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US nuclear technology to india, a threat to asian peace

This is a discussion on US nuclear technology to india, a threat to asian peace within the Missiles & WMDs forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; dear brother, pakistan already have more then 100 nuclear weapons. And with 30 minute preparation they are ready to fire. ...


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Old June 28th, 2006   #31
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dear brother, pakistan already have more then 100 nuclear weapons. And with 30 minute preparation they are ready to fire.
Nuclear weapons have nothing to do with civial nuclear technolghy
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Old June 28th, 2006   #32
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lets not travel down the rock throwing road - I don't want to close the thread unnecessarily.
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Old July 3rd, 2006   #33
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The US State Department said at Friday that they want quick approval of controversial nuclear deal with India but they show changes in the law may be takes effect.
This deal was also approved by Senate.

State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli said: "Obviously, it has to go through some more work"

Under this deal, the US will aid the development of civil nuclear technology in India in return for India placing some of its nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections.
http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publ...cle_006699.php
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Old July 7th, 2006   #34
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Nuclear Technology cooperation- the fourth dimension

Access to civilian nuclear technology implies more business for American firms, Russia helps India in either case so America's is trying tom move into Russia's strategic space with regard to weapons market/nuclaer market.

The deal implicitly acknoledges the legitimacy of carrying out nuclear trade with India, Russia has already shipped fuel for the Tarapur plant citing this deal to legitimize the transaction. Fuel/Any nuclear technology got from Russia need not be placed under sageguard!

Anyway Chinese nuclear technology to Pakistan is not much of a concern as they are not state of the art as is the case with Russian or American technologies besides a lot has happened illegally as well.
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Old July 8th, 2006   #35
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Originally Posted by divinewind
Nuclear Technology cooperation- the fourth dimension

Access to civilian nuclear technology implies more business for American firms, Russia helps India in either case so America's is trying tom move into Russia's strategic space with regard to weapons market/nuclaer market.

The deal implicitly acknoledges the legitimacy of carrying out nuclear trade with India, Russia has already shipped fuel for the Tarapur plant citing this deal to legitimize the transaction. Fuel/Any nuclear technology got from Russia need not be placed under sageguard!

Anyway Chinese nuclear technology to Pakistan is not much of a concern as they are not state of the art as is the case with Russian or American technologies besides a lot has happened illegally as well.
Russian supply of Nuclear fuel to Tarapur is under the NSG guidelines and is sunject to IAEA safeguard. Russia used a saftey clause within NSG guideline which permits fuel supply if safety of Nuclear plant is at stake. While Russia technically did not break the rule...they sure bent it to the maximum extent.
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Old July 17th, 2006   #36
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India's Clout in U.S. Congress Assisted by GE, Boeing, JPMorgan

Looks like Indians have atlast understood the art of doing business in The Hill and even on a shoestring Lobbying budget, made impressive gains.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?p...u38&refer=home


Even congressmen who voted against the deal were impressed by the lobbying.

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The lobbying was ``a very impressive organizational effort,'' says Representative Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican who voted against the measure because of concern it may erode limits on nuclear-weapons technology. ``The United States Congress wants to be more pro-India,'' says Leach, chairman of a House subcommittee that oversees U.S.-India relations.
Off course it helps to have a robust economy, which inturn wins you freinds in high places.

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Among executives writing to lawmakers was William Harrison, chairman of New York-based JPMorgan, the third-biggest U.S. bank, says Ron Somers, head of the Chamber's U.S-India Business Council. JPMorgan has more than 7,000 employees in India, spokesman Joe Evangelisti says.

Others writing letters on India's behalf include James McNerney, chief executive officer of Chicago-based Boeing Co. -- the world's second-largest maker of commercial jets -- and James Reinsch, president of Bechtel's nuclear-power division, officials of the two companies say.

AIG, Dow Chemical, Ford

The lobbying includes executives of GE, the world's second- biggest company by market value; New York-based American International Group Inc., the world's largest insurer; Ford; Midland, Michigan-based Dow Chemical Inc.; and Lockheed Martin Corp., Somers says. Company representatives have met weekly since late last year to devise lobbying strategies, he says.
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Old July 17th, 2006   #37
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Looks like Indians have atlast understood the art of doing business in The Hill and even on a shoestring Lobbying budget, made impressive gains.
Very much so, they have the big guns on their side but at the same time a long road ahead too, India spends ~$1.5 million lobbying, Israels spends ~$60 million, look at the results.
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Old July 20th, 2006   #38
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Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal -

Here is a research report by Ashley J. Tellis, which debunks Nuclear non-proliferation groups theory that India-US civilian nuclear pact will result in NewDelhi rapidly expanding its Nuclear arsenal. The author looks in to India's known Uranium reserves, its capacity to extract Plutonium from spent Uranium and how many bombs it can make (all this using only the known uranium reservers Indian has).

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To begin with, the study concludes that India is currently separating about 24-40 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually, far less than it has the capability to produce. This evidence, which suggests that the Government of India is in no hurry to build the biggest nuclear stockpile it could construct based on material factors alone, undermines the assumption that India wishes to build the biggest nuclear arsenal it possibly can.
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Further, India’s capacity to produce a huge nuclear arsenal is not affected by prospective U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation. A few facts underscore this conclusion clearly. India is widely acknowledged to possess reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). The forthcoming Carnegie study concludes that the total inventory of natural uranium required to sustain all the reactors associated with the current power program (both those operational and those under construction) and the weapons program over the entire notional lifetime of these plants runs into some 14,640-14,790 MTU—or, in other words, requirements that are well within even the most conservative valuations of India’s reasonably assured uranium reserves. If the eight reactors that India has retained outside of safeguards were to allocate 1/4 of their cores for the production of weapons-grade materials—the most realistic possibility for the technical reasons discussed at length in the forthcoming report—the total amount of natural uranium required to run these facilities for the remaining duration of their notional lives would be somewhere between 19,965-29,124 MTU. If this total is added to the entire natural uranium fuel load required to run India’s two research reactors dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium over their entire life cycle—some 938-1088 MTU—the total amount of natural uranium required by India’s dedicated weapons reactors and all its unsafeguarded PHWRs does not exceed 20,903-30,212 MTU over the remaining lifetime of these facilities. Operating India’s eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in this way would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135-13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023-2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal.
Here is the link to full report.

Ashley J. Tellis

Many congressmen have said that this report eventually convinced them to vote for the deal.

Any opinions? (Please no non-technical/political comments...we have seen plenty of them already).
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Old July 20th, 2006   #39
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Question Ashley Tellis

hmm, Ashley Tellis is very credible considering he is indian!!! he has been pushing for this deal since clinton was in office.


here is his bio....
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/exp...&expert_id=198
Education:
[B]B.A., M.A.; University of Bombay[/B]; M.A., Ph.D., The University of Chicago
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Old July 21st, 2006   #40
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Originally Posted by radiosilence
hmm, Ashley Tellis is very credible considering he is indian!!! he has been pushing for this deal since clinton was in office.


here is his bio....
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/exp...&expert_id=198
Education:
[B]B.A., M.A.; University of Bombay[/B]; M.A., Ph.D., The University of Chicago
This is precisely what I wanted to avoid. Instead of reading the full report and commenting on the technical aspects, now we are talking about ethnicity of Author. He is an American Citizen. Please confine your comments on the technical aspects of the report. . If you can not comprehend the technicality, then please do not comment.
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Old July 21st, 2006   #41
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Post indo-us nuclear deal

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2...us-india_x.htm

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration's plan to sell nuclear technology to India for the first time in three decades is under scrutiny from lawmakers on Capitol Hill and critics who say the deal will increase the risk that dangerous materials will spread.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is to testify today before both houses of Congress in support of the deal, finalized last month when President Bush was in New Delhi.

"The intention is to do due diligence, and there are a lot of questions members want answered," said Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., chairman of the House International Relations Committee.

Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar, R-Ind., suggested that Congress is in no hurry to move. "I believe that we have only scratched the surface of this intricate agreement and the national security questions it has raised," he said in a statement.

Rep. Tom Lantos of California, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, said the administration has not yet given Congress details of how it intends to cooperate with India's nuclear industry.

The administration is requesting an exception to a 1954 law that bans U.S. nuclear cooperation with any country that has not allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, to monitor all its nuclear facilities.

The Bush administration has portrayed the deal as a major breakthrough for U.S.-India relations and for global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. If Congress approves, the United States would end a three-decade embargo on selling nuclear technology to India. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 that it had developed under the guise of a civilian program. Under the U.S.-India agreement, India would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and let the IAEA inspect civilian sites.

"We are far better off working with the Indians and having the IAEA place safeguards on India's civil nuclear program than we are if India is isolated," Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the prime negotiator of the deal, said recently. Burns said the deal will cement a strategic relationship with the world's most populous democracy.

Critics say the agreement could encourage the spread of nuclear technology.

Seven proliferation experts led by Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, sent a letter Tuesday to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House foreign relations committees urging Congress not to approve the deal until the administration "has specified what further steps it is planning to take" to ensure that the agreement does not increase proliferation risks.

David Albright, a former IAEA inspector who now heads the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington think tank, said his institute has documented worrisome Indian practices. For more than 20 years, he said, a uranium enrichment plant outside Mysore, India, has placed ads in newspapers to buy sensitive nuclear technology. The content of the ads revealed sensitive information, Albright said. The plant and trading companies acting on its behalf have also failed to identify the end-user for such equipment, he said.perhaps some of these parts could have ended up in IRAN since the state department sanctioning their scientist for aiding IRAN

In 2004, the State Department sanctioned an Indian scientist, Y.S.R. Prasad, for aiding Iran's nuclear program. Prasad is a former head of India's Nuclear Power Corporation and an expert on the extraction of tritium from heavy-water reactors. Tritium is used to make small, compact nuclear warheads.

Prasad has denied giving Iran information about tritium, and the Indian government has asked that the State Department restrictions on U.S. dealings with the scientist be lifted, said Venu Rajamony, spokesman for the Indian Embassy.

Robert Joseph, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, minimizes the complaints. "Our assessment is that India has a good, solid record" of ensuring that its nuclear technology is secure, he said.

"india has a good solid record", someone forgot to mention to this guy that indian scientist are aiding iran nuclear program.
p.s you can read about what these non-indian experts are saying.

Last edited by radiosilence; July 22nd, 2006 at 11:25 AM.
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Old July 21st, 2006   #42
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Post Seventeen myths about the Indian nuclear deal

the wisconsin project is a repected organzition on wmd prolification!!
as far as prolification records goes india is not as solid as some thinks
....


http://www.wisconsinproject.org/coun...teen_Myths.htm

Seventeen myths about the Indian nuclear deal:
An analysis of nuclear cooperation with India


by Kelly Motz and Gary Milhollin
June 13, 2006



In 1974, when India conducted its first nuclear weapon test, no country was more surprised than the United States. The only nuclear explosive material India had on hand was plutonium, and the plutonium had been made in a Canadian-supplied reactor that India was running with sensitive “heavy water” imported from the United States. India had promised explicitly to restrict both the reactor and the heavy water to peaceful use. It was obvious, however, that India was running a secret bomb program under the guise of peaceful energy cooperation.

The United States reacted by passing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. It prohibited the sale of American reactors, or reactor fuel, or heavy water, or similar items to countries like India that rejected the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and refused to put all of their nuclear material under international inspection. The law embodied a policy of providing the strongest possible support to the treaty.

President George W. Bush has now asked Congress to reverse this policy, so that nuclear trade with India can recommence. If Congress agrees, it will have to change the law in order to exempt India from the criteria laid down in the 1978 act. The president will also have to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a consortium of countries that have banded together to restrict nuclear exports, to make an exception for India because India does not meet the Group’s export criteria either.

The president has taken this action after making a deal with India in July 2005. Under the deal, the United States would effectively endorse India’s nuclear weapon effort in exchange for benefits that have proved rather difficult to define. When the deal is examined, it is hard to see a real prize for the United States. Yet, the supporters of the deal have repeatedly put forth claims that greatly exaggerate the supposed benefits. The claims have been repeated so often as to take on the aura of myths. Virtually absent, however, has been any discussion of the attendant risks of reopening this trade. This report tries to give a more balanced view. For each of the administration’s claims, Congress is told the risks. The objective is to enable Congress to see more clearly what is at stake.


Myth #1: The deal will bring India into the "nonproliferation mainstream" and help stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Fact: The deal leaves India far outside the international effort to combat nuclear arms proliferation. India continues to oppose the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has pointedly refused to sign it. It has just as pointedly refused to limit its production of nuclear weapons, or to obligate itself not to test such weapons. It has also refused to stop making fissile material for such weapons. Nor has India joined Europe and the United States in condemning Iran’s enrichment of uranium. The deal does not change India's negative stance on any of these questions; instead, it legitimizes it.

Myth #2: India’s agreement to allow 14 of its 22 power reactors to be inspected is a “gain for nonproliferation.”

Fact: Inspecting these reactors will not limit India’s nuclear weapon production in any way. The other eight reactors, which will be barred from inspection, will make more plutonium for weapons than India will ever need. Thus, the offer to inspect the fourteen is merely symbolic. Among the eight reactors off limits to inspectors will be India’s fast breeder reactors, which will generate plutonium particularly suited to bomb-making. In addition, the inspections themselves will waste resources. The International Atomic Energy Agency has a limited number of inspectors and is already having trouble meeting its responsibilities. To send inspectors to India on a fool’s errand will mean that they won’t be going to places like Iran, where something may really be amiss. Unless the Agency’s budget is increased to meet the new burden in India, the inspections there will produce a net loss for the world’s non-proliferation effort.

Myth #3: India has made other new commitments that will help stop proliferation.

Fact: India made only one new promise under the deal, which is to adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. The protocol allows for more extensive inspections, but is irrelevant to India because the purpose is to unmask hidden nuclear weapon activities. India, however, has a known nuclear weapon program, so there is nothing to unmask. India’s other promises were either already required or reflected existing Indian policy. India’s promise to improve its export control laws was already required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540; India’s promise to “work toward” a cut off of fissile material production for weapons was made long before the deal; India’s decision to voluntarily refrain from testing also preceded the agreement; so did India’s decision not to export enrichment or reprocessing technology.

Myth #4: Nuclear cooperation will make India a reliable U.S. ally.

Fact: India's sovereign interests are likely to conflict with those of the United States. India, for example, cooperates militarily with Iran and has been training Iran's navy. India is dependent on Iranian oil, and is discussing a natural gas pipeline from Iran. Although India grudgingly voted for U.N. efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, Indian politicians have been careful to emphasize that India's friendship with Iran will continue. It is unrealistic to expect that India, the creator of the Non-Aligned Movement, will ever do America's bidding internationally.

Myth #5: The deal will build up India as a bulwark against China.

Fact: The notion that India might assist the United States diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict with China is unrealistic. This “counterweight” theory reminds one of the argument made by the first Bush administration in the 1980's, when it contended that the United States should export sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies had provided. History shows that such predictions can be dangerously wrong. India shares a border with China, is keen to have good relations with China, and does have good relations with China. The two countries have just signed a new memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. India will not sour such relations simply from a vague desire to please the United States.

Myth #6: India’s strategic position entitles it to unique treatment.

Fact: Of the three countries that have refused to sign the NPT – India, Israel and Pakistan – India is the least important strategically to the United States. Pakistan is essential to ongoing U.S. military and political efforts in Afghanistan and to the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda. Pakistan is also a leading power in the Muslim world, a world with which the United States needs better relations. Israel has always been a close U.S. ally, and is located in a region of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy interests. In any competition for strategic favor from the United States, India finishes a distant third.

Myth #7: It is possible to loosen export controls for India without doing the same for Iran and other countries pursuing the bomb.

Fact: Weakening export controls for India will automatically weaken them for Iran, Pakistan, and even terrorist groups who might want to buy the means to make mass destruction weapons. Export controls today depend on groups of supplier countries that have agreed among themselves not to export dangerous technologies. The principle is mutual restraint. If, however, the United States drops export controls to help its friend India, Russia will drop controls to help its friend Iran, and China will drop controls to help its friend Pakistan. That is the way international controls work. India, like Iran, has decided to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful nuclear cooperation. From this standpoint, the two countries are indistinguishable. It will be impossible to convince Russia to refrain from supplying Iran, or China from supplying Pakistan, with the same technologies that the United States wants to sell India. U.S. legitimization of India’s nuclear weapon program will also make it harder to convince Russia and China to brand Iran as an outlaw in the U.N. Security Council.

Myth #8: U.S. nuclear exports will not help India make bombs.

Fact: Such exports will help India make bombs. India now needs more uranium than it can produce. This means that India must choose between using its own uranium to make nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Allowing India to fuel its power reactors with imported uranium will free India’s domestic production for reactors that make bombs, thus increasing India’s nuclear arsenal. In addition, without being able to inspect all of India's reactors, it will be impossible to tell whether a U.S. export supposedly intended for peaceful purposes has been diverted to bomb making. Nuclear exports are inherently capable of military as well as civilian applications.

Myth #9: Peaceful space cooperation will not help India's nuclear missile program.

Fact: The administration’s plan to help India develop its space launch capability will at the same time help it build long-range strategic missiles. In fact, this is already happening. As part of the Strategic Partnership umbrella announced with India, the U.S. Commerce Department has already removed export restrictions on three subsidiaries of the Indian Space Research Organization, which are all active in Indian missile development. India, indeed, is the first country to develop a long-range nuclear missile from a civilian space launch program.

Myth #10: India has an exemplary nonproliferation record and is a reliable trading partner.

Fact: India has a long record of developing both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles under the guise of peaceful nuclear and space cooperation. India tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974 by diverting plutonium made with nuclear imports from the United States and Canada that were supplied for peaceful purposes. In the 1980's, India had a deliberate policy of defeating international controls by smuggling heavy water from the USSR, China and Norway, which allowed India to use its reactors to make plutonium for bombs. In a similar fashion, India built its largest nuclear-capable missile, the Agni, by importing from NASA the design of an American space launcher, again for ostensibly peaceful purposes. Even today, Indian missile and nuclear sites continue to import sensitive American equipment in violation of U.S. law.

Myth #11: India needs more nuclear power to assure its energy future.

Fact: Nuclear power has been virtually insignificant in India’s energy mix in the past, and will be no more important in the future. India has been generating electricity with nuclear reactors for more than 40 years. Yet, reactors supply only 2% to 3% of its electricity today. India has not built more reactors because they have not turned out to be as safe, or as clean, or – most important – as economical as originally thought. Even if India were to achieve a 50% increase in nuclear power generation (which is unlikely) such a step would only increase India’s overall electricity output by one percent at most, and would only increase India’s overall energy output by a fraction of one percent. That is not a significant increase in the energy available to India and would not decrease India’s demand for oil and gas.

Myth #12: The deal will result in more U.S. reactor sales.

Fact: It is unlikely that the United States will receive reactor orders from India. India is building a string of domestic reactors that are cheaper to construct than American imports would be, and there are easier places to buy imported reactors. Russia already has a foothold in India's reactor market, and will charge less money and attach fewer conditions than will U.S. sellers. France and Canada will also enter the competition. The chance that the United States will defeat these competitors is slim. The precedent is the U.S. experience with China in the 1980's. At the time when U.S. nuclear cooperation with China was being debated, American vendors were citing the large number of reactors that China would probably buy from the United States. After the deal was signed, China bought exactly no American reactors. Instead, the U.S. agreement increased the competition and drove down the price for the Chinese buyers. That was good for China, but did nothing for the United States. The same is likely to happen with India.

Myth #13: The deal is needed to build better relations with India.

Fact: There are better ways to improve relations with India than engaging in nuclear trade. The United States can help India generate electricity without expanding India's wasteful and inefficient nuclear infrastructure, which also makes bombs. Supporting India’s reactors only reinforces the perceived prestige of nuclear technology for developing countries, a notion that the United States is trying to discourage. The United States can also support India's space effort without boosting India’s missile work. The United States could offer to launch Indian satellites and to share satellite observation data with India analysts. The reality is that trade, military cooperation, scientific exchange and political consultation can all grow vigorously without a nuclear deal.

Myth #14: The deal is not primarily about making money; it is about creating a new U.S. strategic relationship in south Asia.

Fact: The deal is primarily about making money. The main effect of the deal will be to pardon India – to remove it as a violator of international norms. After such a change in status, there will be no impediment to U.S. arms sales. This is where the real money is, not in nuclear reactors. U.S. exporters have mentioned selling as much as $1.4 billion worth of Boeing airliners, hundreds of F-16 or F/A-18 fighter jets, as well as maritime surveillance planes, advanced radar, helicopters, missile defense and other equipment. The Russian press has even complained that the nuclear deal is a ploy to squeeze Russia out of the Indian arms market.

Myth #15: The deal is consistent with U.S. efforts to fight terrorism.

Fact: The deal undermines America’s ability to fight terrorism. By favoring India over Pakistan, the deal undercuts the Pakistani government's position at home. At best, the deal is a blow to General Musharraf’s prestige, and at worst a public humiliation. Without the aid of General Musharraf, the United States will have a much harder time accomplishing its goals in Afghanistan and succeeding in its efforts to defeat al Qaeda. There is no benefit to U.S. security coming from India under the deal that will offset these disadvantages.

Myth #16: This is a “good deal for the United States.”

Fact: India has received a giant benefit – the American seal of approval for India’s nuclear weapon program – in exchange for virtually nothing. There is not a single “trophy” in the deal – nothing the United States can credibly hang on the wall as an achievement. The deal does not improve India’s proliferation status, or limit its bomb-making potential, or make it a reliable ally, or make it a regional counterweight, or guarantee a reactor sale. For the United States there are mainly costs and few or no advantages.

Myth #17: Congress needs to act now so that the deal can move forward.

Fact: Congress need take no action until a formal agreement for nuclear cooperation has been negotiated with India, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency has agreed with India upon suitable inspection arrangements, and until the Nuclear Suppliers Group – the consortium of countries that supply nuclear technology – has decided whether to change its rules to accommodate the deal. The best, and in fact the only, way for Congress to learn the details of what India will actually do, or promise to do, under the deal is to wait until all these steps are taken. Once an agreement is made and presented for consideration, Congress can add any conditions that seem warranted. Congress has never approved an agreement for cooperation without seeing the actual agreement. There is no reason to start now
.

Last edited by radiosilence; July 21st, 2006 at 10:56 AM.
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Old July 21st, 2006   #43
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My post relates only to myth 7...india does not need Uranium from any one to make her bombs and this deal will not in any way boost Indias capability to produce bombs. Please Please read the report.... on the otherhand don't bother...
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Old July 21st, 2006   #44
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again your source is not credible. Ashley Tellis was born and raised in india. He has been pushing for this deal for at least 6 years now. he is one of the biggest chearleaders of this deal. since you are only speaking about myth 7, i wonder whats your spin oopps i mean your take on the other 16 myths?

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Old July 24th, 2006   #45
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Myth #5: The deal will build up India as a bulwark against China.

Fact: The notion that India might assist the United States diplomatically or militarily in some future conflict with China is unrealistic. This “counterweight” theory reminds one of the argument made by the first Bush administration in the 1980's, when it contended that the United States should export sensitive dual-use equipment to Saddam Hussein in order to build up Iraq as a counterweight to Iran. U.S. pilots were later killed in Iraq trying to bomb things that U.S. companies had provided. History shows that such predictions can be dangerously wrong. India shares a border with China, is keen to have good relations with China, and does have good relations with China. The two countries have just signed a new memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. India will not sour such relations simply from a vague desire to please the United States.
I don't know if the US is seeking for India to be a "bulwark" against China, but it would certainly make sense.

This would mean that the US is balancing out the growing military and economic power of China and thus the primary intent is not to get Indian support in case of a Sino-US conflict. The role of India would be as a "power in being" and as an alternative for investment.

In this way, the provided Iraq example is IMHV unapplicable and either rather naïve or a strawman. Unless US expects to have a war with India...

India and China are at the heart of it, strategic competitors and though there is cooperation at different levels, it doesn't remove this fundamental antagonism.
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