to express political statements that are critical of the PRC, because that implies that the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has made an error and that is not tolerated with severe punishment resulting, not only for the perpetrator but also on occasion their family including parents and siblings. Even, in fact especially, in foreign countries they are monitored quite closely, so advice is not to put them in a position where they can be placed in danger back in China.
Look at how Americans react as a nation when they are told that they can't do something by another country or how they reacted to their defeat in the Vietnam War. The impact of that defeat on the American psyche was depressive for a while. By 1980 they came back stronger and more aggressive in their approach to challenges or perceived challenges. Whilst culturally, philosophically, politically, historically, etc., they are a different people to the Chinese, there are still similarities in how the two react and both nations have been invaded by foreigners, which neither nation have or will forget. Hence it can be argued that both nations now are firm believers in defence in depth, with the homeland being at the centre and periphery being thousands of nautical miles away. China only now has the real resources to be able to begin to put that plan into action.
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IMO both. The Chinese haven't forgotten how at one point in their history; outside powers took advantage of a weak and divided China. The result was that the Chinese became 2nd class citizens in their own country and had no say as to how things were run. This is ingrained in their national psyche. Similarly when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal and Mossadegh did the same with the Anglo-Persian oil company [locals had no access to the books and had poor working and healthcare conditions compared to their Western counterparts]; both received widespread local support but were demonised [to be expected] by the West. It's common to hear some Chinese say : ''what were doing now is our right and is nothing compared to what the West once did''.
And as Robert Kaplan points out : China's land borders are secure for the first time in centuries; enabling the Chinese to focus on other areas.
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I don't think it has anything to do with culture or middle kingdom etc, Vietnam, phillippine , ROC etc etc are also claim large chunk of ScS, and PRC inherit its claim from ROC. its about control of strategic waterway/resource, and influence in the region. China may use century of shame to drum up nationalism, but this is not the case of ScS. btw China just establish China-ASEAN code of conduct recently.
The way China goes about handling things is also driven by history. The way it was treated in the past when it was weak and when others took advantage of this. No doubt, its claim on the South China Sea is driven by strategic issues but also to a large extent based on history.
Yes and whether this will lead to any changes in how China conducts itself in the area remains to be seen.
1. Will Chinese ships still regularly intrude in waters claimed by others and refuse to budge when told to leave?
2. Why did China agree to the Code of Conduct? Was it intended merely for diplomatic window dressing to allay fears other claimants may have or for other reasons like driving a wedge between the claimants and the U.S. whom the Chinese see as the main reason why certain claimants have been 'misbehaving'? Or is China hoping that by signing the Code of Conduct that certain claimants may eventually make concessions?
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is Vietnam/phillippine/ROC etc claim also driven by history? China is in the same position as Vietnam/ROC in term of claim, that is they belief its their.
as for code of conduct, China don't want push too aggressively in ScS, doing so will meant ASEAN shift more toward US. by signing the code of conduct directly with ASEAN, china hope to put US on the sideline, or at least reduce/limited US involvement in ScS. US, been a non-claimant, it will be hard to continue its interest in ScS if ASEAN decide make a deal with China. Phillippine is such example. ASEAN can't fully rely on US, so it has to have some agreement with China, they don't want caught in the middle between US/China power struggle in the ScS. Best to be neutral. By all account, china is already control the ScS, short of war with US. There is no need for china to disrupt the shipping lane etc, as china rely ScS traffic more than US.
I think in the future China/ASEAN will likely make some kind of deal that allow China state company take the 1st dip to extract resource, and share the profit amount other claimant. Phillilppine currently has some discussion with china on a join resource venture in the west phillippine sea.
No their claims are not based on history and China's are. Not only that but China's actions and how it reacts to moves by others are to extent are driven by history.
At the same time it can't completely trust China. The main advantage China has is that the various claimants are themselves divided over how to deal with China with regards to over lapping claims.
My take is that the China wants the various claimants [especially the Philippines and Taiwan which are U.S. treaty allies] to first acknowledge [even if not publicly] that the Spratys are Chinese sovereign territory and that they have to deal directly with China and avoid being influenced in any way by the U.S. In return China will eventually reward them by allowing joint oil and gas exploration.
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ASEAN obvious doesn't trust China, but they can't rely on US either, so best outcome is they get some deal such as joint oil/gas venture, and share the fishing ground etc with china. China obvious don't want US to get involve so they wont pushing too hard on ScS, will use carrot and stick, Philippine is a good example, china basically allow Philippine fisherman go back, promise more investment and more imports from Philippine etc. I'm sure other ASEAN see this too. In 10 to 20years, if china become more powerful in term of military and economy, then its gonna be harder to get a good deal then.
as long as china don't disrupt the shipping lane(no reason for them to do so), or been too aggressive, US can only do FON operation as non-claimant party, it already said itself been neutral in this. If China and ASEAN come up a deal, that basically exclude US from getting involved, which is exactly what China wanted. the initial code of conduct between China and ASEAN just a draft, they will hammer out the details in the up coming years.
I think ASEAN realize they can get a decent deal with China due to US-China power struggle in the region. India in a sense is doing the same, not willing to fully join US indo-pacific strategy such as Australia/Japan, but take advantage of the situation between China/US to get max gain.
as long as china don't disrupt the shipping lane(no reason for them to do so), or been too aggressive, US can only do FON operation as non-claimant party, it already said itself been neutral in this. If China and ASEAN come up a deal, that basically exclude US from getting involved, which is exactly what China wanted. the initial code of conduct between China and ASEAN just a draft, they will hammer out the details in the up coming years.
I think ASEAN realize they can get a decent deal with China due to US-China power struggle in the region. India in a sense is doing the same, not willing to fully join US indo-pacific strategy such as Australia/Japan, but take advantage of the situation between China/US to get max gain.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I believe that was Lenin’s quote.
Interesting phrasing. But let's just skip the implications of that phrasing and talk about a more important matter, which is that there is no Code of Conduct on the South China Sea yet. What you referred to as the code of conduct is merely a first draft, and at any given moment any of the ASEAN + China can add or subtract or modify the text, and this is okay because it is a first draft. So if, say, Brunei chooses to add a passage saying "ALL YOUR BASE ARE BELONG TO US", that's within their right as an ASEAN member, and if China deletes that passage and responds "WHAT YOU SAY", that's within their rights too because it's ASEAN + China.
What is agreed is that this first draft will be the basis for further negotiation on the code of conduct. There will be a second draft, and a third draft, and if/when everyone agree on the final draft, only then the draft turns into the Code of Conduct. This will then be followed with further negotiations on the status of South China Sea itself.
It is too early, way too early, to say that a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea has been established.
Vietnamese and ROC claims are supposedly based on history, in as much as PRC's claim are also supposedly based on history. Philippine's claim isn't based on history, but it's not exactly based on UNCLOS either (notably it claims as sovereign territory several areas that is merely EEZ under UNCLOS). Brunei and Malaysia's also aren't based on history, but are based on UNCLOS. My opinion is that the supposed historical claims are flimsy and revanchist and threatens the international order, but I do note that the respective nations did not ask for my opinion.
Of course they see it. Countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia have higher levels of Chinese investment and more bilateral trade with China compared to the Philippines. Malaysia was the fist country [of the original founding members] in ASEAN to establish diplomatic ties with China. Long before the Philippines; both countries have learnt the hard way that what China says and what it does can differ greatly.
It's also too early to say whether a Code of Conduct will lead to any tangible changes; i.e. will it defuse tensions or prevent any clashes? Also, ASEAN desires a a Code of Conduct as it provides it with some form of reassurance but what are China's motives behind it?
Malaysia maintains that the reefs it claims are an extension of its continental shelf.
Of course but it does provide those making such claims with some form of justifiable excuse.
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yes its 1st draft, in post #712 already mention that. they will hammer out the detail later. but I doubt any nation will wrote down something too ridiculous, including china. At this point ASEAN may as well take the fact of China/US power struggle in the region and get some good deal from both.
differ as how? china always claim the ScS, it never change, and their action in par with their words.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Care to provide sources for the above bolded claim? The earliest concrete claim that I can find from China to the islands in and waters of the SCS dates from just before World War II. During the Qing dynasty (~1644 to ~1912) of Imperial China, it seems as though the Empire ceased to claim jurisdiction over the Spratlys sometime before 1724, despite having those islands and other discovered features included on maps and charts.
Further, the Cairo Declaration (1943) stipulated that Japan had to return to China territories it had stolen from China, but the island chains in the SCS were not included and AFAIK, Japan never directly seized them from China or anyone else, as the islands did not have permanent inhabitants at the time.
ASEAN has realised this years ago ..... The various countries that comprise ASEAN have long ago realised that the have to maintain a fine balancing act in handling relations between China and the U.S. A good example is Malaysia. It is China's largest trading partner within ASEAN and has gone out of its way to maintain good relations with China; yet it regularly conducts bilateral military exercises and exchanges with the U.S. In fact, it trains with the U.S. more than it does compared to any other foreign country.
By saying something but doing something else.
How China deals with the various claimants depends on that claimant's relationship with China, its policy with regards to over lapping claims and its relationship with outside powers ; i.e. has it publicly said anything negative about China's actions in the South China Sea, do high level political figures visit areas claimed by China, is it a U.S. ally, etc? China often talks about resolving the issue peacefully, about how only direct talks between the claimants can ultimately resolve the issue and [but still maintains the area is indisputably a part of China, laying down a caveat before negotiations can even begin] and how the various claimant should not undertake actions that can raise tensions; yet Chinese ships still regularly intrude in areas claimed by others, China has embarked on massive building spree in the reefs it controls and has significantly increased its military presence in the area. What it says and what it does can be two completely different things .... Others smaller countries are expected to toe the line.
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