Night Movement and Tracking Techniques along the Northern Border of Cambodia by Ranger Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13…Spring 1966 DOD/MACV directed Long-Range Reconnaissance Operations (Part 1 of 3)
The Chinese Bandits had been performing extended patrolling operations since their arrival in Vietnam in the fall of 1965 and our SOPs, including mission preparations, had become routine as our teamwork constantly improved. Warning and operations orders were routinely given, however only some priority pre-insertion rehearsals, refresher training and other preparations were performed and were primarily focused on suspected enemy and indigenous population location reports, area studies, route navigation and night movement techniques.
The tentative routes had been planned for night-only movement that would take place primarily along the ridgeline border of Cambodia or Laos and Vietnam with several routes extending eastward into small valleys and the adjacent hilltops. Contrary to policy, the routes and other critical control points were plotted in black pencil directly onto the topographic maps that we would be carrying. Small penlight flashlights having a red tinted lens were carried by all team members and would be used to read and analyze the maps during periods of darkness when necessary.
A small wooded area was located near our Mustang LZ at An Khe where we were billeted in tents. This tree area was used to conduct rehearsals and other refresher patrol training exercises.
For a few hours on the day and night prior to the long-range reconnaissance mission, the Chinese Bandit LRRP team conducted refresher drills to improve our track perception skills of on trail and off trail terrain. The drill that was the most beneficial required each man to assume the front leaning rest position with their arms and hands extended in a manner which formed a small square opening between both hands when the thumb tips met and were held perpendicular to the main body axis while the other fingers were oriented parallel. After examining the area between the hands for one minute, each person would mark the limits of the square while kneeling on one knee after removing the small green colored Memorandum booklet and short wood lead pencil from their breast pocket and attempt to sketch what was observed in the square solely relying on their memory of what was observed. We would critique each individual sketch and strived to detect any missing details that were observed but not sketched. During those drills that were conducted in darkness, the prone positioned was omitted but the hand orientation used to delineate the square area that was observed while kneeling where the penlight flashlight was used to illuminate the area being evaluated and sketched.
I had been shown this drill as a child while training with German Boy Scouts during a scout jamboree held in the black forest and had observed for ten years that everyone subjected to the sketching drill improved to detect more details with practice. Most persons failed to detect a majority of the clearly delineated details within the area being observed during their first attempts. Even relatively undisturbed flat and seemingly feature-less terrain typically contained large amounts of information that was detected and sketched only after practicing in a variety of terrain, light and weather conditions. Indentations, scratches, texture, colors, moisture content, plant, animal and microbial matter, rain drops, etc. were only observed and sketched with practice.
In my patrol cap I carried a flexible 12-inch straight edge fabricated from a 2-inch wide strip of thin sheet metal that had issued luminescent taped fixed to one side. The tape was the same material that was used for the markers sewn on the back of our patrol caps. Several others carried the same device that was used to detect depth changes during light and darkness when the straight edge was placed horizontal along the surface being evaluated. During darkness the faint shadows created by the luminescence revealed details that the brighter red light did not and any variation in depth below the straight edge was more evident. Black permanent ink was used to mark twelve inches with halve and quarter inch increments. The scale was used to measure the dimensions of tracks and various items, including wildlife droppings and spent ammunition casings. Longer measurements, such as the distance between tracks, were measured using the luminescent notches made on a walking stick inlaid with foxfire and notched carvings.
The captured NVA rucksack that I carried had several modifications that included extending the pack straps to provide a more comfortable fit and enhanced ease of movement; and a section of a shelter half was sewn on the upper frame of the pack forming a cape which was large enough to extend over my head and provide a tent above any trail that was being examined during the darkness when lighting was used. This procedure provided concealment of the lighting and improved the lighting control that was needed to create the shadowing required to detect details. A local Vietnamese tailor whose shop was located near the newly established “Sin City” at An Khe had made the pack modifications. He made several other items for the Chinese Bandits including the special 40mm bandoleers.
Since our arrival in country, I had many opportunities to examine the trails and off trail areas where while kneeling over the site being examined, the rucksack would be allowed to slide forward to the back of my head, allowing me to easily grab the cape and pull it over my head and cover the trail. I would then remove my patrol cap and the luminescent straight edge and penlight. The luminescent tabs on the back of the cap were also used to create faint shadows when needed.
Night movement required excellent night vision that demanded a diet containing beta-carotene and Vitamin A. We were concerned that the single LRRP dehydrated ration that we consumed every other day might not provide sufficient amounts of nutrients to optimize night vision and we augmented our diet with the consumption of a variety of green grasses. The soft stems that were pulled from the nodes were the only part of the plant eaten. Although, no tests were performed to confirm the night vision value of the grass consumption, we did not experience night blindness or noticeable night vision decreases after prolonged patrolling. The soft grass stems did not cause observed digestive problems and were filling. One ‘Jungle Chocolate’ candy bar was also consumed daily by each man and the wild fruits were frequently found in the mountainous areas along the border. Extreme dysentery and bouts with malaria adversely effected night vision performance. Every effort was made for every man to remain in the field and complete the long-range reconnaissance missions along the border; however, men weakened by disease or other debilitating did not perform tracking and other critical duties. On only one occasion was one of the LRRP team members evacuated. Louis Tyler had lost consciousness and we were unable to control the fever that was the result of malaria. He was evacuated by helicopter from a small clearing in the forest that required modifying our route plans and increased the likelihood of our being detected. Tyler’s night vision had severely diminished earlier and he was unable to track but merely follow closely behind another patrol member.
At least six weeks was routinely required for an individual’s body to adjust to the environments of SE Asia and for the initial effects of amebic dysentery and malaria to subside. However, disease and illness was expected to flare up at intervals where persons were expected to function marginally. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team was comprised of individuals that did not exhibit strong reactions to the diseases experienced in SE Asia. Malaria tolerance in the local population was well documented and it was believed that some otherwise healthy American troops exhibited this same tolerance.
Alcohol also diminishes night vision performance and a policy of not drinking alcoholic beverages three days prior to patrols was adopted. Smoking was believed to also have an adverse impact on night vision but was primarily prohibited for reasons related to general health and decreases to the sense of smell. Alcohol and tobacco consumption restrictions were not adhered to by half of the LRRP team members. I regret not enforcing these rules and at the time only chose to lead by example.
Chewing tobacco was not done during patrols. Spitting along the route would have made it easier to be followed. Our military issued jungle boots and use of walking sticks left distinctive markings that were easily followed unless individual patrol members exercised the necessary precautions. On trail movement was not routinely permitted when the trail surface was easily marked as was the case in soft or muddy conditions. Many areas along our route such conditions were encountered and provided the opportunity for the NVA to leave tracks whereas we did not. During the spring and early summer of 1966, we did not detect any efforts by the NVA to minimize making tracks on trails but made use of camouflage during movement and in their bivouac sites. It is also my belief that their tracking techniques were not exhaustive and unless obvious telltale signs were left, the NVA would not detect our presence nor be successful in their attempts to locate us.
Camouflage sticks were never carried and not used since it was believed that prolonged contact with the skin caused infantigo-like infections and the odor masked the natural smells of the environment. Some team members did carry red, black and yellow pastel sticks that were intended to be applied as war paint. Although we had opted to carrying limited weapons and equipment, many of us would not abandon the pastel sticks that had no intended use on a reconnaissance operation where contact was to be avoided at all cost. One of SLA Marshall’s books contains a reference to the fact that the Chinese Bandits did not wear camouflage ‘paint’. Jungle ‘rot’ sores were prevented only from frequent stream crossing baths and a constant effort to keep clean using only the available abundance of fresh water. Several photos were taken while in the rear areas that depict members wearing camouflage paste, however, the material was always removed to prevent the infections.
Prior to occupying our observation sites during the last several hours of night movement, the LRRP team moved only off trail to minimize being followed; however since anyone following the team for any period of time would have easily concluded that we were following the ridge line trail along the border. This was one of the reasons that we occasionally changed directions and moved into the valleys and occupied hilltop observation points east of the border.
I did carry a set of tight fitting black tennis shoes that had the flat and featureless soles that were commonly worn by most NVA. The larger length of the shoe did not allow indiscriminate movement but did optimize my ‘counter tracking’ efforts. We did request and the military did produce military boots with NVA shoe and human print soles. We did not receive these boots in 1966 but I have read of their later use in Vietnam and have received personal correspondence from some of those that used them indicating that the boot design was not without its own problems. Another thing that I would have changed in our Chinese Bandit LRRP Team uniform was the use of an NVA-like tennis shoe. It is also my understanding that some LRRP teams later wore such tennis shoes. During my Special Forces training prior to my assignment to the Chinese Bandits, I had been briefed on the frequent TDY uniform of many Special Forces teams operating in foreign countries that consisted of dark sweat shirts, blue Levis and local tennis shoes. I regret not adopting the use of a local tennis shoes SOP, albeit locating a sizes of the normal American foot size took a concentrated effort.
The Chinese Bandits wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues with the metal thirteen star buttons, and tiger fatigues. I normally wore one of my father’s M42 jungle camouflage fatigues. I had brought two pairs to Vietnam in 1965 and preferred the jacket having the “JUSMAAG” scroll patch on the upper left arm. Both pairs were treated with the stock water repellant that was issued to all companies but rarely used. SSG Robert Grimes preferred and only wore tiger fatigues on long-range reconnaissance operations. The remainder of the team normally wore the standard jungle fatigues and jungle boots; however several of the shorter members wore various items of captured NVA clothing on occasion.
The small black leeches seem to prefer attaching to the skin in areas where clothing covered the body. I also carried and frequently work a pair of issued khaki combat swimming trunks and would don the shorts and remove my shirt when leech infested areas were encountered. The tennis shoes and ‘shorts only’ dress would have appeared similar to that worn by indigenous personnel who occasionally hunted in the mountains and when observed for a distance had the advantage of appearing non-military. It was not uncommon on long-range reconnaissance operations for me to remain in this form of casual dress for many days. The long-range reconnaissance patrols that we performed in the spring and early summer were not conducted under the monsoon rains and the shorts and tennis shoes were adequate and provided an optimized indigenous appearance. However, I did not recommend this uniform during NATO debriefings and took efforts to conceal that it was a sometimes-preferred means of dressing, especially in the damp ‘triple canopy’ mountainous terrain where leeches were often encountered. Since our movements were conducted primarily during hours of darkness, a level of tolerance was required for the mosquitoes. To my knowledge no other LRRP team members wore shorts during the operations along the border; however, they would have been permitted to do so and observed me wearing them during our daily reassemblies. I also regret not formally recommending this indigenous uniform for use in the central highlands during the dry season.
Night movement that incorporated tracking and counter-tracking objectives was the norm and sustaining a 3 km per hour movement rate was easily accomplished in the mountainous regions of the Central Highlands. We were lightly equipped and capable of moving during darkness 25 miles daily; however, the assigned mission areas often permitted moving at much slower rates and allowed for a more thorough search. Small active infrared observation devices were carried and used to examine trails for evidence of tracks and longer distance monitoring. The range of the IR light source was limited to about 50 yards that minimized its long-range applications; however, the opportunity to observe the night activity of animals, including insects, snakes and large mammals was enhanced and aided in keeping the user alert and interested in the nighttime surroundings. Many experiments were conducted using the small device in conjunction with the other luminescent tools to examine and evaluate the trail for tracks and other markings. The IR light source was removed from the IR monitoring unit and placed at different angles to provide detection of depressions or other trail disturbances and was beneficial in analyzing any nighttime situation.
In practice, our night movement normally involved evaluation of NVA tracks only at locations where tracks were anticipated. Trail junctions and routes near stream crossings and along muddy sections of the trail and all approaches into our daily observation positions were routinely examined whereas the majority of the route was not examined. Rest halts were never conducted but any possible sight, sound or smell that might indicate NVA contact was investigated which included examining the trail for tracks. It was not uncommon to hear the distinctive singsong voices in the distance and the smell of smoke and other human activity odors during our nighttime movements. Each discovery was evaluated from a distance and recorded in our Memorandum booklets and often plotted on the topographic maps.
In the spring and summer of 1966, we did not observe or anticipate the NVA to booby trap or establish ambush sites in the area that they considered as ‘no man’s’ land and the sole domain of the NVA. We took no precautions to detect mines or any other devices along the trail other than normal visual scanning that was often afforded during periods when star and moon light penetrated the trees and during our day light scouting in the areas near our assigned day time occupied observation points. It was also observed and widely reported that the NVA noise and light discipline was poor in all areas along the border. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team had experienced a ‘detect first’ success since early January and no information had been obtained that movement along the northern borders of Cambodia and southern Laos would encounter an increased level of NVA alertness or an improvement in their noise and light discipline.
Suspected regimental size CPs were plotted on the aerial photographs that we were provided during the early planning stages of each LRRP mission and updated with daily reconnaissance flights including that performed my the LRRP team leaders using OH-13 aircraft. Each trail leading into the suspected NVA sites was thoroughly evaluated for evidence of enemy usage.
One of the most important mission preparations was the conduct of a thorough map study by each individual team member and construction of the ‘sand table’. Each person was required to ‘spider overlay’ their individual topographic maps where a red colored lead pencil was used to trace down each ridgeline and finger to the intercept with the valley floor and a blue or green colored lead pencil was used to trace up the smaller valleys until intercepting the hilltops of the area that encompassing the first days movement after insertion. As this process was completed, the topographic map became a spider-like network of red and blue lines that gradual became denser. This same exercise was conducted to some degree during the daytime prior to each day’s night movement. The procedure assisted in visualizing the terrain in three dimensions and forced focus on the terrain along our intended routes. The subsequent daily routes were only partially delineated with the red ridgeline and valley traces.
See Part 2 of this 3 Part posting.
RANGER Jerry Conners
Master Parachutist, Special Forces Weapons Expert, 101st RECONDO
Chinese Bandit 13
Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66
The Chinese Bandits had been performing extended patrolling operations since their arrival in Vietnam in the fall of 1965 and our SOPs, including mission preparations, had become routine as our teamwork constantly improved. Warning and operations orders were routinely given, however only some priority pre-insertion rehearsals, refresher training and other preparations were performed and were primarily focused on suspected enemy and indigenous population location reports, area studies, route navigation and night movement techniques.
The tentative routes had been planned for night-only movement that would take place primarily along the ridgeline border of Cambodia or Laos and Vietnam with several routes extending eastward into small valleys and the adjacent hilltops. Contrary to policy, the routes and other critical control points were plotted in black pencil directly onto the topographic maps that we would be carrying. Small penlight flashlights having a red tinted lens were carried by all team members and would be used to read and analyze the maps during periods of darkness when necessary.
A small wooded area was located near our Mustang LZ at An Khe where we were billeted in tents. This tree area was used to conduct rehearsals and other refresher patrol training exercises.
For a few hours on the day and night prior to the long-range reconnaissance mission, the Chinese Bandit LRRP team conducted refresher drills to improve our track perception skills of on trail and off trail terrain. The drill that was the most beneficial required each man to assume the front leaning rest position with their arms and hands extended in a manner which formed a small square opening between both hands when the thumb tips met and were held perpendicular to the main body axis while the other fingers were oriented parallel. After examining the area between the hands for one minute, each person would mark the limits of the square while kneeling on one knee after removing the small green colored Memorandum booklet and short wood lead pencil from their breast pocket and attempt to sketch what was observed in the square solely relying on their memory of what was observed. We would critique each individual sketch and strived to detect any missing details that were observed but not sketched. During those drills that were conducted in darkness, the prone positioned was omitted but the hand orientation used to delineate the square area that was observed while kneeling where the penlight flashlight was used to illuminate the area being evaluated and sketched.
I had been shown this drill as a child while training with German Boy Scouts during a scout jamboree held in the black forest and had observed for ten years that everyone subjected to the sketching drill improved to detect more details with practice. Most persons failed to detect a majority of the clearly delineated details within the area being observed during their first attempts. Even relatively undisturbed flat and seemingly feature-less terrain typically contained large amounts of information that was detected and sketched only after practicing in a variety of terrain, light and weather conditions. Indentations, scratches, texture, colors, moisture content, plant, animal and microbial matter, rain drops, etc. were only observed and sketched with practice.
In my patrol cap I carried a flexible 12-inch straight edge fabricated from a 2-inch wide strip of thin sheet metal that had issued luminescent taped fixed to one side. The tape was the same material that was used for the markers sewn on the back of our patrol caps. Several others carried the same device that was used to detect depth changes during light and darkness when the straight edge was placed horizontal along the surface being evaluated. During darkness the faint shadows created by the luminescence revealed details that the brighter red light did not and any variation in depth below the straight edge was more evident. Black permanent ink was used to mark twelve inches with halve and quarter inch increments. The scale was used to measure the dimensions of tracks and various items, including wildlife droppings and spent ammunition casings. Longer measurements, such as the distance between tracks, were measured using the luminescent notches made on a walking stick inlaid with foxfire and notched carvings.
The captured NVA rucksack that I carried had several modifications that included extending the pack straps to provide a more comfortable fit and enhanced ease of movement; and a section of a shelter half was sewn on the upper frame of the pack forming a cape which was large enough to extend over my head and provide a tent above any trail that was being examined during the darkness when lighting was used. This procedure provided concealment of the lighting and improved the lighting control that was needed to create the shadowing required to detect details. A local Vietnamese tailor whose shop was located near the newly established “Sin City” at An Khe had made the pack modifications. He made several other items for the Chinese Bandits including the special 40mm bandoleers.
Since our arrival in country, I had many opportunities to examine the trails and off trail areas where while kneeling over the site being examined, the rucksack would be allowed to slide forward to the back of my head, allowing me to easily grab the cape and pull it over my head and cover the trail. I would then remove my patrol cap and the luminescent straight edge and penlight. The luminescent tabs on the back of the cap were also used to create faint shadows when needed.
Night movement required excellent night vision that demanded a diet containing beta-carotene and Vitamin A. We were concerned that the single LRRP dehydrated ration that we consumed every other day might not provide sufficient amounts of nutrients to optimize night vision and we augmented our diet with the consumption of a variety of green grasses. The soft stems that were pulled from the nodes were the only part of the plant eaten. Although, no tests were performed to confirm the night vision value of the grass consumption, we did not experience night blindness or noticeable night vision decreases after prolonged patrolling. The soft grass stems did not cause observed digestive problems and were filling. One ‘Jungle Chocolate’ candy bar was also consumed daily by each man and the wild fruits were frequently found in the mountainous areas along the border. Extreme dysentery and bouts with malaria adversely effected night vision performance. Every effort was made for every man to remain in the field and complete the long-range reconnaissance missions along the border; however, men weakened by disease or other debilitating did not perform tracking and other critical duties. On only one occasion was one of the LRRP team members evacuated. Louis Tyler had lost consciousness and we were unable to control the fever that was the result of malaria. He was evacuated by helicopter from a small clearing in the forest that required modifying our route plans and increased the likelihood of our being detected. Tyler’s night vision had severely diminished earlier and he was unable to track but merely follow closely behind another patrol member.
At least six weeks was routinely required for an individual’s body to adjust to the environments of SE Asia and for the initial effects of amebic dysentery and malaria to subside. However, disease and illness was expected to flare up at intervals where persons were expected to function marginally. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team was comprised of individuals that did not exhibit strong reactions to the diseases experienced in SE Asia. Malaria tolerance in the local population was well documented and it was believed that some otherwise healthy American troops exhibited this same tolerance.
Alcohol also diminishes night vision performance and a policy of not drinking alcoholic beverages three days prior to patrols was adopted. Smoking was believed to also have an adverse impact on night vision but was primarily prohibited for reasons related to general health and decreases to the sense of smell. Alcohol and tobacco consumption restrictions were not adhered to by half of the LRRP team members. I regret not enforcing these rules and at the time only chose to lead by example.
Chewing tobacco was not done during patrols. Spitting along the route would have made it easier to be followed. Our military issued jungle boots and use of walking sticks left distinctive markings that were easily followed unless individual patrol members exercised the necessary precautions. On trail movement was not routinely permitted when the trail surface was easily marked as was the case in soft or muddy conditions. Many areas along our route such conditions were encountered and provided the opportunity for the NVA to leave tracks whereas we did not. During the spring and early summer of 1966, we did not detect any efforts by the NVA to minimize making tracks on trails but made use of camouflage during movement and in their bivouac sites. It is also my belief that their tracking techniques were not exhaustive and unless obvious telltale signs were left, the NVA would not detect our presence nor be successful in their attempts to locate us.
Camouflage sticks were never carried and not used since it was believed that prolonged contact with the skin caused infantigo-like infections and the odor masked the natural smells of the environment. Some team members did carry red, black and yellow pastel sticks that were intended to be applied as war paint. Although we had opted to carrying limited weapons and equipment, many of us would not abandon the pastel sticks that had no intended use on a reconnaissance operation where contact was to be avoided at all cost. One of SLA Marshall’s books contains a reference to the fact that the Chinese Bandits did not wear camouflage ‘paint’. Jungle ‘rot’ sores were prevented only from frequent stream crossing baths and a constant effort to keep clean using only the available abundance of fresh water. Several photos were taken while in the rear areas that depict members wearing camouflage paste, however, the material was always removed to prevent the infections.
Prior to occupying our observation sites during the last several hours of night movement, the LRRP team moved only off trail to minimize being followed; however since anyone following the team for any period of time would have easily concluded that we were following the ridge line trail along the border. This was one of the reasons that we occasionally changed directions and moved into the valleys and occupied hilltop observation points east of the border.
I did carry a set of tight fitting black tennis shoes that had the flat and featureless soles that were commonly worn by most NVA. The larger length of the shoe did not allow indiscriminate movement but did optimize my ‘counter tracking’ efforts. We did request and the military did produce military boots with NVA shoe and human print soles. We did not receive these boots in 1966 but I have read of their later use in Vietnam and have received personal correspondence from some of those that used them indicating that the boot design was not without its own problems. Another thing that I would have changed in our Chinese Bandit LRRP Team uniform was the use of an NVA-like tennis shoe. It is also my understanding that some LRRP teams later wore such tennis shoes. During my Special Forces training prior to my assignment to the Chinese Bandits, I had been briefed on the frequent TDY uniform of many Special Forces teams operating in foreign countries that consisted of dark sweat shirts, blue Levis and local tennis shoes. I regret not adopting the use of a local tennis shoes SOP, albeit locating a sizes of the normal American foot size took a concentrated effort.
The Chinese Bandits wore a mixture of uniforms including standard issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigues with the metal thirteen star buttons, and tiger fatigues. I normally wore one of my father’s M42 jungle camouflage fatigues. I had brought two pairs to Vietnam in 1965 and preferred the jacket having the “JUSMAAG” scroll patch on the upper left arm. Both pairs were treated with the stock water repellant that was issued to all companies but rarely used. SSG Robert Grimes preferred and only wore tiger fatigues on long-range reconnaissance operations. The remainder of the team normally wore the standard jungle fatigues and jungle boots; however several of the shorter members wore various items of captured NVA clothing on occasion.
The small black leeches seem to prefer attaching to the skin in areas where clothing covered the body. I also carried and frequently work a pair of issued khaki combat swimming trunks and would don the shorts and remove my shirt when leech infested areas were encountered. The tennis shoes and ‘shorts only’ dress would have appeared similar to that worn by indigenous personnel who occasionally hunted in the mountains and when observed for a distance had the advantage of appearing non-military. It was not uncommon on long-range reconnaissance operations for me to remain in this form of casual dress for many days. The long-range reconnaissance patrols that we performed in the spring and early summer were not conducted under the monsoon rains and the shorts and tennis shoes were adequate and provided an optimized indigenous appearance. However, I did not recommend this uniform during NATO debriefings and took efforts to conceal that it was a sometimes-preferred means of dressing, especially in the damp ‘triple canopy’ mountainous terrain where leeches were often encountered. Since our movements were conducted primarily during hours of darkness, a level of tolerance was required for the mosquitoes. To my knowledge no other LRRP team members wore shorts during the operations along the border; however, they would have been permitted to do so and observed me wearing them during our daily reassemblies. I also regret not formally recommending this indigenous uniform for use in the central highlands during the dry season.
Night movement that incorporated tracking and counter-tracking objectives was the norm and sustaining a 3 km per hour movement rate was easily accomplished in the mountainous regions of the Central Highlands. We were lightly equipped and capable of moving during darkness 25 miles daily; however, the assigned mission areas often permitted moving at much slower rates and allowed for a more thorough search. Small active infrared observation devices were carried and used to examine trails for evidence of tracks and longer distance monitoring. The range of the IR light source was limited to about 50 yards that minimized its long-range applications; however, the opportunity to observe the night activity of animals, including insects, snakes and large mammals was enhanced and aided in keeping the user alert and interested in the nighttime surroundings. Many experiments were conducted using the small device in conjunction with the other luminescent tools to examine and evaluate the trail for tracks and other markings. The IR light source was removed from the IR monitoring unit and placed at different angles to provide detection of depressions or other trail disturbances and was beneficial in analyzing any nighttime situation.
In practice, our night movement normally involved evaluation of NVA tracks only at locations where tracks were anticipated. Trail junctions and routes near stream crossings and along muddy sections of the trail and all approaches into our daily observation positions were routinely examined whereas the majority of the route was not examined. Rest halts were never conducted but any possible sight, sound or smell that might indicate NVA contact was investigated which included examining the trail for tracks. It was not uncommon to hear the distinctive singsong voices in the distance and the smell of smoke and other human activity odors during our nighttime movements. Each discovery was evaluated from a distance and recorded in our Memorandum booklets and often plotted on the topographic maps.
In the spring and summer of 1966, we did not observe or anticipate the NVA to booby trap or establish ambush sites in the area that they considered as ‘no man’s’ land and the sole domain of the NVA. We took no precautions to detect mines or any other devices along the trail other than normal visual scanning that was often afforded during periods when star and moon light penetrated the trees and during our day light scouting in the areas near our assigned day time occupied observation points. It was also observed and widely reported that the NVA noise and light discipline was poor in all areas along the border. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team had experienced a ‘detect first’ success since early January and no information had been obtained that movement along the northern borders of Cambodia and southern Laos would encounter an increased level of NVA alertness or an improvement in their noise and light discipline.
Suspected regimental size CPs were plotted on the aerial photographs that we were provided during the early planning stages of each LRRP mission and updated with daily reconnaissance flights including that performed my the LRRP team leaders using OH-13 aircraft. Each trail leading into the suspected NVA sites was thoroughly evaluated for evidence of enemy usage.
One of the most important mission preparations was the conduct of a thorough map study by each individual team member and construction of the ‘sand table’. Each person was required to ‘spider overlay’ their individual topographic maps where a red colored lead pencil was used to trace down each ridgeline and finger to the intercept with the valley floor and a blue or green colored lead pencil was used to trace up the smaller valleys until intercepting the hilltops of the area that encompassing the first days movement after insertion. As this process was completed, the topographic map became a spider-like network of red and blue lines that gradual became denser. This same exercise was conducted to some degree during the daytime prior to each day’s night movement. The procedure assisted in visualizing the terrain in three dimensions and forced focus on the terrain along our intended routes. The subsequent daily routes were only partially delineated with the red ridgeline and valley traces.
See Part 2 of this 3 Part posting.
RANGER Jerry Conners
Master Parachutist, Special Forces Weapons Expert, 101st RECONDO
Chinese Bandit 13
Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66
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