My comment was directed at the IDF armor forces as a whole in 2006.
But how can you make that call? Are you comparing the performance of the IDF armour in '06 against an insurgent force defending territory armed with ATGMs as a primary weapon with another armoured force against insurgent forces armed with ATGMs as their primary weapons? If so what example?
Because I don't know of any other similar campaign... If you are comparing the results with a non insurgency based campaign like Operation Desert Storm or Israeli high intensity tank victories then you are wasting everyone's time.
There have been many cases of insurgents armed with ATGMs on a more limited scale taking on tanks used by other armies (Vietnam, Iraq and Lebanon in the 80s and 90s) and achieving highly effective results. The US experience of armour in Iraq after the initial campaign is very similar to the Israelis but with different tactical outcomes (due to being in an occupation state).
As pointed out by Firn there were clear deficiencies with the preparedness of the IDF armour, brought about by being involved in over five years of continuing police action against the Palestinians (a different scale of intensity compared to counter insurgency in South Lebanon). But these deficiencies do not explain away the apparent lack of performance as markedly as the new tactical situation.
There are clear deficiencies in the expectations of 'observers' and 'commentators' for how tanks are to perform in such a new battle environment. The dominance of contemporary western tanks against straw dog forces like the Iraqi army has skewered public perception of armoured warfare to expect zero casualties.
The reality is tanks suffer against any motivated enemy. But tank knockouts do not equate to armoured force defeat in conventional battles where if 10 out of 20 tanks make it into the enemies rear zone then a rout will ensue. In a counter insurgency (COIN) battle the objectives are a lot less clear cut and each knocked out tank becomes a liability as the tank/crew recovery system is a juicy target for insurgents.
Which is why tanks now deployed into COIN are being equipped with massive additional layers of protection. The full CR2 upgrade, M1 TUSK and the active protection systems for Merkava Mk 4 are examples of this. A lot of this extra armour weight would be ditched for a conventional fight as it affects mobility but in COIN.
Lessons are learnt. Which raises a point I made above. Which army would have done better than the Israelis in Lebanon in 2006? The Canadians, the French, the Koreans? I doubt anyone...