I think the American Army by purely focusing on irregular may be in for a surprise as the future enemy say of the likes of Hezbollah would most certainly like to undertake a totally different form of warfare which some writers have called as hybrid warfare and what i would like to term as asymmetrical hybrid warfare. This implies that the opponent will seek to use a form of war and not just weapons in which he finds there is an underlying weakness. Thus if it is felt that the missile defence systems of an opponent is weak, he may launch a missile attack, if he is vulnerable to a nuclear strike, he will launch a nuclear attack, in case he is vulnerable to a terrorist attack, he will launch a terror strike and so on. So by merely focuinsg on irregular warfare, we may once again surprised and stick to what we are normally accused of, fighting the next war with the last wars presuppositions
Asymmetrical Hybrid Warfare
- Thread starter rahulb
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Good point, almost all Armies seem to train for the last war, and then get surprised by the next war, which is usualy very different. The magor exeption to that is the German army, and they invented War Games which encouraged flexible, inovative officers.
Training, innovation and war-gaming are all magor weaknesses in the American Army. Our war games are scripted in adavnce, with pre-determined outcomes and no deviations allowed. When something unexpected happens, the umpires either over-rule it, or the outcomes are ignored later. I have taken part in 2 Reforger Exercises in Germany, back when Nato used to work together, and was astonished by the timid, indescisive way in which my commanders operated.
Training, innovation and war-gaming are all magor weaknesses in the American Army. Our war games are scripted in adavnce, with pre-determined outcomes and no deviations allowed. When something unexpected happens, the umpires either over-rule it, or the outcomes are ignored later. I have taken part in 2 Reforger Exercises in Germany, back when Nato used to work together, and was astonished by the timid, indescisive way in which my commanders operated.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
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War Gaming
I do agree, war games in most armies are predetermined by their outcomes and thus remain socio-political exercises for the military fraternity. The situation can only be corrected if alternate solutions are sought to make forces more prescient. Any suggestions?
I do agree, war games in most armies are predetermined by their outcomes and thus remain socio-political exercises for the military fraternity. The situation can only be corrected if alternate solutions are sought to make forces more prescient. Any suggestions?
Well, it is also a reflection of a society, what they are able to imagine, and support.
Back to the outstanding exception to the rules; the German General Staff. This was an organization where WHat you knew was more important tham WHO you knew. As such, it may have been unique in human history.
It wasnt always that way, the General Staff was not created until after a fellow named Napoleon came along and mangled the proud Prussians at a place called Jenna in 1806. There is nothing like a good disaster to free a society from the chains of tradition, and the Prussians decided that education was the objective search for the truth. A free society, or a class of free people, are needed to make this work.
They also had a work-a-day aristocracy called "Junkers", a corruption of "Young Herrs", who were young and bright enough to learn new things. The new eliete, who's preferd weapon was their brains, began as the "General's staff". They functioned as advisors, to give tactful guidance to Genarals who, by the very nature of thier position, were difficult to replace or shove aside. The Staff proved thier worth in the increasingly complex, swiftly evolving nature of warfare in the 1800s.
Incidentaly, the Union devised a supreme command that worked nearly as well as the General staff during the Civil War. Lincoln formulated policy and war aims, Halleck devised plans to impliment them, and Grant carried them out in the field. Shamefully, the lessons of that war were forgotten by WW1, where the Americans were astonished to discover that it was impossible for one man to write out all the orders to manuver a division.
Back to the outstanding exception to the rules; the German General Staff. This was an organization where WHat you knew was more important tham WHO you knew. As such, it may have been unique in human history.
It wasnt always that way, the General Staff was not created until after a fellow named Napoleon came along and mangled the proud Prussians at a place called Jenna in 1806. There is nothing like a good disaster to free a society from the chains of tradition, and the Prussians decided that education was the objective search for the truth. A free society, or a class of free people, are needed to make this work.
They also had a work-a-day aristocracy called "Junkers", a corruption of "Young Herrs", who were young and bright enough to learn new things. The new eliete, who's preferd weapon was their brains, began as the "General's staff". They functioned as advisors, to give tactful guidance to Genarals who, by the very nature of thier position, were difficult to replace or shove aside. The Staff proved thier worth in the increasingly complex, swiftly evolving nature of warfare in the 1800s.
Incidentaly, the Union devised a supreme command that worked nearly as well as the General staff during the Civil War. Lincoln formulated policy and war aims, Halleck devised plans to impliment them, and Grant carried them out in the field. Shamefully, the lessons of that war were forgotten by WW1, where the Americans were astonished to discover that it was impossible for one man to write out all the orders to manuver a division.
I disagree. Not about wargames, but about the "who you know, not what you know comment". My experience with the US is that larger entities like DoD are subject to serial thinking. No bodies fault, that is just the nature of the beast with the pyramid structure in US society. But if you come along and talk to a General Officer and say I think you should try this, this and this and you're thinking happens to be radical, new, but most of all innovative and a revelation. If it gets him the best result, he'll implement it in a heart beat.
Then you'll get to know people
(that's a joke BTW)
cheers
W
True, but I was not reffering to technical innovations, we are addicted to those! WHat I am worried about is tactical freedom of manuver and innitiative, and small unit leadrership. Operational level actions are also going to be a serious problem, especialy in a day and age where technology allows micro-managment to the Nth degree.
A four-star fat-ass sitting in the Pentagon can dictate how a battalion on the other side of the world can deploy individual squads. What need, or enouragement is there for individual excellence in such a situation?
Im not joking a Goddamn bit here, and yes, I am also bitter about all this, you can probably guess how I got this way.
A four-star fat-ass sitting in the Pentagon can dictate how a battalion on the other side of the world can deploy individual squads. What need, or enouragement is there for individual excellence in such a situation?
Im not joking a Goddamn bit here, and yes, I am also bitter about all this, you can probably guess how I got this way.
Their methods in ww2 were an evolution of their highly sucessfull stormtrooper methods, using tanks. Their panzers probed between strong points and left their reduction to followup units. In ww1 this "indirect approach" took back all the ground the British won with their tanks at Cambrai. Dynamic leadership from the front was essential for these indirect approaches. The difference was that without tanks, the Stosstruppen losses were high, consequently the Germands lost all their good NCO's accelerating the collapse of their army.
It is normal and sad that armys all around the world learn their lessons again and again.
Just take the USMC. After WWII they trained extensively to invade islands.. after Korea they trained for winter mountains, after vietnam for jungle, after Desert Storm for deserts. They were lucky during OIF to have trained for the right until they reached the cities and the after war campaign began.
We in germany might have nearly invented what is called "Auftragstaktik" but with the implemention of new technologies our army also tends to use them to control some lonely sqads in Afghanistan from our HQs in Germany.
Just look at how often the US army was surprised by their need of gunshields.
This learning does not even works during one campaign.
Often enough every new contingent of our troops in Kosovo or A-stan or the US troops in Iraq do many of the same mistakes again their comrades did some month ago.
I think this will never change.
Just take the USMC. After WWII they trained extensively to invade islands.. after Korea they trained for winter mountains, after vietnam for jungle, after Desert Storm for deserts. They were lucky during OIF to have trained for the right until they reached the cities and the after war campaign began.
We in germany might have nearly invented what is called "Auftragstaktik" but with the implemention of new technologies our army also tends to use them to control some lonely sqads in Afghanistan from our HQs in Germany.
Just look at how often the US army was surprised by their need of gunshields.
This learning does not even works during one campaign.
Often enough every new contingent of our troops in Kosovo or A-stan or the US troops in Iraq do many of the same mistakes again their comrades did some month ago.
I think this will never change.
What you are talking about is more a question of accountability, right?... In that your Lieutenant should have enough brains (and balls) when to disobey orders from the top because he has a better knowledge of the local situation.
People still do that you know. You (the lieutenant) just have to be diplomatic in explaining your actions to the people above you (turn balls off and turn brains on) and make it out in such a way that it makes your superiors look good. Which it does anyway as the beneficial results of the event normally take care of all the other issues.
It comes down to being an objective observor and having the focus to remove outside influences so you can make the best call.
E. Rommel would be a good example of this. His "Infantry Attacks" is a classic.
cheers
W
Well, maybe... nobody ever accused me of being Diplomatic, but isnt war itself a failure of dipolmacy? (and no, Im not saying that politics has no place in war, the military must be subordinate to the government. That old quote from Clausewitz "War is an extension of policy by other means" is a warning to me- "If the policy that decided your war is flawed, then teh conduct of that war is likely to be euqually flawed".)
Im my mind, a division commander is there to guide the Regiments, the regimental commander moves his Battaions around, and TRUSTS THE SMALLER UNIT COMMANDERS TO KNOW HOW TO MANEUVER THIER OWN UNITS.
Von Moltke (the elder) did just that, and became known as hte foremost soldier of his age... which is a tremendous thing to say considering the other Generals of the 1860s and 1870s.
Im my mind, a division commander is there to guide the Regiments, the regimental commander moves his Battaions around, and TRUSTS THE SMALLER UNIT COMMANDERS TO KNOW HOW TO MANEUVER THIER OWN UNITS.
Von Moltke (the elder) did just that, and became known as hte foremost soldier of his age... which is a tremendous thing to say considering the other Generals of the 1860s and 1870s.