Self Protection Jammers, IR missiles and AAM shelf life - would appreciate some opinions

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STURM

Well-Known Member
Below are extracts taken from an Indian defence blog on the recent air to air engagement fought between Pakistan and India.
Would appreciate some opinions as to how accurate these statements are.

''However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference [EMI]. This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM [until it is too late to take evasive action] because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod. ''

Even if a fighter that was illuminating a radar guided AAM was unable to activate its active jammer; wouldn't its RWR provide indication that a radar guided AAM was headed its way? Also it is true that a the use of an active jammer will effect the use of radar?

'The hectic flying activity by both day and night for ensuring high-levels of operational alert have led to an increasing number of BVRAAMs and SRAAMs being used in fully-armed mode, which has reduced their shelf-life from eight years (in case they are stored in cannisters) to only four sorties of service-life, following which they have to be zero-lifed by their original equipment manufacturers'

What does 'fully armed mode ' mean? I was under the impression that the reason air arms tend to limit the number of hours where live missiles are flown is because vibration encountered during flight significantly eats into a missile's shelf life.

Also, would I be right in saying that an aircraft which has been fired upon by a radar guided missile would know it's in danger because of its RWR but without a Missile Approach Warning System; would have no way of knowing from which direction or angle an incoming missile was coming from?

Another question : what device alerts an aircraft that its been fired upon by an IR missile? Unless I'm mistaken quite a few of the numerous aircraft that were downed by ground launched IR missiles in various conflicts didn't even know they had been fired upon.
 
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Boagrius

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
To be honest both paragraphs strike me as being nonsensical. AFAIK, the NCTR or "Non-Co-operative Target Recognition" mode of a modern radar is one in which active RF emissions are used to identify a detected aircraft (for example by analysing the radar returns from the fan blades of the aircraft's engines). It is not a passive radar mode to the best of my knowledge and has nothing to do with obtaining a passive weapons lock as a consequence.

The final sentence about the target aircraft being force to "illuminate" the "incoming AMRAAM" sounds like patent BS as well. There is nothing to stop a target aircraft from switching off its radar and activating its ASPJ pod as it sees fit. Worst case scenario would be for an active radar missile launched in track-while-scan mode where the target RWR generally wouldn't detect the missile launch until the missile's own radar seeker activated in the terminal phase (but it would still be able to provide the pilot with the azimuth of the incoming AAM).

Similarly I have never heard of a "full armed" mode that would reduce the shelf life of a modern AAM... sounds like baloney to me.
 
OPSSG

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
In the Indian blogger and defence forum community, there was an avalanche of direct comparisons of the MiG-21 Bison versus F-16 Viper (and who would win in some fake one-versus-one dogfight) that has no relevance to actual events.


To be fair, this blogger did discuss matters as a systems event but I suspect that this Indian defence blog writer is still spreading misinformation — he is either doing it deliberately or his sources in the Indian Air Force (IAF) or from the original equipment manufacturer (OEMs) of the self protection jamming pods, are feeding him some misinformation by using half-truths that he has swallowed hook-line and sinker. Anyone who pushes that type of childish analysis—usually paired with a sensationalized headline—as some sort of pathway toward a definitive conclusion on these matters should be viewed as an untrustworthy source.

1. It is known that without proper testing, the use of jamming pods can affect a fighter’s radar performance — how this is affected is a closely guarded secret by the air forces and OEMs that use or sell these jamming pods.​

2. Non-Co-operative Target Recognition (NCTR) is just a mode of a fighter radar and in a systems fight, just a data point to determine if the active radar contact is an enemy (in conjunction with datalinks and AWACs providing situational awareness). Not sure why the Indian blogger would make such specific claims on the N011M radar mode (of the Su-30MKI) that is obviously false. NCTR usually means the N011M has to be emitting to track the target — I would assume that the Indian defence establishment would have used radars to map the radar returns of Singapore F-16Ds, when they were in India for exercises with the IAF.​
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3. ELTA sells both self protection and escort jamming pods (eg. ELL-8251) — that have specific uses and must be employed with the correct tactics to be effective. The Indian blogger’s sources are unlikely to tell him if the correct tactics are being used by the IAF or that Pakistan had a strategy to deal with the IAF’s EW tactics. There are lots of operational reasons why things don’t work as they should — I am sure the IAF sources would not be silly enough to tell him so much (and if he claims to have that info, I would disrespect the IAF for allowing such detailed and specific leaks).​
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4. During the 27 Feb 2019 shoot down their own Mi-17 in Kashmir, the IAF demonstrated a simple failure to de-conflict the air space for safe passage by its own helicopter. Indian bloggers often try to ascribe hyper competence to the IAF and grave incompetence to Pakistan. Not sure if I would buy the blogger’s BS.​
 
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S

south

Well-Known Member
It’s likely that there are some “English as a second language” errors in translation... as well as some chest beating...
 
S

STURM

Well-Known Member
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OPSSG,

From the early to mid 1990’s he was based on Singapore, writing for an aviation magazine. Then he moved to Malaysia where he was one of the main writers for Asian Defence Journal. He left in the mid 2000’s.
 
Boagrius

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
To be honest it reads like fighter-jargon word salad that is, to my knowledge, riddled with mistakes. NCTR is for identifying unknown aircraft, not passive missile cueing; R73 does not use an IIR (imaging infrared) seeker; the gibberish about radar illumation of AMRAAM ignores that ESM/RWR is generally the primary sensor responsible for warning of an incoming radar guided missile... The list goes on.
 
S

STURM

Well-Known Member
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  • #8
Thanks to everyone for their feedback. Much appreciated.

From the same writer. Interesting if true. I posted this in another tread about a couple of years ago.

'The NO-11M BARS is a PESA-MMR & like mechanically scanned radars, it has only 1 transmitter/receiver & therefore it cannot undertake simultaneous/interleaved operations in various modes. When operating in the terrain-following mode, the antenna has to remain tilted towards the surface, meaning it cannot do airspace scan/track. AESA-MMRs are different since they contain several transmit/receive modules & hence each module can perform a single mission. Together, such modules can at the same time operate in different modes like terrain-following/avoidance, airspace scanning & tracking, BVRAAM fire-control, directional jamming, collision avoidance & weather mapping.''
 
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OPSSG

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia’s unwillingness to share codes (or its insistence on an additional commercial understanding) resulted in a known interfacing issue between the SAP-518 pod and India’s Digital Radar Warning Receiver DR118.
STURM said:
Thanks to everyone for their feedback. Much appreciated.

From the same writer. Interesting if true. I posted this in another tread about a couple of years ago.

'The NO-11M BARS is a PESA-MMR & like mechanically scanned radars, it has only 1 transmitter/receiver & therefore it cannot undertake simultaneous/interleaved operations in various modes. When operating in the terrain-following mode, the antenna has to remain tilted towards the surface, meaning it cannot do airspace scan/track. AESA-MMRs are different since they contain several transmit/receive modules & hence each module can perform a single mission. Together, such modules can at the same time operate in different modes like terrain-following/avoidance, airspace scanning & tracking, BVRAAM fire-control, directional jamming, collision avoidance & weather mapping.''
Click to expand...
I believe that the N011M is more capable than what Prasun states in the prior post you cited. It might be less capable than an AESA radar but it is not limited in the manner he describes — the N011M is capable of frequency hopping and switching between multiple modes. The issue is the sophistication of enemy EW capabilities. And it is a mis-use of the radar, as Su-30MKI can be equipped with a Terrain Following Radar on a pod.
 
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S

swerve

Super Moderator
Boagrius said:
To be honest it reads like fighter-jargon word salad that is, to my knowledge, riddled with mistakes. NCTR is for identifying unknown aircraft, not passive missile cueing; R73 does not use an IIR (imaging infrared) seeker; the gibberish about radar illumation of AMRAAM ignores that ESM/RWR is generally the primary sensor responsible for warning of an incoming radar guided missile... The list goes on.
Click to expand...
As well as the nonsense about NCTR, etc., Sengupta has often been accused of both plagiarism & making up stories.
 
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