Written by Air Commodore A. Hameed Qadri
Courtesy DefenceJournal, Pakistan
Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even to express in precise terms.
Winston Churchill
Introduction
The Defence Forces of Pakistan are entrusted with the responsibility of providing ready and responsive capability to counter any challenge to national security. In order to succeed in such a mission, either by deterring or defeating the threat, Pakistan Air force shares the task equally with other services. The core around which the entire edifice of defence and military doctrines is structured remains 'Visualization of Threat'. Threat and capabilities in a given environment are ever changing factors. Continual review of these makes an essential prerequisite in keeping the formulated military strategy current, relevant and applicable.
In December 1979, the massive influx of Russian forces in Afghanistan transformed the geo-political scenario of the region. The ulterior motives behind the events, for times to come, would remain a subject of discussion and analysis for the students of military history and international affairs. However, as perceived in Pakistan, the long term principal objective of erstwhile Soviet Union was access to warm waters of Indian Ocean. This change, with strong military overtones, brought forth certain stark realities and limitations of our military system. Till then, as the envisaged threat emanated from the East, so quite naturally the force structure, organisation and plans of the PAF were orchestrated only towards that direction. The newly emerged volatile, dangerous and unpredictable situation in the West called for re-evaluation of our land and air strategy.
At this juncture of history, Pakistan's political and military leadership rose to the occasion. The decision to resist Soviet military aggression at all costs was one of the boldest policy decision taken at the national forum - hopefully for its far-sightedness it would get its due recognition by the posterity. The factor that eased the situation for Pakistan was convergence of national interests which forced United States to offer military assistance. However, the revised land strategy in general and air strategy in particular, seemed to have been influenced by the compulsions of policies set by political leadership. The aim of this article is to analyse the air strategy adopted by the PAF, and recap salient aspects of the conduct of air operations on the Western front.
Formulation of Air Strategy
The pattern of Soviet forces build-up in Afghanistan and their subsequent employment, along with their pre-occupation with combating Afghan resistance, suggested that a full-scale ground offensive against Pakistan was probably neither a viable option nor was it likely. Hostile, rugged terrain along Durand Line being unfavourable for large scale armour employment, reinforced this notion. Any manoeuvre across Pak-Afghan border had to be infantry biased supported with artillery. Under this scenario, it seems that a decision was taken by both Pakistan Army and the PAF that concurrent deployment of forces on the east as well as the west was too costly in terms of burden on our limited inventory. Therefore, resources to counter the new threat were deployed from the existing resources in various sectors of the western front. Simultaneously, plans were chalked out to redeploy these forces on the eastern theatre, if the situation so demanded. Incidentally, throughout the Afghan conflict our arch-rival India never let and opportunity go unexploited in exerting pressure on our eastern border. Throughout the 1980s, she continued to assess our vulnerability arising from divided military strength for realisation of her aims at different times. To our great discomfort, her will to exploit situations for achieving her multiple aims, manifested openly time and again required a suitable response. The most serious ones that merit mention are: threat of a possible surprise attack on Pak nuclear installation and the massive assembly of forces along our borders during exercise Ã’Brass Tack. While dealing with the situation on the western border, PAF along with Pak Army, had to also remain prepared to meet the threat on its eastern border. During the same decade, the fervour of non-proliferation at international level was at its peak. Pakistan allegedly, as portrayed by the west, was at the threshold of acquiring nuclear capability. The threat of a possible Israeli attack on Pak nuclear installations, with or without the support of regional and extra-regional players, was a real possibility. This threat required, both, a realistic assessment as well as suitable measures, to address the contingency. Thus, the air strategy called for undertaking following tasks simultaneously at the operational level:-
(a) Defend Pak airspace on the western front against air violations while remaining prepared to deal with further escalation of the Afghan conflict.
(b) Defend Pak nuclear facilities against a possible surprise attack from the IAF and Israeli Air Forces, jointly or separately.
(c) Remain prepared to undertake full-range of operations, if called upon to do so, on the eastern border.
Getting Prepared
Without going into details of the various policy options which must have been considered by the then political and military leadership to protect Pakistan's long-term interest in the region, the approach adopted by PAF to tackle the above-mentioned tasks could now be discussed. PAF, at this juncture, had to modernise its force to achieve a meaningful qualitative edge, if a credible deterrence had to be offered to its adversary, equipped with state of the art equipment. Making a tough decision, the CAS and his Air Staff wisely, in the first two years of war, turned down US offer of providing low technology F-5E and A-10 aircraft. The argument, put forth by the United States government that only these aircraft could efficiently be absorbed and effectively employed by the PAF, was rejected. PAF leadership insisted that it could not recommend purchase of such outdated and less capable aircraft to its government; and felt fully confident of assimilating advanced technology, and mastering the latest American weapon systems. Standing on its ground firmly, the PAF was able to persuade the Government of Pakistan and of the United States to allow purchase of F-16 aircraft, which were inducted in operational service in 1983. F-16's air intercept radar, and its potent weapons, provided the much-needed cutting edge to the air force and helped in overcoming the terrain-imposed limitation of ground based radar to some extent. In the hands of well trained PAF fighter pilots, F-16 aircraft were a force to reckon with. Except for the initial batch of six pilots, all F-16 air crew were trained by PAF without any foreign assistance. Pakistan Air Force devised a strategy aimed at deterring the enemy from intruding into our airspace, and hot pursuit operations, through Defensive Counter Air Operations only. It also continued to demonstrate its resolve to deal with large-scale aggressions on our western and eastern fronts. Initially, air violations on Afghan front were countered by ordering air defence scrambles from forward bases. Subsequently in 1986, when the intensity of violations increased, a heavier response in the shape of Ã’Combat Air Patrols along the western border was put up with reasonable success. The dictates of defence policy required adaptation of a defensive posture, and exercise of restraint, to keep the conflict from over-spilling the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan.
PAF on War Footing
At the operational level, the strategy devised had much different implications for the PAF than for the Pak Army. It was often not understood or appreciated by those not involved in it. Pak Army deployed necessary force along the western border while the bulk of its forces still remained in cantonments or in exercise areas. Similarly, on the eastern front, reasonable warning was available to occupy battle locations. It was not so in case of the PAF particularly on western front as it operated from a limited number of air bases. As PAF was forced to undertake only Defensive Counter Air Operations, which in simple words required maintenance of pilots and aircraft on ground alert round the clock and mounting continuous Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions, its air bases were kept at highest level of operational readiness. In achievement of first task described earlier, air bases of PAF Northern Air Command were kept ready. Few PAF air bases, along the western border, from where aircraft took off to intercept or patrol air space were at war with the enemy. On eastern front, the threat of a surprise attack on nuclear installation by India or Israel required an air force's response from almost all flying units. The period during which Pakistan was engaged in dealing with the Afghan problem, was also of growing tension between Pakistan and India. Indeed the PAF remained on war footing and prepared to contain any aggressor with all its might during this crucial period. Its aircrew and personnel remained available to react on short notice and continuously rehearsed their well formulated plans. The spirit with which the above mentioned task was performed by the dedicated personnel of PAF, about which not much was made known to public, deserves highest praise. It should now be made available to public to enable them to acknowledge and appreciate PAF's role and achievements during those fateful years.
For PAF, therefore, the situation was not much different from a full-fledged war which it undertook throughout the conflict in general and during the period 1986-87, in particular. It entailed operating air defence sensors and command and control centres at their peak efficiency, while men and officers remained operationally deployed in field and on their respective air bases. Such was the level of readiness of PAF that it could have gone to war almost without any warning. With such a state of preparedness why thousands of air violations, including incidents of attack on targets just inside our borders took place during the Afghan war, is a question which requires a deep understanding of air operations. Unless a no-fly zone was declared and established such intrusions could not have been prevented. It called for aggressive employment of air power. A small air force like the PAF, however efficient it may be, cannot establish a no-fly zone over a 1000-km long frontier. Moreover, crossing of international borders to establish such a zone would have meant open confrontation amounting to war. The situation not only required a Herculean effort in terms of continuous CAP but an early warning system to detect violations. Clearly such an objective was both untenable and unrealistic under the prevalent environment. This subject will be dealt with in greater details later.
Air Defence Ground Environment
Defence of own airspace against hostile enemy aircraft is achieved by creating an Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) through setting up of radar network to guide own aircraft for interception. Before the Soviet invasion, surveillance of our western border was carried out by high level radar only. Therefore, a new plan had to be made to create low as well as high level ADGE, especially covering the areas of interest. However, difficult and rugged mountainous terrain on the western border did not favour setting up of an elaborate low-level network. Nevertheless, a quick re-deployment of the available resources was made in two distinct sectors. The first area, called the northern belt for ease of understanding, consisted of the land mass between Laram to Miranshah. This area witnessed maximum ground as well as air activity by the enemy during the war. The southern belt stretched from Quetta to Pishin in Balochistan. However, the intensity of activity in this area was not as much as in the north.
Deployment of Mobile Low-Level Radars (MPDRs) and Mobile Observers Units (MOUs) at the chosen sites was an uphill task. The tribal belt, insulated terrain and inaccessibility of the selected sites proved a limiting factor in providing contiguous coverage. The first to be deployed were radars of No 4084 and 4102 squadrons at Landikotal and Aravali. Another coverage was provided by No 410 Squadron whereas low-level ADGE comprised a belt of MPDRs and MOUs. The radars located between Swat in north to Miranshah were manned round the clock by the officers and men of No 483 Unit. These radars had to be provided with rations, water, spares and other day-to-day needs. Similarly, conditions in the south were as hostile and difficult as in the north.
Some of the air defence sites were completely cut off from the bases. During winter season the personnel had to melt ice for washing and cooking. However, at no stage the men and officers were found lacking in morale and courage needed to sustain the operations. Air Defence Command rightly deserves credit for the deployment of radar at Machlak and Khojal which were to play an important and meaningful role during operations. Overall, many radar remained extremely under-manned as weapon controllers had to maintain the sites round the clock. The men and officers of Air Defence Branch are unsung heroes of PAF who withstood the rigours and pressures of real operations, weather and terrain for many years without respite.
Initially, F-6s from Peshawar and Samungli provided CAP in their respective areas. Their primary role was to show PAF's presence. The CAP pilots were specifically instructed to avoid engagements. More frequent CAP were mounted as the number or air violations increased. Such was the caution exercised by the higher command that almost everyone who mattered monitored the progress of interceptions from Sector Operation Centre and Northern Air Command Headquarters. It almost amounted to breathing down the necks of our controllers by the senior staff, which restricted the freedom of combat controllers. Given the situation and strategy imperatives, as explained earlier, such caution and close monitoring is understandable in retrospect. The Afghan violations initially remained restricted to occasional 1-2 nm incursions. As the CAPs were maintained in depth with strict instructions to avoid engagement, the whole exercise was one of extreme frustration for the controllers and pilots.
PAF's Air Operations
A review of the operations reveals that squadrons other than the F-16s, were not afforded a fair chance to exploit the intercept opportunities to shoot intruders. Stringent rules of engagement, cautious approach of the higher command and preference to use F-16s for western CAP, appear to have been the causes behind such missed interceptions. Operational activities of various squadrons engaged on western front are described in following paragraphs: -
(a) No 15 AS Squadron.
This Squadron was the first one to be tasked with ADA duties in 1979, from Peshawar. Their involvement on western border continued till the end of the war which required eight to ten pilots on ADA at one time. Periodically, a squadron detachment was also sent to another base to share duties for the defence of Kahuta. While thousands of hours were spent by the pilots on ADA, 2142 hours were flown on the western border. Twice its pilots intercepted the enemy aircraft: first a Russian IL-26 on 1st March 1980, and second two Mig-21s in February 1986. The Squadron was not authorised to shoot, much to the frustration of its pilots.
(b) No 26 TA Squadron.
This squadron remained deployed on ADA since Oct 84, at Peshawar till the end of the conflict. Its pilots flew 1564 western CAP missions whereas they were ordered 355 times to scramble for hot interceptions. They repeatedly flew parallel to Afghan formations within our territory. Large enemy formations would cross back into Afghan airspace on sensing their presence. Demonstrating a high level of discipline and self control, the pilots of No 26 Squadron played their part in forcing the enemy to abandon their pursuit of Mujahideen across the border, and thus minimised damage to own troops and population.
(c) No 17 and 23 AS Squadrons.
Both the squadrons operated from PAF Base Samungli in the southern part of the western border. No 23 Squadron was put on air defence alert right in the beginning whereas No 17 Squadron took over the duty in May 83. No 23 Squadron flew a total of 376 CAP missions and 361 hot scrambles. On the other hand, No 17 Squadron flew 682 CAP missions and was ordered to scramble 238 times. Resources of both the squadrons were stretched to the limit when their pilots had to share the defence of Kahuta from another base in the area of Northern Air Command. Unfortunately, a record of near engagements was not maintained. The same story of sighting the enemy and keeping an eye on him was also repeated here.
(d) No 5 TA&R and No 18 AS Squadrons.
These squadrons operated from PAF Base Minhas in the relatively active period of 1986. Their participation was restricted to patrolling the border areas and manning the CAP stations with other squadrons. The enemy always respected their presence and did not dare to pursue attacks beyond the border. No 5 Squadron flew 108 sorties, including 54 CAPs whereas No 18 Squadron scrambled twelve times.
(e) No 11 AS Squadron.
This squadron, established as operational conversion unit, played a significant role in training pilots for Afghan Operations. At the same time, the squadron shared the operational duties with its sister units namely No 9 and No 14 AS Squadrons. The instructor pilots of No 11 Squadron shared the burden of ADA duties and western CAP missions. Its pilots flew a total of 346 sorties of west CAP, out of which 256 CAPs were flown between active period of February to May 1986, alone. Unfortunately the first-ever engagement, led by a senior commander was not successful because lack of proficiency on newly acquired AIM-9L.
http://www.pakaviation.com/PVA/Library/Docs/pak_afghan_war_strategy.html
Courtesy DefenceJournal, Pakistan
Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even to express in precise terms.
Winston Churchill
Introduction
The Defence Forces of Pakistan are entrusted with the responsibility of providing ready and responsive capability to counter any challenge to national security. In order to succeed in such a mission, either by deterring or defeating the threat, Pakistan Air force shares the task equally with other services. The core around which the entire edifice of defence and military doctrines is structured remains 'Visualization of Threat'. Threat and capabilities in a given environment are ever changing factors. Continual review of these makes an essential prerequisite in keeping the formulated military strategy current, relevant and applicable.
In December 1979, the massive influx of Russian forces in Afghanistan transformed the geo-political scenario of the region. The ulterior motives behind the events, for times to come, would remain a subject of discussion and analysis for the students of military history and international affairs. However, as perceived in Pakistan, the long term principal objective of erstwhile Soviet Union was access to warm waters of Indian Ocean. This change, with strong military overtones, brought forth certain stark realities and limitations of our military system. Till then, as the envisaged threat emanated from the East, so quite naturally the force structure, organisation and plans of the PAF were orchestrated only towards that direction. The newly emerged volatile, dangerous and unpredictable situation in the West called for re-evaluation of our land and air strategy.
At this juncture of history, Pakistan's political and military leadership rose to the occasion. The decision to resist Soviet military aggression at all costs was one of the boldest policy decision taken at the national forum - hopefully for its far-sightedness it would get its due recognition by the posterity. The factor that eased the situation for Pakistan was convergence of national interests which forced United States to offer military assistance. However, the revised land strategy in general and air strategy in particular, seemed to have been influenced by the compulsions of policies set by political leadership. The aim of this article is to analyse the air strategy adopted by the PAF, and recap salient aspects of the conduct of air operations on the Western front.
Formulation of Air Strategy
The pattern of Soviet forces build-up in Afghanistan and their subsequent employment, along with their pre-occupation with combating Afghan resistance, suggested that a full-scale ground offensive against Pakistan was probably neither a viable option nor was it likely. Hostile, rugged terrain along Durand Line being unfavourable for large scale armour employment, reinforced this notion. Any manoeuvre across Pak-Afghan border had to be infantry biased supported with artillery. Under this scenario, it seems that a decision was taken by both Pakistan Army and the PAF that concurrent deployment of forces on the east as well as the west was too costly in terms of burden on our limited inventory. Therefore, resources to counter the new threat were deployed from the existing resources in various sectors of the western front. Simultaneously, plans were chalked out to redeploy these forces on the eastern theatre, if the situation so demanded. Incidentally, throughout the Afghan conflict our arch-rival India never let and opportunity go unexploited in exerting pressure on our eastern border. Throughout the 1980s, she continued to assess our vulnerability arising from divided military strength for realisation of her aims at different times. To our great discomfort, her will to exploit situations for achieving her multiple aims, manifested openly time and again required a suitable response. The most serious ones that merit mention are: threat of a possible surprise attack on Pak nuclear installation and the massive assembly of forces along our borders during exercise Ã’Brass Tack. While dealing with the situation on the western border, PAF along with Pak Army, had to also remain prepared to meet the threat on its eastern border. During the same decade, the fervour of non-proliferation at international level was at its peak. Pakistan allegedly, as portrayed by the west, was at the threshold of acquiring nuclear capability. The threat of a possible Israeli attack on Pak nuclear installations, with or without the support of regional and extra-regional players, was a real possibility. This threat required, both, a realistic assessment as well as suitable measures, to address the contingency. Thus, the air strategy called for undertaking following tasks simultaneously at the operational level:-
(a) Defend Pak airspace on the western front against air violations while remaining prepared to deal with further escalation of the Afghan conflict.
(b) Defend Pak nuclear facilities against a possible surprise attack from the IAF and Israeli Air Forces, jointly or separately.
(c) Remain prepared to undertake full-range of operations, if called upon to do so, on the eastern border.
Getting Prepared
Without going into details of the various policy options which must have been considered by the then political and military leadership to protect Pakistan's long-term interest in the region, the approach adopted by PAF to tackle the above-mentioned tasks could now be discussed. PAF, at this juncture, had to modernise its force to achieve a meaningful qualitative edge, if a credible deterrence had to be offered to its adversary, equipped with state of the art equipment. Making a tough decision, the CAS and his Air Staff wisely, in the first two years of war, turned down US offer of providing low technology F-5E and A-10 aircraft. The argument, put forth by the United States government that only these aircraft could efficiently be absorbed and effectively employed by the PAF, was rejected. PAF leadership insisted that it could not recommend purchase of such outdated and less capable aircraft to its government; and felt fully confident of assimilating advanced technology, and mastering the latest American weapon systems. Standing on its ground firmly, the PAF was able to persuade the Government of Pakistan and of the United States to allow purchase of F-16 aircraft, which were inducted in operational service in 1983. F-16's air intercept radar, and its potent weapons, provided the much-needed cutting edge to the air force and helped in overcoming the terrain-imposed limitation of ground based radar to some extent. In the hands of well trained PAF fighter pilots, F-16 aircraft were a force to reckon with. Except for the initial batch of six pilots, all F-16 air crew were trained by PAF without any foreign assistance. Pakistan Air Force devised a strategy aimed at deterring the enemy from intruding into our airspace, and hot pursuit operations, through Defensive Counter Air Operations only. It also continued to demonstrate its resolve to deal with large-scale aggressions on our western and eastern fronts. Initially, air violations on Afghan front were countered by ordering air defence scrambles from forward bases. Subsequently in 1986, when the intensity of violations increased, a heavier response in the shape of Ã’Combat Air Patrols along the western border was put up with reasonable success. The dictates of defence policy required adaptation of a defensive posture, and exercise of restraint, to keep the conflict from over-spilling the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan.
PAF on War Footing
At the operational level, the strategy devised had much different implications for the PAF than for the Pak Army. It was often not understood or appreciated by those not involved in it. Pak Army deployed necessary force along the western border while the bulk of its forces still remained in cantonments or in exercise areas. Similarly, on the eastern front, reasonable warning was available to occupy battle locations. It was not so in case of the PAF particularly on western front as it operated from a limited number of air bases. As PAF was forced to undertake only Defensive Counter Air Operations, which in simple words required maintenance of pilots and aircraft on ground alert round the clock and mounting continuous Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions, its air bases were kept at highest level of operational readiness. In achievement of first task described earlier, air bases of PAF Northern Air Command were kept ready. Few PAF air bases, along the western border, from where aircraft took off to intercept or patrol air space were at war with the enemy. On eastern front, the threat of a surprise attack on nuclear installation by India or Israel required an air force's response from almost all flying units. The period during which Pakistan was engaged in dealing with the Afghan problem, was also of growing tension between Pakistan and India. Indeed the PAF remained on war footing and prepared to contain any aggressor with all its might during this crucial period. Its aircrew and personnel remained available to react on short notice and continuously rehearsed their well formulated plans. The spirit with which the above mentioned task was performed by the dedicated personnel of PAF, about which not much was made known to public, deserves highest praise. It should now be made available to public to enable them to acknowledge and appreciate PAF's role and achievements during those fateful years.
For PAF, therefore, the situation was not much different from a full-fledged war which it undertook throughout the conflict in general and during the period 1986-87, in particular. It entailed operating air defence sensors and command and control centres at their peak efficiency, while men and officers remained operationally deployed in field and on their respective air bases. Such was the level of readiness of PAF that it could have gone to war almost without any warning. With such a state of preparedness why thousands of air violations, including incidents of attack on targets just inside our borders took place during the Afghan war, is a question which requires a deep understanding of air operations. Unless a no-fly zone was declared and established such intrusions could not have been prevented. It called for aggressive employment of air power. A small air force like the PAF, however efficient it may be, cannot establish a no-fly zone over a 1000-km long frontier. Moreover, crossing of international borders to establish such a zone would have meant open confrontation amounting to war. The situation not only required a Herculean effort in terms of continuous CAP but an early warning system to detect violations. Clearly such an objective was both untenable and unrealistic under the prevalent environment. This subject will be dealt with in greater details later.
Air Defence Ground Environment
Defence of own airspace against hostile enemy aircraft is achieved by creating an Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) through setting up of radar network to guide own aircraft for interception. Before the Soviet invasion, surveillance of our western border was carried out by high level radar only. Therefore, a new plan had to be made to create low as well as high level ADGE, especially covering the areas of interest. However, difficult and rugged mountainous terrain on the western border did not favour setting up of an elaborate low-level network. Nevertheless, a quick re-deployment of the available resources was made in two distinct sectors. The first area, called the northern belt for ease of understanding, consisted of the land mass between Laram to Miranshah. This area witnessed maximum ground as well as air activity by the enemy during the war. The southern belt stretched from Quetta to Pishin in Balochistan. However, the intensity of activity in this area was not as much as in the north.
Deployment of Mobile Low-Level Radars (MPDRs) and Mobile Observers Units (MOUs) at the chosen sites was an uphill task. The tribal belt, insulated terrain and inaccessibility of the selected sites proved a limiting factor in providing contiguous coverage. The first to be deployed were radars of No 4084 and 4102 squadrons at Landikotal and Aravali. Another coverage was provided by No 410 Squadron whereas low-level ADGE comprised a belt of MPDRs and MOUs. The radars located between Swat in north to Miranshah were manned round the clock by the officers and men of No 483 Unit. These radars had to be provided with rations, water, spares and other day-to-day needs. Similarly, conditions in the south were as hostile and difficult as in the north.
Some of the air defence sites were completely cut off from the bases. During winter season the personnel had to melt ice for washing and cooking. However, at no stage the men and officers were found lacking in morale and courage needed to sustain the operations. Air Defence Command rightly deserves credit for the deployment of radar at Machlak and Khojal which were to play an important and meaningful role during operations. Overall, many radar remained extremely under-manned as weapon controllers had to maintain the sites round the clock. The men and officers of Air Defence Branch are unsung heroes of PAF who withstood the rigours and pressures of real operations, weather and terrain for many years without respite.
Initially, F-6s from Peshawar and Samungli provided CAP in their respective areas. Their primary role was to show PAF's presence. The CAP pilots were specifically instructed to avoid engagements. More frequent CAP were mounted as the number or air violations increased. Such was the caution exercised by the higher command that almost everyone who mattered monitored the progress of interceptions from Sector Operation Centre and Northern Air Command Headquarters. It almost amounted to breathing down the necks of our controllers by the senior staff, which restricted the freedom of combat controllers. Given the situation and strategy imperatives, as explained earlier, such caution and close monitoring is understandable in retrospect. The Afghan violations initially remained restricted to occasional 1-2 nm incursions. As the CAPs were maintained in depth with strict instructions to avoid engagement, the whole exercise was one of extreme frustration for the controllers and pilots.
PAF's Air Operations
A review of the operations reveals that squadrons other than the F-16s, were not afforded a fair chance to exploit the intercept opportunities to shoot intruders. Stringent rules of engagement, cautious approach of the higher command and preference to use F-16s for western CAP, appear to have been the causes behind such missed interceptions. Operational activities of various squadrons engaged on western front are described in following paragraphs: -
(a) No 15 AS Squadron.
This Squadron was the first one to be tasked with ADA duties in 1979, from Peshawar. Their involvement on western border continued till the end of the war which required eight to ten pilots on ADA at one time. Periodically, a squadron detachment was also sent to another base to share duties for the defence of Kahuta. While thousands of hours were spent by the pilots on ADA, 2142 hours were flown on the western border. Twice its pilots intercepted the enemy aircraft: first a Russian IL-26 on 1st March 1980, and second two Mig-21s in February 1986. The Squadron was not authorised to shoot, much to the frustration of its pilots.
(b) No 26 TA Squadron.
This squadron remained deployed on ADA since Oct 84, at Peshawar till the end of the conflict. Its pilots flew 1564 western CAP missions whereas they were ordered 355 times to scramble for hot interceptions. They repeatedly flew parallel to Afghan formations within our territory. Large enemy formations would cross back into Afghan airspace on sensing their presence. Demonstrating a high level of discipline and self control, the pilots of No 26 Squadron played their part in forcing the enemy to abandon their pursuit of Mujahideen across the border, and thus minimised damage to own troops and population.
(c) No 17 and 23 AS Squadrons.
Both the squadrons operated from PAF Base Samungli in the southern part of the western border. No 23 Squadron was put on air defence alert right in the beginning whereas No 17 Squadron took over the duty in May 83. No 23 Squadron flew a total of 376 CAP missions and 361 hot scrambles. On the other hand, No 17 Squadron flew 682 CAP missions and was ordered to scramble 238 times. Resources of both the squadrons were stretched to the limit when their pilots had to share the defence of Kahuta from another base in the area of Northern Air Command. Unfortunately, a record of near engagements was not maintained. The same story of sighting the enemy and keeping an eye on him was also repeated here.
(d) No 5 TA&R and No 18 AS Squadrons.
These squadrons operated from PAF Base Minhas in the relatively active period of 1986. Their participation was restricted to patrolling the border areas and manning the CAP stations with other squadrons. The enemy always respected their presence and did not dare to pursue attacks beyond the border. No 5 Squadron flew 108 sorties, including 54 CAPs whereas No 18 Squadron scrambled twelve times.
(e) No 11 AS Squadron.
This squadron, established as operational conversion unit, played a significant role in training pilots for Afghan Operations. At the same time, the squadron shared the operational duties with its sister units namely No 9 and No 14 AS Squadrons. The instructor pilots of No 11 Squadron shared the burden of ADA duties and western CAP missions. Its pilots flew a total of 346 sorties of west CAP, out of which 256 CAPs were flown between active period of February to May 1986, alone. Unfortunately the first-ever engagement, led by a senior commander was not successful because lack of proficiency on newly acquired AIM-9L.
http://www.pakaviation.com/PVA/Library/Docs/pak_afghan_war_strategy.html
: PAF is just GREAT WITH F16s :smokingc:
