High intensity forced entry by USMC?

[Waylander]

The discussion in the Burke/Zumwalt thread about naval gunfire support made me think about the USMCs focus on possible high intensity over the beach entries.
Right now the EFV is in development (and it looks a lot like the FCS Programme) which is meant to bring the Marines onto the beach from far out and with high speed.

Is this concept even sound. They want this concept in order to protect the landing ships which stay far away from the beach. But isn't an enemy which is sophisticated enough to deny the immediate sea around it's cost do USN capital ships also capable of eating the fancy new EFVs raw when they approach the surf?

I mean how big is the chance of an enemy being able to hold the USN at arms length but who is not able to punch an EFV/LCAC force to pulp when it approaches the beach.

Shouldn't the USMC try to focus on being able to bring troops ashore via vertical insertion while a classical AMTRAC together with a probably enlarged LCAC fleet brings the rest of an MEU onto the beach?

BTW, if an enemy is able to deny it's coast to the USN there would also be no NGFS...

 

[My2Cents]

Right now the EFV is in development (and it looks a lot like the FCS Programme) which is meant to bring the Marines onto the beach from far out and with high speed.

Is this concept even sound. They want this concept in order to protect the landing ships which stay far away from the beach. But isn't an enemy which is sophisticated enough to deny the immediate sea around it's cost do USN capital ships also capable of eating the fancy new EFVs raw when they approach the surf?

I mean how big is the chance of an enemy being able to hold the USN at arms length but who is not able to punch an EFV/LCAC force to pulp when it approaches the beach.

Fairly good, IF you already have the defending in place when the Marines start for the beach. This is only possible if there are only a few places where the Marines can land and a large armored force or quantity of fixed defenses (think Normandy) on the defenders side. Deploying a reserve force after the Marines have started their run into the beach is not practical, there is not enough time because of the EFV’s speed (about 30 minutes from the horizon to the beach), and one of the uses of NGFS is to suppress the enemy’s ability to redeploy his forces.

Shouldn't the USMC try to focus on being able to bring troops ashore via vertical insertion while a classical AMTRAC together with a probably enlarged LCAC fleet brings the rest of an MEU onto the beach?

BTW, if an enemy is able to deny it's coast to the USN there would also be no NGFS...

The Marine Corp is trying to maintain as many avenues of attack as possible to force the enemy to spread his forces thin. However, it is likely that this ability will go unused for the most part except as a feint, like they were used in Desert Storm, unless attacking an island or penisula.

The Marines already have a significant vertical insertion capability, and probably favor it for the opening attack, in order to take the beach defenders from the rear. The concept then is that EFVs will land and spread quickly inland to create a perimeter large enough to keep the enemy beyond observation range (and if possible beyond artillery range) so that he cannot target the vessels bringing in of additional forces (LCAC). Airborne forces lack the ground mobility to perform this task.

 

[Feanor]

Well to answer that question we'd have to look at what it takes to keep the USN out. Large numbers of coastal ASM batteries? Major maritime strike capabilities?

 

[Waylander]

@My2Cent
I don't think that normandy style defensive positions are needed. Modern ATGMs alone could wreck alot havoc among the EFVs. And I assume that any opponent which is able to force the USN behind the Horizon would also be able to deploy shitloads of ATGM teams in concealed fire positions on the suitable beaches.

I am also aware what the current vertical and over the beach capabilities of the USMC are.

I have a problem with the conflict within the proposed use of the EFV. That is that apparently the USN assumes that there might be opponents which are able to force the USN behind the horizon.
And their answer to this is sending in a bunch of, albeit fast, but vulnerable amphibious APCs and helicopters on a mission profile which is among the most dangerous one can think of (amphibious assault and air assault onto an unsecured beach/landing zone).

The weird thing is that the USMC seems to think that an enemy might be clever and powerfull enough to threaten the invasion fleet but will somehow be unable to inflict heavy casualties onto the mentioned amphibious and airmobile invasion forces.

 

[rip]

Well to answer that question we'd have to look at what it takes to keep the USN out. Large numbers of coastal ASM batteries? Major maritime strike capabilities?

There is another factor that needs to be considered. If you go through the long process of establishing complete and total air and shore sea control before establishing a physical beach head, you give the adversary far too much time to organize their ground defenses. That makes it much harder on the Marines at the beginning when they are at their weakest. The best approach, if the adversary dose not already knows where you are going to strike before hand, is to establish just enough air and sea control to insure that a beach head can be securely established and then quickly and then heavily reinforced it.

Every helicopter assault against a prepared position, that has no ground support already established first for safe landing has been very costly and should be avoided where ever possible. Keeping the ships farther out to sea leaving in doubt the exact point of attack unknown to the adversar, and then establishing a beach head/ landing zone, for fast reinforcement and supply with fast attack units like EFV’s is better.
Doing a vertical envelopment maneuver (the hammer) without an already established blocking unit with a secure perimeter (the anvil) is just foolish if you are attacking an organized adversary.

 

[Kilo 2-3]

Waylander, isn't the presence of a CBG, SSGNs, and/or USAF assets, etc. likely in any major USMC operation? It seems to me like there's likely be some form of pre-invasion "softening-up" attacks from one or more of these assets before launching a major amphibious and/or airmobile assault.

The F-35B's which will eventually be aboard LHAs/LHDs will probably help even more in the pre-invasion fires mission given their LO, greater range of weapons options, etc.

That said, we've learned some very hard lessons (PTO and ETO WWII) that even intense of naval and air bombardment is a guarantee that all enemy defenses will be destroyed.

On another note, is the EFV really that radical a shift in hardware and thinking? Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me like it the EFV is largely just a very,very capable AAV replacement, one with better protection, range, cross-country ability, etc.

 

[Feanor]

@My2Cent
I don't think that normandy style defensive positions are needed. Modern ATGMs alone could wreck alot havoc among the EFVs. And I assume that any opponent which is able to force the USN behind the Horizon would also be able to deploy shitloads of ATGM teams in concealed fire positions on the suitable beaches.

I am also aware what the current vertical and over the beach capabilities of the USMC are.

I have a problem with the conflict within the proposed use of the EFV. That is that apparently the USN assumes that there might be opponents which are able to force the USN behind the horizon.
And their answer to this is sending in a bunch of, albeit fast, but vulnerable amphibious APCs and helicopters on a mission profile which is among the most dangerous one can think of (amphibious assault and air assault onto an unsecured beach/landing zone).

The weird thing is that the USMC seems to think that an enemy might be clever and powerfull enough to threaten the invasion fleet but will somehow be unable to inflict heavy casualties onto the mentioned amphibious and airmobile invasion forces.

I agree with your criticism but don't see a solution. The enemies who have those kinds of resources can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and they also have the resources to prevent a vertical envelopment by contesting airspace, and saturating the coastline with tac-SAMs, SPAAGs, and MANPADS.

 

[My2Cents]

@My2Cent
I don't think that normandy style defensive positions are needed. Modern ATGMs alone could wreck alot havoc among the EFVs. And I assume that any opponent which is able to force the USN behind the Horizon would also be able to deploy shitloads of ATGM teams in concealed fire positions on the suitable beaches.

I have a problem with the conflict within the proposed use of the EFV. That is that apparently the USN assumes that there might be opponents which are able to force the USN behind the horizon.

And their answer to this is sending in a bunch of, albeit fast, but vulnerable amphibious APCs and helicopters on a mission profile which is among the most dangerous one can think of (amphibious assault and air assault onto an unsecured beach/landing zone).

The weird thing is that the USMC seems to think that an enemy might be clever and powerful enough to threaten the invasion fleet but will somehow be unable to inflict heavy casualties onto the mentioned amphibious and airmobile invasion forces.

The landing ships are high value targets, and can be attacked using long range anti-ship missiles. A single Wasp class LHD in assault configuration can have 42 helicopters, 40 EFVs, 3 LCAC, and 1900 troops, and 1100 crew. Sink, or even heavily damage, one before the landing force disembarks and the whole landing may have to abort. The vessels tasked to supply fire support will probably move in to shore with the assault forces. The USN is not so much “forced over the horizon” as certain high value targets are best kept out of harms way.

Much of the reason that the ships want to stay over the horizon is to maintain surprise, but before the EFV the landing vehicles were slower than the ships that carried them (generally less than 8 knots, but the AMTRAC was particularly slow at 6.5 knots) and up until the introduction of the AAV-7 lacked the capability to handle anything more than a light chop (particularly the AMTRAC). They were therefore incapable from being launched from the mother vessels more than a few miles from the landing point, which sacrificed the element of surprise and allows the enemy several hours to prepare and reposition his forces, and put a significant number of beaches out of reach due to extensive shoal waters.

As you say, the enemy would have to “be able to deploy shitloads of ATGM teams in concealed fire positions on the suitable beaches”. Most heavy ATGM launchers have a maximum range less than 4 miles, infantry portable ones less than 2 miles. The EFV can cover 4 miles in 5 minutes (whereas older landing vehicles took ½ hour or more) so the defenders will only have time for 2 to 4 shots per heavy launcher. Assuming 20 EFVs per mile, a 50% hit rate (EFVs due to low profile in the water and wave action are difficult targets), and 50% attrition needed to abort the landing, you would need at least 4 launchers per mile, probably 6 to 8 after allowing for loses due to a quick bombardment / airstrike. That is the equivalent of 2 companies of infantry per mile, or about 300 men + support. Or about 1 division of infantry per 20 miles of beach, which is a “shitload” of troops that cannot be used elsewhere, to stop a brigade that might never come.

And that assumes that the Marines do not hit the beach with ‘hot smoke’ to block visual and thermal observation just before they enter ATGM range, rendering the defensive ATGMs moot.

 

[My2Cents]

I agree with your criticism but don't see a solution. The enemies who have those kinds of resources can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and they also have the resources to prevent a vertical envelopment by contesting airspace, and saturating the coastline with tac-SAMs, SPAAGs, and MANPADS.

Actually, no one has the resources to saturate their coastline with defenses adequate to stop a landing along all suitable coastline. But the ones you are referring to have the resources to deny to best landing spots and maintain a sufficient reserve that can, if they can re-establish local air superiority, easily counter attack and eliminate the landing forces elsewhere before they can be reinforced with enough Army units to withstand it.

 

[F-15 Eagle]

I have a slightly off topic question but what happens if the EFV gets canceled?

There is a lot of news articles suggesting that the DoD may axe the program.

What will be the USMC's contingency plan if the EFV is canceled.

 

[Feanor]

Actually, no one has the resources to saturate their coastline with defenses adequate to stop a landing along all suitable coastline. But the ones you are referring to have the resources to deny to best landing spots and maintain a sufficient reserve that can, if they can re-establish local air superiority, easily counter attack and eliminate the landing forces elsewhere before they can be reinforced with enough Army units to withstand it.

But that's not even the point. Obviously you can't control all coastline. Ultimately you either know where the attack is or is likely, to come, and cover those locations, or you don't and then trying to protect the coastline is impossible to begin with. We're dealing with the scenario that the enemy does know where the landing is to occur, either because so few locations are suitable, or because he has decent intel. That's the scenario where a high-intensity forced entry would even matter. And in that scenario an opponent who has the resources to deal with EFVs, and push back the USN, also has the resources to at least contest the airspace, making vertical insertion problematic to say the least.

 

[rip]

But that's not even the point. Obviously you can't control all coastline. Ultimately you either know where the attack is or is likely, to come, and cover those locations, or you don't and then trying to protect the coastline is impossible to begin with. We're dealing with the scenario that the enemy does know where the landing is to occur, either because so few locations are suitable, or because he has decent intel. That's the scenario where a high-intensity forced entry would even matter. And in that scenario an opponent who has the resources to deal with EFVs, and push back the USN, also has the resources to at least contest the airspace, making vertical insertion problematic to say the least.

There is a need to define the different missions that we might want to perform before we can decide what is the best approach. There is the punitive strike, the more forceful gambit of hit and run, then there is search and destroy, and then there are the always popular police, humanitarian, and peace keeping rolls that these ships and men have been used for in the past. These amphibious assets are superbly qualified to perform all these tasks but as superb as they are when we employ them in those roles, they are not essential to perform them. In these roles other assets can be used though I admit they are less effective. That lack of the same effectiveness of other kinds of assets however dose not justify the high cost of our ships and men. The Amphibious ships we posses are built specifically to effetely mount a major land invasion (high intensity conflict as it was put at the begging of this thread). Because that is where real wars are finally won. So the most important capacity they must always have is the ability of performing a major sustained assault against a major land power that is both determined and capable of defending its self.

The idea that large amphibious assault is no longer a violable military operation due to the power of land based defensive weapons on the modern battlefield is a false one. It was supposedly dead, as a viable military tactic, after the World War One fiasco in the Dardanelles but the US Marines thought differently as they have hence proved they were right. Vertical assault is a powerful tool but it will never replace the necessity of holding an open port or some other high volume sea supply capable point so as to land large land armies and their heavy equipment for the purpose of bringing a war to a conclusion. If you do not have the capacity to bring a war to its final conclusion and if the enemy has no great concern about the harm that is caused to its civilian population, as many governments have proven in the past that they do not in fact do not care, what else can you do?

It has been many years since such an high intensity assault has been made by anyone and it may be many years before we see one again I hope but the capacity to go inland is where wars are finally won, is essentially an unchanged requirement. We will never see the high troop concentrations and packed formations of the past ether in attack or defense as we saw in WW2 because the destructiveness of modern weapons in use today, requires a far more spread out deployment of troops in all combat situations with in every battlefield. The single greatest weakness of the US Navy & Marine combat team at present is in ability to deploy large numbers of troops quickly and safely to defended objectives and then supply and reinforce them.

The ability to take large scale offensive actions against defended shoes targets regardless of the fate of the EFV is something that needs to be filled. There has to be. There are several approaches to the problem, massed fire power in the inshore environment (we don’t have and are at present not planning to develop), the use of vast numbers of troops (I don’t see that happening), the willingness to take high causalities (not on my watch), or even employing the much under used and underrated tactics of cover and deceptions, among others. When push comes to shove, I chose a balance of fire power, flexibility and above all high mobility. This combination has served the Marines well in the past and I see no reason why they will not continue to do so in the future.

 

[My2Cents]

But that's not even the point. Obviously you can't control all coastline. Ultimately you either know where the attack is or is likely, to come, and cover those locations, or you don't and then trying to protect the coastline is impossible to begin with. We're dealing with the scenario that the enemy does know where the landing is to occur, either because so few locations are suitable, or because he has decent intel. That's the scenario where a high-intensity forced entry would even matter. And in that scenario an opponent who has the resources to deal with EFVs, and push back the USN, also has the resources to at least contest the airspace, making vertical insertion problematic to say the least.

Those conditions have not been evident in previous posts, but your conclusions are obviously correct when the conditions are added.

Without at least strategic surprise no landing scenario against a defended beach is practical unless you have overwhelming force and a willingness to sustain heavy casualties. This has been a well known fact throughout recorded history.

 

[Feanor]

But then the opposite becomes true. Defending the coastline on a strategic level, unless we are talking about very small amounts of accessible coastline, is impossible.

 

[Waylander]

I don't oppose the general idea of being able to perform amphibious assaults against enemy coastlines.

What I oppose is the idea that in order to mitigate the threat for the assault ships and to be able to achieve some surprise one develops the EFV.
This vehicle is going to be so gold plated and expensive that the Marines will never get enough of them if they get it at all.

Why not design a new AAV which is less ambitious and save the money.
Heck, surprise on undefended beaches can be achieved by LCACs and helicopters. If you just buy some more LCACs and bring them along if the need ever arises might be much more usefull. And the vehicles a LCAC can bring to the beach are much more capable than an EFV ever will be.

 

[Feanor]

Well now we're dealing with cost issues. This is particular to the program in question rather then to the general principle of amphibious IFVs. So if the EFV was cheaper you wouldn't have much against it?

 

[Waylander]

I would still be sceptical about the rationality behind the idea that a sophisticated enemy who threatens a USN assault fleet can be countered by just staying behind the horizon and sending thin skinned APCs to the shore.

As soon as costs come into the equation the doubts I have are growing alot. Return on investment is important for any strategy. Even if the strategy itself may work it is severely hampered by the fact that it relies on equipment which is so expensive because of it's, maybe overambitious, requirements that the USMC won't get as many as it needs.

The capability to surprise an enemy by staying behind the horizon may be usefull only in very rare circumstances. Could this capability not be provided by LCACs?
I doubt they are more vulnerable than EFVs.

If the assault fleet stays behind the horizon because of the enemy ASuW threat than an EFV won't help them either.

 

[Feanor]

I think I've addressed the issue earlier though. If the enemy has a defense line that can not be suppressed to allow the USN close enough, then no landing is really possible. Be it helicopter borne or EFVs.

 

[rip]

I think I've addressed the issue earlier though. If the enemy has a defense line that can not be suppressed to allow the USN close enough, then no landing is really possible. Be it helicopter borne or EFVs.

It is easy to talk about saving money but in reality they will just spend it on something else less effective. The EFV may not be a supper weapon but it is key part of a comprehensive system, if you buy it, it will last us at least twenty-five years with reasonable upkeep and training costs. For a light tank 23 million a copy, if that price is true, is expensive I grant you, when the Abrams Main Battle Tank at 4.3 million and it is more powerful but if you cannot get to where you need to be, when you need to be there, it dose not matter how powerful or cheap an Abram is, it is useless
.
When you consider that a new JASSM AGM-158 (cheaper than what it replaces) costs $300,000 per unit, just to shoot one built. Is one EFV worth 75 shots of this weapon? Not counting the delivery platform it requires and the cost of servicing the stored AGM-158 rounds over their life time?

The Marine Core’s ethic is to hit fast, hit hard, and where it is least expected before the emery can effectively respond even when they are out numbered, which as it turns out they usually are. They are traditionally our shock troops after all. Shock troops are intended to break the defensive lines or to overcome the insurmountable barriers which other troops can then fully exploit. That is why the Marines stayed with the V-22 Osprey with all of its teething problems, are demanding the F-35B VTOL variant even though is the most expensive and least air capable of the three types that are being developed, and they want the EFV or something very much like it. Let’s hope they get it or something similar to it and even perhaps develop a full-up pure Tank variant as well
.
Just think what it would have meant if we had EFV to use within the Mekong delta back in Vietnam? All the VC’s river ambushes would have been far less effective and our combat sweeps far more effective. When we talk about the Navy and its blue water role, which I grant you must come first before any other concern, remember that most of the people and more impotently, the most economically productive people, in the world live by rivers, ports, and sea coasts. And people are what wars are all about.

 

[Feanor]

The EFV is projected to cost 23 million a piece? For a light armored vehicle? There's jetfighters to be had for less.....