Will Super Anti Ship Missile change who controls the oceans?
This is a discussion on Will Super Anti Ship Missile change who controls the oceans? within the Navy & Maritime forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; Originally Posted by rip
So let’s be clear, all the Chinese commercial ships of which there are many, and all ...
So let’s be clear, all the Chinese commercial ships of which there are many, and all the foreign flag vessels that are carrying cargo to and from China are going to broadcast their identity and location to the US navy so that they can then be safely escorted out of harm’s way? Now that is interesting. The commercial tracking systems referenced above are used not to control ocean going traffic but by their owners to monitor their time and cost sensitive business, though I am sure there are some safety benefits as well.
no, what I'm saying is that the chinese are mandating civlian systems which are defacto military IFF systems anyway. ie in chinese airspace, if you don't have the approp transponder (and I'm talking supplementary to the normal non chinese civilian transponders) then by rote, as soon as you appear in chinese airspace, without their supplementary transponder, then you would/could be identified as an intruder.... ditto the same for shipping if they try to adapt the terran based system for a satellite based system. similar systems exist in the west already (eg queensland fisheries have a smaller system in service)
________________ A corollary of Finagle's Law, similar to Occam's Razor, says:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity"
So let’s be clear, all the Chinese commercial ships of which there are many, and all the foreign flag vessels that are carrying cargo to and from China are going to broadcast their identity and location to the US navy so that they can then be safely escorted out of harm’s way? Now that is interesting. The commercial tracking systems referenced above are used not to control ocean going traffic but by their owners to monitor their time and cost sensitive business, though I am sure there are some safety benefits as well.
The system as you you describeit sounds like a self-targeting system for the US Navy but I might be wrong. Dose this system include fishing vessels of all the world’s countries that sail the Pacific or smaller cargo vessels, and large sea going people carring ferries of all these countries? And if this system is so powerful how come piracy and smuggling has not been eliminated?
I will tell you what my experience is and you can take it for what it is worth, I have participated in several naval exercises where a commercial ships traveling in an area when it was supposed to be restricted, was taken under simulated fire and simulated to have been sunk, and that was within the Radar horizon of the ships firing range and not a thousand miles away. There was one time Northwest of Midway Island, I had the embarrassing experience of sending a message by flashing light to a freighter telling it that it had been sunk by missiles. It was not happey to be so informed. The real target was a ship ghosting behind the freighter. The targethad fired up it gun fire control weapons radar and from behind the freighter which made it look like the real target through ESM intercept because it was coming from approximately the same baring.
If hostilities have already began howeven most but not all of the civilian traffic would have tried to clear the area But what area, a hundred or a thousand miles from china’s cost, that would stop 25% of the worls commerical trafic. Is it not the same thing as a self-imposed embargo on all Chinese commercial traffic, which is not generally considered a good thing and not in China’s best interest?
It is the responsibility of the shouter to know what he is shouting at and not the target. Killing the wrong people has big political consequences with long memories. Case in point when the US mistakenly boomed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We are still getting shit from that mistake of ours twenty years later and that was only one small mistake.
That is the fallacy of sea level radar. The sensitivity of distinguishing radar signals in depth in the same vector is very different from the air which suffers less from such depth issues due to the angle of signal transmission. Hence I would presume that's the reason why LRIT appears to be sat-based and also why AWACs datalinks is beneficial. .
There is of course the possibility of jamming.
If one deems an exclusion zone, it would also take a brave commercial captain to sail his ship into a war-zone.
Last edited by weasel1962; January 2nd, 2011 at 09:03 PM.
That is the fallacy of sea level radar. The sensitivity of distinguishing radar signals in depth in the same vector is very different from the air which suffers less from such depth issues due to the angle of signal transmission. Hence I would presume that's the reason why LRIT appears to be sat-based and also why AWACs datalinks is beneficial. .
which is why you effectively need to either used a combination of OTHR, SBR, eyes upstairs via aicraft or have a marker on the asset to get a positional fix.
sea based radar at sent at sea level to track and tag other surface assets is fundamentally 2 dimensional - unless its bouncing or diverting/redirecting off something else in the sensor chain.
its why SWR is also less effective as originally thought and why most countries dropped development after a few years of grief trying to make it reliable - ie results generated with high levels of confidence.
Its why OTHR or air/upper atmosphere based sensors can generate higher levels of confidence because the 2 dimensional fix is able to dance around surface level clutter. ie a top down validation.
________________ A corollary of Finagle's Law, similar to Occam's Razor, says:
"Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity"
which is why you effectively need to either used a combination of OTHR, SBR, eyes upstairs via aicraft or have a marker on the asset to get a positional fix.
sea based radar at sent at sea level to track and tag other surface assets is fundamentally 2 dimensional - unless its bouncing or diverting/redirecting off something else in the sensor chain.
its why SWR is also less effective as originally thought and why most countries dropped development after a few years of grief trying to make it reliable - ie results generated with high levels of confidence.
Its why OTHR or air/upper atmosphere based sensors can generate higher levels of confidence because the 2 dimensional fix is able to dance around surface level clutter. ie a top down validation.
Which bring us back to the same point. I am not saying that long range targeting is not possible, it is just very hard to do without mistakes. Because it is hard, it usually requirs several kinds of target verifications to confirm and the range of the weapon in use is not, and usually never has been, the limiting factor in target section, leading up to thefinal order to open fire that cannot be taken back. And getting the target section wrong had big costs, like giving away the missiles launch position, wasting a missile or missiles, exposing your tactics, intentions, and doctrine unnecessarily, and the biggest one of all killing the wrong people. In many cases people who were intending to be natural in the conflict but because of loss of life and property then become your enemies.
In gulf War One 25% of the Collation’s causalities were from friendly fire and that was close order land warfare not long range naval. Try to think less about the capacities of the weapons themselves but more upon the constraints, and challenges faced by the tactical commander. When you add all of the bad, incomplete, extraneous, and miss-information that any commander must wade through to come too his decision, his task is not easy. But that is not all; there are all kinds of deliberately planted deceptions that can confuse the situation even more. Making innocent targets look like real ones and real ones look innocent or to disappear completely.
This problem is much harder to solve than most would think from running their scripted training exercises. But the most important source of target identification has not even been talked about, the Mark one mod Zero eye-ball. The ocean full of shipsthat will have upon them many eyes, many of them friendly to one side or the other and some kind of radio and other communication devices capable of reporting warships positions. In the sneak attack game plan that is the hardest intelligence asset to counter and we havn't even talked about trailing submarines.
