By Sean D. Naylor, Army Times staff writer
Friendly fire knocked out at least one — and possibly two — Abrams tanks in an attack originally attributed to Iraqi forces.
That conclusion can be drawn from an informed read of a briefing prepared by Lt. Col. Bob Lovett, the product manager for the M-1A2 Abrams tanks. The briefing makes no reference to friendly fire, but finds disabling damage caused by ammunition used by U.S. Army Bradley fighting vehicles.
Despite the damage to the tanks, no crew members were injured.
Lovett spent the war in Iraq with 3rd Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) division support command, monitoring the performance of Abrams tanks.
He prepared the briefing, titled “Abrams Tank Systems — Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003,†at the request of Chief of Armor Maj. Gen. Terry Tucker. Army Times obtained a copy of the briefing, which Lovett said in a May 30 interview should have been renamed “Observations,†since official “Lessons Learned†from the Iraq war have yet to be compiled.
The briefing includes a page that explains what happened to one of two tanks from B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment that were knocked out in a night battle outside Najaf. The briefing gives the date as March 26, but the battle in which the two tanks were hit occurred the night of March 24-25.
In the immediate aftermath of the battle, crewmen in the two tanks said they thought they had been hit by Iraqi fire by some sort of truck-mounted cannon. If true, this would have meant they were the first two Abrams tanks ever knocked out by enemy fire, and Army Times reported this.
But it is now certain that the rounds that hit at least one of the B Troop Abrams were fired by a Bradley fighting vehicle’s 25 mm main gun. The tank in the photographs, according to the slide, was “disabled from 25 mm penetration of [the] engine compartment.†Four photographs show the rear of the tank punctured by about a half dozen nickel-sized holes. An accompanying diagram indicates the tank was hit in the rear by eight 25 mm rounds.
Another slide in the briefing refers to “documented instances where 25 mm AP-DU [armor-piercing depleted uranium] and above ammunition disabled a tank from the rear.â€
Lovett said he was limited in what he could say about the incident because it was still under investigation. But he confirmed that the reference to vehicles disabled by 25 mm depleted uranium ammunition referred to the Najaf incident. And he also confirmed that the Bradley’s Bushmaster main gun is the only weapon that fires that sort of round.
Maj. Mike Birmingham, the 3rd Infantry Division spokesman, said in a May 30 e-mail that the division had just completed an investigation into what he described as “a friendly fire incident … from around an Najaf involving the Cav.†However, he said he would be unable to provide details on the results of the investigation so shortly before press time.
Other highlights of the Abrams briefing include:
• There was no reported case of any Iraqi antitank guided missiles being fired at any Army vehicle. Lovett said this surprised him, because the Iraqi military was presumed to have substantial supplies of Soviet-era antitank missiles.
• The Abrams’ turret ammunition blast doors worked as designed. In the Najaf incident, the 25 mm rounds hit the Abrams’ “ready rack†of 120 mm main gun ammunition in the turret, igniting some main gun rounds. But the blast doors contained the explosion and the crew survived unscathed except for fume inhalation.
• One 3rd Infantry Division lieutenant had a lucky escape when he was shot by an Iraqi fighter while poking his head out of his Abrams turret. The Kalashnikov’s 7.62 mm round did not penetrate the lieutenant’s combat vehicle crewman helmet. The incident demonstrated the stopping power of the helmet.
• If a tank has to be destroyed to prevent it from falling into enemy hands, commanders need to have a plan ahead of time on how to do this and train their crews to execute it. In one case, U.S. forces used a thermite grenade, a 120 mm sabot round fired by another tank, and two Maverick missiles to destroy an abandoned Abrams. The resultant destruction penetrated the secret armor package at the front of the tank, therefore exposing it to possible compromise.
• Because relatively few Iraqi armored vehicles came out to fight, Abrams crews used very little of their sabot ammunition. Instead, the main gun rounds of choice were the high-explosive antitank (HEAT) and multi-purpose antitank (MPAT) rounds, which despite their names are mainly used to attack unarmored vehicles and buildings.
• Iraqis hid in fighting positions until U.S. tanks were too close to engage them with their main guns. As a result, “machine guns ended up being [the] weapon of choice in numerous engagements,†the briefing states.
• There was an unexpectedly high failure rate of Abrams’ road arms and assemblies, which form part of the tank’s suspension system, Lovett said.
• Logistics were a challenge. Units that deployed with the most spare parts fared best, but the pace of the drive to Baghdad meant spare parts were not pushed forward until the Iraqi capital had been secured.
(Article from Army Times)
Friendly fire knocked out at least one — and possibly two — Abrams tanks in an attack originally attributed to Iraqi forces.
That conclusion can be drawn from an informed read of a briefing prepared by Lt. Col. Bob Lovett, the product manager for the M-1A2 Abrams tanks. The briefing makes no reference to friendly fire, but finds disabling damage caused by ammunition used by U.S. Army Bradley fighting vehicles.
Despite the damage to the tanks, no crew members were injured.
Lovett spent the war in Iraq with 3rd Infantry Division’s (Mechanized) division support command, monitoring the performance of Abrams tanks.
He prepared the briefing, titled “Abrams Tank Systems — Lessons Learned, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003,†at the request of Chief of Armor Maj. Gen. Terry Tucker. Army Times obtained a copy of the briefing, which Lovett said in a May 30 interview should have been renamed “Observations,†since official “Lessons Learned†from the Iraq war have yet to be compiled.
The briefing includes a page that explains what happened to one of two tanks from B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment that were knocked out in a night battle outside Najaf. The briefing gives the date as March 26, but the battle in which the two tanks were hit occurred the night of March 24-25.
In the immediate aftermath of the battle, crewmen in the two tanks said they thought they had been hit by Iraqi fire by some sort of truck-mounted cannon. If true, this would have meant they were the first two Abrams tanks ever knocked out by enemy fire, and Army Times reported this.
But it is now certain that the rounds that hit at least one of the B Troop Abrams were fired by a Bradley fighting vehicle’s 25 mm main gun. The tank in the photographs, according to the slide, was “disabled from 25 mm penetration of [the] engine compartment.†Four photographs show the rear of the tank punctured by about a half dozen nickel-sized holes. An accompanying diagram indicates the tank was hit in the rear by eight 25 mm rounds.
Another slide in the briefing refers to “documented instances where 25 mm AP-DU [armor-piercing depleted uranium] and above ammunition disabled a tank from the rear.â€
Lovett said he was limited in what he could say about the incident because it was still under investigation. But he confirmed that the reference to vehicles disabled by 25 mm depleted uranium ammunition referred to the Najaf incident. And he also confirmed that the Bradley’s Bushmaster main gun is the only weapon that fires that sort of round.
Maj. Mike Birmingham, the 3rd Infantry Division spokesman, said in a May 30 e-mail that the division had just completed an investigation into what he described as “a friendly fire incident … from around an Najaf involving the Cav.†However, he said he would be unable to provide details on the results of the investigation so shortly before press time.
Other highlights of the Abrams briefing include:
• There was no reported case of any Iraqi antitank guided missiles being fired at any Army vehicle. Lovett said this surprised him, because the Iraqi military was presumed to have substantial supplies of Soviet-era antitank missiles.
• The Abrams’ turret ammunition blast doors worked as designed. In the Najaf incident, the 25 mm rounds hit the Abrams’ “ready rack†of 120 mm main gun ammunition in the turret, igniting some main gun rounds. But the blast doors contained the explosion and the crew survived unscathed except for fume inhalation.
• One 3rd Infantry Division lieutenant had a lucky escape when he was shot by an Iraqi fighter while poking his head out of his Abrams turret. The Kalashnikov’s 7.62 mm round did not penetrate the lieutenant’s combat vehicle crewman helmet. The incident demonstrated the stopping power of the helmet.
• If a tank has to be destroyed to prevent it from falling into enemy hands, commanders need to have a plan ahead of time on how to do this and train their crews to execute it. In one case, U.S. forces used a thermite grenade, a 120 mm sabot round fired by another tank, and two Maverick missiles to destroy an abandoned Abrams. The resultant destruction penetrated the secret armor package at the front of the tank, therefore exposing it to possible compromise.
• Because relatively few Iraqi armored vehicles came out to fight, Abrams crews used very little of their sabot ammunition. Instead, the main gun rounds of choice were the high-explosive antitank (HEAT) and multi-purpose antitank (MPAT) rounds, which despite their names are mainly used to attack unarmored vehicles and buildings.
• Iraqis hid in fighting positions until U.S. tanks were too close to engage them with their main guns. As a result, “machine guns ended up being [the] weapon of choice in numerous engagements,†the briefing states.
• There was an unexpectedly high failure rate of Abrams’ road arms and assemblies, which form part of the tank’s suspension system, Lovett said.
• Logistics were a challenge. Units that deployed with the most spare parts fared best, but the pace of the drive to Baghdad meant spare parts were not pushed forward until the Iraqi capital had been secured.
(Article from Army Times)