Re Kh-31's purchased by the USN for supersonic testing:
Janes Defense Weekly 14 October 1998
Defense contractor McDonnell Douglas wrote a 1995 document, titled "MA-31 Foreign Technology Comparison Test (FCT) Program Review Highlights," for the U.S. Navy. (doc is/was unavailable to the public)
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Russia has decided to sell its most sophisticated cruise missile to China. Moscow's decision to sell the Kh-31, NATO code-named AS-17 Krypton, missile was reported in the Washington Times as part of a secret multibillion-dollar package of arms destined for Beijing.
However, what has not been reported is the fact that Moscow could not sell the Krypton if it were not for Bill Clinton and Al Gore. During the 1990s, the Clinton administration made direct payments to Russia for the Krypton missile program and provided direct assistance to Russian engineers developing the weapon for sale.
In 1995, Vice President Al Gore traveled to Moscow and cut a secret deal with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. According to Gore, Russia agreed not to export advanced weapons in exchange for U.S. assistance.
In 1995, Russian missile maker Zvezda-Strela was on the verge of collapse. The Russian weapons company could not sell its missiles to the bankrupt ex-Soviet military, and many of its newest weapons were not ready to be exported. One such untested weapon was the Zvezda Kh-31 Krypton.
In 1995, the U.S. Navy needed a special missile target supersonic drone. The drone would replicate the anticipated threat of ex-Soviet missiles entering the international market, such as the massive SS-N-22 Sunburn missile purchased by China.
The Clinton administration found a solution that it thought would kill two birds with one stone, turning to Russia for the Navy supersonic drone program and as a way to assist the Russian weapons maker Zvezda in finding peaceful markets for its lethal products.
Krypton for the U.S. Navy
In 1997 the U.S. Navy test-fired four kerosene ramjet-powered Krypton missiles with a blistering Mach 2.7 performance at 30 feet over the sea. Three of the Krypton missiles were test-fired to verify performance – which according to the manufacturer was over 1,700 miles an hour at sea level and over Mach 3.5 at altitude.
The fourth Krypton was flown in a live-fire exercise in which the Navy was reportedly unable to shoot it down. The Clinton administration decided to purchase more of the missiles from the Russian Zvezda-Strela missile design bureau.
Boeing spokesman Bob Alarotti confirmed the U.S. Navy deal with Boeing and Russian contractor Zvezda to supply MA-31 target missiles.
"We have an active contract with the Navy to supply MA-31 targets from Russia," stated Alarotti. "There have been a whole series of tests done against the MA-31 missile since the mid-1990s."
The target drone version, called the MA-31, is derived from the Russian ramjet-powered Kh-31 cruise missile. Normally the MiG-29 Fulcrum, or Su-30 Flanker strike-fighter carries the Kh-31.
Payments to Russian Generals
The project to help Zvezda stay in business was off to a blistering start. However, the payments to Russia raised many questions.
According to Jane’s Defense, each U.S purchase also included a 28 percent "fee" given directly to Russian generals. Navy documents show that each MA-31 missile costs $910,000. The extremely high price for the MA-31 is almost twice the price of U.S. weapons. In addition, the 28 percent fee amounts to over a quarter-million dollars per missile paid directly to the Russian generals.
Under pressure from a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request, U.S. Navy managers denied any knowledge of allegations of corruption regarding kickbacks in the payments for the Russian missiles.
"We send the money to the Russians," stated Mr. G. Hotze, the official Navy spokesman for the project. "What they do with it is their business."
Yet the MA-31 could not replicate the actual threat from the Russian Sunburn cruise missile. Documents from the U.S. Navy, obtained by using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), show that the missile did not meet the original range requirements.
According to the U.S. Navy "Foreign Comparative Testing Contract" published in 1995, the Russian MA-31 "will be capable of meeting the following range requirements ... 25 nmi (nautical miles) at an altitude of 30 ft and at full throttle."
The Zvezda Krypton has a very limited range while flying at low altitude. According to official U.S. Navy statements, the MA-31 missile can fly "only 16 miles on the deck" and cannot duplicate the required performance of over 50 miles at low level.
U.S. Improves Russian Missile
Thus, in order to meet the U.S. Navy contract requirements, the Clinton administration decided to work with the Russian missile maker in jointly developing "pre-planned product improvements (P3I)" for the Krypton missile.
Declassified documents show that U.S. defense contractor McDonnell Douglas, now part of the Boeing Corporation, gave improvements for the Krypton missile to Russia in 1995 and 1996. The documents were obtained from the Clinton administration using the Freedom of Information Act.
The improvements to the Russian Krypton, including design and fuel changes for "extended range," were given directly to the Russian missile contractor as part of an effort to win the supersonic target contract from the U.S. Navy.
According to the U.S. Navy documentation, the American program to improve the Russian Krypton missile was intended to provide the U.S. Navy with a supersonic target drone.
Defense contractor McDonnell Douglas wrote one 1995 document, titled "MA-31 Foreign Technology Comparison Test (FCT) Program Review Highlights," for the U.S. Navy.
"The MA-31 target will need (pre-planned product improvements) P3I in order to meet the range and ground/surface launch requirements for the Supersonic Sea Skimming Target program (SSST). The range of the MA-31 target in its FCT configuration is approximately 15 nm (nautical miles) at low altitude," states the review document.
According to the 1995 McDonnell Douglas review, one "extended range option" given to the Russian contractor "adds an auxiliary fuel tank, a reduced drag nose cone, changes the fuel to JP-10 (which has a higher specific energy content than the Russian fuel), and modifies the ramjet nozzle. The extended range modification is intended to increase range to approximately 42 nm (nautical miles) at 10m (meter) altitude."
Another more crucial design improvement given to Russia involved "Ground Jettison Testing" done by the U.S. defense contractor against the Russian missile. According to the 1995 program review document, the Russian-built AKY-58M missile launcher for the MA-31 was fatally flawed and could destroy the firing plane.
"Two jettisons were planned; four completed," states the 1995 review document. "An anomaly was encountered during testing of the emergency jettison sequence. The lanyard which, during normal launch, remains with the launch rail and pulls the Booster Safe/Arm Plug which arms the booster for ignition, is supposed to remain with the target during Emergency Jettison. In three emergency jettison tests, the lanyard stayed with the launch rail instead of with the target. In all cases the booster would have been armed, and ignition could have occurred for any of several reasons."
"(McDonnell Douglas) MDAC has determined that use of a longer lanyard and slower separation velocity would allow proper operation of the emergency jettison sequence. The problem has been turned over to the Russians for resolution," states the 1995 review document.
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Newsmax also ran their own investigation using Freedom of Information requests while Clinton was in power.
Finally this is an excerpt on the Russian view of the programme.
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Apart from such "traditional" customers, Zvezda-Strela also had some dealings with the US government. In the mid-to-late 1990s Zvezda-Strela took part in an abortive cooperative venture with McDonnell-Douglas (later Boeing) to produce a supersonic cruise missile target for the US Navy. After an attempt to procure 3M80 Moskit [SS-N-21 "Sunburn"] missiles from NPO Raduga failed due to Russian insistence that missiles could be sold only as part of a deal also involving Sovremennyy-class destroyers, attention turned to Zvezda-Strela's Kh-31 missile which, although much smaller than the Moskit, could replicate the Moskit's speed and low trajectory.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) export control commission permitted Zvezda-Strela to participate in the US Navy competition, and in 1997 the Kh-31 variant MA-31 was declared the winner of the competition, in which four Kh-31 missiles were test-fired at the Point Mugu Naval Air Station in California.
The Russian missile's victory led to some criticism of the deal on the grounds that the US government was subsidizing the Russian defense industry. Additional complications were caused by the US desire to extend the range of the missile, which required additional development work.[9] In spite of these complications, the first batch of four missiles that was used up in the testing was followed by a second batch of nine, and Boeing wanted to sign a third, longer-term contract to procure MA-31s in October 1998. Under that contract Boeing would purchase 20-50 missiles a year for five years.
Final conversion work, which included installing telemetry and other specialized apparatus, would be done at the Boeing facility in St. Louis.[10] Zvezda-Strela's general director claimed that it could deliver up to 65 Kh-31 missiles per year, if required.[11] The long-term contract never materialized, however. In November 1998 the MOD blocked the deal, after Boeing and Zvezda-Strela reportedly reached a preliminary agreement on supplying 20-30 missiles per year over 10 years, and in spite of the fact that the Kh-31 belonged to "list no. 1," which included military equipment authorized for export, approved by a presidential edict.
According to the official MOD position, the military was not against continuing the contract if Boeing were willing to procure a large quantity of missiles, no fewer than 100, in a single batch. The first two small batches, according to the MOD, were not blocked so that Rosvooruzheniye, which was an intermediary in this deal, would not be forced to pay a penalty for breaking the contract.[12] The Zvezda-Strela leadership opposed the MOD decision to cancel the contract. According to Sergey Yakovlev, since 13 missiles have already been sold, the US government had a sufficient amount of missiles to study and copy their technology. Selling additional batches of missiles would not have made the danger of technology leakage greater. Moreover, the Kh-31A is also used by China, and the MOD had no objections to that sale.
Finally, Zvezda-Strela argued that missiles supplied to the US did not have the guidance mechanism or warhead, and had a differently shaped nosecone, with different aerodynamic properties, further reducing the danger of technology leakage. Zvezda-Strela also complained that the Russian military has not financed the enterprise, and that it has already faced the danger of bankruptcy twice. It has been forced to finance the development of new missile types out of its own resources.[8] Moreover, the contract specified that Boeing was forbidden from perfecting or copying the missiles, or using them for any other purposes than as target missiles.[13]
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