TEL AVIV - If you don't know that Israel won the recent war with Hezbollah it's because you haven't heard the behind-the-scenes story of the fighting.
A good place to start is to ask why, despite many televised threats from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah did not hit Tel Aviv. The answer is that using a combination of intelligence and technical means, Israel identified the location of Hezbollah's longer-range missiles and knocked them out with amazing speed and efficiency.
About 90 per cent of them were destroyed quickly in the war. Nasrallah could not deliver on what he considered to be his ultimate weapon.
An equally remarkable success, despite being taken for granted, is Israel's domination of the air. More plane and helicopter combat flights were flown than in any previous war by Israel, yet only one helicopter was shot down.
This was not due to Hezbollah lacking advanced anti-aircraft systems. In fact, they had the best light equipment available. Highly secret Israeli counter-measures, however, ensured that every anti-aircraft missile missed. Throughout the war, Israel retained full air superiority, which meant that its planes could go anywhere in Lebanon and hit any target.
While Hezbollah lost the war militarily, it did score significant victories in terms of public relations. One of the biggest hoaxes of modern media history was how Hezbollah manipulated the media. Photographs were falsified by those fooled by or aiding Hezbollah. All Lebanese casualty figures came from the Lebanese government, of which Hezbollah is part, and these never admitted that anyone killed was a Hezbollah gunmen or that any target hit was a military one.
Yet Israel has firm evidence that around 450 Hezbollah soldiers were killed -- more than half the purported civilian death toll -- and large numbers of Hezbollah facilities and arms dumps were destroyed. This is roughly 20 per cent of Hezbollah's best soldiers. Proportionate to forces in the field, Hezbollah's death toll alone was more than 30 times higher than Israel's.
One of Israel's most impressive achievements, which has still not been fully comprehended, was its ability to hit incoming shipments of arms from Syria. In many cases, trucks were hit within moments of crossing the Syria-Lebanon border. Hezbollah was using up munitions far faster than they were coming in. If the war had not ended when it did, they would have suffered an even more visibly humiliating defeat.
Another factor that has not yet registered is the deaths of high-ranking Hezbollah officials, several of whom are still missing, due to Israeli attacks on their headquarters and hiding places. One known name is Sajed Dawayer, head of Hezbollah's special forces. At one point, Mr. Nasrallah threatened to attack Tel Aviv if Israel struck at central Beirut. But why central Beirut when Hezbollah's followers live in south Beirut? Presumably, he was hiding in the centre of the city.
Given the huge number of rockets fired at Israeli civilians, the Israeli civil defence system functioned reasonably well. A key element there was the post-1992 policy of mandating that all newly built apartments have a specially reinforced room that could serve as a bomb shelter. Many lives were saved by this method. While losses were serious and social disruption tremendous, Hezbollah's claims of inflicting heavy losses should be weighed against the fact that single suicide bombings have killed almost as many Israelis as did 4,000 Hezbollah rockets.
The war also saw some firsts in imaginative psychological warfare. Israeli technicians broke into Hezbollah's al-Manar television broadcasts to send their own messages to its viewers. Recorded messages were sent to Lebanese telephone numbers warning of Hezbollah's inevitable defeat.
Unquestionably, Israel made mistakes in the war, many of them due to the political leadership's slow start and to an over-dependence on air power early on. Hezbollah also used some new techniques and advanced weapons that caused Israel troubles and casualties. Bolder techniques -- such as the reserve paratroopers' operation, which killed several dozen Hezbollah men with no Israeli losses -- came later in the campaign.
But less visible is the fact that Israel quickly adjusted to these conditions. Already, committees have been meeting and making recommendations -- in some cases already in the process of being implemented -- to correct faults. For example, tanks are going to be fitted with better defensive systems against advanced missiles. The anti-rocket Nautilus system will be developed for the future. A different approach will be used for attacking fortified bunkers, avoiding the use of tanks when possible.
One technique to which Israel caught on was Hezbollah's setting up of scattered rocket batteries activated by a two-man crew racing around on a motorcycle to fire them. And most important of all was the new type of army created by Hezbollah with the help of Iran and Syria. Its secrets include the fact that it is a regular army operating as guerrillas, possessing the world's most advanced arms, and ready to behave like suicide soldiers.
As U.S. forces found in fighting against the Japanese in the Second World War, it takes longer and costs more casualties to root out an enemy that prefers death to surrender or retreat. Yet suicide techniques are ineffective in winning victories. Such an army loses its best men and much equipment as a result, rather than falling back to fight another day.
Hezbollah also set its victory conditions very low. It was sufficient to survive and inflict losses on Israel. By this standard, however, many losers in war could claim success. The question is whether Hezbollah really is better off now with Lebanese army and international forces -- even if far from fully effective -- deploying in the south.
Moreover, its own constituents are not pleased with Hezbollah for bringing on their sufferings. Other Lebanese forces are outraged at it for dragging the country into a devastating war.
In the end, defeat on the battlefield cannot be wished away by claiming victory in speeches.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (Gloria) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and editor of Turkish Studies.
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=f010b2ed-6aca-4101-a143-22cd3e4f1813
I think Isreal is Won the war but not in real sense, one can understand from the sistuation that Hezbolla lied about isreali commando operations, like isreali commando fall into their trap and attack repulsed etc but when isreali showed in video, things was different. Hizbolla lied too much for media publicity but infact hizbolla suffered worst casuality
A good place to start is to ask why, despite many televised threats from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah did not hit Tel Aviv. The answer is that using a combination of intelligence and technical means, Israel identified the location of Hezbollah's longer-range missiles and knocked them out with amazing speed and efficiency.
About 90 per cent of them were destroyed quickly in the war. Nasrallah could not deliver on what he considered to be his ultimate weapon.
An equally remarkable success, despite being taken for granted, is Israel's domination of the air. More plane and helicopter combat flights were flown than in any previous war by Israel, yet only one helicopter was shot down.
This was not due to Hezbollah lacking advanced anti-aircraft systems. In fact, they had the best light equipment available. Highly secret Israeli counter-measures, however, ensured that every anti-aircraft missile missed. Throughout the war, Israel retained full air superiority, which meant that its planes could go anywhere in Lebanon and hit any target.
While Hezbollah lost the war militarily, it did score significant victories in terms of public relations. One of the biggest hoaxes of modern media history was how Hezbollah manipulated the media. Photographs were falsified by those fooled by or aiding Hezbollah. All Lebanese casualty figures came from the Lebanese government, of which Hezbollah is part, and these never admitted that anyone killed was a Hezbollah gunmen or that any target hit was a military one.
Yet Israel has firm evidence that around 450 Hezbollah soldiers were killed -- more than half the purported civilian death toll -- and large numbers of Hezbollah facilities and arms dumps were destroyed. This is roughly 20 per cent of Hezbollah's best soldiers. Proportionate to forces in the field, Hezbollah's death toll alone was more than 30 times higher than Israel's.
One of Israel's most impressive achievements, which has still not been fully comprehended, was its ability to hit incoming shipments of arms from Syria. In many cases, trucks were hit within moments of crossing the Syria-Lebanon border. Hezbollah was using up munitions far faster than they were coming in. If the war had not ended when it did, they would have suffered an even more visibly humiliating defeat.
Another factor that has not yet registered is the deaths of high-ranking Hezbollah officials, several of whom are still missing, due to Israeli attacks on their headquarters and hiding places. One known name is Sajed Dawayer, head of Hezbollah's special forces. At one point, Mr. Nasrallah threatened to attack Tel Aviv if Israel struck at central Beirut. But why central Beirut when Hezbollah's followers live in south Beirut? Presumably, he was hiding in the centre of the city.
Given the huge number of rockets fired at Israeli civilians, the Israeli civil defence system functioned reasonably well. A key element there was the post-1992 policy of mandating that all newly built apartments have a specially reinforced room that could serve as a bomb shelter. Many lives were saved by this method. While losses were serious and social disruption tremendous, Hezbollah's claims of inflicting heavy losses should be weighed against the fact that single suicide bombings have killed almost as many Israelis as did 4,000 Hezbollah rockets.
The war also saw some firsts in imaginative psychological warfare. Israeli technicians broke into Hezbollah's al-Manar television broadcasts to send their own messages to its viewers. Recorded messages were sent to Lebanese telephone numbers warning of Hezbollah's inevitable defeat.
Unquestionably, Israel made mistakes in the war, many of them due to the political leadership's slow start and to an over-dependence on air power early on. Hezbollah also used some new techniques and advanced weapons that caused Israel troubles and casualties. Bolder techniques -- such as the reserve paratroopers' operation, which killed several dozen Hezbollah men with no Israeli losses -- came later in the campaign.
But less visible is the fact that Israel quickly adjusted to these conditions. Already, committees have been meeting and making recommendations -- in some cases already in the process of being implemented -- to correct faults. For example, tanks are going to be fitted with better defensive systems against advanced missiles. The anti-rocket Nautilus system will be developed for the future. A different approach will be used for attacking fortified bunkers, avoiding the use of tanks when possible.
One technique to which Israel caught on was Hezbollah's setting up of scattered rocket batteries activated by a two-man crew racing around on a motorcycle to fire them. And most important of all was the new type of army created by Hezbollah with the help of Iran and Syria. Its secrets include the fact that it is a regular army operating as guerrillas, possessing the world's most advanced arms, and ready to behave like suicide soldiers.
As U.S. forces found in fighting against the Japanese in the Second World War, it takes longer and costs more casualties to root out an enemy that prefers death to surrender or retreat. Yet suicide techniques are ineffective in winning victories. Such an army loses its best men and much equipment as a result, rather than falling back to fight another day.
Hezbollah also set its victory conditions very low. It was sufficient to survive and inflict losses on Israel. By this standard, however, many losers in war could claim success. The question is whether Hezbollah really is better off now with Lebanese army and international forces -- even if far from fully effective -- deploying in the south.
Moreover, its own constituents are not pleased with Hezbollah for bringing on their sufferings. Other Lebanese forces are outraged at it for dragging the country into a devastating war.
In the end, defeat on the battlefield cannot be wished away by claiming victory in speeches.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (Gloria) Center, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, and editor of Turkish Studies.
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=f010b2ed-6aca-4101-a143-22cd3e4f1813
I think Isreal is Won the war but not in real sense, one can understand from the sistuation that Hezbolla lied about isreali commando operations, like isreali commando fall into their trap and attack repulsed etc but when isreali showed in video, things was different. Hizbolla lied too much for media publicity but infact hizbolla suffered worst casuality
, well if Olmert and his def minister had no experience, who's fault is that, although also Dan Halutz is up on a block too, he after all pushed the "air power alone" strategy also of course he is in trouble for his finance dealings before the war,and the IDF sent most of the inexperienced reservist's to the gaza strip, most of the elite units and regulars went to Lebanon