After a full year of evaluation between the finalists Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B and Embraer A-29B Super Tucano, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) announced on December 30^th that Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) as primary contractor was the winner of the highly contentious Light Air Support (LAS) competition. The $355 million contract awarded to the SNC/Embraer team details the delivery of 20 aircraft, ground training devices and associated equipment to train pilots from allied nations commencing with Afghanistan.

Since September, many unexpected changes have been made to the original USAF requirements. At the start of the competition, the Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) program, planned to supply up to 100 aircraft to the USAF, was paired with Light Air Support (LAS) to supply 20 aircraft to Afghan Air Force.

Nevertheless, in September the USAF backtrack on LAAR, reducing the number to 15 aircraft. The rationality behind to cut was due to the shift of the USAF priorities from establishing a dedicated COIN wing to "building partnership capacity". The change in priorities left Hawker and the SNC/Embraer team to duck it out for LAAR’s 15 and LAS’s 20 aircraft requirement.

Hawker suffered a deathblow when in late November, without much explanation from the USAF, was suddenly dropped from the competition, apparently due to problems with its proposal. In an effort to salvage the AT-6B, Hawker resorted to the courts, suing the USAF and launched a formal complaint with the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

In mid-December, the GAO declined Hawker’s complaint and the USAF quietly awarded the contract to the SNC/Embraer team on December 22^nd, but became official on December 30^th. Meanwhile, waiting for the outcome of Hawker’s lawsuit and after strong negative reaction from Kansas lawmakers (Hawker’s home-state), the USAF ordered to halt work on LAS four days after the contract was awarded.

This is too much drama for such small aircraft. LAS has turn out to be another controversial acquisition program like those of the future tanker (KC-X) and the combat search and rescue-x (CSAR-X) helicopter competitions. Even though the USAF advocates transparency, there was no clear and public statement of why the AT-6B was dropped. The USAF stumbled by not clearly stating why it took the decision, now it must do so. Hawker’s credibility was also weakened by not alerting the USAF of any wrongdoing before it was dropped. Instead Hawker’s strategy, after its complaint was declined by the GAO, is to rely on strong congress supporters for a favorable resolution.

A-29B Super Tucano

Meantime the U.S. Navy has run into difficulties of its own, by clearly preferring the Super Tucano after it took part in an evaluation phase known as Imminent Fury programme in 2009 to develop a CAS/COIN platform for special operations. Since then, congress rejected additional funds of $22 million for further development in 2010 and $17 million last October for phase II known as Combat Dragon II programme for deployment and combat confirmation of the Super Tucano’s capabilities in Afghanistan.

There is a paradox here, the Pentagon clearly wants the aircraft, but congress refuses to finance it. Congress lawmakers, this is for you: operating costs for the F-15E runs at roughly $44 thousand per flight hour, $19 thousand for the F/A-18E/F and $7 thousand F-16C/D. Paying millions of dollars more for flight patrols and to drop bombs makes absolutely no sense. There is simply no plane that can match the light attack aircraft’s capabilities of mission flexibility, air-to-ground weapons variety, and low operating cost of roughly $1 thousand per flight hour. At such low operating costs, the Super Tucano looks just as sexy as any teen fighter.

LAAR and LAS acquisition must move forward in an expeditiously madder, especially now that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have selected the same aircraft. Both services must work together because the days of which each service ran different and independent programs, without mutual cooperation must end.  In the words of ex-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates “the culture of endless money” is gone.

Take the A-10 Thunderbolt II; it has survived over 20 years after the original plans to have the aircraft retired. The USAF made a conscious decision to retain its capabilities; providing  a service life extension program (SLEP) upgrade the entire fleet. At an operating cost of roughly $3 thousand per flight hour, the A-10 is a remarkable example of the kind of bargain the USAF needs to operate in a low intensity conflict environment.

No doubt that the light attack aircraft envision by CENTCOM is late for the party, especially now that the Iraq war has officially ended and U.S. involvement in Afghanistan appears to be winding down. A leaner and cheaper U.S. military is coming, but we don’t have to sacrifice the meaner part. Is never too late to save our taxpayer’s money.

References

Burno, Michael and Anselmo, Joseph “LASt Chance”. Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 3, 2012: 31-32. Print Edition

Burno, Michael. “Sierra, Embraer Wins USAF LAS, Hawker Fights”. Aviation Week and Space Technology , January 3,2012,

Dorr, Robert F. “Capital Hill Rejects Light Attack Aircraft Request”. Defense Media Network, October 21, 2011,

Dorr, Robert F. “Super Tucano is Winner of Contentious Light Attack Contest”. Defense Media Network, January 3, 2012,

Trimble, Stephen. “Rivals not deterred by USAF shift on turboprop fighters”. Flight Global, September 15, 2011

Sierra Nevada Corporation. “U.S. Air Force Stop Work Order on Light Air Support Award”. Sierra Nevada Corporation, January 4, 2012

This paper analyses the options for a local US military presence and the implications for Australia.

For Australia, the presence of US forces is about much more than just their physical presence. It is about declaring our strategic intent in the burgeoning Sino-US competition in the Asia-Pacific.

It is time to bring back Vietnam War era CAS/COIN tactics and merge them with 21^st century weapons, technology and platform. LAAR’s winner will not bring the glamor of the F-16C/D, F/A-18E/F or F-15E; nevertheless, it will perform many of legacy aircraft CAS missions for about one $1 thousand per flight hour.

For the first time since the Vietnam War, the U.S. military is set to make a decision to acquire between 55-100 CAS/COIN aircrafts from two finalists: Hawker Beachcraft, teaming up with Lockheed Martin to provide the AT-6B and Brazilian aircraft manufacture Embraer, teaming up with U.S. based company Sierra Nevada to provide the A-29B Super Tucano.

LAAR’s winner will be capable of flying at altitudes up to 30,000 ft. above sea level, with a range up to 900 nautical miles, competently able to perform 6 hours missions. The aircraft will be fitted with fuel tanks, multi-function display (MFD) and fully compatible head up display (HUD) with night vision goggle (NVG). It will also be able to perform a numerous of missions such as streaming video, forwarding air control, escort missions, CAS, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). At the same time using a wide-range of equipped such as electro-optical, infrared and laser sensors. LAAR will be armed with .50 caliber machine guns pods, 2.75 inch rocket pods, air-to-ground missiles like the Hellfire or Maverick, AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, laser guided bombs including Paveway II and Paveway IV, joint attack munitions (JDAM) and small diameter bombs. The future CAS/COIN aircraft will roar like a cat, but most definitely will bite like a lion.

To those who oppose adopting such “retro” aircraft, two factors to take into consideration: 1) there isn’t many aircraft capable of performing such wide missions, with these many weapons, at such low  operating cost, and 2) the massive defense cuts just announced by the Obama administration should serve as incentives to look for cost-effective alternative solutions.

Many have favored the AT-6B arguing that is a proven platform, already adopted by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy as the T-6A Texan II for primary training. Favoritism towards the American defense establishment over foreign aircrafts, concerns about spare parts for the A-29B Super Tucano and the already known arguments about keeping jobs in the United States. However, many of these arguments have little substance. Unlike the A-29B Super Tucano, the AT-6B was not originally developed for CAS/COIN missions. Consequently, Hawker Beachcraft had to scramble to beef up the AT-6B to meet LAAR requirements with a more powerful engine, strengthen airframe, wing redesign to fit hardpoints, cockpit and engine armor. Contrary to popular believe, the AT-6B, is not a U.S. design; it is based on the Pilatus PC-9M from Switzerland, constructed by Hawker Beachcraft since 1998.

The A-29B Super Tucano will be made by U.S. based company Sierra Nevada in Jacksonville, Florida. The A-29B is combat proven, build from the ground up for CAS/COIN missions, therefore requiring no modifications and has outsold the T-6A Texan II in the international market. It will be a mistake to underestimate the A-29B Super Tucano as a formidable opponent, already tested by the U.S. Navy to take part in an evaluation phase known as Imminent Fury program to develop CAS/COIN platform for special operations personnel. The AT-6B was unavailable to be evaluated by Imminent Fury, because it was still under development.

The U.S. Air Force cannot afford another disastrous and controversial acquisition program like those of the future tanker KC-X and the combat search and rescue-x (CSAR-X) competition. The U.S. military needs the 55-100 aircraft already planned for LAAR and more. The new CAS/COIN aircraft should be operated from both U.S. Air Force airbases and the U.S. Navy carriers as a cost-effective solution to the many Pentagon budget challenges ahead.

References

Fogleman, Ronald. “Making the Right Choice for a LAAR”. Lexington Institutes, June 29, 2011, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/making-the-right-choice-for-a-laar?a=1&c=1171>

George, Fred. “Pilot Report: Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B”. Aviation Week, July 30, 2011,<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awx/2010/07/30/awx_07_30_2010_p0-244911.xml>

Warwick, Graham. “U.S. Wants COIN Aircraft for Foreign”. Aviation Week, May 19, 2011, <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2011/04/01/DT_04_01_2011_p38-297236.xml&headline=null&next=10>

Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006.

Although the fight against organized crime is clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and enforce the rule of law. While the federal government has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon administration, the armed forces continue to be the main implementers of the National Security policy, aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the operational capacity of organized crime.

Their strong institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to political control, and history of interaction with the population mainly through disaster relief efforts have made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society.

Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of public policies at the national level, from emergency vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the United States, Haiti, and Central America among the most recent.

The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries: the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with society and the results obtained from this division in military power confirms the utility of their independence.

Their use as the state’s last line of defense has led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of the population.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the DefenceTalk.com.

This monograph offers an assessment of the progress of the ANA to date. It draws on a variety of sources, including in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past three years.

Assessment of the Afghan National Army

Our assessments pertain to following areas:

• manpower, infrastructure, and equipment
• training
• operational proficiency
• public perceptions of the army.

Manpower, Infrastructure, and Equipment
Of these three areas, manpower shows the most progress. The ANA has recruited nearly 79,000 soldiers, and the goal of 122,000 personnel plus an additional 12,000 in training, transient, holding, and student (TTHS) status seems possible, if difficult. Reenlistment efforts have been relatively successful, with about 67 percent of noncommissioned officers and about 49 percent of soldiers opting for an additional enlistment. This success notwithstanding, important personnel issues remain, including an unacceptably high absent-withoutleave rate and a lack of ethnic balance across the force.

Progress has occurred in developing the infrastructure, but it lags behind in manpower recruitment. Only about 40 percent of infrastructur projects are completed or under way. Funding is available to complete many of them, but the time line of that completion extends longer than U.S. officials would like. The projected force increase, from 80,000 to 122,000, will require additional infrastructure, posing yet another set of challenges to a program that already lags behind the requirements.

Finding a source of funding to pay the salaries of an additional 40,000 soldiers and to build the necessary infrastructure has not been a bright spot thus far. Afghanistan’s GDP is only $11 billion, and the annual federal budget is $4 billion, much of which is foreign aid (O’Hanlon, 2008). Opium cultivation and trafficking constitute a large part of the country’s economic activity. Thus, the ability of the Afghans to provide the economic support and develop the infrastructure that the ANA requires remains an open question. It is likely that a continued international commitment will be necessary to ensure that the ANA and its infrastructure are sustained.

Equipment is also a problematic area. Some units, such as the commandos, are well equipped, but others are missing equipment or have old or obsolete materiel. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that Afghan combat units are short about 40 percent of the major necessary items. A recent U.S. decision to provide additional equipment to the ANA will help, but some units that do not currently have the assistance of coalition forces find themselves outgunned by their Taliban adversaries.

Training
After a somewhat rocky start, institutional training appears to have progressed well. The programs of instruction appear sound and attuned to the needs of the Afghan army. More problematic is the unit-level training, which depends in large part on the efforts of embedded training teams. Teams promised by NATO have been slow in coming, and two years after the program’s inception, only about half of the operational mentor and liaison teams (OMLT) have been staffed. Additionally, some of these teams have restrictions on what they can do. Furthermore, the schedules of the teams do not mesh well with the operational employment of the Afghan units they advise. Ensuring that enough teams are available to meet current demands and to support the increase will be important and, if recent history is any guide, difficult.

Operational Proficiency
The key to the success of the Afghan army is how well it performs in combat. The coalition claims that Afghan units participate in almost all operations and take the lead in about half of them. Publicly available data to support or refute this claim are hard to come by. Anecdotal information is mixed, but in general it seems that the army is steadily improving. Some units (commandos) essentially run their own operations with some advice from mentors. Others are considerably less adept. Still, many observers note real improvement, although the starting baseline was relatively low. A recent GAO assessment indicates about 40 percent of the ANA is capable of conducting operations with support of international forces (GAO, 2008). Accounts of several operations—for example, the one in Kandahar province in summer 2008 to reimpose security after a large number of Taliban broke out of prison in—show a capability to respond quickly and carry out a relatively sophisticated operation. Still, the increase in the number and quality of Taliban fighters is posing a serious threat to the stability of the country to the point that U.S. commanders have made requests for additional forces. Thus, in spite of the progress made in the development of the ANA, its operational effectiveness remains very much in the balance.

One area universally seen as needing major improvement is the ability of the ANA to support itself. Logistics remains a weakness, both in planning and in execution.

Public Perception
In a conflict that ultimately hinges on public support, it is noteworthy that survey data indicate that the people of Afghanistan view the army positively. While the overall perception of security has declined recently, the ANA is seen as a positive force in providing security. This positive perception helps coalition forces carry out operations, using the Afghan forces to interact with the civilian population while they focus on direct combat with the insurgents.

The Way Forward
The ANA remains a work in progress but is an indispensable part of the ultimate security of the country. Coalition forces cannot be the guarantors of national security. Only the Afghans themselves can do that. However, coalition forces, particularly those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces operating out of Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. Even if the ANA reaches the stage where it can operate independently, the United States and other nations will need to keep a security presence in the country for a substantial period. Moreover, it is likely that an international commitment will be necessary to ensure that the ANA and its infrastructure are sustained for the foreseeable future.

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What has allowed North Korea to act in the way it does?

The accumulated mistakes of successive administrations to understand that the North Koreans really want to have a nuclear weapon and that they are not prepared to trade it away. There are honest disputes among many people about whether or not North Korea was at one time or another time willing to trade its nuclear weapons. But I think that now, since 1990 through 1994, despite agreements that Clinton had as well as the various agreements under president Bush, it is now very clear that North Korea wants a status very similar to India, where they obtain recognition of their right to retain nuclear weapons, but otherwise normalize relations with their neighbors and the United States.

So what is the solution to the problem: the six-party talks, or something else?

The six-party talks are probably the only mechanism that, if there was a desire by Pyongyang to reach a solution, could provide the means to solve it. However, the situation has deteriorated to the point now where the six-party talks have been rejected by the North and I think China would have a very hard time getting the North Koreans back to the six-party talks. And to answer your fundamental question, I think we need to see some kind of change in North Korea. They currently have a powerful domestic motivation for what they are doing and we need to see domestic motivations adjusted in order to get them to take seriously the concerns of their neighbors and the United States.

Would it be right to say that as long as Kim is in power nothing will change?

That appears to be the case. Because it is a one-man leadership he can change things anytime he wants to. Now, they appeared to be focused on the succession arrangements, they are rapidly promoting the young son, they are creating arrangements around that son to have a kind of regency, in case Kim dies. To back him up they need the support of the military…and to demonstrate their importance to the country’s survival. The nuclear missile capabilities appear to be at the heart of that.

Do you think North Korea poses a real threat or is it just a political game that they are playing?

I am a little different from some observers, because I think the threat is very small. North Korea lacks the industrial capacity to build large numbers of long-ranged missiles. They will not be able to build so many weapons as to become a strategic factor in the region. But I have to acknowledge that they do pose a threat to South Korea both through short-range missiles, and the possibility of using the nuclear weapons in the South, even though there are just a few, or artillery from the North to the South. That would be the end of the North regime if they were to attack the South, but they still have that capacity. Moreover, they may force the Japanese to reconsider their very modest defense program. The Japanese have the capacity to move to a nuclear weapon, I do not think they will, but they certainly can. Certainly, politically Japan will debate whether or not move to a nuclear weapon in the short term because of this development in North Korea. And they do feel threatened by the North Korean short-ranged missiles and nuclear weapon. But as I said, North Korea is an industrial midget and not really in a position to pose a large-scale threat to the neighborhood.

Summary

The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot long ignore the inadequacy of much of the current force for nontraditional challenges lurking on the strategic horizon. In the face of the next large-scale unconventional challenge when the President turns to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for options, the SecDef must have the right force available to respond effectively.

Senior landpower leaders in particular should reorient on a new unconventional balance point for force optimization. They should anticipate that there will be changes in the U.S. approach to defense-relevant and defense-specific challenges around the world. As a consequence, they should act proactively to help the SecDef identify and build capabilities for the new balance point during the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. Doing so will enable DoD to better account for contemporary strategic conditions with minimum future institutional disruption. This monograph arrives at the following conclusions.

• The contemporary strategic environment is marked by a new unconventional status quo. Four characteristics define this new normal. First, unconventional threats of "purpose" and "context" dominate the defense operating space. Second, internal and external threats to foreign interests will commingle in future land-centric contingencies. Third, hybrid combinations of purposeful and contextual threats will be commonplace. And, finally, fourth, traditional military power--employed in isolation--will be increasingly less useful. Combined, these indicate that "fighting and winning America's wars" will mean something quite different to senior land force leaders in the future.
• U.S. landpower fulfils two roles in this new unconventional operating space. It delivers decisive lethal and nonlethal military effects and enables effective employment of important nonmilitary capabilities and resources like aid, development assistance, consequence management, and preliminary reconstruction.
• Armed stabilization may be the next most common and most important major combat operation (MCO) for DoD land forces. More broadly among the many targets available for land force optimization in the coming years, the most prudent course is one that pursues an unconventional revolution in mission and capabilities. Shifting land force policy in this direction acknowledges that armed stabilization of nations and/or regions in crisis and the defeat of violent threats to a foreign internal order are likely more important organizing principles for future force planning than is preparation for future traditional MCOs.
• Here, U.S. land forces optimize for circumstances where: (1) vital interests are challenged by violent unconventional threats; (2) the degree of violence itself is quite high and the environment is nonpermissive; (3) physical threats demonstrate some organization and relative sophistication at various levels (but not that commonly associated with high-end MCO); and finally, (4) foreign partners suffer from substantial loss or complete failure of sovereign control over political and security outcomes.
• Four principles should govern future landpower employment in this new environment. These reflect the strategic experience and choices of the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) era, and are sensitive to contemporary risk and cost tolerance. They are: (1) core interests first; (2) limited objectives; (3) risk management; and, finally, (4) early integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational contributions. All four blend at critical points.
• Shaped by these four principles, unconventional land force optimization calls for the adoption of eight new or revised missions. This new mission set is not a threat to the warfighting culture of either the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. Instead, it represents a recalibration of landpower's focus consistent with history, the likeliest strategic futures, and, finally, the desire by senior defense leaders to shift DoD's weight decisively in the direction of unconventional threats.
• The new mission set includes: (1) active management of purposeful unconventional threats; (2) armed stabilization; (3) preemptive/ punitive campaigns; (4) security sector reform and assistance; (5) conventional deterrence and limited traditional war; (6) facilitation of whole of-government stabilization and reconstruction; (7) generation and sustainment of adequate land force capabilities; and finally, (8) homeland defense and security. All of these missions andtheir associated force pools are interdependent. When combined, they amount to a new 21st century land power force planning construct.

Pursuit of an unconventional land force revolution that accounts for these eight missions resets landpower for decisive intervention in future complex contingencies. General purpose land forces, in particular, must optimize for armed stabilization missions that demand rapid containment and defeat of nontraditional foreign hazards under conditions of general civil disorder in order to create secure operating space for the effective employment of essential nonmilitary agents (e.g., interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental). This course recognizes that U.S. land forces are warfighting institutions first. However, it forces landpower leaders to build for a different kind of warfighting future.

Conclusion: Pursuing a New Balance

An unconventional revolution in land forces redefines the balance point for force optimization. As a hedge against lingering traditional uncertainty, full-spectrum balance remains a legitimate goal for parts of DoD. Nonetheless, the author concludes that uncompromising pursuit of full-spectrum balance in land forces is fraught with unwarranted strategic risk. Indeed, pursuit of full-spectrum balance is likely to result in renewed imbalance in favor of the missions landpower leaders are culturally most comfortable with as against those they are likeliest to undertake. In this regard, excessive investment in full-spectrum balance in land forces is an expensive strategic detour that can result in sub-optimizing for an unconventional future.

Pursuit of a wider unconventional revolution resets the balance point for land forces in a way that best positions them for decisive intervention against compelling unconventional threats. Landpower remains the most versatile and broadly employable DoD capability. General purpose land forces, in particular, must optimize for armed stabilization. This envisions a land force capable of containing and defeating nontraditional hazards to U.S. core interests under conditions of general civil disorder in complex foreign contingencies. Their purpose in doing so is to create secure operating space for the essential work of important nonmilitary agents (i.e., interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental). This course recognizes that American land forces are warfighting institutions first. However, it pushes landpower leaders to recognize that they must anticipate and build for a different kind of warfighting environment.

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Authored by Mr. Nathan P. Freier

NOWRA, Australia: BAE Systems plans to establish a world class aviation maintenance facility in Nowra, NSW, if it secures the contract to support the Royal Australian Navy’s S-70B-2 Seahawk helicopter fleet.

Jim McDowell, Managing Director, BAE Systems Australia, said today the company remained committed to Nowra as the long term home of its naval helicopter support operations.

“BAE Systems has been providing deeper maintenance support for Navy helicopters based out of Nowra since 1993,” Mr McDowell said.

“If we are selected in response to a current tender process, we plan to establish a new helicopter support capability at the Albatross Aviation Technology Park, adjacent to HMAS Albatross.

“This proposal will enable cost effective investment in a long term facility solution at Nowra and support of a sustainable Nowra based industry capability for the Seahawk Mission System and broader Navy requirements,” he said.

The deeper maintenance facility at Albatross Aviation Technology Park, to be known as the Navy Helicopter Support Centre will incorporate the previous Seasprite facility and a purpose built maintenance facility.

The company is leading a defence helicopter industry alliance, known as the Seahawk Support Team, together with partners Raytheon Australia, Rosebank Engineering, and Asia Pacific Aerospace and Air Affairs, in its bid for the contract. Raytheon Australia is the leading provider of avionics maintenance and engineering services to the ADF across multiple aircraft platforms.

“The release of the RFT for an initial period of seven years, and lifting a restriction that mandated government furnished facilities at HMAS Albatross has allowed the Team to offer the Navy a much improved industry support model for the Seahawk helicopter,” Mr McDowell said.

BAE Systems is the premier global defence and aerospace company delivering a full range of products and services for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electronics, information technology solutions and customer support services. With approximately 105,000 employees worldwide, BAE Systems' sales exceeded £18.5 billion (US $34.4 billion) in 2008.

MOSCOW: After the breakup of the Soviet Union, many intellectuals in Russia and the West announced "the end of history." It seemed that the United States' complete domination of the world was not disputed by anyone.

The subsequent decade, during which Russia lost its foreign policy positions, and its former satellites and even provinces became U.S. and NATO allies, seemed to have buttressed this idea.

The first signal that the situation could change came on September 11, 2001, when it suddenly transpired that U.S. domination did not guarantee Washington absolute security. Moreover, for the first time since the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States had to bargain in order to guarantee the loyalty of its allies. With the start of the Iraqi conflict, U.S. domination was called into question even more openly, despite obvious successes in the post-Soviet space such as the admission of the Baltic nations into NATO and permission to use bases in Central Asia.

The second half of the first decade of the new century saw a new trend. Russia's consolidation, buoyed by a favorable economic situation and political stabilization, raised the issue of spheres of influence, at least in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe. Many analysts saw the series of colored revolutions that spread across the post-Soviet space as the final renunciation of peaceful settlement of disputes between Russia and the West; but this was not true - Russia did not give up attempts to come to terms with pro-American governments.

The issues of missile defense and the Kosovo problem proved the Rubicon of East-West relations. The West demonstratively ignored Russia's position, and this was bound to evoke response. Russia had to face military confrontation and settle disputes in the CIS to its own benefit, without looking to the West.

Almost as soon as Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, many observers began to see Georgia as the most probable arena of an armed conflict with Russia. All the prerequisites for this were in place - Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presence of many Russian citizens in these republics, and Tbilisi's open desire to subjugate the rebellious territories.

There is no need to describe the history of the five-day war again. Its main geopolitical result is not the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but the return of political confrontation between Russia and the West. What could it lead to?

Nobody wants a military solution to the conflict, which could be fatal for the whole world. Both sides will have to prove their cases by political and economic means. Russia's integration into the world economy over the last 15 years has led to a situation where the West cannot inflict serious damage on us without hurting itself as much, if not more.

As a result, Russia's main lobbyists to Western governments are the Western companies, for which a quarrel with the eastern neighbor could be financially ruinous.

Apart from oil and gas, I could recall agreements on the supply of titanium spare parts for the world's biggest aircraft-builders, the Russian market for cars and other hardware, and many other spheres where cessation of economic cooperation will deal substantial damage to Western interests.

And there are political, as well as financial, interests that would be damaged by confrontation with Russia. Space cooperation between Russia and the United States, the air corridor granted by Russia for NATO flights to Afghanistan and some other programs, not as obvious as oil and gas supplies, are too important to be jeopardized over Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

What will global confrontation be like now? It is clear that the point of no return has already been passed. Russia is not prepared to renounce its positions as it did in the 1990s. The West may be indignant, but it will have to face reality - it has become too expensive to risk.

Revision of values is inevitable. The weight categories of the political players will be revised, and many countries which had been seen as subjects will come to be viewed as objects - bargaining chips in a big power game. Their elites will not welcome this change. This is why some East European and Baltic countries quickly expressed their unreserved support for Georgia.

Where will the next round of confrontation take place? It is hard to predict with certainty, but it is likely to be in Ukraine, where not only the destiny of the Black Sea Fleet but also Russia's influence in Eastern Europe is at stake. This round will be bloodless. At any rate, I would like to hope that Ukraine is not going to oust the Black Sea Fleet from the Crimea by force.

However, the propaganda confrontation will be much more intense than in Georgia. A world event is not the one in which 10,000 take part, but the one which is being filmed by 10 TV cameras.

RIA Novosti military correspondent Ilya Kramnik. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik): Analysts are actively debating the possible outcomes of an armed conflict between Georgia and self-proclaimed Abkhazia that seceded from Georgia in 1992.

Without looking into the most pessimistic scenarios envisioning a nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO, let's try and predict the possible outcomes of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

In late 2007, the Georgian Armed Forces had about 33,000 officers and men, including a 22,000-strong army that comprised five brigades and eight detached battalions.

These units had over 200 tanks, including 40 T-55 and 165 T-72 main battle tanks that are currently being overhauled. The Georgian Army also had 180 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as 20 other armored vehicles, 120 artillery pieces with a caliber of 122-152 mm, 40 multiple-launch rocket systems and 180 mortars, including 60 120-mm mortars and 120 mortars with an 82-mm caliber.

Although the Georgian Air Force has 10 to 12 Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack jets, only 4-5 of them are operational. It also has 15 Czech-made L-29 and L-39 combat trainers that can be converted into light-weight attack planes and 30 helicopters, including 8 Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships.

The Georgian Navy has 10 motor boats of different types, including two guided-missile boats. One of them is similar to the French-made Le Combatant and carries four Exocet anti-ship missiles. And the Soviet-made Project 206-MR boat has two P-15M missiles.

However, their combat readiness is in doubt.

The Georgian military faces a 10,000-strong Abkhazian Self Defense Force wielding 60 tanks, including 40 T-72s, and 85 artillery pieces and mortars, including several dozen with a 122-152-mm caliber and 116 armored vehicles of different types.

The Abkhazian Army also has numerous anti-tank weapons ranging from RPG-7 rocket launchers to Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Additionally, the break-away republic has one or two Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers, one MiG-23 fighter, five combat-ready Su-25 ground-attack jets, 3-4 L-39 combat trainers and 3-4 helicopters. Although some sources allege that Abkhazia has 1-2 Su-27 Flanker fighters, this seems unlikely.  

The Abkhazian Navy has over 20 motor boats armed with machine-guns and small-caliber cannons.

The experience of the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhazian conflict shows that even small units can resist superior enemy forces in mountainous areas for a long time. Consequently, the outcome of any hypothetical conflict would depend on the aggressors' level of military training and the influence of third parties, primarily Russian units from the Collective CIS Peacekeeping Force.

Analysts have long noted the inadequate combat readiness of Georgia's Armed Forces. Although the United States has trained several crack Georgian units in the last few years, the fighting effectiveness of all other elements is uncertain.

According to American instructors who helped train Georgian units, the country's officer corps is riddled with corruption. There are no trained sergeants, and troop morale is running low. Only about 50% of the military equipment is operational, and coordinated operations in adverse conditions are impossible.

The Abkhazian Armed Forces pack a more devastating punch because they would resist an aggressor that has already tried to deprive the republic of its independence.

Abkhazian units are commanded by officers trained at Russian military schools. Many of them fought in the early 1990s. Analysts agree that the combat-ready Abkhazian Army does not suffer from corruption.

Moscow has recently beefed up the local peace-keeping contingent. Neighboring Caucasian nations, including North Ossetia, are siding with Abkhazia and are ready to square accounts with Georgia.

Chechen volunteers, who had fought in Abkhazia in 1993, could also join a hypothetical conflict and minimize Tbilisi's chances still further.

The Georgian Army would be quickly defeated if Tbilisi tries to settle the conflict by force. The situation could change in case of foreign intervention. For instance, the United States could provide weapons, reconnaissance and other intelligence information to Georgia. New NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic countries which are close U.S. allies, could even send their units to the conflict zone.

The possible outcome could be succession from Abkhazia of its eastern and southern parts. Although NATO peacekeepers would be stationed there, military involvement is highly unlikely because its unsuccessful outcome would undermine the alliance's reputation. Brussels and Washington realize this, and are in no mood to conduct another protracted counter-insurgency operation. 

Behind-the-scenes bargaining and saber-rattling also seem possible. However, a Balkans-style "divorce" is more likely because Georgia does not want to recognize Abkhazian independence, and Abkhazia flatly refuses to consider itself part of Georgia.

Although a de facto "divorce" has already taken place, both Moscow and Washington will have to recognize it de jure after bilateral talks. The Kremlin and the White House should search for troubleshooting options and find the required bargaining chips.

Still it is unpleasant to realize that human destinies, rather than missile sites or oil wells, are at stake. 

Hopefully, the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry will consider the human factor to be more important than even the most attractive missile-defense proposals or lucrative energy contracts.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.