The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[OPSSG]

For those with a professional military background, please accept my apologies for stating the obvious and I stand ready to be corrected.

In the prior discussions, I note that there was some confusion in certain terms and these conceptual difficulties resulted in fellow forum participants becoming confused and I would like to make an attempt to provide some basic clarifications via answering 5 questions:

Basic Conceptual Terms Defined
(1) Strategy - The overall concept of using military power to achieve political and/or military ends

(2) Tactics*** - The art of winning battles and engagements (and this idea is always tied to a specific area of operations, usually at a lower level of command and against a specific enemy)

(3) Battle - A violent collision of forces at a specific time and place

(4) Concept of Operations - The planned positioning and movement of forces to gain an advantage over the aggressor

------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ***The following definition of tactics may also be used:

(i) The employment of units in combat (FM 3-0).

(ii) It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (FM 3-0 & FM 3-90).​

When I talk about military strategy, I mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends. It is clear from the prior posts that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.


Q1: Why is Singapore so reluctant to use military power as a strategy?

Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). An example of the SAF in non-combat roles is all the humanitarian relief deployments (eg. the Dec 2004 Tsunami) or peace support ops. And the SAF contributes to peace support ops too. If we can achieve the same political goal by negotiations or diplomatic efforts:- Why not? Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.


Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?

Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.


Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?

Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the RSN's capabilities and gives us a greater choice of tactics in any naval battle.


Q4: Singapore has a strong but small* air force and navy, why do you need an army?

Ans: Because without an army we cannot hold physical ground (we would have to give up the possibility of using forward defence as a potential tactic, if we cannot hold ground) and it would create a force imbalance, that can be easily overcome by a capable aggressor. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where they are separated by miles and miles of water), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore physically connected to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army component is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). Our army components include recce elements (like LRRPS), armoured battle groups, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and so on.

Fortress Singapore have no choice to play with conventional defence...once it's breach...she'll be lost since unlike the others that can retreat to the rural and jungles to make unconventional resistance, that choices in my opinion regretfully does not applicable to Singapore...

Q5. What do you mean when you say that Singapore is capable of hybrid warfare?

Ans: Just as insurgent commandos can set off bombs at Orchard Road and at the former Ambassador Hotel (during the 'Konfrontasi'), conventional armies are capable of unconventional attacks. For example, Operation Rimau carried by the Z Special Unit in WWII. Singapore's own SOF last saw action in the 1991, at the SQ117 hijack and our NDU have undergone deployments in Iraqi waters for the last 5 years. So it is important to understand that the SAF (while it is not designed as a guerrilla warfare organisation) has well trained unconventional forces that will be employed as part of our concept of operations in any battle (which is often called hybrid warfare**). Please remember, that conceptually, the same or similar tactics are available to both the aggressor and the defender. Our investment in training, technology and organization are but tools in an attempt to stack odds in our favour. That is why we don't ever intend to fight fair or only conventionally. So please do not assume that the SAF will cede any area of specific competence to any potential aggressor (like unconventional warfare). While warfare is inherently unpredictable, our army is not small in numbers and our defence of Singapore will be considered, dynamic and robust. Let me end with a quote from Clausewitz:

"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult... the difficulties accumulate... so that one always falls short of the intended goal... [and this] distinguishes real war from war on paper."​

Footnotes:
*Small being a relative concept when compared to regional powers (the RSAF has the best trained and largest combat aircraft fleet amongst the ASEAN countries). The RSN has arguably the most capable naval fleet amongst the ASEAN countries (in terms of force balance).

**Hybrid warfare or swarming are only tactics. Our country's strategy is to live in peace with our neighbours and try to get along with the regional powers, if possible.

 

[cm07]

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two )

Attempts to inflitrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long peroid of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

Should any neighbouring country announce purchase or clear intent to purchase SRBMs or similar tactical missiles, Singapore will definitely acquire ABM systems that are comprehensive enough easily deal with such threats and at the same time (for convienience and cost effectiveness) handle cruise missiles / ICBMs.

The question still goes back to under what circumstances would such force be used publicly against Singapore.

 

[Crunchy]

Besides, your generals will tell our generals: What do you know? Singapore has never fought a war.

@ OPSSG: Thanks for your answer.

Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war.

 

[OPSSG]

To be honest, ST (Singapore Technologies) sells plenty of firearms and munitions to neighbouring countries (with the exception of Malaysia). However, this is neither prolific nor prominent in order to avoid being implicated as co-murderers when the same weapons are used in human-rights sensitive conflicts.

For most parts of this thread, we are discussing the best strategy to defend Singapore from an external threat (originating from outside of ASEAN). There are 3 points to note in relation to Indonesia:

(i) Singapore seeks peace with Indonesia. To have peace with Indonesia, we must try to work with whoever is in power. IMO, the normalization of Indonesia-Singapore relations provided the benign regional threat environment that enabled Singapore's economic growth in 1970s and 1980s, when we were most vulnerable to external threats. In return, for this peace, we also have to accept that we cannot actively intervene in the domestic politics of Indonesia or act against their national interests (and to be consistent, we should also resist any Indonesian / Malaysian attempt to intervene in our domestic politics).

(ii) Developing an arms industry enhances Singapore defence posture and keeps our costs down. This means we have to accept that guns don't kill people, people kill people. Having an arms industry means we sell guns. In fact, US, Sweden, Russia, China, Pakistan, Korea and Israel all sell arms to some ASEAN countries. Some of these arms selling countries have little or no constraints on selling their arms (and likewise we cannot be expected to act very far outside of international arms selling norms). Therefore, I would not dare to take moral high ground on arms sales save to say that we will comply with relevant UN resolutions.

(iii) The strongest diplomatic message we have sent to a fellow ASEAN country thus far is to abstain from a UN vote, to indicate our disapproval.

With regards to how Singapore defends itself in a conflict - certainly plans are already in place for all three individual/combined scenarios : Land, Sea and/or Air.

Yes, certain types of drawer plans are standard. We should expect no less from the SAF.

In fact, the Australian military had conducted (with UK, US, Canadian and New Zealand participation) ‘Exercise Rainbow Serpent’, that simulated a peace enforcement exercise in a regional country that assisted them in planning for their INTERFET deployment in East Timor. The Aussies, as lead country, augmented by US naval power, showed their impressive military capabilities. Because of their ability to plan well and rapid deployment plan, the local militias were not able to effectively resist. In fact, their naval deployment had to contend with 'aggressive' patrols by Indonesian submarines. Therefore we have much to learn from our FPDA partner.

Do note that Singapore has SIG/INT capabilities to monitor traffic up to 300Km away or more. Any plane and ship heading in the direction of Singapore will be queried and identified long before the actual arrival. Any object that fails to establish communications will be intercepted with armed/live war machines. (This has happened before and each time, the media will cover the incident quite closely for a day or two )

It is much further than 300 km, even if our aircraft and other intelligence assets remain only in Singapore air-space. Thailand will also also be acquiring an AEW aircraft and we know that certain Malaysian navy ships have some intelligence gathering capability. I am not sure about other ASEAN countries.

Attempts to infiltrate by land checkpoints will be dealt with the Immigration and their advance scanners. Unless the aggressor intends to sneak in armed troops, over a long period of time,in little boats as smugglers do with illegal immigrants(even then, there's the coast guard to avoid), there's little chance of an aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

We try to watch our small border closely but illegal immigration is still present (at low levels) and if Mas Selamat can escape, we should not be too complacent.

However, I do agree that there's little chance of a large aggressive armed force consolidating on the main island.

 

[OPSSG]

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense.

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support)?

IMO Indonesia could have been less affected by a US arms embargo!

Traditionally, whatever Suharto asked from Singapore, our government will give it to him (and we also deferred to Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN). They say jump, we say how high (but the key is that they did not ask for too much). If they wanted to borrow NVG or UAVs (to suppress their internal conflicts), we will lend it to them. If he wanted weapons, these would be sold at friendship prices or given to the TNI. If they need engineering support for their fighters (and we have no problems keeping our F-5s & F-16s flying) Singapore would have provided it in the past (on the idea that in general they do not harm our interests).

That relationship changed when Suharto fell from power. We become the little red dot to be kicked around for political expediency. They also decided to renegotiate all prior agreements (on the basis that Singapore got more out of it) and sought ways to make life difficult - like cutting off the sale and supply of sand and granite to Singapore and even arresting a Singaporean for alleged illegal acts in 2007. The relationship thus became conditional even though we stood down a portion of our defence to help Indonesia after the 24 Dec 2004 Tsunami. Everything (though only relevant equipment was selected) and everyone on alert during X'mas (RSN & RSAF troop lift and even an army division HQ, deployed, as a task force) was activated to help them and we deployed our first wave in 5 days not knowing if the insurgency was active after the Tsunami and we did not know if delivering the aid through TNI would make us legitimate targets for the rebels.

In return for the bad treatment, Singapore is also renegotiating our terms of engagement with the TNI, that is why I provided a link of the Indonesians seeking help from Turkey (but not getting it). Thanks to a passage of time (and their inability to keep planes flying) Indonesia is rediscovering the benefits of working with Singapore again and we use mostly western made equipment.

In contrast to our relationship with Indonesia, Singapore donated/transferred 3 F-16As and 4 F-16Bs (all Block 15) to Thailand in 2005 (as a reward for allowing us to use their airbase and other training arrangements). I am not saying that we could have donated the F-16s to Indonesia with the embargo in place, at the relevant time, but it signals our ability to give to friends. Hmm... we have 6 more retired/unused missile gunboats (Anyone else want to be our friends?)

Note: Why give away F-16A/Bs to the Thai military when we still use F-5s? It is a diplomatic Thai-Singapore signal that too many observers fail to see. And how did the Thai navy reward Singapore Inc. recently (before the military government stepped down)?

My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

 

[Tavarisch]

I have copied and modified this post from another thread. What I say here is speculative but you decide if it makes sense.

IMHO, the issue is more complex. Indonesia has F-5Es, F-16A/Bs (which replaced their MiG-21s) and Su-30MKs. Why is it that they can operate their older F-5E squadron (and at the same time have difficulty operating their block 15 F-16s delivered in 1989)? Why was flying Indonesia's western fighter planes never a real problem under President Suharto's rule until 1999 (over the East Timor issues)?

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Please tell me again if Indonesia had purchased the required weapons for their Russian aircraft and explain why there are reported problems with their relatively new purchases (and lack of spare parts or avionics problems is always an excuse)? Keeping in mind that Indonesia has some 'capability' to 'manufacture' other aircraft types?

Are their problems related to a lack of technical expertise, an embargo or a lack of planning (in stocking parts and reliance on outside help for engineering support)?



My point is embargo or not, if Indonesia did not harm Singapore's interests, their planes will still fly (if they asked). That is why I kept pointing out that there is lots of non-US expertise and sub-systems available for the F-16 platform. It is a safe choice (they just have to cultivate F-16 operators as friends).

It could be because Indonesia doesn't have the money to fly them or to get those sub-systems as you suggest.....

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

 

[Ananda]

Why are their F-16s still not flying even after the ban was lifted in late 2005 and could only dispatch a single F-16 for a territory dispute? Further, why is Indonesia reportedly considering block-52 F-16s again under their procurement plan for 2010-2014?

Moneeyyy....

A senior Venezuellan Airforce Officer was being asked (If I'm not mistaken on latest Air Defence Review) when they're coming to Brazil with 6 F-16 A (for inter Latin Amarican Exercise), why they still can fly those F-16 even with the on-going US embargo...??
He simply said...'when you have a lot of money..you can buy anything you want through the internet'...

Maybe he's being modest on the internet issues..however what he's said..when you got money...Embargo is not an issue...
Well look on Iran...30 years of embargo and their F-5, F-4 & F-14 are still flying well...

After Soeharto (and even today)...we still have big issue on the availability for financing our Military Expenditure...In paper we might be an approximately USD 500 bio Economy....but last year we can only provide USD 4 bio (0.8% of GDP) for overall our armed forces budget...

Also there's a strong speculation many people in current political circle wants to enlarge the effect on US Embargo..so providing enough reasoning to go outside US on getting new equipments....

Current replacement schedulle;
1 sq of OV-10 being proposed to be replaced by Super Tucano...
1 sq of Hawk MK 53 with....T-50/M439 (still watching if Singapore or UEA choose it)

1 sq of F-5..???? as I've mentioned on other thread...the Defence Ministry wants Rusian Stuff...the Airforce wants F-16 Block 52 (2 Sq for replacing F-5 and current F-16 A)...

Also a lot of speculation here on replacing F-5 and F-16 with 2 sq of ex Qatary Mirage 2000...if that happen and true..well Frenchie will have last laugh considering their stuff being throw back in the last end of the 80's for F-16...nfloorl:

Indonesian procurement still show a lot of speculation...even in Soeharto era...(especially considering his family muddling through the process)...
One of the most infamous ones is the procurement of Hawk 100/200...the price of those planes that Indonesia has to paid close to the price of F-16 at that time..Everybody knows that the airforce wants more F-16..and no airforce sane mind wants to get Hawk 100/200 as the exchange...and mind you at that time the US still wlling to provide us with additional F-16..

How's this going to play at the end....well the interesting show's still not finish..

 

[OPSSG]

Realistically...can you made Fortress Singapore holding over one month on your own against outside MAJOR Forces..???

Technically, Singapore in WWII was never a fortress in the way of Fort Eben-Emael (the strongest fortress in the world prior to the start of WWII), whose artillery pieces dominated several important bridges over the Albert Canal which German forces intended to use to advance into Belgium. However, the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael also demonstrated that:

(i) the era of static fixed defences had ended; and
(ii) commando raids and unconventional warfare are tools of conventional armies.​

In a battle that took place between 10 -11 May 1940 airborne troops landing via the use of gliders and were able to disable the defences of the fortress. Simultaneously, the rest of the German assault force had landed near the three bridges over the Albert Canal and brought them under German control. German forces were then able to utilize the bridges to aid in the invasion of Belgium. There is a 5 part video series of this story. [ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iD_rX71O78I"]Fort Eben Emael-Part 1[/ame]

Likewise, in World War II, the Japanese attacked Malaya and Pearl Harbor almost at the same time. In a similar act of tactical brilliance and excellent command of operational art by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), Malaya and Singapore both fell faster than the IJA had hoped. I also previously provided a link to a Pointer Monograph on this battle.

The net effect of these successes was to give rise to the idea of manoeuvre theory in land warfare that existed even prior to that period (as exemplified by the writings of by Basil Liddell-Hart and others). The concept of manoeuvre in warfare is, in its simplest form, to employ
movement to apply one’s own strength against enemy weakness while avoiding the reverse. There is an excellent 2008 edition of an Australian army publication that explains The Fundamentals of Land Warfare. Their thinking represents the ‘world’s best practice’ in strategic thinking about land power. Please look at:

(i) Chpt 2: Influences on land warfare; and
(ii) Chpt 4: Conduct of Land Warfare (which includes manoeuvre theory as a theoretical foundation to understand modern combined arms operations).​

This is a good reference point of what we in ASEAN can learn from a nation with an advanced military doctrine. That is why I took a considered view that our defence of ASEAN against any external aggression must be dynamic, considered and utilizing all the tools are our disposal. If we ever need to engage in a collective defence, we must assume it is against a very capable opponent.

However, I would like to say that despite the claims by fellow forum participants of prevailing anti-US sentiments in their respective countries, I would say that this is:

(i) not an anti-US or anti-western scenario; and
(ii) ASEAN forces are so overmatched by US forces that it is pointless to consider it.​

Rather, it is to contemplate an invasion by an external party (like the Imperial Japanese Army) but not against US led forces. It is also useful to note that the USN has a logistic presence in Singapore and therefore we welcome their presence in our Changi naval base.

Whichever forum member that want to contemplate an ASEAN fight against US led forces, please stand on your own. I do not want to be associated with such posts.

None of us in SEA have strong INDEPENDENT Military Industries...whatever Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand...produce locally...all basically depends to the outside sources....

Which all again show under realistic scenario...not one of SEA countries can invade each other...thus potential threat will come from outside SEA...which if that happen not one of us will be able to hold indefinitely...without outside SEA help...

In recent days, ASEAN has started to reconsider what steps we can initiate to consider a security community. The ASEAN Defence Ministers discussed a broad range of security issues including adopting three papers, namely:

(i) the "ADMM-Plus: Principles for Membership";
(ii) "The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief"; and
(iii) "ASEAN Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security".​

While the concept of a security community is not a defence pack, it is a start. In fact, Australia and the US have each brought forth their respective views on how to promote defence cooperation. In the case of Australia, we must keep in mind the existing FPDA.

 

[OPSSG]

And let's not forget the rather heavy anti-US feeling over there, considering the fact that the majority of the population are Muslim.

@Ananda

What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?

However, the same Anti-US feeling here in Malaysia apparently didn't stop us from flying F/A-18s, so I don't really know.

Agreed and it also did not stop Malaysia recently from accepting the US gift of coastal radars.

 

[Ananda]

@Ananda
What do you think? Is there still rising anti-US sentiments after Clinton's visit or are things slowly getting better?

Anti US....They're always anti US sentiment even in Soeharto era..
However Mc Donalds, Pizza Hut & KFC are the biggest fast food franchise in Indonesia...and keep going strong with other US franchise like Starbucks, Domino's Pizza etc,etc...:

Those people that burn US flag, and cry anti US in front of US embassy...will gladly throw their anti US banner....if the guys across the embassy fences shout 'there're oppening for US Visa'....

Face it...there are a lot of grieviences in the Moeslem world on US...but only one that really matter..."ISRAEL"...As long as that matter is not resolve...anti US sentiment will still creaping back...no matter who's in charge in Washington...

Hey...I'm a Moeslem...with a touch of US Education...I really HATE BUSH...but does'nt mean I'm anti US..
Those feeling are more in tune on what most of us feeling in here..we devinetely Anti BUSH...but not necceseraly anti US...

Just like wrote on previous post above...
We don't want to buy US equipments because, we don't trust US will not embargo us further in the future...and also their stuff is just too pricy...which we believe we can got value of money using Rusian or Frenchie stuffs..

However if the US can provide them cheaply..(like the coastal radars...and new upgrading for the Herkies...)..than we probably will take them...

 

[OPSSG]

I found a NBR Analysis (Vo. 14, No. 2, Aug 2003) titled: "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and Projection" by Sheldon W. Simon and I quote a small section of what he wrote and in particular, what he said about Singapore:

"Of America’s three closest Southeast Asian security partners, (Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines), only Singapore’s armed forces are sufficiently technologically proficient to interact with U.S. forces in a manner comparable to Japan, the ROK, and Australia...

Singapore’s defense concerns focus entirely on its own neighborhood. As a major international port and business center, maintaining freedom of the SLOCs and air routes is essential to the city-state’s prosperity. This core interest fits well with U.S. East Asian strategy... Moreover, Singapore is the only Southeast Asian military to have an active rapid deployment force, which operates in an integrated manner with the navy and air force...

While the city-state prefers U.S. defense technology because of its superiority and logistical advantages, Singapore also maintains a complex system of licensed production, assembly, and technology agreements with Britain, France, Italy, Israel, Thailand, Sweden, and Taiwan...

The United States has solidified its security ties to Singapore with a logistics facility, which provides a surge capacity during crises, and was used in Operation Enduring Freedom. Moreover, the new Changi Naval Base, with its deep-water capability, permits the berthing of U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Despite these close ties, Singapore is not completely satisfied with its U.S. defense relationship. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) desires full technology release on all systems it purchases. That is, Singapore wishes to have the right to modify U.S. technology to fit its own needs. Therefore, it is less concerned with maintaining interoperability with the United States than with integrating U.S. equipment into Singapore’s own armed forces doctrine...

At bottom, Singapore believes defense to be essentially its own responsibility. What it wants from the United States, therefore, is increased technology transfer to enhance its independent military capability. Singapore is more enthusiastic about multilateral anti-terrorist cooperation, though even along this dimension the city - state seems more comfortable sharing intelligence with the United States than its neighbors...

Protecting the Strait of Malacca where 1,100 supertankers pass eastbound annually is of great concern to Singapore. A terrorist incident could disrupt traffic simply by causing insurance rates to skyrocket... Terrorist groups have engaged in piracy according to the Malaysian Institute for Maritime Affairs. The MILF and Abu Sayyaf from the Philippines have attacked vessels in the Sulu Sea; and although some anti-piracy cooperation occurs among the littoral states, obstacles remain... This is a particular problem when pirates flee into Indonesian waters among that country’s thousands of islands..."​

As the Americans noted, Singapore believes defense is our own responsibility. While the SAF desires interoperability with other forces it is also designed to operate on it's own, if need be.

 

[OPSSG]

@ OPSSG: Thanks for your answer.

Quoted for truth: Vietnam is the only country in SEA, which has a "collective memory" for a full scale (defensive) war.

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:

(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.​

While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.

 

[Tavarisch]

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:

(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.​

While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.

Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?

In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)

Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)

 

[shockwave11]

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts.

During the same period and following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Vietnamese forces often crossed over from Cambodia into Thailand in operations against Cambodian guerrilla forces. This led to several battles with the Thai military.

I entered military service at the tail end of the Sino-Vietnam border conflict and went to Thailand for our normal military training cycle and gained some insights (combined with reading the history of the PLA) which I would like to share:

(i) In 1984, the PLA overran some Vietnam army (or the PAVN) positions near Lao Son and the PAVN counter attacked;

(ii) the PLA was able to hold onto their positions for 3 years despite all the skirmishes and PAVN counter battery fire and counter attacks (see pages 259-262);

(iii) this meant that while the PLA troops were not well trained or equipped in the 1984-87 period, they were able to fight in a hostile and unfamiliar terrain (and against PAVN war veterans);

(iv) the late 1980s, I learnt how hard it was to train in this sort of terrain in the Thai training area;

(v) in my short stint in Thailand, I uniformly respected the Thai soldiers and officers I met and trained with (especially since many of them had served at the border); and

(vi) the PLA then was very different from what it is today.​

While the fight was between PLA and the PAVN, we should take note of some technological changes since that era (of relevance to the collective defence of ASEAN countries).

In the late 1980s, there was a wide technological and doctrine gap between PLA compared to Thai and Singapore forces (that I served with). The situation is entirely different today. The PLA has modernised and we need to respect the changes and take that into account in our current assessment. If you exclude the SAF, a significant technological gap exists between the PLA and many other ASEAN countries (who have not been able to modernise their forces at the same rate).

So my question is how relevant is a 20-30 year old collective memory to the current way of war in the same terrain? Especially since the PLA has changed so much.

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.

Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically

no need to be worried sir

 

[OPSSG]

Are you implying that there is a possibility that China wants to nab us?

You don't have to automatically assume that we should prepare for a bellicose China, as the sole possibility of an external threat. It was a historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army invaded us and that there was a war between a current ASEAN member (Vietnam) and China in recent memory. IMHO, there is only a very, very slim chance that China might adopt an aggressive posture once again.

Even Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou is less concerned about a bellicose China and are planning to phase-out conscription and move towards a fully professional force. This may indicate that the Taiwanese are now less worried about a China invasion threat (or it could be an internal vote getting issue for the KMT).

In any case, a move like that would probably provoke Commonwealth intervention. (I hope so)

Philippines and Thailand are official US allies, so they have uncle sam. The non-alligned countries in ASEAN (like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei) have more to worry about.

The Commonwealth is an association with a shared historical past but it is not structured for any form of military action. An agreement of relevance to Malaysia and Singapore (in relation to external threats or against Indonesia) is the FPDA with Australia, UK and NZ. Please bear in mind that in the past Malaysia under Dr. M had opted not to participate in certain FPDA exercises.

 

[OPSSG]

Anyway, I'm sure the US doesn't want to lose it's SEA assets, especially, to put in those capitalist terms, losing them to those "godless red heathens". We are investment money for the West. (SEA that is)

I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog and I quote:

"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),​

if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. The BBC and the Independent have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.

Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.

Well in my personal opinion you don't need to be worried about
PLA Because you are in a ASEAN country
in south Asia Singapore is strongest
Politely,economically,strategically
no need to be worried sir

I am not worried.

However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.

 

[shockwave11]

I think that it is in the interest of the US and China to work together but there is no guarantee that they will navigate the path smoothly or that all choices made will be rational (or in our national interest). Given Malaysia's track record of 'condemning' the US and that what leaders like Dr. M said on his blog and I quote:

"I would like to have the Malaysian Armed Forces attack the United States and Israel but I don't think the Government and the MAF would agree with me..." (over the Palestinians in Gaza issue),​

if I were a Malaysian I would not be so complacent (that the US will automatically come to your country's aid), especially if it is on an issue like an offshore drilling rights or EEZ issues. Keep in mind that China views most of the South China Sea as its area of influence and is willing to engage in aggressive maneuvers whenever it suits China. The BBC and the Independent have reported on recent incidents. This is similar to the April 2001 incident, when a Chinese fighter jet collided in midair with a USN EP-3 and the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese military for 11 days.

Please remember that US pull out after the Vietnam war demonstrated that ASEAN countries are a part of their interest but we are not their core interest (the US core interest is keeping the SLOCs open). Save for our geo-strategic position, our countries' respective national interests are not always part of their core interest. OTOH Singapore has tried to remain aligned with US interests and have offered the USN the use of our facilities.



I am not worried.

However, I believe in taking the prudent precaution of keeping our military capability up to date and engaging China to ensure her peaceful rise.

Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers

 

[OPSSG]

First of all, due to our small size, Singapore does not tackle external powers. Instead, we engage them in peaceful dialogue.

Oh my god CHINA is not a devil

No one is demonizing China. Likewise do not demonize other countries.

However, China can and have made things difficult for countries like Singapore, who are trying to engage China. In contrast to Mynmar, the PLA's response to the Wenchuan earthquake showed China's human face and the international community supported China's efforts. In fact, PLA's Deputy Chief of General Staff, LG Ma Xiaotian just concluded a three day visit to Singapore, which follows from the 2008 dialogue initiatives.

What China has done in relation to incidents with the USN is of your own country's making. No one in ASEAN is anti-China but China must behave herself. This incident brings to mind China's clumsy and assertive attempts to signal its intention to enforce its territorial claim near and around the Spratly Islands in the 1980s. In 1988, China's navy sank three Vietnamese ships in the Spratly Islands region. In a refreshing change in tone, China in Nov 2002 signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" and the 2003 declaration of peace to promote the development of the resources in the disputed islands signed in the Philippines.

You need to grow up. My earlier post is mild and valid criticism of China's bad behaviour. If you cannot accept this criticism - it reflects more on your maturity than anything else.

And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars, missiles, jet engines, sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power

You need to improve your English and you should be proud that China's PLA is modernizing. Hopefully, the PLA's modernization will not be used for aggression. How re-assured other countries feel in relation to China's rise depends on how China behaves.

 

[ReAl PrOeLiTeZ]

Oh my god
CHINA is not a devil
And if we are talking about Her Rise as a military super power
it will take whole century to her they stands no where compared to radars,misssiles,jet engines,sensors or electronic warfare
only the thing thy have is nuclear power
and
if we are worried about nuclear war then USA is a big devil
ok yes
Singapore must have military power to tackle all other external powers

nuclear power is no low tech or easy make. its extremely hard and high tech. missles arent that much of other western powers ones. electronic warefare isnt far off, their cyberwarefare is extremely impressive since theyve hacked into foreign military database on several ocassions already. the only weak point is engines. and equipping their large army. its easy to make a army modern if its small army, but china has a big army so it takes longer and more money for them to standardise through the military chain.

back to singapore, have good political dialogue is the only suggestion, they have very small military force, and their terroitory is small, so no where to manuver in war. so not much of military defence is available. so political dialogue is the way to go.

 

[FutureTank]

Just to gain experience and mind sharing.

As all of us know, Singapore nowadays can being consider the most modern army in South East Asia. With a stable economy and politics, add with good relation with most of NATO nation especially US, British & Israel.

However, with land area only about 800km2, urban terrain and population about 4 million, it's seem hard to defending this island from all direction.

The WW II has show the result when Japanese Empire Army success occupied the island and drive-out the strongest British Empire who defending the island.

To have a defence strategy, one has to also have a threat.

What is the threat to Singapore?

Why does it seem hard to defend Singapore? Its a very large fortress with a very big moat. The strategy would be one of a naval and air blockade, but I should think this would take longer than most regional neighbours could afford, or would be allowed to stage.

What would be the incentive for attacking Singapore? Its value is economic, and the destruction of this economic value in the ensuing combat would render any campaign against it, even if successful, meaningless.

Besides that Singapore is a global strategic economic hub. Disruption to its function would be felt all over the World, and reaction would be reciprocal, with or without diplomatic links between Singapore and other states.

The occupation of Singapore by the Japanese was part of a much wider regional strategy, and can not be used as an example to base considerations of Singapore's strategy as a city-state.