What if Germany had won The Battle of Stalingrad during WW2

[Tactics Master]

:?: What would have happened if the German Sixth Army had defeated the Russian Army at Stalingrad during The Second World War :?:

:germany :russia

 

[Feanor]

Elaborate. So far you're giving a generic what if scenario that hardly merits an in-depth discussion.

 

[A.Mookerjee]

The German lines had been overstretched if one considers logistics. Germany was beyond Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc, which were not the natural dominions of Germany, and Stalingrad was already one distant corner, in the military ambitions of Germany, in the Soviet Union. I do not believe, that the Soviet Union, or Germany, could have withdrawn from Stalingrad in a unilateral fashion. The German forces in Stalingrad, had nowhere else, where they were required, as the other Army Groups, had their duties. It would have been foolish for Army Group North, to have given up the seige of Stalingrad. The reinforcements for the Germans, during the seige of Stalingrad, were limited, because there was fierce fighting which was being experienced by all the three army groups. An overwhelming force could not be sent to Stalingrad. Hitler had won his earlier campaigns, due to the overwhelming capabilities of his armed forces, as compared to his enemies. At Stalingrad, when one had to fight for survival, there was no inherent advantage, either for the German forces, or the Soviet forces, before the Soviets were reinforced by troops, and supplies. The myth of German invincibility was seen for what it was. Germany could never have won the Battle of Stalingrad. If I were Germany, I would have thought hard before dividing my army into three groups, but then, Hitler was confident of victory.

 

[riksavage]

:?: What would have happened if the German Sixth Army had defeated the Russian Army at Stalingrad during The Second World War :?:

:germany :russia

NOT A LOT!

Failure to take Moscow by diverting troops South to the Caucasus was the real game changer. After that the real 'brains' in the German high command knew the war was lost.

Russian tank/SP Gun production (106, 334 all types) outstripped the Germans (50, 439 all types) two to one. Add to that UK and US tank production, which also outstripped the Germans and you can see why after 1942 they were on a rapidly deteriorating wicket.

Following the Battle of Britain, Churchill was so confident the Nazi's would be beaten he hosted a conference for senior/middle ranking officers designated with rebuilding Germany after the war. One of the men in attendance was Major Ivan Hirst, REME who ended up overseeing the post war production of the VW Beetle.

 

[dragonfire]

NOT A LOT!

Failure to take Moscow by diverting troops South to the Caucasus was the real game changer. After that the real 'brains' in the German high command knew the war was lost.

Russian tank/SP Gun production (106, 334 all types) outstripped the Germans (50, 439 all types) two to one. Add to that UK and US tank production, which also outstripped the Germans and you can see why after 1942 they were on a rapidly deteriorating wicket.

Following the Battle of Britain, Churchill was so confident the Nazi's would be beaten he hosted a conference for senior/middle ranking officers designated with rebuilding Germany after the war. One of the men in attendance was Major Ivan Hirst, REME who ended up overseeing the post war production of the VW Beetle.

This is why i love this forum, how informative !

I remember seeing a documentary on Stalingrad during WW2 and how The soviet strategy was far superior to that of the Germans and which ultimately resulted in the Soviet wining, unfortunately i cant remember the precise details

 

[Ananda]

:?: What would have happened if the German Sixth Army had defeated the Russian Army at Stalingrad during The Second World War :?:

:

Even with Germany manage to won Stalingrad, and push back the Red Army, however they haven't been able to produce a real effort on destroying Russian War Machine Industry which been relocated beyond Ural.

It's matter of Timing. The Western Allies (US & UK) continue deteriorating Germany War Machines Industry, while Germany has been able to reduce UK and USSR War Machines Industries, let alone the US.
It potentially delay the Red Army Eastern Push and buy the German some time to regroup, however with the Red Army war machines industry remain intact, the Push from the east will still happening.

Perhaps the questions is, will the delay from eastern push in the end will made the US & UK to reach Berlin first, thus prevented the Germany divisions post war.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

IMHO the war would have lasted for another 6-8 months. The German lines on the northern flank of the Caucasus were already bled dry half way through the battle, and even if they had taken the city Russian strength in the area would have made the Wehrmacht's position in the south untenable. The post Stalingrad offensives would not have been as successful and the Soviet position in the summer of '43 would not have been quite so strong & thus Kursk would have been more successful.

 

[alexycyap]

If the 4th Panzer Army wasn't diverted away to join Army Group South A (resulted in a big traffic jam) in July 1942, but instead supported 6th Army in a focused drive towards Stalingrad, it might have been possible for the Germans to storm and seize the city in late July/early August, before the Soviets could organize the defense of the city. Then the Germans could have consolidated their positions, dug-in on the west bank of the Volga. 4th Panzer Army could have been pulled back to form a reserve to counter any Soviet attack that managed to cross the Volga. The Soviets would have to pay a very heavy price to attack fortified German positions in late 1942/ early 1943, probably with only minor gains.

Thus 1943 might see the Germans continue to secure the Caucasus, and there would be no Battle of Kursk in 1943. The Germans would also have been able to commit far stronger reserves to counter Allied landings in Sicily/Italy, possibly defeating the Allies there. This would seriously affect Allied plans to invade France in 1944.

Of course, if the war dragged on into late 1945, the Allies might grow so frustrated by the lack of progress that they just drop the atomic bomb on Berlin.

 

[STURM]

The loss of Stalingrad would have meant the loss of the Caucasus but ulitmately would have made no difference to the outcome of the war. Logistical problems would have stalled a German advance beyond the Caucasus and it would have taken them months to start extracting oil in large volumes from the Baku oilfields which would have been heavily damaged by the Soviets. Even after losing Stalingrad, the Soviets would have been able to muster enough troops and material to keep the Germans off-balance and over extended by launching offensives in the northern and central sectors.

alexycyap, it's just speculation on my part but I really doubt the Allies would have dropped an atom bomb on Germany. Firebombing the Germans was one thing but the key question as I see it, is whether racial considerations would have prevented the use of the atom bomb on Germany. One of the factors that played a part in the decision to use atom bombs on Japan was the huge loss of life that would have occured if the Allies had to fight on the Japanese home islands. Germany by mid -1945 had been all but defeated and largely occupied

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

If the 4th Panzer Army wasn't diverted away to join Army Group South A (resulted in a big traffic jam) in July 1942, but instead supported 6th Army in a focused drive towards Stalingrad, it might have been possible for the Germans to storm and seize the city in late July/early August, before the Soviets could organize the defense of the city. Then the Germans could have consolidated their positions, dug-in on the west bank of the Volga. 4th Panzer Army could have been pulled back to form a reserve to counter any Soviet attack that managed to cross the Volga. The Soviets would have to pay a very heavy price to attack fortified German positions in late 1942/ early 1943, probably with only minor gains.

A few points:

1) The whole point operation Blau was the successful capture of the oilfields in the southern Caucasus, cutting the Volga at Stalingrad was a secondary objective. There's no point focusing on the flank of the primary axis of attack if your fundamental objective is not attained. Taking Rostov was far more important than taking Stalingrad.

2) 4th Panzer would have been useless in such a heavily degraded urban environment (even in August or September the city would have been devastated). The Soviet formations in the Don bend were largely intact so there were significant Soviet forces available to garrison the city, even if the advance had been significantly faster. In any case it’s likely the Germans would have had to wait for the arrival of the infantry heavy formations in 6th army which means November.

3) Even with Stalingrad secured and 4th Panzer in reserve by the winter of 1942 the German position would have been untenable simply because of the threat posed by counteroffensives launched from Soviet beach-heads on the south bank of the Don. The Soviets would not have had to cross the heavily fortified Volga; the man axis of the winter counteroffensive was always running south rather than west.

Thus 1943 might see the Germans continue to secure the Caucasus, and there would be no Battle of Kursk in 1943. The Germans would also have been able to commit far stronger reserves to counter Allied landings in Sicily/Italy, possibly defeating the Allies there. This would seriously affect Allied plans to invade France in 1944.

This assumes the winter counteroffensive launched by the Soviets would have been ineffective, and given the precarious nature of Army Group South's left flank (no natural barrier to form a defensive line), the previous German failure in the winter of 1941 and the massive Soviet formations available it’s highly unlikely Army Group A would have been able to prevent a withdrawal from the Caucasus. A massive Soviet winter counteroffensive somewhere along the south bank of the Don would have been disastrous for the German armies south of Rostov. They could not have heavily fortified their entire left flank, we are talking a front of over 500 km. The Defensive battle around Kursk worked because the Soviet high command knew the exact location of the offensive well before it happened; you have to mass your defences in depth.

In any case the withdrawal back to pre July lines would have made more formations available for operations in the west; longer lines require larger forces to hold the ground you control.

Of course, if the war dragged on into late 1945, the Allies might grow so frustrated by the lack of progress that they just drop the atomic bomb on Berlin.

If the Allies were in France in 1944 then I doubt they would have used Nuclear weapons, the war was basically done by that point + Berlin had already been levelled by conventional air raids.

 

[Firn]

This is why i love this forum, how informative !

I remember seeing a documentary on Stalingrad during WW2 and how The soviet strategy was far superior to that of the Germans and which ultimately resulted in the Soviet wining, unfortunately i cant remember the precise details

It would be nice if you could elaborate this view.

Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each. As these are all things which to a great extent can only be determined on conjectures, some of which turn out incorrect, while a number of other arrangements pertaining to details cannot be made at all beforehand, it follows, as a matter of course, that strategy must go with the army to the field in order to arrange particulars on the spot, and to make the modifications in the general plan which incessantly become necessary in war. Strategy can therefore never take its hand from the work for a moment.

Strategy is intertwined with the context and the circumstances, and ressources are possibly the most important influence and factor in it. The Soviet strategy was able to achieve the political objective first and foremost because the allies had a crushing superiority in manpower and material over the Axis. This key difference allowed the soviet strategic leadership to win togheter with the Allies despite colossal blunders and to shine in quite some occasions.


Firn

 

[Firn]

A few points:

3) Even with Stalingrad secured and 4th Panzer in reserve by the winter of 1942 the German position would have been untenable simply because of the threat posed by counteroffensives launched from Soviet beach-heads on the south bank of the Don. The Soviets would not have had to cross the heavily fortified Volga; the man axis of the winter counteroffensive was always running south rather than west.

This assumes the winter counteroffensive launched by the Soviets would have been ineffective, and given the precarious nature of Army Group South's left flank (no natural barrier to form a defensive line), the previous German failure in the winter of 1941 and the massive Soviet formations available it’s highly unlikely Army Group A would have been able to prevent a withdrawal from the Caucasus. A massive Soviet winter counteroffensive somewhere along the south bank of the Don would have been disastrous for the German armies south of Rostov. They could not have heavily fortified their entire left flank, we are talking a front of over 500 km. The Defensive battle around Kursk worked because the Soviet high command knew the exact location of the offensive well before it happened; you have to mass your defences in depth.
.

He might assume that potential winter offensives by the Soviets would have been ineffective, but you assume with no doubt that they would have been successfull. I would just say that we don't know, but that arguably more huge Soviet counteroffensives were stopped and even often crushed by the German defenders from 1941, 1942,1943 to mid 1944. (See the good Forgotten Battles by Glantz, which views the whole war more from the Soviet side then possibly any Western scholar)

The German counteroffensive at Kharkov which preceded Kursk is just the most shining example:

The German Donets Campaign cost the Red Army fifty-two divisions,[85] including over 70,000–80,000 personnel losses. Of these troops lost, an estimated 45,200 were killed or went missing, while another 41,200 were wounded.[86][87] Between April and July 1943, the Red Army took its time to rebuild its forces in the area and prepare for an eventual renewal of the German offensive, known as the Battle of Kursk.[88] Overall German casualties are more difficult to come by but clues are provided by examining the casualties of the SS Panzer Corps, taking into consideration that the elite Waffen-SS divisions were frequently deployed where the fighting was expected to be the harshest. By 27 March, it is estimated that the SS Panzer Corps had lost around 44% of its fighting strength, including around 160 officers and about 4,300 enlisted personnel.[45]

As SS Panzer Corps began to emerge from the city, they engaged Soviet units positioned directly southwest of the city, including the 17th NKVD Brigade, 19th Rifle Division and 25th Guards Rifle Division. Attempts by the Red Army to re-establish communication with the remnants of the 3rd Tank Army continued, although in vain. On 14–15 March these forces were given permission to withdraw to the northern Donets River.[89] The Soviet 40th and 69th armies had been engaged since 13 March with the Grossdeutschland Panzer grenadier division, and had been split by the German drive.[90] After the fall of Kharkov the Soviet defense of the Donets had collapsed,[91] allowing Manstein's forces to drive to Belgorod on 17 March,[92] and take it by the next day.[91] However, weather and exhaustion forced Manstein's counterstroke to end soon thereafter,[93] despite the Field Marshal's ambitions to also attack the Kursk salient which had been created as a result of the recapture of Kharkov and Belgorod.[75]

This offensive was of course an example of operational art and tactical skill of rare brilliance.

Between 13 January and 3 April 1943, an estimated 500,000 Red Army soldiers took part in what was known as the Voronezh–Kharkov Offensive.[1] In all, an estimated 6,100,000 Soviet soldiers were committed to the area, with another 659,000 out of action with wounds of varying severity. In comparison, the Germans could account for 2,200,000 personnel on the Eastern Front, with another 100,000 deployed in Norway. As a result, the Soviets deployed around twice as many personnel as the Wehrmacht in early February.[31] However, as a result of their over-extension and casualties taken during their offensive, at the beginning of Manstein's counterattack the Germans could achieve a tactical superiority in numbers, including the number of tanks present — for example, Manstein's 350 tanks outnumbered Soviet armor almost seven to one at the point of contact.[29]

All quotes are from the Wiki.


Firn

 

[STURM]

This is why i love this forum, how informative !

I remember seeing a documentary on Stalingrad during WW2 and how The soviet strategy was far superior to that of the Germans and which ultimately resulted in the Soviet wining, unfortunately i cant remember the precise details

By mid-43 the Germans had lost the strategic iniative to the Soviets. After Kursk it was downhill all the way for them and despite numerous victories at the tactical level the Germans at this point were so overextended that they could only react to Soviet moves. Whether or not Soviet strategy was superior is something I can't answer but I believe that numerical superority in men and equipment played a big part in allowing the Soviets to follow the strategy they did. Glantz, whom as Firn pointed has done a number of detailed books on the Soviet conduct of the war, holds the view that whatever the Germans did, whether it was a mobile/elastic defence as conducted by people like Manstein/Guderian/Hube or a firm defence with the aim of wearing out the Soviets as practiced by Raus/Henrici, were doomed anyway.

One of the best books in recent years on Stalingrad IMO is 'Stopped At Stalingrad'' by Joel Hayward. On a more personal level, ''Enemy At the Gates'' by William Craig is also worth reading.

 

[alexycyap]

If we ignore for the moment the existence of atomic bombs, I think Germany still had a chance of fighting WW2 to a draw in 1942.

If the Germans quickly captured Stalingrad by August 1942, it would give them enough time to consolidate, dig in and prepare for the Soviet winter attacks. The historical performance of German versus Soviet forces in the first half of 1943 showed that the Germans still possessed tactical superiority. Therefore, if 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army were properly deployed for defense, and later reinforced by the SS Panzer Corps, there was a good chance they would have defeated the Soviet winter offensive. With Stalingrad secured, the Caucasus would eventually fall to the Germans.

In the long term, Soviet numerical strength would be overwhelming. However, a successful defense of the Eastern Front in early 1943 with no major losses would have drastically improved Germany's situation in the following critical time period of mid-1943 to mid-1944. Germany could then meet the initial Allied landings in Sicily/Italy with far stronger forces. This would ultimately adversely affect Allied plans to invade France in 1944. If the Allies delayed Overlord by just a few months, the technological balance would have shifted. V1 flying bombs would rain down on Britain. Jet fighters would appear in increasing numbers to shoot down Allied bombers, possibly reversing some of the damage inflicted by Allied strategic bombing. Rommel would have added more fortifications, mines and obstacles on the invasion beaches.

Lack of Allied progress in 1943-1944, coupled with heavy Soviet losses with not much gain, might just compel Stalin to negotiate a ceasefire.

Of course, once the Allies acquired atomic weapons in late 1945, everything changed. The Allies would win no matter what.

 

[Firn]

By mid-43 the Germans had lost the strategic iniative to the Soviets. After Kursk it was downhill all the way for them and despite numerous victories at the tactical level the Germans at this point were so overextended that they could only react to Soviet moves. Whether or not Soviet strategy was superior is something I can't answer but I believe that numerical superority in men and equipment played a big part in allowing the Soviets to follow the strategy they did. Glantz, whom as Firn pointed has done a number of detailed books on the Soviet conduct of the war, holds the view that whatever the Germans did, whether it was a mobile/elastic defence as conducted by people like Manstein/Guderian/Hube or a firm defence with the aim of wearing out the Soviets as practiced by Raus/Henrici, were doomed anyway.

One of the best books in recent years on Stalingrad IMO is 'Stopped At Stalingrad'' by Joel Hayward. On a more personal level, ''Enemy At the Gates'' by William Craig is also worth reading.

I value Glantz greatly due to insights he provides throught his huge methodical efforts to reconstruct the Soviet campaigns. Especially the detailed analysis of the Soviet strategical, operational and tactical art within the context of said operations is fantastic. Still there are some interpretations with which I do not fully agree, perhaps because I think that in his valid and much needed efforts to destroy some common myths about the Eastern Front he sometimes goes a bit overboard.


Take for example this part:

Glantz asserts the German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet armed forces. The principal factor at Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tactical techniques. The General Staff had learned lessons from previous battles and disseminated "war experience" based on "exhaustive" analysis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine (Soviet deep battle), producing new procedures.[104] Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was even, between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets' favour.[105]

The numerical superiority might have been exaggerated but it was very consistent to say the least. By his own numbers:

780,900 men[3]
2,928 tanks[4]
9,966 guns and mortars[5]
2,110 aircraft[6][nb 3]

1,910,361 men[7]
5,128 tanks[8]
25,013 guns and mortars[9]
2,792 aircraft[10][nb 4]

2.5:1 to 2.8:1 in infantry during the Soviet defense ( 2.7:1 to 3.2:1 during the Soviet counter)
1.7:1 to 2:1 in tanks besides all huge numbers of AT-guns ( 2.3:1 to 3.1:1 in the Soviet offensive)
2:5 to one in guns and mortars
Only in regards to aircraft the numbers were almost evenly matched with only 1.3:1 for the Soviets.

So it is right to note that the Soviet army of 1943 had improved greatly after the very mixed bag of the years before, but it is equally important to put that into the context. Interestingly the Soviet forces defending skillfully with this great superiority and excellent intelligence a long-prepared, thick and deeply layered defense suffered in every regard considerably more losses then the Germans which had pretty every possible disadvantage.

Clauswitz (Book 3, Chapter 8)

In such an aspect we grant, that the superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. The direct result of this is, that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.

...

There remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superiority is not attainable, but to produce a relative one at the decisive point, by making skilful use of what we have.

In the striking victory of Kharkov Manstein proved his and his staffs mastery in this regard.


Firn

 

[STURM]

I. Still there are some interpretations with which I do not fully agree, perhaps because I think that in his valid and much needed efforts to destroy some common myths about the Eastern Front he sometimes goes a bit overboard.

The most common myth, as a result of books by Guderian, Mellenthin, Manstein, etc, all share the same theme that, of German field commanders having their hands tied by Hitler. According to these writers, if they had been able to conduct unhindered elastic and fluid maneuver operations the outcome would have been different. Another school of thought view holds the view that fluid operations as conducted by Manstein were no longer possible by mid-1944 due the worsening German situation with regards to shortages of men, equipment and fuel. Examples of the latter view would be the Ardwnnes and Hungarian offensives, both of which employed a larger force than was available in Mansteins counter stroke at Kharkov, and both which bogged down and failed due to Allied material superiority and German logistical problems

The numerical superiority might have been exaggerated but it was very consistent to say the least. By his own numbers:

2.5:1 to 2.8:1 in infantry during the Soviet defense ( 2.7:1 to 3.2:1 during the Soviet counter)
1.7:1 to 2:1 in tanks besides all huge numbers of AT-guns ( 2.3:1 to 3.1:1 in the Soviet offensive)
2:5 to one in guns and mortars
Only in regards to aircraft the numbers were almost evenly matched with only 1.3:1 for the Soviets.

The key question for me is whether STAVKA would have been able to conduct its operational art and grand strategy to such good effect had the Soviet Union from the start hadn't enjoyed a numerical superiority in men and equiptment and enjoyed a much larger industrial capability. Unless I'm mistaken, Soviet operational art is based I on the premise of having from the start a certain level of superiority in men and material.

Though I'm not a fan of ''what if''/alternative scenarios, the most interesting scenario for me would be speculating and studying how far the Germans would have suceeded
on the Eastern Front had had the Normandy landing failed. Even had the Germans been able to concentrate most of their recources in the East thanks to the failed 2nd Front,
the Allies would most certainly have pressed ahead with their strategic bomber offensive and Land Lease, both of which would have played a major role in in assisting the Soviet effort..

Interestingly the Soviet forces defending skillfully with this great superiority and excellent intelligence a long-prepared, thick and deeply layered defense suffered in every regard considerably more losses then the Germans which had pretty every possible disadvantage.

Plus the fact that STAVKA knew for certain the Germans were making a move in the Kursk sector. According to Glantz, up to this point the Soviets had never been able to stop a major German offensive dead in its tracks.

Apart from Glantz and John Erickson, I'm not aware of other writers that have written about the Soviet angle in such detail and depth in English. Come to think of it, I'm also not aware of any books in English covering the German side with the same level of analytical detail.

 

[chukahleong]

If the Soviets were defeated in Stalingrad, the Nazis could have undoubtedly gained a stronghold to steady themselves and their supply lines, although Stalin, knowing his ways of commanding, would definitely have ordered wave after wave of troops to retake the city, given its extreme strategic importance.

But then, the Nazis had to face the fact that their supply lines were overextended, and the Russian winter was pounding their operations mercilessly. So, after taking Stalingrad, I'm pretty sure that these dudes won't be launching any major offensives again for some time except to regain a few footholds.

Plus, the Soviets would have already geared up and ready for another fierce retaking of Stalingrad anyway, unless the Nazis again possess the zeal to encircle them and crush them.

 

[Bergerpollm]

If the Soviets were defeated in Stalingrad, the Nazis could have undoubtedly gained a stronghold to steady themselves and their supply lines, although Stalin, knowing his ways of commanding, would definitely have ordered wave after wave of troops to retake the city, given its extreme strategic importance.

But then, the Nazis had to face the fact that their supply lines were overextended, and the Russian winter was pounding their operations mercilessly. So, after taking Stalingrad, I'm pretty sure that these dudes won't be launching any major offensives again for some time except to regain a few footholds.

Plus, the Soviets would have already geared up and ready for another fierce retaking of Stalingrad anyway, unless the Nazis again possess the zeal to encircle them and crush them.

Not true at all. Moscow could've been an easy take had the Nazis done the following

1. Focused their front so that a tremendous amount of man power was devoted to a smaller front headed towards Moscow, taken the city

 

[swerve]

Three reasons why that wasn't as easy as you seem to think: logistics, logistics & logistics.

 

[chukahleong]

Not true at all. Moscow could've been an easy take had the Nazis done the following

1. Focused their front so that a tremendous amount of man power was devoted to a smaller front headed towards Moscow, taken the city

One military fact that has to be faced by all armies and generals is that supply plays a fundamental role in the campaigns of a war. You need additional food, manpower, gasoline and intelligence to continue your journeys. Even though you have the greatest army in the world with the most powerful tanks and artillery pieces, they won't be of any great use unless you provide them with a sufficient supply of ammunition and petroleum.

As for the Stalingrad phase of the Nazis, their supply lines were pretty overextended, so that means they won't be getting reinforcements and resources that fast, and will have to camp down on the spot and wait, if they have to do so.

As a conclusion, the major offensives cannot be launched properly if the troops haven't refurnished themselves with supplies. So, I'm sure the Nazis couldn't launch an offensive to take Moscow at that time, even though they managed to repel the attack of the Soviets in Stalingrad.