World War One Discussions

[Ozzy Blizzard]

There seems to be a lack of interest on the great war here in DT land which is a shame for a number of reasons, namely the huge possibility for discussion on tactical and strategic questions, and the ammount of blood that was spilt in wageing it. Hopefully this will drum up some interest. Just a few points i would like to discuss.


The Battle of Jutland. Who won this naval encounter on tactical or strategic terms? The German fleet inlficted more damage on the royal navy so did they win the battle? It seems to be the contention of many historians ( on the History chanel anyway :lol) that allthough the battle may have been a tactical german victory, because the Royal Navy blockade remained in place and the high sea's fleet did not sally forth again that it was a strategic defeat for the Germans. However the german objective was to lure the Royal Navies battle cruiser squadron into battle peicemeal in order to destroy it in detail, which they sucseeded in doing. So was the German stratagy sound? Who, if anyone, won this battle?

The Battles of the Some and Verdun. I'm adressing these two offensives together because they are inextricably linked.

Verdun.Was Falkenhayn's logic in wageing the verdun offenceive fundimentally flawed? His attempt to force the french into a battle of attrition acheived its goal, however the Germans suffered casualties on an almost one for one basis. Did the battle acheive anything exept half a million dead young men? The horrors of verdun did directly lead to one of the critical moments of the war, during the mutinies of Assains (Neivelle) offenceive in early 1917. This clearly illistrates the debilitataing effect the battle had on the french army and people. However the germans suffered similar casualties. Could the battle have been waged in a more tactically sound maner by either side? Did the battle acheive anything of strategic significance for either the franch or germans?

Somme. The somme offencive was waged by Hauge in order to relieve the pressure on verdun, averting a french collapse. It has gone down as the bloodyest battle in the history of the commonwealth. However could it have been waged in a sounder manner? On the imfamous first day of the battle, was the order for the attacking formations to walk into no-mans land justified or was it criminal slaughter? One must remember that the army Hauge commanded an army or raw recruits and forced to fight at neither a time and place of his choosing. Did he have annother tactical option on the 1st of july? Was there a better way to wage the battle on that first day? Was the continuation of the battle into november that lead to many slaghterhouses with nemes like Pozieres and Bullecourt justified? Did it achieve any strategic goal, or did it effectively relieve the pressure from the french at verdun? Was the change in tactics from advances on wide fronts which lead to the desimation of the first day, to the narrow front advances which lead ot the carniage at battles like pozieres?

The Micheal Offencive (Kaiserschlacht). Was Ludendorf right to wage this offensive in the begining of 1918? Could this battle have been waged in a more effective manner? When Gough's 5th army teitered on collapse was it supreime folley to push toward Ameins instead of the channell through the steadfast defence of the 3rd army? How did the small unit tactics used by the germans influence the battle?

The Ottoman Campaign. Was the campaign in the middle east a waste of time for the allies? Did the attempt to help their russian allies just turn into a huge waste of effort considering the russian collapse and revoloution in 1917 occured anyway? Or was any delay in russian collapse worth the time and blood? Was there primary objective realy to expand their respective empires?

Tactics. Which had a longer lasting effect on the way armies wage war today and which had a larger effect on the outcome of the war?: The small unit "stormtrooper" tactics pionered by the germans and used to devistating effect in the micheal offencive, or; The truely combined arms battle pioneered by commanders like Monash and utilised to devistating effect in the summer offenceives of 1918?

Leaders. Who had the largest effect on the outcome of the war? Who had the greatest influece on the world after the war? who do you like and who dont you like? Who was the greatest? Was Hauge a fool who murdered his men or a military genius with an iron will? Did Ataturk have the greatest effect on the post war world? Was Petain's actions in WW2 caused by the horrors of the first war? What would have happened if kitchener hadn't died?

Alternative theories. What would have happened if.......? How would a change in events on the battlefield ahve changed the cource of the war, or the world after including world war two?


Anyways i hope we get some discussion on this because it is a shamefor us to neglect such a conflict that killed so many and shaped the world we live in now.

 

[riksavage]

My views on Jutland

The Battle of Jutland was a minor German tactical victory, but a major strategic loss. Battles won or lost are not measured by casualties or tonnage but by tactical or operational gains, which influence the final outcome of the war. The German failure to cripple the British fleet at Jutland indirectly resulted in unrestricted submarine warfare, which in turn had a critical impact upon neutral America (along with the Zimmerman telegram encouraging Mexico to invade California) deciding to finally side with the Allies.

At the end of the day what is the point of having a large battle fleet, if it remains trapped in port, which is what happened to the German Grand Fleet as a result of Jutland. Following the initial engagement against Beatty’s ‘fast cat’ Battle Cruisers (who strayed too far ahead of Jellicoe’s main dreadnought fleet), Sheer spent the rest of the battle running away! Jellicoe crossed Steers ‘T’ twice and as a result of German good fortune and the sudden fear of submarine attack (reports of periscope sightings) prevented Jellicoe from closing and destroying the German fleet. This latter decision was greatly influenced by British intelligence, which had already cracked the German codes revealing the latter’s plan to draw the British fleet into a trap of waiting U-Boats.

We have to look at the battles losses as part of the bigger strategic picture. Britain lost three modern Battle Cruisers, Germany one. But two months after the battle Britain had seven modern Battle Cruisers ready for sea and Germany only two. The older armoured RN Cruisers lost during the battle were not missed, and the remaining vessels in that class were immediately withdrawn from service. The British High Seas fleet was heavily damaged yes and took weeks to repair, however only one was sent to dry dock and that left 23 capital ships available for action in a relatively short period of time. The Germans on the other hand were forced to place three of their best dreadnoughts in dry dock for repairs, lasting weeks. Germany’s two best Battle Cruisers were out of action for months, and Sheer’s light Cruisers had been cut from eight to six against thirty available to the RN. in a nut-shell the German fleet remained the lesser force, plus the Keiser lost confidence in the German Grand Fleet as a war winner.

Also the problems associated with open 'flashdoors' in the RN ships leading from the main turrets to the magazines (to speed up reloading), which directly resulted in the RN Battles Cruisers blowing-up was resolved following a detailed investigation. Remember the Germans suffered the same problem in a previous engagement, and if it had not been for the speedy flooding of the magazine by a swtiched on German officer the same would have occurred. The Germans learnt from their near fatal incident and passed the knowledge around their fleet, and fitted additional flash-doors and changed their SOP's.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Indeed the status quo continued after the battle. The high seas fleet was still the inferior force after the battle as it had been before. However even when looking at the wider strategic picture i cant see why it was in fact a strategic loss for the germans, maybe a minor one. The objective of jutland was not to bring the RN into a trafalgar style battle, in order to defeat it. The high seas fleet was drasticaly outnumbered and would have been decimated if they had attempted such a move. The only way the High Sea's fleet could win any battle against the RN was to fight it piecemeal. Only over several of these peicemeal battles would the RN be brought to a point in terms of losses were it could be enguaged by the High Sea's fleet on even terms. This was the objective at Jutland, to lure a portion of the RN into a battle were it could be waged on terms that favoured the germans numerically. This is why they planned to shell the north of englland, to generate a quick reaction from a protion of the RN which they would overwhelm, then get back to port before the heavies could entered the fray. The codebreaking efforts of the RN however allmost allowed the HSF to be traped themselves. For the germans this battle was about the numbers, although it was part of a larger plan that they never implemented. What other stratagy could the germans have persued? A trafalger style battle against the full weight of the RN were they would have been killed to a man? That would have allowed the blockade to continue with only a skeleton presence by the RN, allowing its main units to move to the mediterainian or pacific. As far as the implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare the battle had no effect on its implementation, the only event that would have prevented it was the destruction of the RN and lifting of the blockade of germany, which would have lost the war for the allies anyway. As jellico said, he was the only man who could have lost the war in one day. The implementation of unrestricted submarine warfare was going to be waged anyway.

 

[riksavage]

I concur with most of your observations accept for the switch to unrestricted Submarine warfare. Prior to Jutland the Kaiser supported those in the German high-command who argued for the continued use of restricted submarine warfare. It was his loss of confidence in the surface fleet’s ability to decisively beat the RN, break the blockade and force the RN to divert ships from picket duty, whiched changed his views. After Jutland the hawks won and the Kaiser approved unrestricted warfare, he simply ran out of time, Germany was starving to death, whilst Britain continued to feed herself. The Kaiser always believed Britain to be his greatest foe, ultimately his dream was to create a German Empire outside of Europe, and that could not be achieved unless he beat the RN. Drawing three British battle cruisers to their deaths, whilst a propaganda victory had zero impact upon the war further compounded by the fact that Britain was building faster, stronger more heavily armed ships faster than Germany was. Also the Admiralty, though angry at the loss of Beatty’s Fast Cat’s never once doubted they would ultimately beat their German counterparts.

The following book provides an excellent account of the dialogue between the various German politicians and senior officers and why they eventually took what ultimately proved to be a fatal decision.

Robert K. Massie – Castles of Steel – Random House

 

[Tasman]

The Battle of Jutland was a minor German tactical victory, but a major strategic loss.

I thought your posts on Jutland were excellent - concise and, in my opinion, spot on.

You haven't left much else to say in support of the above statement but I might add some comments if anyone argues the opposite!

Tas

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I concur with most of your observations accept for the switch to unrestricted Submarine warfare. Prior to Jutland the Kaiser supported those in the German high-command who argued for the continued use of restricted submarine warfare. It was his loss of confidence in the surface fleet’s ability to decisively beat the RN, break the blockade and force the RN to divert ships from picket duty, whiched changed his views. After Jutland the hawks won and the Kaiser approved unrestricted warfare, he simply ran out of time, Germany was starving to death, whilst Britain continued to feed herself. The Kaiser always believed Britain to be his greatest foe, ultimately his dream was to create a German Empire outside of Europe, and that could not be achieved unless he beat the RN. Drawing three British battle cruisers to their deaths, whilst a propaganda victory had zero impact upon the war further compounded by the fact that Britain was building faster, stronger more heavily armed ships faster than Germany was. Also the Admiralty, though angry at the loss of Beatty’s Fast Cat’s never once doubted they would ultimately beat their German counterparts.

The following book provides an excellent account of the dialogue between the various German politicians and senior officers and why they eventually took what ultimately proved to be a fatal decision.

Robert K. Massie – Castles of Steel – Random House

I still have one major problem with your contention, that somehow jutland was the decicive moment reguarding unrestricted submarine warfare. Or in other words had the battle not have happened, or taken a different cource that the desision may not have been taken by the kaiser.

Whether or not jutland had occured, the highe sea's fleet was drastically outgunned by the RN. They could not realisitically hope to meet the home fleet in battle and defeat it. Therefore i dont see how the desision to move to unrestricted submarine warfare could have been avioded. The desision may not have been made when it was, the battle may indeed have given specific hawk's the ammunition they needed, however as the blockade took a greater toll the pressure to move to USW would have been unaviodable. Therefore i dont see how jutland itself was the decisive moment. It illistrated a blatent fact, that the high sea's fleet could not defeat the british in battle and could not break the blockade. This fact however would have been blatantly obvious after any other naval encounter or in the event of no naval encounter at all.

Therefore i dont see how jutland was a strategic defeat the germans, it seems to have maintained the status quo. It was as muc as the germans could have hoped for, and it did even the odds a bit for the germans, which didnt matter because no further major action was to be made by the german fleet.

 

[riksavage]

Well we will have to agree to disagree on this one.

However had the tables had been turned and the Germans succeeded in drawing the RN fleet at Jutland into the waiting U-Boat screen we could have witnessed catastrophic losses, which would have encouraged the Germans to breakout in numbers, continue raiding the UK coast-line and carryout attacks against picketing RN light-Cruisers and Destroyers. With the RN stranglehold lifted and food supply-chains to Germany guaranteed, she could have easily maintained a program of restricted submarine warfare to convince the US to remain neutral (The German Ambassador in Washington was a very popular character, his British equivalent was not and generally hated in US political and social circles). Germany could have then realistically fought the Allies on the ground in Europe to a standstill and negotiated a favorable peace treaty without paying horrendous reparations.

The strategic goal for the Germans at Jutland was to strike a severe blow against the RN, this never happened. On the other hand the UK public was expecting a decisive Nelson style victory, but Jacky Fisher and Jellicoe always maintained thier critical mission was to ensure the complete blockcade of Germany.

 

[Manfred2]

I don't see Jutland as a serious defeat, or victory, for either side.

What was disturbing was how little use the Germans made of supporting units. Not just submarines- what about teh naval airships?
Zeppelins had been touted, and built, for Naval recon. Where were they?

 

[riksavage]

The Germans did use Zeppelins at Jutland. However like all surveillance assets during WWI they relied entirely on either the ‘mark one eyeball’ or intelligence to guide them in the right direction. Britain having broken the German Naval codes had a distinct advantage, they at least knew when the Germans left port.

WWI Naval battles were unique in the sense you had incredibly powerful ships armed with large caliber guns capable of firing long distances, but extremely limited detection and communication equipment (radar and reliable secure radios etc.). This often led to confusion, particularly if you were unfortunate enough to be on board a coal fired ship (newer vessels were oil fired), which in certain wind conditions resulted in you being completely blinded by thick black smoke from your own funnels resulting in the gunnery officers having guess the direction, speed and range of target. This is why the RN trained it's crews to fire extremely quick broadsides one after another in the vain hope that by saturating the area where you think your enemy is you will at least gain a certain number of critical hits.

If you study the battle of Jutland in detail you will see how this inability to detect and plot the movement of enemy ships at great distances was critical to the final outcome. The 'fog of war' on both sides had a major impact on the outcome.

 

[Manfred2]

Jutland was still a dissapointment, to battleship enthusiasts. 55 minutes of broadsides between the main fleets was a pretty lame climax to the dreadnought era.

About 1918; Verdun should have shown everyone how futile trench warfare was,and the Somme should have driven the point home with a vengance.

After the Russian collapse freed a million men from the Eastern Front, teh Germans should have split that force. Half could have gone to France to solidify the front, but not attack anywhere. The other half could have reversed the faltering fortunes of the Ottomans. 500,000 Germans could have closed the Suez, cleared the British out of Mesopotamia and threatened Persia and India.
By presenting reasonable terms, Britian could have been induced to leave the war by May, or face the spectre of German troops in Cairo and Tehran.

 

[KGB]

After jutland, it was agreed by the Germans that the HSF was best kept as a tacit threat, or "a fleet in being". The HSF was essentially a white elephant to the germans. It couldn't be used, because the RN was just so much larger, yet they were an enourmous drain on resources. The RN on the other hand was essential for Britain. I remember reading somewhere that there was a proposal to scrap the HSF and use the guns. August 1914 was a close call, perhaps a few more divisions in the German army may have brought the Schleiffen plan to success? It seems to me participating in the battleship race was a losing proposition from the start, a diversion resources for Germany.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Well we will have to agree to disagree on this one.

However had the tables had been turned and the Germans succeeded in drawing the RN fleet at Jutland into the waiting U-Boat screen we could have witnessed catastrophic losses, which would have encouraged the Germans to breakout in numbers, continue raiding the UK coast-line and carryout attacks against picketing RN light-Cruisers and Destroyers. With the RN stranglehold lifted and food supply-chains to Germany guaranteed, she could have easily maintained a program of restricted submarine warfare to convince the US to remain neutral (The German Ambassador in Washington was a very popular character, his British equivalent was not and generally hated in US political and social circles). Germany could have then realistically fought the Allies on the ground in Europe to a standstill and negotiated a favorable peace treaty without paying horrendous reparations.

That scenario is a very optomistic best case scenario for the germans. Even if things went as well as they could have possibly gone i doubt the outcome would have been that favourable. Its doubtfull wether Uboats could have indeed inflicted catasrophic losses on large formations of fast balttleships, their speed alone makes targeting difficult and persuit impossible. IIRC an individual dreadnought was sunk by a U boat before the battle but the notion that significant losses could have been inflicted by a Uboat screen (midway calibur losses, that is what would have been needed to change things strategically) doesnt make too much sence to me. As soon as one was spotted or any losses were inflicted Jellico could just turn at high speed and run. The U boats could do nothing about it, they would basically have a submerged kill zone, and could not effect anything out of it while remaining submerged. The main units could have turned at high speed and moved out of the kill zone at the drop of a hat, so i seriosly doubt a U boat ambush could have dramatically changed the cource of the battle. Even if 3 or 4 dreadnoughts had been sunk, which would have been the lead of the line anyway, its a LONG, LONG way from the 12 needed to even the scores as far as captol ships were concerned. If jelico had been cought in a Uboat ambush and lost some units it would have been a bonus, but i doubt that anything strategiclay decisive could have been achieved by the germans, indeed it was not their intent. The objective of jutland was to even the odds a bit for a future action, which they achieved. The notion that a different turn at jutland could have imediatly and directly lead to breaking the RN blockade isnt realistic in my opinion, the germans would have needed a midway or better to achieve that and they did not hold the inteligence advandtage. In other words that would have needed a tacticle mirracle.

The strategic goal for the Germans at Jutland was to strike a severe blow against the RN, this never happened. On the other hand the UK public was expecting a decisive Nelson style victory, but Jacky Fisher and Jellicoe always maintained thier critical mission was to ensure the complete blockcade of Germany.

I disagree with this contention aswell. The objective at jutland was to do as much damage as possible, thus allowing the realistic possibility of of a large fleet action on more even terms at a later date, not win that large fleet action and break the blockade at once. IMO that was not a realistic objective in 1916. Given the strategic environment in 1916, i dont see how this was a strategic loss for the germans, they achieved their goal tactically and to some extent strategiclally, however the close call stoped them from following up jutland with annother "ambush" battle or a large scale fleet action, which would have made jutland a difinitive strategic victory for the germans. However given the strategic situation i dont see how jutland was a strategic defeat, draw would fit the situation better.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

After jutland, it was agreed by the Germans that the HSF was best kept as a tacit threat, or "a fleet in being". The HSF was essentially a white elephant to the germans. It couldn't be used, because the RN was just so much larger, yet they were an enourmous drain on resources. The RN on the other hand was essential for Britain. I remember reading somewhere that there was a proposal to scrap the HSF and use the guns. August 1914 was a close call, perhaps a few more divisions in the German army may have brought the Schleiffen plan to success? It seems to me participating in the battleship race was a losing proposition from the start, a diversion resources for Germany.

But that sword cuts both ways. The british put more effort into the naval arms race than the germans did. If the germans had not built a fleet how many extra divisions could the british had offorded???? the naval arms race cost the british more than it cost the germans. So there is indeed a case for the "fleet in being". Anyway you needed a fleet to have a large empire and i think this was the primary objective of the High Seas fleet.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Jutland was still a dissapointment, to battleship enthusiasts. 55 minutes of broadsides between the main fleets was a pretty lame climax to the dreadnought era.

About 1918; Verdun should have shown everyone how futile trench warfare was,and the Somme should have driven the point home with a vengance.

After the Russian collapse freed a million men from the Eastern Front, teh Germans should have split that force. Half could have gone to France to solidify the front, but not attack anywhere. The other half could have reversed the faltering fortunes of the Ottomans. 500,000 Germans could have closed the Suez, cleared the British out of Mesopotamia and threatened Persia and India.
By presenting reasonable terms, Britian could have been induced to leave the war by May, or face the spectre of German troops in Cairo and Tehran.

Contrary to popular ideas the war was won and lost in the trenches of the wester front in 1918. After 4 long hard and bloody years both sides had leaned how to effectively and sucsefully wage trench warfare. The sucsess of campaigns such as the kaiserschlact and 1918 summer offencives illistrate this. The fact is the centre of gravity for both sides was on the western front, and i doubt wether the war could have been won anywere else for either side. If the germans had shifted their 1918 effort to the middle east they would have suffered from horrendous logistical problems, and would have had to rely on breaking british resolve, rather then breaking them in the field in france. If they had been boged down in the sands of the middle east and not achieved their objectives by the middle to end of 1918 (their objective beeing to take cairo and tehran and knock the british out of the war) then divisions stuck in the middle east would have been sorely missed with the masssive influx of American divisions and inevitable, huge allied offencive that would have occured in the summer and autum of 1918.

 

[Manfred2]

Those troops were missing from France anyway, as cassualties in a failed campaign. The Allies broke the Germans because the best the Germans had were killed off during Ludendorf's failled offensives.

Yes, the logistical situation in the M.E. was terrible, but converting the Turkish single-rail system would have cleared that up. If the Central powers had made it a top priority, they sould have been able to do the job quickly enough.

Do you think the 1918 offensive would havebeen made in the strength it was with Germans on the Suez and marching through Persia?

 

[riksavage]

1918 was the make or break year, both Germany and Britain suffered more casualties in 1918 than at any other time during the war. However the allies had time on their side, America was entering the war and Germany was starving to death. Even though Germany continued to produce munitions at very impressive rates they could not feed the population and discontent was growing at home, which greatly impacted the morale of the troops on the front line. At the end of the day the German population couldn’t live off bullets and gun-power!

 

[kato]

Germany was starving to death.

That had already been the case before. Winter 1916/1917 was known as the Steckrübenwinter, when, in addition to war-related rationing, the potato harvest spoiled and people had nothing left to eat but rutabaga (yellow turnip). The vegetable actually became known as the Hindenburg Root.