Tactics in Vietnam

[NICO]

Originally Posted by STURM

........ The main long term goal of winning any or most insurgencies is to convince the locals that the government can provide a better long term alternative to that offered by the insurgents - high body kills and constant tactical victories at the end of the day, made no difference to the outcome in South Vietnam.

If that is an original line of yours, congrats! STURM, it should be engraved on the walls of military academies around the world, definitely at West Point and also Pentagon. Clear and to the point, win the hearts and minds, stop being worried about the body count. Very easy to say, very difficult for military's in the past and present to execute since it goes so much against what the military trains and equips for.

[STURM]

Originally Posted by NICO

IfClear and to the point, win the hearts and minds, stop being worried about the body count.

As the whole purpose of the exercise is to physically remove the threat posed by enemy combatants - either by killing, capturing or converting them - body counts or killing the enemy are of course somewhat essential or useful. What I feel is counterproductive is placing too much emphasis on body counts at the expense of other vital areas. Regularly having a high body count can also lead to a false sense of security and give the impression that all's well on the ground and genuine progress is indeed being made when that might not be the case.

Originally Posted by NICO

Very easy to say, very difficult for military's in the past and present to execute since it goes so much against what the military trains and equips for.

Well certain armies managed to do it easier and better than others due to a number of reasons, mainly historical and having less resources. In Nagl's book he argues that the British army, as a learning organisation, after trial and error, adopted the proper mindset and other changes required in a way the Americans never did.

Very easy to say and extremely hard to do indeed especially when one is caught in the thick of things, has been trained with a very different doctrine and has an indifferent political leadership, but then again innovation and flexibility are important and essential requirements, wouldn't you agree? A number of American officers and officials [like Paul Vann] did try and succeed but were hampered buy their senior leadership and indifference.

[Kilo 2-3]

STURM is right on the money about the link between counterinsurgency success and convincing local populations that "their government" is indeed their government and their best hope for the future. During Vietnam, Diem's religious and political alienation with his people didn't help matters any. In a similar vein, one might also argue that Karzai's nepotism and tribal cronyism aren't helping matters much in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, this making these struggling governments viable and respected exceptionally difficult to do. "Nationbuilding" in countries with poor infrastructure, divided cultures, and histories of autocratic leadership is both challenging and costly.

Another critical issue to consider in counterinsurgency is the matter of security.

If counterinsurgency forces can stabilize things to the point where farmers can tend to their fields and women can shop in the markets without fear of land mines or suicide bombers, then they've won a critical victory. At the end of the day, I firmly believe that most civilians want a resolution to the conflict in their backyards, as a consequence, they'll throw their lot in with the side most likely to achieve it.

However, the means towards reaching this goal of stability can often be counterproductive. Firstly, the very nature of guerrillas makes them exceptionally hard to find and destroy. They can simply melt into urban populations or hide away in the hills. Finding them requires capable local intelligence and aggressive (and hazardous) reconnaissance.

Secondly, the means necessary to destroy guerrilla fighters can in part be counterproductive to the larger goals of counterinsurgencies. While night raids, airstrikes, and the like are often lethally effective, they run the risk of catching civilians in the crossfire, potentially undermining hard-won civilian support.

Quite a catch-22 there. The US struggled with it in Vietnam, and now the ISAF has to deal with it in Afghanistan.