Martime Strategy

[Salty Dog]

Fundamentally countries with any maritime interest must have a maritime strategy which determines the maritime force structure and how it will be employed.

We should discuss the variety of martime strategies around the world with their similarities and differences.

Perhaps we can see why (or why not) some countries need aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, riverine forces, naval aviation, or even a coast guard.

 

[Salty Dog]

The US Martime Strategy is no secret and you can download it from here:

US Maritime Strategy

Although the Sea Services conduct many missions, the following six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an
increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build
partnerships.

1- Forward Presence
2- Deterrence
3- Sea Control
4- Power Projection
5- Maritime Security
6- Humanitarian Assitance and Disaster Response

 

[weasel1962]

Australia's maritime strategy

Deleted

 

[Lostfleet]

It is my understanding that major navies of today have focused too much on counter-terrorism or supporting foreign expeditions of their own military. At the moment it seems like there will be no fleet to fleet actions anymore.

Do you think there will be proper naval warfare again in the near future?

 

[kato]

The German intention is to have it both ways.

A limited fleet capable of "winning a regional conflict", and a similar-sized fleet with a primary peace-keeping / expeditionary role - with lots of mutual support and interchange between both parts of course.

For the most part, the "expeditionary fleet" would not be able to survive in any symmetric conflict; the intended outfit pretty much reduces AAW and ASW to self-defense-only (ASW a bit better), as such capabilities would be provided primarily by attaching "combat fleet" units to a taskgroup if needed in a theater.
On the other hand, the "combat fleet" is barely outfitted for MIO or land attack, and has only rudimentary facilities to support any SF or infantry.

The variable expeditionary taskgroup and a number of essential concepts for the future German Navy strategy has been tested extensively in UNIFIL and in large-scale maneuvers.

The mutual-interchange in systems though goes to the extent that e.g. the Type 212A submarines are used for the "regular fleet", while the Type 212B are slated for the "expeditionary fleet" (to replace Type 206A there) due to their support for SF insertion and improved surveillance facilities. Mine Warfare systems are identical between both fleets, although the regular fleet is a bit more focused towards minehunting instead of wide sweeping actions.

The final outfit for the two fleets btw:
- Combat fleet: 3 F124 FFG, 4 F123 FFG, 5 K130 FFL, 4 U212A SSK, 6 MHC
- Expeditionary fleet: 4 F125 FFG*, 6+ K131 FFL*, 2+ U212B SSK, 9 MHC

(* - shortterm: 8 F122 FFG / 10 P143A FAC)

 

[IrishHitman]

It is my understanding that major navies of today have focused too much on counter-terrorism or supporting foreign expeditions of their own military. At the moment it seems like there will be no fleet to fleet actions anymore.

Do you think there will be proper naval warfare again in the near future?

The EU has recognised the overemphasis of counter-terrorist naval power, and the UK and France are currently cooperating on an aircraft carrier program..

Spain is currently building two small carriers, and (I may be wrong on this) Italy has ordered/is building one.

 

[kato]

The EU has recognised the overemphasis of counter-terrorist naval power, and the UK and France are currently cooperating on an aircraft carrier program..

... without much success due to funding problems. More significant in that regard however are the major escort units ordered by both - entirely "classic" ASW/AAW ships. Same for e.g. Spain, Italy, Denmark, Norway, the upcoming competition in Greece...

Spain is currently building two small carriers, and (I may be wrong on this) Italy has ordered/is building one.

Italy has two, one older, one brand-new (it commissioned a while ago). Same situation for Spain, though their new carrier is still fitting out.
There are no other carriers under construction or ordered right now in the EU outside the UK (France is considering it, while the UK has ordered long-lead items).

 

[IrishHitman]

... without much success due to funding problems. More significant in that regard however are the major escort units ordered by both - entirely "classic" ASW/AAW ships. Same for e.g. Spain, Italy, Denmark, Norway, the upcoming competition in Greece...


Italy has two, one older, one brand-new (it commissioned a while ago). Same situation for Spain, though their new carrier is still fitting out.
There are no other carriers under construction or ordered right now in the EU outside the UK (France is considering it, while the UK has ordered long-lead items).

Treaty of Lisbon is set to change the funding situation.
Never discount politics when it comes to military ambition...

Who was it said "Diplomats are just as important in starting wars as soldiers are finishing them"?

 

[kato]

You're reading too much into the Treaty of Lisbon.

It contains mutual defence clauses, and formalizes the representation of (unanimously) common security interests by the EU body, but not much more.
It prescribes steps toward a common EU defense policy, and only touches equipment to the extent that procurement should be handled via (not by) the EDA.

There won't be any additional funding, spread of funding to other nations, or procurement for joint operation.

 

[IrishHitman]

You're reading too much into the Treaty of Lisbon.

It contains mutual defence clauses, and formalizes the representation of (unanimously) common security interests by the EU body, but not much more.
It prescribes steps toward a common EU defense policy, and only touches equipment to the extent that procurement should be handled via (not by) the EDA.

There won't be any additional funding, spread of funding to other nations, or procurement for joint operation.

It also states that all member states must increase their military capabilities (which is a reason many Irish people are against it).
And all parties to the treaty will have to obey that.

Are you saying that the UK won't increase funding for the new carrier project despite this justification?

 

[kato]

Are you saying that the UK won't increase funding for the new carrier project despite this justification?

The UK can (rightfully) point out that it has one of the highest GDP percentages on military spending throughout the EU (excepting Greece).

Also, it doesn't say anywhere that these "improvements" actually have to mean more money for procurement.

The future §28a (3) could just as well - and likely will by many members - be interpreted as not cutting spending, and investing in modernizing the militaries of the individual members. The paragraph doesn't say anything about funding at all in fact, but just says that there have to be moves towards improving military capabilities.
Note that the EDA - in the same paragraph - is described as an Evaluation Agency for requirements, and will support national measures to fill these requirements; it doesn't say anywhere that the requirements actually have to be met by member nations, or that the individual members can't still set differing priorities and requirements.

We're getting quite a bit off topic for this thread though

 

[IrishHitman]

The UK can (rightfully) point out that it has one of the highest GDP percentages on military spending throughout the EU (excepting Greece).

Also, it doesn't say anywhere that these "improvements" actually have to mean more money for procurement.

The future §28a (3) could just as well - and likely will by many members - be interpreted as not cutting spending, and investing in modernizing the militaries of the individual members. The paragraph doesn't say anything about funding at all in fact, but just says that there have to be moves towards improving military capabilities.
Note that the EDA - in the same paragraph - is described as an Evaluation Agency for requirements, and will support national measures to fill these requirements; it doesn't say anywhere that the requirements actually have to be met by member nations, or that the individual members can't still set differing priorities and requirements.

We're getting quite a bit off topic for this thread though

True, but the politics of the military are so damn interesting....

 

[ltb]

i would say that most countries around the world are focusing on an expeditionary strategy with the exception of the usa which is looking more toward command of the ocean, with the view to implimenting power projection enabled by this dominance.

Most NATO coutries are reducing the size of there fleets due to the cost of intigration within forcenet and american NCW systems, this is not to say that they are packing less punch... they are jsut smaller.

To say that navies around the world are moving toward a strategy of tackling terrorism would be niave, i personally stuggle to see the benifit of a war ship even the new littoral style craft in the prevention of such acts. I do conceed however that navies aroudn the world have a major role to play in preventing crimal activities in all forms which are likly to be linked int o the funding of terrorist activities at some level

 

[swampfox]

Re:

Who was it said "Diplomats are just as important in starting wars as soldiers are finishing them"?

That was Will Rogers.

 

[Ths]

Thanks Salty Dog for bringing it up.

There is no doubt the USNavy is the force every maritime nation has to consider.

The fundamental issue for the USNavy is nuclear submarine - own and others.
Though the finger has been moved from the trigger, nuclear armed submarines can never, ever, take second priority - the destructive power is simply to great. Furthermore political moodswings are considerably shorter than the time taken to build a force.
There is no doubt, that the US naval strategy is to keep any potential enemy nuclear submarine inoperative, if that isn't accomplished, then keep them in port, if that is not accomplished sink them at sea. The last option is very expensive and risky,
The melting of the polar icecap gives new problems: You can hide any amount of submarines under the ice - from satelites, that is. The question is however if there hasn't been developed methods to detect, track and control submarines under the water - irrespective of ice. How effective these methods are, is a matter of the greatest interest, and probably the highest classified information at all.

The second priority is the ability to control any portion of the oceans at will. Generally that is done by the carrier task forces. Significantly the carrier air wings have been reduced in size.
Reduction is not surprising, as both the reduced threat level and the increased efficiency of the airborne weaponssystems call for rationalisation.
This reduction could have been achieved by reducing the number of carriers and giving the air wings double punch. There are arguments for that, as the ability to defend the carrier from air threats require a minimum number of aircraft to maintain a force 24/7 in the air. This consideration has apparently taken the back seat to other considerations; namely the ability to maintain a presense with a task force everywhere - and deliberately incur the extra cost of running extra carriers.

The carrier task force has limitations:
1. Due to existence of mobile shore batteries with SSMs the carrier force has to stand off a potentially hostile shore - around 50 nm. Compared to carriers such batteries are simple and cheap.
This is particularly irritating for the marines, as their ability to land from their landing ships is curbed. It either means a long and potentially dangerous trip in landing crafts - some with marginal seaworthiness in nasty weather; or it means a longer flight with helicopter - and range is not the long suit of that mechanical contraption. Thus the inordinate patience with the Osprey project - which can only be described as torteous; but essential to one main missions of the task force: To size a foothold on more or less any shore at will.

The other limitation is that there are waters where carriers have great difficulty sailing, let alone operate. The classical example is the Baltic Sea - it has been tried in peacetime exercises, and apparently the findings were that it was inadviceable. On the other hand: Ships for the Baltic are next to useless anywhere else. (The classical problem of the Russian navy: Not only is the navy divided into 4 fleets, but if they join up they are next to impossible to operate together, as the ships are to different)

 

[Salty Dog]

Operation Unified Response

The US Martime Strategy is no secret and you can download it from here:

US Maritime Strategy

Although the Sea Services conduct many missions, the following six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an
increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build
partnerships.

1- Forward Presence
2- Deterrence
3- Sea Control
4- Power Projection
5- Maritime Security
6- Humanitarian Assitance and Disaster Response

USN assets conducting humanitarian and disaster relief operations for Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response certainly are supporting US Maritime strategy.

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) maneuvers off the coast of Haiti.

USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) is anchored off the coast of Haiti.

USS Bataan (LHD 5) transits off the coast of Haiti while conducting flight operations.

 

[dragonfire]

The Indian Navy's maritime strategy document is available for download at its official site. Link http://indiannavy.nic.in/maritime_strat.pdf