Unfortunately, it seems as some have missed, or misunderstood, the implications of raising and sustaining an amphibious capability.
Canada has managed without an amphib capability since WWII IIRC, I do think it should have one, since that would provide Defence and gov't a range of additional options, but it so far has not been a necessity.
Also, any decision to develop an amphib capability needs to be a joint (purple) defence decision, as such a capability would require resources from across the defence force.
In order to be done effectively (in terms of both cost, output, and sustainability) significant planning needs to be done, otherwise Canada could waste or lose precious resources, and/or not have outputs when and where needed, Hence my crawl/walk/run comment.
Keep in mind that any amphibious force is going to pose service demands on the RCN, the RCAF, and the Army. I would therefore argue that Canada should start smallish, with perhaps a company-sized deployable amphibious force. Just to keep perspective, in order to sustain a company-sized force, ~three companies are required. By also going with a smaller sized sealift vessel, the ship would be less of a 'high value' target, which could ease the escort demands. I would also suggest that any amphibs be based together, preferably near to where the troops they would be transporting are based. Splitting sealift vessels between coasts IMO should only be done when there are sufficient numbers of everything involved for both coasts to support deployments. Having a single sealift vessel based by itself would mean half the time (if not more) there was no useful sealift output available from that base. The vessel could be unavailable due to training needs, or maintenance cycles, or the vessel might be ready, but there might not be enough escort ships to accompany it. Or everything could be ready in terms of RCN forces, but there might not be enough locally available Army troops to embark, etc.
I will go back to the
Mistral-class vessels, to illustrate just how much their entry into RCN service would distort the entirety of Canadian defence. Assuming all three where homeported in Halifax, in order to sustain such a Canadian LHD deployment the following would likely be required:
- 3 to 6 GP and/or ASW frigates
- 3 area air defence-configured frigates or destroyers
- ~1,400 troops trained in amphibious operations
- ~40 MBT's to support landed troops
- ~500 additional RCN personnel to serve as crews for the vessels
- a mix of between 48 heavylift and 105 light helicopters
The above numbers are in the neighbourhood of those required to meet the likely training, maintenance, and operational cycles. And while Canadian forces likely exceed all of the above numbers (except perhaps for helicopters) those forces already in Canadian service have tasks at present. Reassigning said forces to support and sustain amphibious operations would then cause the current tasks to either be taken over by other assets, or left undone. For some tasks that could be fine if the task is relatively unimportant. Other tasks however...
At some point, I do think it would be good for Canada to be able to support and sustain a deployable, battalion-sized amphibious force. However, work and thought needs to go into developing such a Canadian capability.
