Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia

The Watcher

New Member
last time i checked turkey and iran had good relations but turkeys special place with western nations and its possible entry to EU could cause some rifts! iran and saudis do have trouble getting along. iran having nukes could give the kingdom another reason to acquire nuclear weapons.

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Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia
Drafted By: Jonathan Feiser
http://www.pinr.com


On January 1, 2005, Iran at last codified that the Islamic republic will be holding presidential elections this summer. One of the major policy issues that will be affected by this election will be Iran's potential development and acquisition of nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran -- regardless of its intention -- remains a clear and intrinsic threat both to the United States and its regional interests and allies.

If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, then, from a strategic standpoint, a "best case" scenario for U.S. interests would be an Iran that retains a defensive stance and does not seek to expand its influence in the region. That being said, even defensive tactics can be affected in a world where states possess variable and often wildly differing notions of national security interests. Because of this, Washington is working to take preventive measures to slow Iran's quest for power. For instance, one preventive measure taken by the United States to slow Iran's growth -- and a measure that has been in place for years -- is U.S. economic sanctions.

Washington's sanctions policy has not been entirely effective. Iran's economic sectors remain heavily reliant upon its energy resources. While its energy industry is ineffectually managed due to haphazard state control, questionable oversight procedures, as well as murky forms of regulation, these inadequacies and potential liabilities make little difference to thirsty states such as China and India that have a growing demand for energy resources.

Because of this, Tehran is able to compensate for U.S. economic sanctions through its growing relations with China and India. Further, in the case of China, it is not in Beijing's present interests to see Iran weakened and for the U.S. to be strengthened, since increased U.S. influence in the Middle East and Central Asia is looked upon by Chinese policymakers as a threat to China's growth as a regional power. These geopolitical interests are intrinsically linked to pipelines and other infrastructure investments through Central Asia that have everything to do with China's and India's interests in Iran.

In sum, the Iranian leadership recognizes the energy demand realities that limit the consequences of U.S. economic sanctions. Therefore, Tehran's long term solution is found within the rudimental calculus of supply-and-demand: regardless of U.S. sanctions, countries experiencing high growth rates and/or rapid industrialization (China and India) or countries that have large populations with no indigenous hydrocarbon resources (Western Europe) will trade with Iran, regardless of the ongoing "war on terrorism." In addition, the current insurgency in Iraq, along with the consistent insurgent tactic of targeting oil pipelines there, has an impact on the markets and will continue to place countries such as Iran -- regardless of the regime's nature or ideological affiliation -- on the VIP list of oil and gas dealers.
Two regional U.S. allies that are affected by Iran's upcoming elections, and its suspected drive towards nuclear weapons, are Turkey and Saudi Arabia. On paper, both are allies of the United States, and depending on the terrorist caught in their respective spheres of influence, ardent advocates of the "war on terrorism."

Turkey's Reaction to a Nuclear Iran

Turkey's reaction to a nuclear-armed Iran is a complicated one at best. Turkey had spent its Cold War years under the nuclear umbrella afforded by the United States. For Ankara, N.A.T.O. has become more of a symptom of the past than a solution to the future, and Turkey's geopolitical and strategic situation vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran capitalizes on this new landscape.

In the face of a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey will not likely seek out nuclear programs of its own because, at least for now, it is perceived and perceives that it is not the reason Iran has sought to "nuclearize" in the first place. However, Turkey's relations with Europe -- primarily through the auspices of its long-awaited entrance talks with the E.U. -- will affect its policies towards Iran. The closer that it sticks to E.U. policy, the better position it will find itself in the Union -- either as an equal or shackled with new "requirements" that would taint its relationship as something similar to "separate but equal."

This is where diplomatic decisions have strategic consequences. Turkey's policy opportunities after the Soviet Union lost control of Central Asia remain dependent on the Western states such as Europe and the United States for acceptance while simultaneously maintaining an easterly eye toward the predominantly Turkic Central Asia republics as hopeful horizons of uncertain opportunity. As events on the ground begin to unfold both before and after the Iranian elections this June and the reality of a nuclear-armed Iran becomes undeniably clear, Turkish policy toward Iran will become a matter of reaction rather than one containing a slew of policy options. In this context, Turkey's value as a member of N.A.T.O. as well as its present efforts to join the E.U. will both become critical variables vis-à-vis a nuclear Iran "facing off" against a U.S. and European regional security consensus. Thus, Turkey's goal of entering the European Union will not merely rely on a series of economic and humanitarian overtures of submission, but also be based upon what it chooses to do in response to a nuclear Iran.

The success of Turkey's venture to enter the E.U., while balancing the security and military concerns of American, Israeli, and European allies, remains concurrent with its strategic disposition in regards to a nuclear Iran. Ultimately, the economic components of Turkish efforts toward membership in the E.U. -- and the reaction of its outcome -- will also be based on what Turkey will do in the face of an Iran with nuclear weapons and the delivery systems to match.

Lastly, Turkey's internal political dimensions are important to take into account when considering the nuclearization of Iran. The primary Turkish issue of conflict reflects a specific fault line evident within Turkish society as well: the E.U. promise. Although the Turkish National Security Council (T.N.S.C.) has kowtowed to the theory of civilian leadership -- a precondition for entrance to the E.U. -- the essence of Turkish nationalism lies not far below the surface. Attached to this powerful notion of Turkish nationalism is the Turkish military command structure and their Ataturk-based mandate of guardians of a secularized Turkey.

The rise of a nuclear Iran would, in the worse case, spark an internal strife between the T.N.S.C. and the reform-minded and Islamist-tilted Justice and Development Party. In spite of Islamic innovations within its platform, the Justice and Development Party has worked diligently to secure the hope of integration into the European Union.

In direct -- yet quiet -- contestation to this, the T.N.S.C. has condemned these reforms as a compromise tantamount to "selling out" the Ataturk legacy. Thus, where the Turkish military leadership would seek to meet Iran with resistance, it would be highly probable that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's party would find themselves restraining a highly nationalistic Turkish military while seeking to convince the Europeans that Turkey is yielding to a more relaxed approach.

The dangers of this dilemma, if it would occur, would be quite serious. Turkey is still emerging from the Cold War as a regional power. Indeed, its foreign policy has sought to balance investment within Central Asia while balancing its security concerns with the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Konga-Gel at home. The rise of a nuclear Iran would re-wire already high tension between the Kurds and Turkey over Turkish fear of Kurdish power in northern Iraq.

Saudi Arabia's Reaction to a Nuclear Iran

It would also be unlikely that Saudi Arabia would nuclearize in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran, certainly not because of economic factors, but rather because of potential political problems (although cost would nonetheless remain a very real deliberating factor). Like Turkey, there remain other factors that do, and would continue to, motivate Riyadh to revert to more stringent, internal security policies versus attempting to galvanize any tilt toward strategic or medium range nuclear technology.

Because Saudi Arabia would likely not seek to build or establish nuclear technologies, alternate means could be considered to secure a similar strategic end. More specifically, in regards to weapons of mass destruction, the monarchy could seek to increase clandestinely its chemical weapons as a parallel deterrent. At present, the current ruling regime still has much to prove to its citizenry how it can reform without breaking the perceived interpretations of Islamic law. A nuclear Iran ten or fifteen years ago would have been a significant threat to Saudi Arabia; today, however, it would likely cause only a moderate change to the power equation. Nonetheless, such change would greatly benefit the Iranians with an advantage in current bargaining issues -- i.e. the treatment of Shi'a within Saudi Arabia -- regardless of U.S. sanctions or rhetoric.
The closet analogy to the U.S.-Saudi relationship in regards to a nuclear Iran exists more on political and economic paradigms than on a reattribution of a de facto Cold War scenario. In the modern sense, no one appears to be pulling Iran's strings on the drive or meaning behind its nuclear project. Indeed, the vision herein is inherently based on internal and historical factors that have fused themselves into the perceived national security agenda of an Iran that feels seriously threatened by a continued perception of U.S. military encirclement, in addition to Israel's foreign policy strategy of preventing an Arab or Persian regional hegemon.

In this same strategic conception of U.S. regional interests, Saudi Arabia owns a significant amount of energy resources that defines a large part of the industrial dependency of the United States. Since the virtual extinction of known U.S. hydrocarbon resources in the 19th century, Saudi Arabia in the post 9-11 world continues to maintain a role that would be deemed somewhere along the line of "supportive ally in the global war on terrorism" while utilizing this relationship to do as little as possible -- all with the intended goal of maintaining power in certain hands while balancing the internal power of the Wahhabist clergy. A nuclear Iran would not change this realpolitik balance unless it became quite apparent that the United States intended actually to invade Iran.

Reacting to an Aggressive and Nuclear-Armed Iran

Both the Saudi monarchy and the Turkish republic would face a precarious dilemma in the face of a nuclear Iran arm-twisting for conciliatory benefits. In such an event, Saudi Arabia would face the possibility of conceding limited regional influence to Iran -- a decision that would certainly heighten the chance of increased U.S. military aid to the Saudi regime in order to rebuff potential unpleasant developments that would tip the balance of power against U.S. regional interests.

Turkey, however, would likely face a more complicated dilemma in regards to an aggressive posture by a nuclear-armed Iran. If this were to occur, there would be an intensification of the political and cultural/economic competition throughout the Central Asia states -- regardless of their ethnic composition. Specifically in regard to Central Asia, Turkey would likely attempt to balance particular regional interests by tightening its present relationship with President Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan.

Turkey continues to reestablish better relations with the United States since the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The rise -- and perception of the apparent rise -- of a nuclear Iran has and will continue to expedite an increase in mending diplomatic and economic relations. This tactic would not only prepare Turkey for Iranian nuclear cards being played in the future, but would also seek to reestablish a possible deterrence for Iran. In the interim, however, it remains unlikely that a nuclear Iran would be any less dissuaded than a non-nuclear Iran.

Overall, Saudi Arabia would likely maintain its present stance because it would be in the best interests of its own internal status quo. An Iran with nuclear weapons would, in the best interests of the Al Saud monarchy, not change, alter, confirm, or deny any shift of foreign relations with the Islamic republic, Europe, or the United States.

Conclusion

A nuclear Iran would alter the Middle Eastern balance of power as well as create a risk for policymakers and military leaders in the United States and Israel. Key regional states, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have become more neutral over time in regards to Iran. Some balances, however, are all too often more temporal than permanent.

The likely result of U.S. allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia pursing a nuclear Iran with a "neutral course" remains an option defined by both internal domestic consensus and fear of being perceived "too close" to the United States or its "war on terrorism" for political and/or ideological reasons. Such a course, however, in the face of a nuclear Iran will cause the U.S. and its allies to consider a variety of responses ranging from sabotage to, in the worst case, some form of U.S.-acknowledged Israeli military response that could possibly lead to some degree of direct or indirect U.S. military intervention.
 

srirangan

Banned Member
kashifshahzad said:
:coffee I dont know why Iran hates Saudi Arabia and Turkey:confused:
Historically there has been an ethnic power struggle betw the Arab's, Turks and Persians for supremacy in the Islamic world. The present day Iranian Mullah Govt sees SA and Turkey as American stooges.
 

A Khan

New Member
turkey is seen as a american stooge as sriragan pointed out, and as a potential competitor for influence in Central asia, but not regarded as the major adversary, which KSA is because of the major ideological difference between the two... unless the realigous institutions on both sides start thinking real-politics they wont really get anywhere being like this...

But i dont really think iran will be in such a position to threaten turkey with nukes, because Turkey is a member of Nato, the US has nukes stationed there, so they wont be afraid of a nuclear Iran. Afterall they had a nuclear armed soviet union breathing down their neck for 4 decades and they got through that... Besides cant really see the risk of a potential (MAJOR) conflict between the two.

With regards to KSA then i think the situation is more murky... there is a big idealogical gap, tension in OPEC over production cuts... can they rely on Pak nukes to counter the irani threats? or will the americans be around to help them? dont know... what do you guys think?
 

merocaine

New Member
The only thing more worrisome than a nuclear armed iran is nuclear armed saudi,
how many of the 911 hijackers were iranian. If I was american I would be terrified of a nuke capable Kingdom, the place is libel to fall apart in the next 10 years or so, already there biggest exports are oil and terrorists!
 

ali.uaf

New Member
well why saudis ?? wts wrong with India itself why its can b the biggest threat to the satbility of the asia and world in wider view ???
ok 9/11 hijackers were saudis bt wt do u mean by few # of persons u r lebeling them wth terrorists no no no brother well let me remind u
in Gujrat Hindus killed almost 2000 muslims dats nt wt m sayying its yyour government brother .... now come to saudia ... Kingdom has one of the worlds lowest rate of crimes ....
Brother why India has the right to built its arsnel with neuclear weapons and not the otehr countries ???

Brother dont just label n e one as terrorist jst bcoz u think so put sum facts ... i can provid u so many facts against India .... is dat mean i shud label India as Terrorist Country ....

regards ...........:)
 

kams

New Member
ali.uaf said:
well why saudis ?? wts wrong with India itself why its can b the biggest threat to the satbility of the asia and world in wider view ???
ok 9/11 hijackers were saudis bt wt do u mean by few # of persons u r lebeling them wth terrorists no no no brother well let me remind u
in Gujrat Hindus killed almost 2000 muslims dats nt wt m sayying its yyour government brother .... now come to saudia ... Kingdom has one of the worlds lowest rate of crimes ....
Brother why India has the right to built its arsnel with neuclear weapons and not the otehr countries ???

Brother dont just label n e one as terrorist jst bcoz u think so put sum facts ... i can provid u so many facts against India .... is dat mean i shud label India as Terrorist Country ....

regards ...........:)
I agree that Saudi falling in to hands of Jihadis is a terrifying thought. Imagine the impact on world economy due to its oil wealth.

I don't think a nuclear Iran is a threat to Pakistan, although Irans relationship with saudi is not all that good (Shia vs Sunni conflict I guess)

As for India, may be you should try posting in complete English rather than as a text message so that everybody can understand what you are really talking about.
 

kams

New Member
Although its not the right thread (or for that matter right forum), I am just replying to your comments on Gujarat communal riot - We do not condone it..it was a national shame and we kicked out the govt. at Federal level in the next election. Although same party is in power in Gujarat now...their time will come and they will pay for their crimes. :)
 
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