Novascotiaboy
Active Member
At the request of another forum member I would like to open this thread on Amphibious and Support vessels for discussion.
Amphibious / Support Vessels
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Novascotiaboy
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The ability of a nation to deploy expeditionary forces is dependant upon its air and naval transport capability.
This thread is primarily to discuss naval amphibious and transport vessels and operations.
From new build vessels and conversions there is a lot of interesting designs and trends taking place by both large and small nations.
Multi purpose vessels allow nations the opportunity to use these vessels in both military and non military disciplines. Some nations such as Canada could make great use of such vessels for both home use as well as a tool for international relations.
Our recent conversion of a commercial container ship to an improvised AOR has created a very effective vessel that has just proven herself across a number of exercises throughout the Pacific. A similar conversion of a sister ship, the Oblix, appears to be stalled by politics, go figure. This second vessel could allow Canada to offer its assistance to nations affected by natural disasters along with support to our own areas affected by wild weather and our remote northern communities.
Such conversions could provide smaller nations with resources at a fraction of the cost of new build vessels especially given the over supply of vessls from the Oil and Gas industry.
Hopefully we can generate an interesting discussion.
This thread is primarily to discuss naval amphibious and transport vessels and operations.
From new build vessels and conversions there is a lot of interesting designs and trends taking place by both large and small nations.
Multi purpose vessels allow nations the opportunity to use these vessels in both military and non military disciplines. Some nations such as Canada could make great use of such vessels for both home use as well as a tool for international relations.
Our recent conversion of a commercial container ship to an improvised AOR has created a very effective vessel that has just proven herself across a number of exercises throughout the Pacific. A similar conversion of a sister ship, the Oblix, appears to be stalled by politics, go figure. This second vessel could allow Canada to offer its assistance to nations affected by natural disasters along with support to our own areas affected by wild weather and our remote northern communities.
Such conversions could provide smaller nations with resources at a fraction of the cost of new build vessels especially given the over supply of vessls from the Oil and Gas industry.
Hopefully we can generate an interesting discussion.
Other than the funding issues, are you aware of any reason why Canada hasn't opted to build from new, or for that matter, asked the UK about 2nd hand vessels that our govt seem to be keen to get rid of ?
Additionally, Hypothetically speaking, IF Canada was to go down the build from the ground up approach, do you see the prospect of any 'new build' vessel having ice breaking capabilities as an advantage, or disadvantage ?
SA
Novascotiaboy
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At various times over the years I have reached out to MPs in our province to advocate for the acquisition of naval assets that have become available from the UK and the Netherlands. I thought the RFA Fort George would have made an excellent alternate supply ship for the RCN given it was almost two decades younger than our Protectours.
When the Dutch were going to sell their brand new JSS, Karen Doorman, I sent correspondence to a Dutch born local MP in support of acquiring her. The Dutch changed their mind.
Finally when the Largs Bay was deemed surplus I advocated for her acquisition and again our government wasn’t interested.
The Russian Mistrals were another missed opportunity.
It has been a recognized limitation that the CAF is hang strung by not having an organic seabourne transport. Former CDS Rick Hillier advocates for a BHS. Otherwise known as a big honking ship. His idea was for a large LPD or LPH to provide the CAF with its own transport and mobile aviation facility. Along cane the Olympics and the cash was gone so said the Pollies.
Canada needs some form of transport vessel. We had a chartered vessel during the Afghan years, a former soviet RORO, that delivered heavy equipment to Pakistan and then returned the gear. It was a stubby blue and white vessel that stood by in Bedford basin for long periods on charter. This was after the GTS Katie Affair when RCN ships sent a boarding party to retake the vessel off Newfoundland with a quarter of the Armies heavy equipment enroute from the Balkans after a contract dispute. Good times.
Davie has a design for a second converted container ship to serve as another IAOR but with more transport capability. The Oblix and two additional sisters are available for conversion. These vessels could be used during the summer season to support operations in northern waters as well as coastal support to the RCN in place of the New Protectour class JSS when and if they arrive.
As to your question about the need for ice strengthening I personally do not see the need. I would rather these vessels be able to operate worldwide as the RFA vessels do. A second Davie built conversion could easily be paid for from the Foreign Affairs budget and used like the RFA vessels in support of HADR operations in the Caribbean where we regularly send our Kingston class for counter narcotics patrols.
Money isn’t an issue in the sense that there is a lack of it. It’s about spending money on the military. Canada has the same issue as New Zealand. No threat as we have a strong neighbour. Let them spend the money so we can have social programs and subsidized everything for certain segments of our population.
To me we need three of the Davie conversions. One for each coast plus a spare for maintenance rotation. MV Asterix has proven her worth after some teething problems. BTW her civilian Master is a Nova Scotian. The ability of this ship is amazing. Two helicopters. Large accommodations. Hospital. Multiple boats. Mexiflote capable.
Enclosed sea can storage. A vehicle deck with LOLO capability. Mixed civilian and naval crew.
During the past twenty years we have seen the need for transports during HADR operations here in Canada and abroad. We have had a need for a sea base during military operations. The best we could do was our now retired AORs for the sixties, our frigates and a buoy tender during the Katrina hurricane aftermath.
We are a rich nation. We are rebuilding our ship building capacity but political interference, Admiral Norman case, from all parties have slowed the renewal. This combined with a fear of change and Navy not wanting to be the wheels for the army in my view.
Logistics is the winning component of any military.
When the Dutch were going to sell their brand new JSS, Karen Doorman, I sent correspondence to a Dutch born local MP in support of acquiring her. The Dutch changed their mind.
Finally when the Largs Bay was deemed surplus I advocated for her acquisition and again our government wasn’t interested.
The Russian Mistrals were another missed opportunity.
It has been a recognized limitation that the CAF is hang strung by not having an organic seabourne transport. Former CDS Rick Hillier advocates for a BHS. Otherwise known as a big honking ship. His idea was for a large LPD or LPH to provide the CAF with its own transport and mobile aviation facility. Along cane the Olympics and the cash was gone so said the Pollies.
Canada needs some form of transport vessel. We had a chartered vessel during the Afghan years, a former soviet RORO, that delivered heavy equipment to Pakistan and then returned the gear. It was a stubby blue and white vessel that stood by in Bedford basin for long periods on charter. This was after the GTS Katie Affair when RCN ships sent a boarding party to retake the vessel off Newfoundland with a quarter of the Armies heavy equipment enroute from the Balkans after a contract dispute. Good times.
Davie has a design for a second converted container ship to serve as another IAOR but with more transport capability. The Oblix and two additional sisters are available for conversion. These vessels could be used during the summer season to support operations in northern waters as well as coastal support to the RCN in place of the New Protectour class JSS when and if they arrive.
As to your question about the need for ice strengthening I personally do not see the need. I would rather these vessels be able to operate worldwide as the RFA vessels do. A second Davie built conversion could easily be paid for from the Foreign Affairs budget and used like the RFA vessels in support of HADR operations in the Caribbean where we regularly send our Kingston class for counter narcotics patrols.
Money isn’t an issue in the sense that there is a lack of it. It’s about spending money on the military. Canada has the same issue as New Zealand. No threat as we have a strong neighbour. Let them spend the money so we can have social programs and subsidized everything for certain segments of our population.
To me we need three of the Davie conversions. One for each coast plus a spare for maintenance rotation. MV Asterix has proven her worth after some teething problems. BTW her civilian Master is a Nova Scotian. The ability of this ship is amazing. Two helicopters. Large accommodations. Hospital. Multiple boats. Mexiflote capable.
Enclosed sea can storage. A vehicle deck with LOLO capability. Mixed civilian and naval crew.
During the past twenty years we have seen the need for transports during HADR operations here in Canada and abroad. We have had a need for a sea base during military operations. The best we could do was our now retired AORs for the sixties, our frigates and a buoy tender during the Katrina hurricane aftermath.
We are a rich nation. We are rebuilding our ship building capacity but political interference, Admiral Norman case, from all parties have slowed the renewal. This combined with a fear of change and Navy not wanting to be the wheels for the army in my view.
Logistics is the winning component of any military.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Something to keep in mind with doing conversions of civilian vessels to provide a military/naval support role, is that the vessel at heart is still a civilian/commercial vessel. What this means is that it was designed and built to meet civilian class or code requirements, not military/naval ones. This can impact damage control and survivability following an accident and/or battle damage. It can also impact the compatibility of some of the ship's systems. The RAN vessel HMAS Sirius comes to mind, being an AO converted from a civilian tanker. Where the compatibility comes into play as a potential issue is that IIRC the engine aboard HMAS Sirius was designed/built according to commercial standards and to use a civilian grade diesel fuel oil, while the other services in RAN service, or at least those likely to undergo RAS, using a higher military/naval grade of diesel fuel oil, which has a higher energy density.
I freely admit my understanding of this is limited, but I suspect it is a similar situation to what can be found in petrol-fueled engines in 'normal' and 'high performance' automobiles, with normal engines performing best with 87 octane fuel in the US, while higher performance engines might require an octane rating of 89 or higher.
Where this can cause issues aboard a replenishment vessel in naval service, is that the converted oiler might find itself in the curious position of being almost out of fuel, while the tanks are full awaiting naval vessels to re-fuel, because it cannot utilize the higher grade diesel. OTOH the opposite situation could also be encountered, where the vessel has plenty of fuel to continue sailing, but cannot provide any more replenishment fuel because the tanks are essentially empty.
Another area of concern for me with respect to amphibious and support vessels, is trying to fit and enable too many dissimilar roles to such vessels. The vessel's could fund themselves having where the different roles are competing for space and weight/displacement aboard the vessel to carry out the various roles, and/or the fit out required for one role is incompatible with that required for a different role. This can be illustrated with a hypothetical joint sealift/replenishment vessel, where there is space and weight/displacement set aside for fuels, victuals and stores, as well as space and weight/displacement set aside for troops, vehicles and aircraft. If a particular deployment only requires a sealift or a replenishment role, then the space and weight/displacement set aside for that role ends up being unused and wasted. If both a sealift and replenishment role are required, the amounts required could potentially exceed what a single joint vessel could provide, unless the vessel capacity was quite large, in which can the vessel would just be that much less efficient when only a single role was required.
As already mentioned though, it is quite possible for support vessels to be assigned incompatible roles as well. The RNZN's HMNZS Canterbury comes to mind as an example of this. The vessel was supposed to be a multi-role vessel, with two of the roles being a sealift/LPA-type vessel, and another being an ice-strengthened patrol vessel. Where the issue comes in is that the way a ro/ro vessel rides in the water and handles when it is loaded is quite different from when it is unloaded, and that a vessel on Southern Ocean fisheries and EEZ patrols is not going to be cruising around with a company of troops and their vehicles/kit embarked. In order to handle properly when laden and not start wallowing in heavy seas, the sealift role required the vessel be designed to handle with a certain displacement range. OTOH the patrol role the Canterbury would have had a displacement which was far enough removed from the laden displacement that the vessel rode further out of the water and handled differently, likely being more reactive to wind and wave motions.
A takeaway I would have would be that it would be better to group complimentary roles together before trying to require one ship or class cover a range of potential roles. Another takeaway would also be to be reasonable in terms of the quantity of capability the role should provide to prevent inefficiencies or ineffectiveness while delivering a role.
I freely admit my understanding of this is limited, but I suspect it is a similar situation to what can be found in petrol-fueled engines in 'normal' and 'high performance' automobiles, with normal engines performing best with 87 octane fuel in the US, while higher performance engines might require an octane rating of 89 or higher.
Where this can cause issues aboard a replenishment vessel in naval service, is that the converted oiler might find itself in the curious position of being almost out of fuel, while the tanks are full awaiting naval vessels to re-fuel, because it cannot utilize the higher grade diesel. OTOH the opposite situation could also be encountered, where the vessel has plenty of fuel to continue sailing, but cannot provide any more replenishment fuel because the tanks are essentially empty.
Another area of concern for me with respect to amphibious and support vessels, is trying to fit and enable too many dissimilar roles to such vessels. The vessel's could fund themselves having where the different roles are competing for space and weight/displacement aboard the vessel to carry out the various roles, and/or the fit out required for one role is incompatible with that required for a different role. This can be illustrated with a hypothetical joint sealift/replenishment vessel, where there is space and weight/displacement set aside for fuels, victuals and stores, as well as space and weight/displacement set aside for troops, vehicles and aircraft. If a particular deployment only requires a sealift or a replenishment role, then the space and weight/displacement set aside for that role ends up being unused and wasted. If both a sealift and replenishment role are required, the amounts required could potentially exceed what a single joint vessel could provide, unless the vessel capacity was quite large, in which can the vessel would just be that much less efficient when only a single role was required.
As already mentioned though, it is quite possible for support vessels to be assigned incompatible roles as well. The RNZN's HMNZS Canterbury comes to mind as an example of this. The vessel was supposed to be a multi-role vessel, with two of the roles being a sealift/LPA-type vessel, and another being an ice-strengthened patrol vessel. Where the issue comes in is that the way a ro/ro vessel rides in the water and handles when it is loaded is quite different from when it is unloaded, and that a vessel on Southern Ocean fisheries and EEZ patrols is not going to be cruising around with a company of troops and their vehicles/kit embarked. In order to handle properly when laden and not start wallowing in heavy seas, the sealift role required the vessel be designed to handle with a certain displacement range. OTOH the patrol role the Canterbury would have had a displacement which was far enough removed from the laden displacement that the vessel rode further out of the water and handled differently, likely being more reactive to wind and wave motions.
A takeaway I would have would be that it would be better to group complimentary roles together before trying to require one ship or class cover a range of potential roles. Another takeaway would also be to be reasonable in terms of the quantity of capability the role should provide to prevent inefficiencies or ineffectiveness while delivering a role.
Novascotiaboy
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Just read an article in the Halifax Chronicle Herald from the author of the blog Halifax Shipping News that Davie has offered the Government of Canada a price of $500 million to convert and supply the MV Obelix as a second supply ship of the Asterix class.
Although highly politicised this has to happen in my opinion. The Asterix has performed admirably since entering service. If approved the Obelix wont be available until early 2021. This would allow each coast to have access to an AOR a full two or three years before the "Canadianized" Bonns arrive. By that time the Asterix will require docking. This still leaves two AOR.
If the design of the Obelix can be modified to include a RORO door to allow vehicles to access the vehicle deck that would improve on an otherwise radical ship that has yet to show all its merits.
Davie still has one or two partial hulls that could be acquired as multi purpose vessels for naval operations. One vessel was completed, Cecon Pride, and at 10000 tons and 130 metres these are big ships with a large capacity. Following the UK lead these hulls could become the next RFA Argus type vessel on a smaller scale.
For the RCN these vessels could act as sea bases supporting SF in support of coalition operations against piracy in places like the Gulf of Guniea and off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia ..these operations do not require 200 sailors and Halifax class patrol frigate .The ability to support a number of CB90, vertical RPAS and helicopter operations would free up other resources.
These vessels could also act transports for heavy equipment for military or HADR operations. As a mothership with bulk fuel to support counter narcotic operations in the Caribbean along with allied patrol vessels.
Although highly politicised this has to happen in my opinion. The Asterix has performed admirably since entering service. If approved the Obelix wont be available until early 2021. This would allow each coast to have access to an AOR a full two or three years before the "Canadianized" Bonns arrive. By that time the Asterix will require docking. This still leaves two AOR.
If the design of the Obelix can be modified to include a RORO door to allow vehicles to access the vehicle deck that would improve on an otherwise radical ship that has yet to show all its merits.
Davie still has one or two partial hulls that could be acquired as multi purpose vessels for naval operations. One vessel was completed, Cecon Pride, and at 10000 tons and 130 metres these are big ships with a large capacity. Following the UK lead these hulls could become the next RFA Argus type vessel on a smaller scale.
For the RCN these vessels could act as sea bases supporting SF in support of coalition operations against piracy in places like the Gulf of Guniea and off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia ..these operations do not require 200 sailors and Halifax class patrol frigate .The ability to support a number of CB90, vertical RPAS and helicopter operations would free up other resources.
These vessels could also act transports for heavy equipment for military or HADR operations. As a mothership with bulk fuel to support counter narcotic operations in the Caribbean along with allied patrol vessels.
Can you provide a link to said article.
NZ built the Aotearoa Support Ship for NZ$493 million (CAN$450 million) which is polarised and ice capable. Gotta wonder why the Canadians still persist, but then again (shakes head ..... )
Why oh why would you suggest such a nightmare scenario for a Canadian defence acquisition???? Anywhere else, maybe even India, it would be a practical feasibility study option that may pass into design and build. But Canada??? If it did ever get to design and build they'd still be stuffing it around when my soon to be 5 year old grandson starts collecting his old age pension.
Novascotiaboy
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Here is the info from the National Post.
https://nationalpost.com/news/quebe...uced-cost-to-entice-liberal-government-to-buy
https://nationalpost.com/news/quebe...uced-cost-to-entice-liberal-government-to-buy
It is sad and funny at the same time when I read about the trial of Vice Admiral Mark Norman. His alleged leaking of information to Davie seems to have been partly responsible for the relatively quick purchase of the MV Asterix. The glacial decision-making process seems to be so institutionalised now that it seems to be considered treason if you dare to do anything that is actually likely to achieve a result.
Novascotiaboy
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The Liberal government will pay dearly for this. Hopefully the alleged interference by high ranking Liberals such as Treasury Board President Scott Brison will open the eyes of the voters as to how they put party priorities above the national defence of this once fine country once again.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The average Canadian voter has their eyes closed except when whining for more government handouts. Defence is an alien concept to most here.
Novascotiaboy
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MV Asterix has been built with the idea of using and having the ability to store the mexiflote barge system. This has been discussed in the periodical Canadian Naval Review but the discussions have only centered on a capability.
Is anyone aware if a mexiflote has been procured or if there is a plan to acquire this capability for the Asterix?
Is anyone aware if a mexiflote has been procured or if there is a plan to acquire this capability for the Asterix?
Catalina
Member
Excuse me.
Does anyone have any information at what distance from an undefended beach would a LPD launch LCACs?
Am particularly interested in Chinese PLAN amphibious operations and the launching of LCACs from a Type 071 LPD.
Any answers gratefully received thank you.
Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
@Ananda
Was this news already shared before somewhere at DT? I probably missed this.
|"Perusahaan pembuat kapal milik negara Indonesia PT PAL (Persero) menandatangani kontrak dengan Angkatan Laut Uni Emirat Arab (UAEN) untuk pengadaan enam kapal jenis LPD (landing platform dock)."|
So in short PT PAL has signed a contract witg the UAE Navy for the delivery of 6 LPDs.
So it will be the LPD variant of 163 m long, 24 m beam and a displacement of 12.500 ton. It will have a long helicopterdeck for three medium helicopters and a hangar for two.
I just wonder how PAL can handle this large order besides the two additional LPDs for the Philippine Navy, the Iver Huitfeldts and other projects.
www.airspace-review.com
Was this news already shared before somewhere at DT? I probably missed this.
|"Perusahaan pembuat kapal milik negara Indonesia PT PAL (Persero) menandatangani kontrak dengan Angkatan Laut Uni Emirat Arab (UAEN) untuk pengadaan enam kapal jenis LPD (landing platform dock)."|
So in short PT PAL has signed a contract witg the UAE Navy for the delivery of 6 LPDs.
So it will be the LPD variant of 163 m long, 24 m beam and a displacement of 12.500 ton. It will have a long helicopterdeck for three medium helicopters and a hangar for two.
I just wonder how PAL can handle this large order besides the two additional LPDs for the Philippine Navy, the Iver Huitfeldts and other projects.
AL Uni Emirat Arab pesan enam LPD 163 dari PT PAL
AIRSPACE REVIEW (airspace-review.com) - Perusahaan pembuat kapal milik negara Indonesia PT PAL (Persero) menandatangani kontrak dengan
www.airspace-review.com
Ananda
The Bunker Group
I have scrutinized all official statement on Indonesia and UAE what being call IUAE-CEPA (Indonesian UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement). There's no mentioned any order for 6 LPD.
Jokowi dan Pangeran MBZ Saksikan Pertukaran 6 Dokumen Kerja Sama Indonesia - UEA
Jokowi dan MBZ bertemu di Istana Al Shatie, Abu Dhabi, Jumat, 1 Juli 2022.
My suspicion is some fanboys just quote point 6 of the agreement as order for 6 LPD. Well nobody can blame them, after all being fanboys (everywhere) is always taking grandiose thinking without thorough comprehension
.There are no detail contract yet on what specifications of LPD that UAE going to pursue with PAL yet. This talk of 163m version is only because it is the model of LPD that PAL bring to UAE. Whether LPD will be 143m or 163m version, it will be PAL first project as they are so far build 123m models.
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