This is a discussion on Tanks in Cities within the Military Strategy and Tactics forum, part of the Global Defense & Military category; So, Im not sure if this is the right forum for this, but Im wondering if you guys (and gals) ...
So, Im not sure if this is the right forum for this, but Im wondering if you guys (and gals) have information on how tanks and armored vehicles preform in cities. I know that certain tanks, like the Abrams have some issues with military support, so lets look at both the T-series and the Abrams series, as those (and their kind) seem to be some of the most common in combat zones today.
So, are tanks useful in cities? what kind of casualties could be expected when in the city? and is it worth sending tanks into a city?
Same question applies to Armored Personnel Vehicles and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BMPs, BTRs, and western stuff like Bradleys).
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The same questions can be applied, but the answers will be very different, be aware. Tanks in cities depend on tactics, the type of resistance, the willingness to deal collateral damage, etc.
The first and second assaults on Grozny (94 and 99, not the multiple battles for Grozny during the wars) show like night and day the two opposites of the spectrum. In one case older tanks, poor tactics, lack of coordination, and infantry support, led to them being destroyed en-masse. In the second we have good coordination, with the tanks providing tactical fire superiority.
The US used Abrams in Fallujah with considerable success as well, and even the new Iraqi Army has used their T-55s a few times with good results.
To bring another example in addition to the ones already mentioned one can have a look at the thunder runs during OIF.
It worked because the opposition despite being numerous had nearly to no coordination, wasn't trained properly and employed mostly inneffective weapons.
If a of properly trained and supplied russian mot. rifle division would have been dug in the city the US Spartan Brigade wouldn't have been able to perform these thunder runs.
One may say that usually tanks in a city are pushed into a supporting role in which nevertheless they may be crucial to the fight.
Most impressive are the different fates of the tip of the armored spearheads. The Soviet tankers and SP tankers seemed to have the loss of the first tanks in an enemy ambush practically for granted. In Iraq the American Armor seemed almost invulnerable. Only the rear and the rear flank seem to have suffered penetrations.
During MOUT soviet sappers lead the way, followed by tanks supported by SMG infantry. This was necessary as "The Germans had converted every sewer manhole into a gun pit and mined the streets around them. So it was difficult to move forward, the attack progressed very slowly." In Sadr "Mahdi army elements set many burning roadblocks that had
to be destroyed immediately." However once again it was tanks who led the way, even if RPG gunners used the thermal screen to ambush the tanks.
Panzerfaust operators would (and partly had) to seemingly very often fire from very close range and were greatly feared in the last years/last year of the war, especially in built-up areas. They caused massive losses of Soviet AFV. In Iraq the RPG gunners seem to have very little experience. Although the fought with courage their positions were not set up very well. Losses were very low for the Americans. This is of course part of a general trend, Soviet losses were appalling and the stories of the veterans underline it often. Overall the American also suffered very few losses.
Soviet tankers would close their hatches very often in MOUT even if it blinded them as German defensive fire as well as handgrenades were seemingly very deadly. In Iraq members of the tank crew and additional soldiers would fire from the top of the tank even if the Abrams offered far better SA than the T34. The Iraqi small arms fire was rather uneffective. Lesson: "During military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), tank units without infantry support need to fight open hatch."
In most MOUT in WWII overall progress was even with slow and very slow. Even if the commanders had great (Stalingrad) and huge (Berlin) firepower at their disposal. So while combat itself was very fast and fluid, operations were very timeconsuming. In OIF the Allies mostly advanced all in all very quickly.
Firn
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"The first criterioun in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.
What's you opinion on the infantry-armor relationship in modern MOUT? Is there or should there be a dominant arm? (By "dominant," I mean the unit which sets the pace and the focus of the engagement, with the subordinate unit working in a supporting role.) According to FM 3-90.2, Chapter 7 "the close combat phase of urban operations is infantry-centric," and it seems to place armor and mechanized forces in a secondary maneuver and support role.
And if there is a dominant arm, should this arm determined by the situation or should one always be the primary arm?
I'm not sure as to whether or not my questions are fully relevant or reflective as to the way combined arms really work in urban warfare. I am fully aware that my depth of understanding on the issue is limited and so I am genuinely interested in hearing your thoughts.
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I'm not Firn, but I'll take a shot at your question. Infantry centric is the way to go, with tanks providing tactical superiority in terms of fire power. In other words clearing the city is an infantry operation, with tanks backing them up against any hard spots.
There is not cut and dry rule, but the sources suggest that the armored vehicles bring a lot to the table. The protection of tanks allows them to bring their great firepower to bear in support of the infantry in a more forceful manner than most AFV could.
Firn
________________
"The first criterioun in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.
It's certainly useful in having the firepower of an MBT for FIBUA/MOUT. My question is whether an FAE round, either fired from a vehicle or shoulder launched, would be more useful in the anti-personnel role in clearing out buildings, rather than an MBTs main gun? Off topic, apologies, but I've always wondered why western armies haven't adopted shoulder launched FAE's like the Russians for use in urban areas.
Apart from the need of having adequate infantry support for MBTs, a lesson learnt a long time ago, a problem the Israelis found in Beirut was the inability of their MBTs to elevate their main guns high enough to deal with multi-storey buildings, hence their use on the 20mm Vulcan for surpressive fire. Waylander, did German army doctrine during the cold war call for the employment for MBTs in urban areas?
It's certainly useful in having the firepower of an MBT for FIBUA/MOUT. My question is whether an FAE round, either fired from a vehicle or shoulder launched, would be more useful in the anti-personnel role in clearing out buildings, rather than an MBTs main gun? Off topic, apologies, but I've always wondered why western armies haven't adopted shoulder launched FAE's like the Russians for use in urban areas.
Apart from the need of having adequate infantry support for MBTs, a lesson learnt a long time ago, a problem the Israelis found in Beirut was the inability of their MBTs to elevate their main guns high enough to deal with multi-storey buildings, hence their use on the 20mm Vulcan for surpressive fire. Waylander, did German army doctrine during the cold war call for the employment for MBTs in urban areas?
It's not shoulder launched but from what I understand the "novel explosive" (read: thermobaric) Hellfire variant is seeing use in Afghanistan and Iraq, isn't it?
It's not shoulder launched but from what I understand the "novel explosive" (read: thermobaric) Hellfire variant is seeing use in Afghanistan and Iraq, isn't it?
Not sure about a Hellfire with thermobaric warhead. In the 90's the British army issued a requirement for shoulder launched thermobaric weapon but I'm not sure what came out of it. Like I said, it's always puzzled me why only the Russians seem to have adopted thermobaric weapons for urban use.
Not sure about a Hellfire with thermobaric warhead. In the 90's the British army issued a requirement for shoulder launched thermobaric weapon but I'm not sure what came out of it. Like I said, it's always puzzled me why only the Russians seem to have adopted thermobaric weapons for urban use.
I dig some quick searching and found a link for you about the SMAW-NE, which is a thermobaric variant of the shoulder launched SMAW used by the United States. I hadn't heard of it. Also briefly mentions the BLU-118:
During the cold war urban combat played a minor role when it came to the procurement of specialiced equipment.
With other scenarios than an armored clash becoming more relevant the west changed this. The mentioned weapons are anexample as is for example the Bunkerfaust.
As for what a tanks brings to the table what organic RPGs and ATGMs can't.
A tank offers armor protection which an ATGM troop doesn't have which comes in handy in some situations.
Mobility is another point. While many routes in a city may be difficult the open ones enable it that the heavy tracked support gets shifted around relatively fast.
The engagement time is much faster as is the rate of fire. A tank also carries much more ammo as well as different kinds of ammo (programmable HE, HEAT, PELE, canister,...). An ATGM troop is rather limited in this regard.
As said before, infantry and the organic equipment belonging to them is the core of a battle in an urbanized battle. Nevertheless the other arms of a combined arms doctrine (not only just tanks) add alot of usefull capabilities.
And Germany always planned to attach tank units to mech or light infantry units for urban warfare if needed. Albeit training for this wasn't done as other training scenarios had a much higher priority.
City fighting is very ugly and what is often called complex terrain. When grunts operate in complex terrain, we know we are often the bait as we move through the area. So it's only a question of how many of us will die to achieve our higher HQ objectives. Here's a Rand report on the IDF lessons learned from 2006 and 2009 that is also relevant to the use of tanks in the city. I note the solution is not tanks alone but rather better integration at combined arms warfare.
I mused in this thread that a gun-mortar similar similar to the concept of the YouTube- 2s9 Nona 2s31 Vena 120mm on a tank chassis might be equally interesting, if not more. The advantages of such a system are of course not limited to MOUT, as they can equally perform the role of standard heavy mortar with all the ammunition and low-velocity but superior HE/HE-FRAG/HEAT/HESH/Smoke/WP/ projector.
________________
"The first criterioun in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.
Last edited by Firn; April 18th, 2010 at 03:04 PM.
Reason: Could somebody edit this post - somehow I'am unable to do so
From the recent reports it looks like the BMPT, together with several other interesting projects, is dead. And while interesting it IMO doesn't offer enough advantages to justify inegrating another vehicle into them MR/Tank units. Not with a limited budget.