Let me preface my post with saying the neither the TNI nor the SAF consider each other as a military threat.
Singapore and Indonesia should really communicate their intentions to each other well then. Right now the relationship between the two countries isn't as good as it could be. Not that it's bad, but there's plenty of areas where things could be improved.
The problem with that is that Singaporeans have heard the Indonesians clearly. Certain segments of Indonesian society and their body politic are saying that they can be as assh0lic as they like, consequences be dammed.
This Indonesian insistence on being A** of regional proportions has reduced the level of trust and willingness to work together - as Singapore faces a
toxic brand of Indonesian nationalism.
In October 2013, Indonesia conducted it's largest deployment of warplanes to Hang Nadim Airport in Batam during the Angkasa Yudha war games. It is noted that some Indonesian flights took off from Hang Nadim Airport to destination Natunas, while ignoring instructions from Changi air traffic control, whose job was to ensure safe flight separation between commercial traffic and Indonesian aircraft on exercise.
Further, on
28 Oct 2014, a C90GTi King Air owned by ST Aerospace and was operated by its pilot training subsidiary, Pacific Flight Services was intercepted by Indonesian fighter jets. It was flying from Sibu Airport in Sarawak to Seletar Airport in Singapore when it was intercepted by the Indonesian jets and ordered to land at the Supadio military airbase in Pontianak, Kalimantan. The TNI said the plane illegally flew into its airspace and the Singapore-registered plane was fined 60 million rupiah (S$6,300) before it was released - this level of stupidity will have long-term consequences (see this Nov 2014 blog post on '
Brisk RSAF air activity noted over Singapore' and this Feb 2014 Jakarta Globe article, titled
'End Indonesia’s Aimless Spat With Singapore').
Beyond this Oct 2014 freedom of navigation incident (it is important to note that the C90GTi King Air was not flying to Indonesia but through their air space and with a filed flight plan), in 2007 the Indonesian Navy enforced a sand embargo on Singapore theoretically on environmental grounds. But Indonesian lip service on concerns about the environment is bogus. This bogus concern for the environment is demonstrated in 1997, 1998 and again in June 2013, when Malaysians and Singaporeans were suffocated by the thick haze caused by forest fires from Indonesia. The recurring haze led to an agreement on trans-boundary haze pollution was approved by the ASEAN in 2002. However, Indonesia has shown no sign that it intends to ratify the agreement. As a compromise, in October 2013, ASEAN members agree to implement the Haze Monitoring System, which was paid for and developed by Singapore, and again provided free to Indonesia. It essentially uses satellite imagery to establish the areas where burning occurs and is dependent on Indonesian input to upload land concession maps. So you might say, that, Singaporeans suffer from a suffocating relationship with certain members of the Indonesian Government, which we have a privilege to pay for with our tax dollars.
its not a kumbayah relationship - but its not unfriendly or ineffective
The SAF and the TNI have been cultivating the relationship for decades and Singapore is in tune with Indonesian sensitivities.
Singapore like everyone else is communicating with regionals and quietly bonding.
Yup. ASEAN has to grow closer or grow irrelevant, which is entirely possible if the new Indonesian leadership continues to play the wrong chess moves.
everyone in the region has indicated to the US that they value their presence - ironic because the very thing china wanted to do was invoke a regional divide where countries would see the pacific and scs as "theirs", welcome china as a counterpoint and diminish US clout. The opposite has occurred - and the US hasn't needed to go to anyone - the region is lining up to co-operate or share capability with the US
Thanks to a memorandum of understanding (1990 MoU) signed by then US Vice-President Dan Quayle and then Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Tokyo on 13 November 1990, the US has had a presence in Singapore for the last 2 decades. The 1990 MoU permits the use of existing military facilities in Singapore by the US armed forces, calls for enhanced a bilateral relationship to facilitate joint training and interoperability, and enables the USN to remain forward-deployed in Southeast Asia in lieu of permanent bases in the region.
Since 1991, the US has maintained the US Air Force's (USAF's) 497th Combat Training Flight (497th CTF) at Singapore's Paya Lebar Airbase (PLAB) in eastern Singapore. It also relocated the USN's Logistics Western Pacific and Combined Task Force 73 (CTF 73) to the country's northern port facility of Sembawang Terminal just prior to the closure of Naval Base Subic Bay in 1992. The close relationship has also seen an amendment of the 1990 MoU to include the use of Singapore's Changi Naval Base (CNB). CNB was subsequently upgraded in March 2001 with a deep-draft pier that is capable of supporting USN aircraft carriers - entirely at Singapore's own expense. In July 20015, the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security (
2005 SFA) was signed between Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and President George W Bush. The 2005 SFA is a natural step in the expansion of bilateral ties between the US and Singapore. And Singapore is hosting USN''s littoral combat ships out of CNB.