With Stuxnet worm seemingly demonstrating that even relatively secure and relatively isolated (ie not networked) and embedded systems are open to attack. Have people upgraded security measures to completely immune themselves from attack?
Stuxnet -Are virii and worms viable cold war weapons?
- Thread starter StingrayOZ
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We wish we could, but there is always something new. Sometimes that patches to close the old holes even open new ones! The software is just too big and too complex to find all the holes.
Then someone like Microsoft or Apple makes a major version change in the operating system (like from Windows XP to Vista) or applications (like Office 2003 to Office 2007) and the process starts all over again. And that is just at the personnel level. Server can have even worse problems because by design more people have access.
If you are running on a Windows based system go to the control panel, select Settings, then Control Panel, Windows Update, and then Update History. The last one is probably less than a week ago. Then check your anti-virus software and see when that last updated, which is probably less than 24 hours ago. (I just looked, mine says 7 minutes ago!)
Computer security is like the Red Queen's race -- You go as fast as you can just to stay in one place.
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So is it possible to ever have a secure system? Is every electronic system open to attack?
Or did Stuxnet work because something like this had not become public knowledge therefore seen as a real risk?
Or did Stuxnet work because something like this had not become public knowledge therefore seen as a real risk?
The only to have a completely is by isolating it physically from all inputs and outputs. No outside connections, not external ports, manual input at a terminal only, and probably only hard copy output.
Stuxnet is not that much different than many computer worms before it, except that it was probably the most sophisticated, powerful, and possibly the largest piece of malware to date. What made it so nasty is that while it was very effective at infected Windows computers using a variety of exploits (including several not previously known), it did nothing more than pass itself on unless a specific version of the Siemens industrial control software was running on the computer. The Siemens software was then infected using a different worm carried within the main worm, and then then the stems controled were scanned for a specific make of variable speed drive controler operating in a limited speed range. The actual attack did not even take place the infected computes, but instead by using yet another program layer to reprogram the drive controller. The result is that actual effects of the Stuxnet were confined almost exclusively to the Iranian centrifuges, even though Stuxnet infected a huge number of computers worldwide.