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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Could HHI now be not offering the NSC variant but the Iver Huitfeldt based Type 31e Arrowhead 140 as its FFG(X) contender?

Dr Craig Cooper from Next Navy offers an interest article postulating on what maybe going on behind the scenes.

Is HII’s “Missing” FFG(X) Using StanFlex? Is it a Type 31e?

It does raise the prospect of a fairly interesting vessel.
The article is a good read, however I don't think that the author has grasped what StanFlex is. He appears to think that StanFlex is a ship class when in fact it's a capability set that is just one part of the Iver Huitfeld class of FFG. There are other really good design concepts with in the Iver Huitfeld class and the Absalon class of vessels that aren't to do with StanFlex that, for example, make for an easier to maintain and modify /upgrade ship. I noticed that one part of the BMT Arrowhead 140 Type 31e concept is the ease of access to pipes, wiring etc. Having said all that, I do agree with Mr C that this looks to be a very interesting concept vessel. It's also a decent sized hull that should leave room for upgrades as long as they don't decide to try and full it with enough gear to turn it into a DDG.
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
The article is a good read, however I don't think that the author has grasped what StanFlex is. He appears to think that StanFlex is a ship class when in fact it's a capability set that is just one part of the Iver Huitfeld class of FFG. There are other really good design concepts with in the Iver Huitfeld class and the Absalon class of vessels that aren't to do with StanFlex that, for example, make for an easier to maintain and modify /upgrade ship. I noticed that one part of the BMT Arrowhead 140 Type 31e concept is the ease of access to pipes, wiring etc. Having said all that, I do agree with Mr C that this looks to be a very interesting concept vessel. It's also a decent sized hull that should leave room for upgrades as long as they don't decide to try and full it with enough gear to turn it into a DDG.
To be fair I think he does grasp Stanflex (descriptor words such as systems, concepts, interfaces are peppered throughout his article) - but the issue is that he has leaped his logic through to the view that as the Iver's use Stanflex therefore his assumption is that the hypothetical / unannounced FFG-(X) offering based on the Arrowhead 140 will therefore also use Stanflex. He also pushes the boat out on why he thinks Stanflex is great in his view.

The article pre-dates the official Arrowhead 140 announcement and my guess is that he possibly had prior unconfirmed insight to the Babcock offering of a Iver variant for Type 31e or he has a very good weegee board - he has just thought that HHI would be using Stanflex as well.
 

Greeny

New Member
Hi Guys ( and ladies )

I am stucked on a question and looking for some help.

Can you tell NYONE PLEASE WHICH CANISTER IS BEEING USED FOR mk41 self defence vls ESSM missile ? I heard that there is a "standard" and a short version of MK25 quad pack canister but no confirmation about the shorter one.

THX
 

FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
Video: RIMPAC 2018 SINKEX - former USS Racine (LST-1191)

I believe the first impact is a NSM, land launched by the US Army. There are a number of other engagements. I found the naval gunfire to be incredibly disappointing. Really presses the need for development and deployment of guided cannon munitions. The coup de grace hammers home the point, it certainly appears the best way to kill a ship is with a torpedo.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I recall a joint RCN/USN sinking of a decommissioned RCN vessel, the results were similar and it was a torpedo fired by a USN SSN that finished the ship off in a spectacular fashion. The torpedo literally lifted the ship up midships and split her in half sinking almost immediately.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Medium caliber HE gunfire is a very inefficient way to sink a ship. It disables and disrupts and causes huge casualties but rarely sinks.
I was part of a SINKEX in the early/mid 70s off the East coast of Oz. Our target was an old converted ferry/BDV, Karra Karra.
The ships involved were a DDG 5", T12 4.5" and and Minehunter. We took it in turns to pepper the old girl so it looked to Swiss cheese, the FAA played with an A4 Zuni rockets and everything else and she still remained stubbornly upright although a little low in the water.
I remember we also attempted to fire a Tartar in SU mode but failed so finally, the Minehunter despatched some divers to lay charges which thankfully committed her to the deep.

Moral of the story use a single shot torpedoe and do a proper job.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
There has been recent discussion about the Chinese naval buildup on the RAN thread which has prompted me to refer to an essay in the June edition of proceedings. It’s written by Professor James Holmes the inaugural holder of the JC Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.
The following is my amateur attempt to précis his essay and I aplolagise for not have access to a link.

His essay explores the context in which China is amassing sea power and this should help US military leaders comprehend their maritime strategy along with the forces and methods the PLA N and affiliated joint forces are deploying to fulfill their operational and strategic goals. Sea power is no longer a matter for fleets alone, air forces and strategic rocket forces can increasingly reach far out to sea and the guided missile and precision guidance age has hastened the onset of land based sea power.
The PLA has harvested all available elements of maritime might to mount forward defences of Chinese shores.

The PLA has drawn on Mao and four other maritime scholars to deliver their strategic goals.
MAO his well known tenet of “ active defence” has been rebranded as “offshore waters defence”
It makes little sense to place the homeland and adjoining waters in jeopardy for the sake of secondary enterprises in faraway seas but if the PLA could defend the homeland and Pacific interests with land based weapons, diesel submarines and fast attack craft they could spare a sizeable fleet to venture beyond Chinas geographical environs and they could enforce open seas protection without risk at home.

Therefor if the US and her allies can compete effectively in the Western Pacific they can draw Chinese forces homeward to guard China proper and relieve Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and other areas of importance.
The US should subsequently focus on the East Asia area and apply all seaborne energies and resources there.

THE OFFSHORE CRUMPLE ZONE
Chinese anti access logic operates like a car crumple zone, some areas are sacrifices in sequence to protect the passengers.
Security for the near seas and mainland is what they treasure most further, they know they can’t erect a defensive perimeter that blocks out the US fleet altogether. What they can do is impose a high if not unbearable cost on the US fleet and their reinforcements surging westward to supplement the forward deployed forces.

In this they take inspiration from Carl Von Clausewitz who teaches that there are three ways to prevail in war, simply, one can smash, one can overawe and one can bankrupt a foe.
Therefore if China can dishearten her adversaries or drive the price so high that the US is unwilling to pay China can win without committing to a major fleet engagement.

Again Mao’s “active defence”. Forces will not try to protect a fixed outer perimeter, they will stage a fighting retreat while launching piecemeal attacks to cut the US fleet down to size in preparation somewhere in the crumple zone.
If Chinese anti access defences grow powerful enough to impose unacceptable costs on the US fleet they ,AU be even able to hold their battle fleet in reserve - why risk your fleet when you can fulfill your goals by sending expendable platforms out to the near seas to dispense punishment. This is a strategy that both Mao and Clausewitz would endorse.

MAHAN AND THE FORTRESS
The next faces of Chinese sea power are those of MAHAN and AUBE
These two foresaw maritime tactics that are only now coming into their own with the advent of long range precision guided weapons.
Mahan wrote decrying the Russian tactics of keeping the fleet in harbour under the protection of the fort guns during the Russo Japanese war of 1904-5. The protection of land based guns was erroneous as it limited fighting ships radius of action and bred timidity in commanders.
But what if the Port Arthur guns boasted both the range and accuracy of today, the Russian tactics would have been justified, they were facing a far superior Japanese fleet, the result would have been far different.
No longer is the ‘Fortress Fleet’ strategy wrong, it’s an obvious choice for China.

AUBE
The French Admiral promoted the “Jeune ecole” or young school 19th Century Naval strategy. It sought to counter the RNks ocean going hegemony, it sought to keep the RN away from French shores by harnessing asymmetric technology such as torpedoes, seagoing mines, patrol forces and submarines.
Aube’s strategies resonate today, technology has super empowered submarines and patrol craft reinforcing his “jeune ecole” strategies.
By merging jeune ecole and Fortress Fleet concepts you have a perfect solution for China’s defence.

FOOTLOOSE FLEET
Speaking at the 1908 Battleship Conference Pres. Teddy Roosevelt promoted coastal gunners and light forces as a means of guarding seaports.
This concept would free the battle fleet to roam the seas to search out and destroy a foe thus rendering the fleet “footloose”.
In this strategy both Moa and TR agree, a mass of PLA defences in the West Pacific would render the PLA fleet “footloose” and that is the goal of offshore waters defence.
If the home land is defended by “fortress fleet” and “jeune ecole” platforms the bulk of the fleet is freed to mount a regular if not permanent presence in remote waters.

CHINA’S STRATEGIC IDEAS
All these concepts add up to a strategy that the US and her allies dare not take lightly. Chinese sea power is here to stay so what should the US do about it?
first understand the concepts impelling Chines maritime strategy, sound ideas from the past make sense in a modern world, Clausewitz, Mao, Mahan, AUBE and Roosevelt would instantly understand the strategies.
Second, fashion forces and counter strategies to punch through China’s crumple zone.
Third, study Chinese operating patterns. If they have faith in homeland defence and their crumple zone they will increasingly deploy further afield in greater numbers.
Hardware and methods need developing to pierce that zone.
 
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Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
Great read, Thank You. I agree with Assail vis a view PLAN strategy and thier Offshore Crumple Zones.

That said, I don’t see perhaps any strategic imperatives that would necessitate the need for a US attack on the Chinese Mainland. No offensive actions against mainland China, no high price to Pay for US assets to punch through the A2D2 crumple Zones.

If we look at the new Multi Domain concepts it also conceives “Crumple Zones” dispersed on the First Island chain creating a more dispersed target array for the PLAN to exit. Why should the US and it’s Allies run the gauntlet when it would be able to keep the PLA inside its own A2D2 zones and force its forces out to meet them outside the bubble?
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Great read, Thank You. I agree with Assail vis a view PLAN strategy and thier Offshore Crumple Zones.

That said, I don’t see perhaps any strategic imperatives that would necessitate the need for a US attack on the Chinese Mainland. No offensive actions against mainland China, no high price to Pay for US assets to punch through the A2D2 crumple Zones.

If we look at the new Multi Domain concepts it also conceives “Crumple Zones” dispersed on the First Island chain creating a more dispersed target array for the PLAN to exit. Why should the US and it’s Allies run the gauntlet when it would be able to keep the PLA inside its own A2D2 zones and force its forces out to meet them outside the bubble?
You’re looking at the Chinese strategy through US eyes.
The essay is written through PLA N eyes, it’s their defence strategy for their homeland and further, if enacted, allows them to exert influence and maintain fleet operations in new areas (string of pearls).
It then offers some hints on how the US could develop strategy to counter the growing influence of the PLA N in the wider Indo Pacific.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
It would be interesting to know the decommissioning cost for a LA class SSN and eventually an Ohio SSBN for comparison. The Enterprise may be the worst case disposal as she has 8 reactors that have to be defueled and then the reactors have to be sealed and buried. Other CVNs only have two larger reactors.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
It would be interesting to know the decommissioning cost for a LA class SSN and eventually an Ohio SSBN for comparison. The Enterprise may be the worst case disposal as she has 8 reactors that have to be defueled and then the reactors have to be sealed and buried. Other CVNs only have two larger reactors.
The British still haven't disposed of the R class SSBNs saw a picture of the QE entering Portsmouth last year with them in the background.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Given the UK's cash crunch wrt defence I guess it is not surprising the R class hasn't been scrapped yet although the reactors have been defueled. The good old days of dumping reactors in the ocean are long gone although it is doubtful anyone would notice a few more dumped in the Arctic Ocean off Russia. There must be quite a few reactors awaiting disposal in Russia. Could be a long wait.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro

FORBIN

Member
I hope that you realise that the AGM-158 is not the Harpoon, but the JASSM (AGM-158A) JASSM-ER (AGM-158B) and LRASM (AGM-158C).
For ships planned maybe boats after ?

Exclusive: Pictures of the First LRASM Surface Launch Test at Sea

He do normaly 55 cm cm of diameter
http://cmano-db.com/pdf/weapon/2378/
so not usable with a TL which do 533 mm inner size except Seawolf have 660 mm TLT !

but i don't know the size of VLS have USN SSNs exist 3 variants individuals for LA Fl II/III-688i
first Viginia ; a module with 6 missiles for last Virginias and a module with 7 missiles for Ohio SSGN be and futur Virginia block V same ? the module can host 7 missiles
And for only 2 cm must be possible

Interest is to have a true successor which replace Tomahawk retired a very long range anti ships missiles.
In more a AGM-158 variant would be perfect yet produced in big qty and enough sheaper very accurate 3 m
 
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For ships planned maybe boats after ?

Exclusive: Pictures of the First LRASM Surface Launch Test at Sea

He do normaly 55 cm cm of diameter
http://cmano-db.com/pdf/weapon/2378/
so not usable with a TL which do 533 mm inner size except Seawolf have 660 mm TLT !

but i don't know the size of VLS have USN SSNs exist 3 variants individuals for LA Fl II/III-688i
first Viginia ; a module with 6 missiles for last Virginias and a module with 7 missiles for Ohio SSGN be and futur Virginia block V same ? the module can host 7 missiles
And for only 2 cm must be possible

Interest is to have a true successor which replace Tomahawk retired a very long range anti ships missiles.
In more a AGM-158 variant would be perfect yet produced in big qty and enough sheaper very accurate 3 m
Welcome aboard Mr. Forbin.
 
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