Vietnam...what if...?

[CBS]

HEY:
If we had started with 52s in the North, started 'The Trail' bombing daily and had mini-invasions into North Vietnam at the DMZ, do you think 'they' might have considered a truce. In other words the doctrine of ' Attack, attack, attack' like ' Alexander the Great, Attila the Hun' would have made a quicker resolution to that mess we entered into in 1962 ?

We were way to passive for me and I was directly involved in combat at
the Infantry level. When in a fight...take it to them...caution..of course, but nail it soon and leave !

SF...........> Chuck :daz

 

[TheBlurryOne]

HEY:
If we had started with 52s in the North, started 'The Trail' bombing daily and had mini-invasions into North Vietnam at the DMZ, do you think 'they' might have considered a truce. In other words the doctrine of ' Attack, attack, attack' like ' Alexander the Great, Attila the Hun' would have made a quicker resolution to that mess we entered into in 1962 ?

We were way to passive for me and I was directly involved in combat at
the Infantry level. When in a fight...take it to them...caution..of course, but nail it soon and leave !

SF...........> Chuck :daz

It is particularly difficult to follow a doctrine such as ..."attack, attack, attack" when one is facing an enemy who excels on the defensive and has the ability to 'disappear' into the terrain. You are suggesting using conventional "shock and awe" military tactics to combat a guerrilla force. A mistake made so very many times throughout history and arguably even today. I myself would argue that there is no way to combat a guerrilla force in the conventional sense, at very least a method has not yet been developed.

The fact that you said "nail it soon and leave" suggests that you have not considered that much of what America and her allies were fighting in Vietnam was a completely unconventional volunteer force (i realise thats quite a crude description but more or less true) who would engage the enemy on their own terms. An example of this is the tet offensive itself, the very fact that large numbers of enemy guerrillas could infiltrate and coordinate an attack on such a grand scale, proves the inadequacy of American strategy at the time and you are simply suggesting undertaking a more reckless form of said strategy.

 

[STURM]

We were way to passive for me and I was directly involved in combat at the Infantry level. When in a fight...take it to them...caution..of course, but nail it soon and leave !

If anything the Americans were certainly not too passive in Vietnam and actually placed an overeliance on firepower and technology. What you described would certainly work against an opponent who was foolish enough as Saddam to try and meet the U.S. army in conventional, all arms combat in the open desert.

The fact that you said "nail it soon and leave" suggests that you have not considered that much of what America and her allies were fighting in Vietnam was a completely unconventional volunteer force (i realise thats quite a crude description but more or less true) who would engage the enemy on their own terms.

The American experience in Vietnam only reinforced what was learnt by others engaged in counter-insurgency campaigns - you can't rely totally on military power alone to solve what is also a political problem. In 'Fiasco' by Rick Atkins, the author also mentions a lot of mistakes the Americans initialy made in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, in dealing with the threat posed by insurgents. Relying on too much firepower and heavy handed tactics in a counter insurgency campaign tends to be counter productive and loses one the support of the locals, which is very essential.

For those interested in counter insurgency, Nagl's 'Learning To East Soup With A Knife' is an excellent read. He analyses American strategy and tactics in Vietnam and asks if the U.S. as a learning insitution was able to make the changes needed to deal with counter insurgency in Vietnam and comes to the conclusion that because of historical factors, amongst others, the U.S. army was unable to adapt the way the British army did when faced with a counter insurgency campaign.

 

[CBS]

If anything the Americans were certainly not too passive in Vietnam and actually placed an overeliance on firepower and technology. What you described would certainly work against an opponent who was foolish enough as Saddam to try and meet the U.S. army in conventional, all arms combat in the open desert.



The American experience in Vietnam only reinforced what was learnt by others engaged in counter-insurgency campaigns - you can't rely totally on military power alone to solve what is also a political problem. In 'Fiasco' by Rick Atkins, the author also mentions a lot of mistakes the Americans initialy made in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, in dealing with the threat posed by insurgents. Relying on too much firepower and heavy handed tactics in a counter insurgency campaign tends to be counter productive and loses one the support of the locals, which is very essential.

For those interested in counter insurgency, Nagl's 'Learning To East Soup With A Knife' is an excellent read. He analyses American strategy and tactics in Vietnam and asks if the U.S. as a learning insitution was able to make the changes needed to deal with counter insurgency in Vietnam and comes to the conclusion that because of historical factors, amongst others, the U.S. army was unable to adapt the way the British army did when faced with a counter insurgency campaign.

It should be noted that in the "I" Corps, the enemy was 90% NVA regulars who all had homes in North Vietnam.....traveled down 'the trail' and came to take over South Vietnam or die. Simple mission really....very little guerilla activity but the US
Army policy was to sit in defensive posture...Con Thien, Gio Linh, Carroll, Cam Lo and many other scenic spots and run search and destroy missions while taking a heavy pounding ( passive here no doubt ). Yes, you do develop conventional tactics under those situations. My thoughts are hit their homeland, destroy everything....pull out and then go further north of the 'Z' and do it again and again. All the while, moving north into N. Vietnam and fighting battles in the south. Bomb 'the trail' daily...attack 'the trail' daily. It was noted that things slowed down considerably when the Americans went on the offensive and truly were seeking all the trouble that could be located. General Giap has admitted in his book that the
52s had them up against the wall and within two days of asking for peace although
I doubt if that would have stopped their drive south later, after we left SE Asia. Make no mistake about it, we did not lose that war...it was taken away from the field by our own politicians for a 'Peace with Honor' by Henry & Richard Milhouse.....baloney ! Now, there's a pair !

 

[STURM]

Army policy was to sit in defensive posture...Con Thien, Gio Linh, Carroll, Cam Lo and many other scenic spots and run search and destroy missions while taking a heavy pounding ( passive here no doubt ). Yes, you do develop conventional tactics under those situations.

Yes but until the later stages of the war, NVA units were essentially still guerilla orientated units, heaviliy reliant as well on the communist infrastructure in S. Vietnam and local support. At the early stages the NVA were not 'conventional' in the same sense of the word as say the some western armies were at that period. Army policy as whole remain deep-rooted in conventional warfare doctrine, based on a strategy of attrition and maneuver, which is natural as this was and is an area the U.S. excels in. The fixation with body counts is a prime example, and was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq. American search and destroy missions in the South, with their heavy reliance on firepower, whilst often failing to create any decisive results, had the effect of alienating a portion of the population.

My thoughts are hit their homeland, destroy everything....pull out and then go further north of the 'Z' and do it again and again. All the while, moving north into N. Vietnam and fighting battles in the south. Bomb 'the trail' daily...attack 'the trail' daily. It was noted that things slowed down considerably when the Americans went on the offensive and truly were seeking all the trouble that could be located. General Giap has admitted in his book that the 52s had them up against the wall and within two days of asking for peace although I doubt if that would have stopped their drive south later, after we left SE Asia. Make no mistake about it, we did not lose that war...it was taken away from the field by our own politicians for a 'Peace with Honor' by Henry & Richard Milhouse.....baloney ! Now, there's a pair !

Bear in mind that though the U.S. was worried that a victorious North Vietnam would export the 'revolution' to other parts of SEA and that a unified Vietnam, under communist rule, would be a stooge of Moscow or Peking, the U.S. was not prepared to risk Soviet or Chinese intervention. American units on the N.Vietnam Chinese border would most certainly have resulted in a Chinese military reaction and instead of eradicating the communist presence in South Vietnam might have had the opposite effect of creating a bigger and more widespread insurgency problem.

In hindsight we know that the N.Vietnamse leadership had no interest in exporting their 'revolution' anywhere but at the height iof the ColdWar, this was a great concern to the U.S. and it's allies. Robert McNamara's book - 'In Restropect' explains how both sides misunderstood and misjudged each other's intentions. At the end of the day, the North Vietnamese were prepared to fight for decades and at a huge cost in human lives to achieve their goals, the U.S. wasn't. The key question that intersts me for purposes of debate, is whether the U.S. would have eventually achieved it's political goals in South vietnam if at the onset the insurgency campaign was conducted in a more effective manner, involving more coordination with the military and civil authorities to deal with the historical, political and social problems unique to Vietnam and had the neccessary doctrinal and mindset changes had been done.

If you haven't, I'd really recommend you get hold of Bernard Fall's books on the French involvement in Vietnam and his thoughts on early American involvement there.

 

[CBS]

Yes but until the later stages of the war, NVA units were essentially still guerilla orientated units, heaviliy reliant as well on the communist infrastructure in S. Vietnam and local support. At the early stages the NVA were not 'conventional' in the same sense of the word as say the some western armies were at that period. Army policy as whole remain deep-rooted in conventional warfare doctrine, based on a strategy of attrition and maneuver, which is natural as this was and is an area the U.S. excels in. The fixation with body counts is a prime example, and was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq. American search and destroy missions in the South, with their heavy reliance on firepower, whilst often failing to create any decisive results, had the effect of alienating a portion of the population.



Bear in mind that though the U.S. was worried that a victorious North Vietnam would export the 'revolution' to other parts of SEA and that a unified Vietnam, under communist rule, would be a stooge of Moscow or Peking, the U.S. was not prepared to risk Soviet or Chinese intervention. American units on the N.Vietnam Chinese border would most certainly have resulted in a Chinese military reaction and instead of eradicating the communist presence in South Vietnam might have had the opposite effect of creating a bigger and more widespread insurgency problem.

In hindsight we know that the N.Vietnamse leadership had no interest in exporting their 'revolution' anywhere but at the height iof the ColdWar, this was a great concern to the U.S. and it's allies. Robert McNamara's book - 'In Restropect' explains how both sides misunderstood and misjudged each other's intentions. At the end of the day, the North Vietnamese were prepared to fight for decades and at a huge cost in human lives to achieve their goals, the U.S. wasn't. The key question that intersts me for purposes of debate, is whether the U.S. would have eventually achieved it's political goals in South vietnam if at the onset the insurgency campaign was conducted in a more effective manner, involving more coordination with the military and civil authorities to deal with the historical, political and social problems unique to Vietnam and had the neccessary doctrinal and mindset changes had been done.

If you haven't, I'd really recommend you get hold of Bernard Fall's books on the French involvement in Vietnam and his thoughts on early American involvement there.

Sorry mate, you're incorrect....... "NVA units were essentially still guerilla orientated units, heaviliy reliant as well on the communist infrastructure in S. Vietnam and local support" Most (VC) were wiped out during TET in '68. They, NVA,were nothing but conventional on a slight deviation. McNamara was a bean counter of Edsel fame and nothing more....please don't quote that fool...rememeber he created his own French Line which by the way, never worked and in fact, they toyed with it to drive up figures of troops coming and going. One major difference between you & I could be that I was there, acted out the pawn parts but realized a lot of American Doctrine...we WERE very passive for a war environment.....we sat and waited...they acted...they had an excellent intelligence network and ours, well let's just say, it 'worked for the Generals'...not for the rest of us who really required the info. When one enters a fight / war....two major things must be present to win; one, the will to win and two, some pre-determined knowledge of his opponent....the US had neither. When active, we did not depend upon firepower to pull us out.....we utilized it as a weapon in the arsenal but we
operated as units and fought the same way. Body counts is strickly political BS...we agree there...as far as China and Russia go...well, we're scared to death of both or one of them. I'd have put them on notice, stay clear and out of this little venture....we did fight the Chinese on the ground....mostly advisors and in the air over N. Vietnam as pilots...all nations do that to tune their weapons of war. Who really knows what would have happened if they had entered troops on the field; we might have gone Truman on them...you know the big one ! MacArthur warned LBJ about a ground war in Asia...you'll lose if you go there....but LBJ, being a typical American political fool...charged ahead. He died to face over 58K souls asking why ? It truly would then have gotten very interesting to see how that war would have resloved itself.....I think we'd have done the same...pulled out. What is left today...Thialand...that's about it. nfloorl: Some day, the Americans will have to stand and fight for a considerable amount of time and I wonder if they are up to it ?

 

[STURM]

Most (VC) were wiped out during TET in '68. They, NVA,were nothing but conventional on a slight deviation.

Compared to the VC [I'm refering to the early stages of the conflict and not 1972 and 1975 when the NVA was used in a very different manner due to the changed political and military situation] the NVA were certainly much, more conventional - they were organised into battalions, regiments, etc, with supporting elements, when they had to they operated in much larger units than the V.C - BUT the point I was trying to make was that they were not ''conventional'' in the strictest sense of the term as it would be applied to other armies. They had a much smaller logistical/support footprint and despite the emphasis on big unit operations when required, their strategy and field doctrine was still more very much 'guerilla' rooted. They tended to blend in the terrain or ''disappear'' after operations and that were very reliant on local support.

McNamara was a bean counter of Edsel fame and nothing more....please don't quote that fool...rememeber he created his own French Line which by the way, never worked and in fact, they toyed with it to drive up figures of troops coming and going.

Nonetheless, McNamara as well as several key U.S. military and civilian participants did have a series of discussions with their Vietnamese counterparts in the late 1990's to analyse the reasons that led to the escalation of the conflict, the way each side conducted their respective policies and military moves in response to each other - IMO a valuable and objective contribution to the history of the Vietnam war.

 

[CBS]

Compared to the VC [I'm refering to the early stages of the conflict and not 1972 and 1975 when the NVA was used in a very different manner due to the changed political and military situation] the NVA were certainly much, more conventional - they were organised into battalions, regiments, etc, with supporting elements, when they had to they operated in much larger units than the V.C - BUT the point I was trying to make was that they were not ''conventional'' in the strictest sense of the term as it would be applied to other armies. They had a much smaller logistical/support footprint and despite the emphasis on big unit operations when required, their strategy and field doctrine was still more very much 'guerilla' rooted. They tended to blend in the terrain or ''disappear'' after operations and that were very reliant on local support.



Nonetheless, McNamara as well as several key U.S. military and civilian participants did have a series of discussions with their Vietnamese counterparts in the late 1990's to analyse the reasons that led to the escalation of the conflict, the way each side conducted their respective policies and military moves in response to each other - IMO a valuable and objective contribution to the history of the Vietnam war.

If you can believe a man, who knew years before, that this effort was wasted while costing America thousands more lives, and yet did not have the will power to stand and say so, then you have some logical issues to deal with.

I don't trust him..even though he's dead, I don't listen to his thoughts about Vietnam. His book was nothng more than an attempt to justify his means, mistakes and calculations during his tenure. As to the rest of your arguement...you are correct that early on, the NVA did require support from the VC and they did provide them with intelligence as they, the NVA, did act on a conventional war methodology while the VC were unconventional.

By the way, we are now on good 'terms' with Hanoi for the purposes of trade, MIA locations and their oil reserves, I still have some major reservations about them. First of all, they're Communist and I don't believe in that form of government and secondly, the Oreintals don't like or trust US for much of anything....I don't blame them either. So whatever 'they' say might be self serving and I must doubt it as well, until real proof surfaces and we won't see that in our lifetimes.

 

[surpreme]

I use to wonder why the US didn't bomb the NV real hard in the beginning. I would like to know if more SF would have made a difference in the war? Or maybe doing hit and run in NV would have help. This was the last time there was a draft. Would it make a difference if they was volunteer army? Seem like VC and NVA were determine soldiers offensive and defensive.

 

[AvengingAngel]

Vietnam... What If??

I wonder when Ho Chi Minh asked Truman after WWII for weapons against the French and the U.S. supplied Ho Chi Minh with the firepower for Vietnam's independence from the French, what the political outcome would have been?

Vietnam's situation was unique and also bad timing as the fear of the Red Menace was prevalent in the U.S. and Europe after WWII and that anything connected with the word communist was to be shunned and distrusted.

Hindsight is always 20-20. But looking back, HCM was looking for political and military support from the U.S. from French colonial imperialism.

Who knows what could have been then.