Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Text

SABRE

Super Moderator
Verified Defense Pro
A lot of people come up saying xyz state can go nuclear. Perhaps they can but for the sake of maturity of the discussion one must also consider the NPT.


Only 4 states are not members of NPT:

1. India
2. Pakistan
3. Israel
4. North Korea

Rest of the world has exceeded to NPT.

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The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,


Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,


Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,


In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,


Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,


Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,


Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,


Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,


Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,


Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,


Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,


Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,


Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,


Have agreed as follows:


Article I: OBLIGATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES


Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.


Article II: OBLIGATIONS OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES


Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


Article III: IAEA SAFE GUARDS

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.


2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.


3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.


4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.


Article IV: RIGHTS OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES



1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.


2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.


Article V: SHARING POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WITH NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE


Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.


Article VI: NEGOTIATIONS TO CESSATION OF ARMS RACE & MOVE TOWARDS G&C DISARMAMENT


Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.


Article VII: NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE (NWFZ)


Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.


Article VIII: AMENDMENTS


1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.


2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.


3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX: SIGNING, RATIFICATION, EIF & THE CUTOFF DATE


1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.


2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.


3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositories of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.


4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.


5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.


6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.


Article X: WITHDRAWAL & DURATION



1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.


2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

(NOTE: Duration extended indefinitely)


Article XI: AUTHENTICITY OF THE TEXT IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES


This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
 
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SABRE

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Verified Defense Pro
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Here is the list of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties which usually follow the same rules as that of the NPT. However, if any wants to see the full texts and articles of these treaties do a google search. These treaties are important to be undertaken before discussing nuclear weapons issues involving proliferation (along with the NPT).

[Thanks to the Arms Control Association (ACA) for the list]
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A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Three such zones exist today, and two others have been negotiated but have yet to enter into force. Countries in Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), and Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) have all forsworn nuclear weapons. African countries also agreed to prohibit nuclear weapons on their continent, but the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba has not entered into force. Most recently, five countries of the former Soviet Union in September 2006 signed the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, which has yet to enter into force.
Article VII of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed that right in 1975 and outlined the criteria for such zones. Within these nuclear-weapon-free zones, countries may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are legally binding, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear weapons are referred to as negative security assurances. However, the five nuclear-armed countries have at times signed and ratified a NWFZ protocol and declared conditions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. For instance, the United States signed the protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in Southeast Asia because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace. The other three zones do not explicitly rule out the transit of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states through the zones, and the general practice of nuclear-weapon states is not to declare whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels.
In addition to nuclear-weapon-free zones, there are treaties, which are not covered by this fact sheet, banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Mongolia, on the seabed, and in outer space.
Basic Elements of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties

Duration: The treaties are to remain in force indefinitely. Yet, each treaty includes a withdrawal option for states-parties. With the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which simply requires three months' advance notice before a withdrawal can take effect, all the NWFZ treaties require 12 months' advance notice for a state-party to end its treaty obligations.
Conditions: None of the treaties can be subjected to conditions by its non-nuclear-weapon states-parties.
Verification: Each state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which verifies that states-parties are not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly.
Territory Covered: Each zone applies to the entire territories of all of its states-parties. Territory is understood to include all land holdings, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters. The Latin American treaty also extends hundreds of kilometers from the states-parties' territories into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, but the nuclear-weapon states, citing their freedom at sea, assert that this does not apply to their ships and aircraft that might be carrying nuclear weapons. A dispute also exists over the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as part of the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom recognizes Diego Garcia as being subject to the Pelindaba Treaty.
Background

Initial efforts to create an area free of nuclear weapons began in the late 1950s with several proposals to establish such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland offered the first proposal-named the Rapacki Plan after the Polish foreign minister-in 1958. The Rapacki Plan sought to initially keep nuclear weapons from being deployed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and East Germany, while reserving the right for other European countries to follow suit. The Soviet Union, Sweden, Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria also floated similar proposals. All these early efforts, however, floundered amidst the U.S.-Soviet superpower conflict, although the Rapacki Plan would serve as a model to the nuclear-weapon-free zones that were eventually set up in other regions of the globe.
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The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Opened for signature: February 14, 1967
Entered into force: October 23, 2002[1]
States-parties: 33 total; Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: Protocol II (negative security assurances) ratified by China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.[2]

The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific)

Opened for signature: August 6, 1985
Entered into force: December 11, 1986
States-parties: 13 total; Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: Protocol II (negative security assurances) ratified by China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.[2] Protocol III (ban on nuclear testing in the nuclear-weapon-free zone) ratified by China, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.[2]

The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)

Opened for signature: December 15, 1995
Entered into force: March 27, 1997
State-parties: 10 total; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: None.

The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa)

Opened for signature: April 11, 1996
Entered into force: The treaty has not entered into force, but it will once 28 signatories have completed ratification. Twenty-one of the 51 signatories have completed ratification.
States-parties: 0; Signatories that have ratified the treaty are Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: Protocol I (negative security assurances) ratified by China, France, and the United Kingdom. Protocol II (ban on nuclear testing in the nuclear-weapon-free zone) ratified by China, France, and the United Kingdom.

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Opened for signature: September 8, 2006
Entered into force: The treaty has not entered into force, but it will once the remaining three signatories—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—complete ratification.
States-parties: 0; Signatories that have ratified the treaty are Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekstan.
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: None.
Notes:

1. The treaty specified that the full zone would not enter into force until it was ratified by all states within the zones. That did not occur until Cuba ratified the treaty in 2002. However, the treaty permitted individual states to waive that provision and declare themselves bound by the treaty, which many did beginning in 1968.
2.Russia is recognized as inheriting the Soviet Union's treaty commitments.



http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz.asp
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
One could argue that NATO Nuclear Sharing has violated the NPT since the beginning. Well, at least some people do.
 

SABRE

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USA & France providing India with nuclear technology is illegal according to NPT. & Russia signed signed an agreement with India yesterday as well.

China is to provide Pakistan with 2 nuclear reactors. That also seems to be against the NPT.

The irony of the whole affair is that Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) & later the NPT (in some ways) were established after the 1974 Indian nuclear test in order to prevent India & other states (particularly the 3rd world) states becoming nuclear power and today the states which established these institutes are providing same technology to India that they attempted to keep away from it.

For India, as well as Pakistan, all these affairs are legal since neither party is member of NPT.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Over suspicions on NPT Members Country

http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cnsc3ins.html

Over suspiscions...??
Just because we are a thrd world country..a moeslem contry..we can not developed nuclear for peacefull purposes ??

Nearly 40 years of nuclear research track record..we already proved we do not have nuclear incidents whatsoever..however when we'are going to developed our own nuclear power capabilities..when we are going to process our own fuel...even UNDER IEIA guidance and standard...still we are inviting suspiscions from Internationaly think tank like Sipri...

What in the world they have right to doubt our ability to safeguard our nuclear facility...what this suspiscion that somehow the 'so called' militants in our country can get access with our nuclear materials...
We have track record to maintain our spent nuclear fuel responsibily...but still when we're going to developed commercial nuclear plants...than those accusions coming around...

We have playing with nuclear as long as Pakistan, and North Korea..longger than Iran...and we already keep our word when we join the NPT for our purposes....we have capabilities to go diffreent way...but we don't...
Still this suspiscions lingger...

Ooo welll...I'm just a little bit 'pissed'...that our nuclear puposes after all this year as NPT members contry...with all safe nuclear track record...we're still under suspiscions..simply because we're a moeslem thrd world non western allies...

Just show that being NPT members..still means youre under western suspiscions...
 

powerslavenegi

New Member
USA & France providing India with nuclear technology is illegal according to NPT. & Russia signed signed an agreement with India yesterday as well.
Sabre...you are WRONG....plain and simple.

US and France are cooperating with India in CIVILIAN nuclear sector while the NPT talks about avoiding proliferation of technology which can be used for nuclear weapons.


Infact you should read the ARTCLES 1,2 and 3 you posted on this very page.

Article I: OBLIGATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES


Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.


Article II: OBLIGATIONS OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES


Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Now do you see anything above which prohibits transfer of CIVILIAN nuclear technology ?
Also for your benefit the reactors which will be built under this cooperation will be for power generation and under IAEA safeguards .

And for the uniformed that is why India and US signed an agreement and the former got the clearance from the NSG i.e. to trade in civilian nuclear technology despite not being a signatory to the NPT.

India's stellar track record with regards to non proliferation and its clout in the world economy have allowed the former to get such concessions from the NSG despite opposition from some states.

All in all while NPT is a law which all the signatories are obliged to uphold , the Indo-US nuclear deal and the NSG clearance is something which the former have to keep NPT or no NPT.
 
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SABRE

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Sabre...you are WRONG....plain and simple.

US and France are cooperating with India in CIVILIAN nuclear sector while the NPT talks about avoiding proliferation of technology which can be used for nuclear weapons.
There are addition protocols of NPT under which nuclear states can provide assistance to other states only if they are member to the NPT. In such a case France, U.S., Russia are violating NPT. But since India is not a member of NPT there are not legal obligations on it.
 

powerslavenegi

New Member
The NPT text is available for everyone to read on the UN site and I am afraid there is no such hidden clause .

And you did not answer the other question..i..e. NPT is about preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons related technology not about civilian reactor and related technology. So there is no question of violating the NPT wrt to the Indo-US deal infact that is why the entire group of countries under the NSG too have ratified the deal.

Lastly at the end of the day what is important is not just signing a piece of paper be it NPT or whatever but upholding the commitment to non proliferation and as far as India is concerned its track record is exemplary .US,France and Russia have entered a huge market by entering into a MOU with India .
 
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