Aja-ijn,
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Firstly tell me why do think present Attack helicopters are Combat worthless?
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1. They will never leave the zone 5,000-7,000ft AGL. Which is heart of the envelope for trashfire.
2. In /peacetime/ they have ten times the MMH:FH and maintenance costs of an equivalent manned platform on a per sortie basis. They have four times the accident rate.
3. They typically carry between 3 and 4,000lbs of mission ordnance (some of which is admittedly quite good and rather more (10-20lb warhead) appropriate for the OOTW set). Hot'n'Hi they will have to trade this against what is often less than 2,500lbs of internal fuel. Combined, these factors ensure that nearly any fixed wing asset from a PC-9 to an A-10 and even an F-16 will outhorse them for loiter or combat persistence. Or both.
4. Everytime you want to go up, you have to stop pushing yourself forward. This means that you will be lucky to sustain a 1,500fpm climb and will likely be moving at only 90-100 knots as you do so. Perversely, the /top/ speed of even an AAH is typically below 170 knots before you get the uncontrollable roll of RBS. Taken together with 3G rotor limit and frequently some additional articulation/transmission/mast restrictions based on load and environmentals, this means you cannot even properly use dive and zoom tactics to maintain a decent energy loading.
5. They make noise. Don't let anyone fool you about 'but ears can't say precisely where' or 'fenestrons are quiet'. They are 120-170db machines whose presence in the target area can only be hidden by putting something solid between them and the (hoped for) known enemy presence. Where this happens in an urban environment where in fact (as OIF proved) the threat is /all around you/, you cannot hope to approach unannounced. Even in conditions of 'advanced warfare' such as stalking tank columns with the aid of scouts and bobup hides behind ridges and treelines; you are looking at blocked sensor LOS from all but a (complictated EM stabilization rig and performance degrading) mast mounted sight as well as the likelihood that a tank round, moving at upwards of a mile per second, will STILL come overtop your rotordisk and shred it based on somebodies radar spotting the vortices from your hover.
6. They can't take damage worth a darn. When some schmuck shoots down a 21 million dollar AH-64D in 2003 using a 1,500 dollar Berdan rifle made in 1870, something is _very wrong_ (that same mission, 36-40 Apaches set out to attack elements of the once proud Medina division south of Baghdad and in a classic 'lure them to the hulks' ambush /30/ came back so badly beat up that the entire BATTALION unit was rendered combat ineffective). And yet, despite all the hooplah about 'damage tolerant' this/that/other; the fact remains that the aircraft is only as good as the man who hit's it where it is easily hurt. Rotor, Oil/Transmission, Tail Rotor, Sensor Apertures, Cockpit. We have had this proven to us /over and over/ again. Losing 5,086 out of roughly 12,000 serving in Vietnam. Losing 7 in a single day in Grenada. Losing three in 30 minutes over Mogville. Losing 2 in Albania when we didn't even fly combat missions. Losing 11 in one week during OIF.
And when a helo goes down, it often kills more than just the aircrew. We lost 39 people on a Chinook when it was hit by RPGs as it lifted out on it's way to BIA to send those men _home_ for leave. We lost 3 and had 12 others horribly mutilated when a Crashhawk setting down in a hot LZ in Grenada had to 'swerve' to miss another aircraft that had just been shot down from a 3ft hover and itself ended up landing so hard it broke it's back. When the pilot tried to take off again, the boom snapped and the aircraft rolled over a squad. Even when looking at attack-aviation only; you end up seeing so many points of the envelope where a hit /guarantees/ a crash (anything to do with a hover or transition to/from IGE/OGE 'off the cushion'), that you end up having to plan to rescue what you have loss in close contact with the enemy using the _very same_ (vulnerable) platform. Often in Silver Team or even Mike Force -greater numbers- than were originally loss-risked.
7. Minimal Operational Freedom.
Short of hurricane force winds, I can fly a jet in almost any weather because I can knock the ice off and be above it before anything happens. Certainly, I can fly /out of/ the met by several hundred miles and still return back as a function of 300-400 knot transit speed. Not so a helicopter. Which doesn't like heavy rain, ice, dust, hail or any of a dozen other elements. And which, contrary to popular belief often takes MONTHS to deploy because you cannot operate without a hardstand and the literally tons of matting and deployment kit it takes to standup even a troop sized unit. Admittedly, part of this is nothing less than inter-service snubbing with the USAF tasked to give the USAr a free lift. But it still highlights the notion that there is no ready ability to get the forces to theater if that theater is not itself ready to accept them (which makes the entire notion of VTOL somewhat moot).
Furthermore, even in the combat area, a jet can service several hundred thousand square miles worth of 'road recce/OBAS/MAS' type missioning in one sortie. A helo will need a FARP just to keep the pressure on 90 miles from it's MOB. If you have limited legs and limited airspeed, your ability to sanitize an area looking for targets (and contributing to the netcentric PBA) is equally worthless because, particularly in the 'COIN' (irregular/insurgent forces) ops mentioned in the article brief, you may be looking for 4-20 figures scampering across a hillside 30 seconds after the rotor noise is over the horizon and 2hrs before it can (literally, by airframe cruise speed) come back. Which is why the Army has quietly dumped the third attempt at a Divional/Maneuver nonsense UAV and are quietly begging for Predator Purchasing Priveleges while making AMUST and followon efforts the primary means of integrating 'top down' (literally by altitude) with their mighty helos.
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May be u think like that but US,Russia does not think like that.
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Please, we KNEW what the provision of coordinated ambush tactics and modern (ALASCA) MANPADS could do when the Bear Went Over The Mountain. Because we caused it. And all the analysis coming out of OIF and the occupation suggests that the days of the rotary winged attack platform are numbered, Key West be hanged.
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Helicopter was Superhit during desert storm.
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Please. The only 'superhit' was a highly OVERPUBLICIZED effort by TF Normandy to hit a target that could have been (and was, by A-10's with AGM-65G in a mirror attack the following morning) attacked by dozens of other methods. It should also be noted that they flew over several areas of small arms fire and 'never saw it comin''. Only to survive, intact, by luck as a function of reaching the target area because a Pave Low with GPS and operating TF radar dumped a bag of chemlumes out the back door. Whoopy.
OTOH, Apaches had problems with the gun, with the TADS, with the filters and environmentals. They also managed to kill TWO of their own, at a range of less than 800m, when operating at night. Despite the fact that nearly every veteran who saw the video was /screaming/ that these vehicles were too tall to be BMP or MT-LB and indeed the Apaches had themselves been looking at the targets for over 30 minutes with nary an operative brain cell between them to JUST THINK inspire a "Have the scout drop his troop door and flash the day code!" or "Have him twist his turret 100` towards Bullseye!" or even "I'm going to kill one. Let me know if someone squawks..." radio message DESPITE awareness that it was the company security team (effectively an armored OP) which had sent the enemy infiltration contact report.
God save us from fratricidal Majors that just 'have to' get in some medal time.
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It was the attack helicopter that terrorized MBT's.
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A-10's, though starting later because of the SCUD+INT inanity, actually did just as well as Apaches, both because they had the speed to fly to rich target areas and because they had the freedom to shoot-vacate-come-back reengage multiple times with weapons that were technically more primitive (only 2 AGM-65's and a 30mm with no CCIP calc and thus only about 4-6,000ft of registered fixed-pipper range).
Given the time they were commited; M-1 and M-2 armor outdid both.
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Without heli's US army potential with become half.
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Only when measured by outdated metrics that have nothing to do with fighting modern wars, whether high intensity or small scale contingencies. Given that the USAr's 'potential' is already cut in half by the very existence of the USAF; half of half is not all that much anyway.
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Only Becoz some guyz carrying RPG shoots down heli's,it does not mean that the complete attack heli's are combat worthless.
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It does when there are better means available. If you _insist_ on the direct (LOS) 'gunship' method of fire support, put it a Minitat turret under an MQ-9B Predator and cue it with the Viper Sniper Finder. Also buy up a few thousand 'converted' BAT-as-Viper-Strike mini LGBs. Between the turret weapons ability to fire deep /under/ the airframe's nominal flight path. The VStrike's ability to be carried X4-X6 at a time above 10,000ft, along with the drone's much greater endurance at 170-200 knot speeds. And the general 'don't send a man where a 'bot can better go' INTELLIGENCE inherent to avoiding another BHawk down scenario over some Fallujah or Najaf slum certainly makes the notion of 'aggressive air support' seem more viable. If you can't stand the thought of the AF controlling them out of a conventional airbase, they move to an Eagle Eye tiltrotor or something like the Boeing CRW.
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If country uses Attack heli's well,then it become a terror for the enemy armed forces.
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Shortly after DS back in like 1993, the Marines ran an exercise in which they replicated a Khafji type attack. They found that unsupported maneuver by ground forces in an environment of enemy air superiority almost /mandated/ upwards of a 70% loss rate of engaged forces 'once found'. No matter who did the bomb dropping. The signatures of battle and the shock effects upon troops and equipment trying to maneuver deep in enemy territory almost always were insurmountable. However; they also discovered that if they split their forces up into smaller and smaller units (forget Company teams we are talking platoon or even sections); they could literally move faster, farther, deeper, 'in between' (enemy butchering of comrade lemmings) to achieve their objectives with a _higher_ percentage of remaining forces. To the limits of their available fuel, mechanical reliability and terrain channelization in the objective maneuver area. Again, regardless of whether the threat air came from FOL or conventional runway basing modes. The ONLY thing which could routinely stop them all dead was a decent (deep and well connected) observation system with heavy artillery or NGS. Because it was the only system which could put rounds on target in less than a minute from contact report.
Comparitively, India doesn't HAVE a major threat force which can send tanks over the freakin' Himilayas into the southwestern urban areas. So why buy an antiarmor system whose value is questionable for the presented Pak threat facing you?
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Secondly India does not have the tech to make something ultra new stealth helicopter.
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I mentioned RCS only tangentially in relation to the cockpit windows. In point of truth, my intent was to outline some of the major aerodynamic improvements necessary to make a decent 'new gen' attack helicopter. And I did. You want to save money? Stop trying to build a turboshaft engine with two power takeoffs, two reduction gears and a /massive/ weight penalty inherent to a topheavy structural carrythrough for the transmission and rotormast. If you move to a reaction jet or jet flap rotor which need ONLY use enough air to preenergize the rotor prior to an (autogyro assisted STOL) takeoff before becoming a non-loaded or even stopped wing design then you have ELIMINATED one of the largest drivers in modern helicopter weight, size and cost. Namely the heavy nickel steel transmission and (probably) most of the articulated or semirigid rotor hinge systems.
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obsolescent design??
Guy the Helicopter did not even fly ,Just by the given information in bharat rakshak how can u think LCH is obsolescent design.
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It is indeed quite possible to design a platform which is obsolescent before first service entry. The AH-1 Cobra comes to mind as a machine more lethal to it's pilots than /ever/ the 'benefit' (cancelled AH-56) achieved by putting a flapping rotor on a maneuvering attack platform and then giving the USAF/USN permission to effectively abandon CAS for the glories of 'over the 17th parallel' work.
The only reason systems like the HELICOAT Mi-35 improvement program and the various (Euro-Tiger and Japanese OHX etc.) indigenous programs still exist is either because they cannot develop the techbase to integrate on their own. Or they are suffering from a 'multinational' need to satisfy commercial sales contracts long after the military mission specification around which the platform was designed has become obsolescent. Given an alternative of 'yet another round of U.S. designed replacements for LOH or Longbow' equivalents the motivation is as obviou$ as it is $illy.
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Quote:
1 LAH/LCH= 20 million dollars.
who said u that LCH cost 20 million dollars.
and by the way LCH and LAH are not same.
India has another Light attack helicopter which is lightly armed for antit-terrorist operations.
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Because the 50 newbuild King Cobras for Turkey are going to run them 50 billion dollars (30 million each) and a newbuild AH-64D runs 35 million each. Giving you 'R&D self amortization credit' for selfdevelopment of your own combat system; I took 30% off the top.
My use of the LAH/LCH indicates a 'sequential association' meaning one from the other as this-
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It's not the ALH,it's not the LCA. Previously known as the LAH (Light attack helicopter), it is not to be confused with the currently known LAH (Light attack Helicopter ) Lancer,which is a derivative of the Cheetah helicopter. HAL's recently rechristened Light Combat Helicopter ( LCH )
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Indicates is valid.
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Quote:
when you are running in place on /someone else's/ treadmill of conceptually obsolescent design truly is a waste of effort.
Who said its waste of effort,its invaluable experience.
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It's aping someone else's idea. Look where that 'countering the counter with a similar configuration' got the Russians after fifty years of trying hard to be second best 'but most' on a production schema based around deliberate manufacture of an obsolescent concept. Be the lead dog or the view will never change and you will run yourself into the poorhouse trying to 'defend your defenses' as a function of keeping up with the Jones' rather than trying to pioneer your own unique solutions. Particularly where those new solutions bring with them capabilities-at-cost that outmode /the other guys/ offering and thus allow you to lay off your own R&D debt through someone else's sticker shock.
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Guy its first attack helicopter project,how can u expect it to compete with western helicopters.
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If it's not useful, why try? If it ends up costing you BILLIONS more than what the 'superior' Western designs would to simply purchase through standard FMS channels (or the EADS/Kentron/Mil equivalent) why not purchase some 'from the experts' and gain _operational_ experience before commiting to development of a system you don't even truly know you need?
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Anything first time u do,u are bound to face problems.After u get experience u can master over it.
Just after birth nobody will become rocket scientist.
India has just entered into development of indigenous defence projects.
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Actually, in today's risk averse world where even the Indian government may rise and fall on the wisdom of investing in specific programs (LCA anyone?), it seems to me that one must indeed get it right the first time. Because billions wasted may not be available to be respent fixing any mistakes. Particularly if the nation involved is on a 'rotation system' of naval/AF/landforces spending. In any case, none of what I have suggested necessarily increases the complexity of the project. Indeed as a 'technical demonstration effort'; stopped rotor/compound design may very well reduce both the developmental elements of a basic rotorcraft and/or dependence on a specific foreign import of engines or transmission.
Which brings me back to my first comment, in that, if you are designing for a peculiar operating condition (hot and very high), ANY conventional helicopter is apt to be a waste because you simply cannot beat the air into submission sufficiently to lift a useful load for a long enough period to get any serious mission tasking accomplished. And furthermore any helicopter which exposes itself to direct (LOS) threat from low value forces while itself no longer occupying a similar 'buy ten for the price of a single fixed wing fighter' equivalent acquisition cost level (ignoring continuing training/maintenance requirements) is also non-functional. Because there is NO NEED to employ the same platform as both targeting and fires platform when you can halve the (weight as) cost of each by splitting them up.
CONCLUSION:
Like I say. Go back, read what's coming, doctrinally, out of Iraq. Apply some realworld engineering to tunnel tests and 'new approaches' that avoid the crippling envelope shortcomings that are the bane of both conventional military ops and your own particular roof-of-world needs. In the same stroke.
Don't get on a treadmill of monkey-see-do mimicry of a system concept whose origin is as much political (CAS and Key West) by nature as ever it was tactical in application.
KP
LINKS-
Grim Future
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch_120303_Helicopter,00.html
Review Stick Tight Or Die = Zero Operational Initiative
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/urb07303.xml
Never Ask An Indian
http://www.aviationtoday.com/cgi/rw/show_mag.cgi?pub=rw&mon=0503&file=0503paris.htm
Viper Strike
http://www.defense-update.com/directory/viper-strike.htm
http://www.special-operations-technology.com/archive_article.cfm?DocID=588
CRW Stop Rotor and Jet Flap Blades
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn2341
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn2341
King Cobra and AH-64D Costs
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-1z.htm
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/helicopter-m/ah64/
Srirangan,
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Kurt Plummer,
A boy learns the Alphabet and recites it, you are saying "that's no good because it's not a real sentence".
PS: For the metaphorically challanged: boy=India; alphabet=LAH;
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Honestly, I can't tell whether you are saying that India is in the infancy of it's helicopter development and must be allowed to take 'baby steps'. Or if I am bigoted for assuming they can't make larger ones.
In either case, I supported my argument with both conceptual alternatives and supporting evidence for the inadequacy of the given solution. Take it or leave it, the existing deisgn paradigm for the attack helicopter results in a dead duck of absent military capability. Something that will likely only get worse as everybody on the planet shifts from point specific (RF) sensors to integrated acousto-optic (modified HALO meets ADADS), netcentric, targeting. To drive hunting SAM (FIM-160 MALI) and DEWS (XM87 meets Nautilus/THEL).
Under such conditions you WILL meet basic minima for standoff manned platform conservationism and rapid-transit to and from said _fires not targeting_ driven 'dumptruck' munitions transport. Or you will lose against even a fairly primitive (vice fixed wings) threat.
In OOTW, the variables may change somewhat (laser as dazzle rather than hardkill) but the overall higher-faster-further-out-on-slant variables will remain potent. And India, by dint of her unique requirements in Kashmire, could take the first step towards a 300 knot VTOL platform metric and thus both raise and set a new bar for OTHER countries to follow.
KP