The iminfamous Brisbane line

[Ozzy Blizzard]

This one goes out to all the Aussies on this forum. I'm sure we've all heard of the Brisbane line. An imaginary defencive line that ran east-west to the north of brisbane and any time my nan mention's it she shudders. But to me it doesnt seem to be a bad idea. Any Australian invasion would have happened on the eastern coast. The Japanese could have attacked Pearth and Darwin but this would have been strategically indicisive. If Blamey concentrated any father north he ran the risk of large Japanese forces landing right on his lines of communication and left a clear road between the Japanese forces and the main population centres to the south. Any landing further south of the Brisbane line would have overstreached Japanese logistical capabilities. Every thing of use had been moved south or destroyed under Curtins orders. If the Japanese thrusts could have been stoped allong the coast, Allied mobile forves could have defeated them inland. So to me it seems to be logicall military stratagy. Or were we just being defeatist? What do you guys think???

 

[Sea Toby]

Tactically the Brisbane line defence of Australia had its merits. Losing Perth and Darwin would not have been a military disaster for Australia. On the other hand strategically, allowing the Japanese control of the Coral Sea would have cut off the sea lanes to Australia from the United States. Lucky for the Australians, the British were not too keen to open the second front in France as early as the Americans wished, which allowed America to send forces to the Pacific to stem the Japanese tide.

While MacArthur may not have been the best tactical commander around, not many had a better strategic mind. Being a former chief of staff of the American Army, MacArthur understood the strategic situation. Prime Minister Curtin was impressed with MacArthur and his staff, their knowledge of Washington D.C. led him to follow MacArthur. Frustrated with the British, in which the Australians knew well, and unfamiliar with the Americans, Curtin chose well.

While it is true the Australians paid a high price for Papua New Guinea, the Americans paid a high price for Guadalcanal. MacArthur knew if the allies were able to win a victory in battle, more forces and supplies would be sent as the Americans ramped up. MacArthur and Admiral King also understood the Atlantic/European cartel in Washington, including General Marshall and Eisenhower, would have to be weaned for every scrap of men, equipment, and supplies.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

Yeah i see your point. I supose that the coral sea and lines of communication to the U.S. was Australia's jugular. And the "Battle of Australia" meaning the kokoda/New Guinea campaign and the Guadalcannal/Solomon Islands campaign really rendered the defence of mainland Australia irrelevent. If those shipping lines had been cut then Australia would have been redered useless as a staging point for an Allied counter-offencive, and without the assets of the USN the Australian army would have been pretty much incapable of independant offensive action in New Guine or the Dutch East Indies. Strategically the Coral Sea was imperritive.

 

[Sea Toby]

I understand the Australian generals were only planning with what they had in hand, and the Brisbane line was a good tactical plan. Keep in mind the Australians were very familiar with the British, but that was not the case with America. MacArthur knew of the American war plans against Japan, he also knew the Army wasn't going to take a back seat either. Furthermore, MacArthur blamed the navy for the loss of the Philippines, it was the navy's job in the war plans to send reinforcements. Unfortunately, the navy was hurt very badly at Pearl Harbor and was unable to fulfill the war plans. The navy showed the importance of the Coral Sea sea lanes with the carrier battle, which forced his army, both Australian and American, to strike Papua New Guinea.

Of course Papua New Guinea wasn't the best terrain to fight a war or win a battle. After huge losses, MacArthur and his staff started hitting the Japanese where they ain't, bypassing their stronger positions, cutting them off to let them whither on the vine. While American forces moved onwards to the Philippines, it was left to the Australians to mop up these strongholds, which didn't necessarily whither on the vine. While there can be claimed a tactical fault in this plan, it was strong strategically.

One of MacArthur's biggest headaches in Washington was the large number of American generals having been involved in Europe during WWI against the few numbers having been involved in the Pacific. His only ally, and not much of one at that, was Admiral King, chief of the navy. This powerful Atlantic/European cartel eventually led to the Marshall Plan and NATO.

MacArthur's occupation of Japan was his shining hour, in my opinion. His disagreements with Truman over Korea may have been his worst hour.

While MacArthur gathered a very good staff, the one that shined in my opinion was the commander of the fifth air force, General Kenney. His leadership of the air corps led to many air victories.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I Guess New Guinie and the Duth east indies were allways going to be primarily Australian campaigns, since New guinie was an Australian teritory and large Australian forces were allready there. And the philipines were allways going to be MacArthur's primarry goal for U.S. forces. MacArthur was an oustanding officer in manny respects, but he was definately a primadona, there's no way he would have let any allied boots stand on the Phillipines unless they were U.S. standard issue. And it seems that the Australian forces were relegated to a somewhat strategicly insignifigant role. e.g. the New Guinea campaign after Gona, and eventually the Tarakan/Borneo campaign (where my grandfather served) and this could have been somewhat political, with MacArthur having one eye on the white house. But one could argue that the entire south pacific campaign was somewhat strategically insignifigant after the threat to Australia had been removed. Japan was defeated by the destruction of the Japanese merchant marine by the USN and Nimiz's drive through the central Pacific to Sipan and eventualy Okinawa and Iwo Jima, so retaking the Philipines wast really vital in a miltary scence, it may have done wonders for public moralle.

 

[Sea Toby]

I wouldn't classify any theater more important than another. Maybe the Austrailians felt used in a secondary campaign in Borneo, but there are many Amerians who felt the entire Italian campaign was a wasted effort, the priority should have been the second front in France. I feel every campaign in which bullets were flying towards you as important and honorable, even for those who took part in the back and never saw action had a hand in victory.

And while it is true the liberation of the Philippines wasn't important for the war effort, it was important to the American people, especially those who wished to liberate Amerian territory. Keep in mind even Canada sent a division to help America liberate the Aleutians.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

The 5th airforce was definately an important unit in the south pacific campaighns. The Air superiority enjoyed by allied forces in New Guinea was definately decicive and the 5th air force definately plaid a (or the) major part in that (Dont forget the RAAF). MacArthur may have been good at picking his staff and his subordinate commanders but he was hell to work under. His shortcomings as a tactitian were preety clear to see. During the retreat on the Kokoda track after isurava, he told Blamey that "the japanese will be stoped here" pointing to a spot on a map and taking no consideration of the massive supply dificulties, terrain or the condition of the men, and obviosly getting nervouse about the possibility of Mosresby falling. He seems to have been the compleat oppisite to ike, who was often bullied by his pushie subordinates like Montgomery and Patton and would rarely attemt to get involved in tactical problems. He also publically chastised Australian troops for the "defeat" of the Kokoda campaign, even though it was a stunning succsess, which seems like he was covering his ass showing his political opportunism:rel . To be fair so did Blamey with the imfamous "the rabit who runs gets shot in the back" speech. This was probably worse since these were his own troops. To be honest i dont think he picked the right man for the Suprime Commander Allied Land Forces General Thomas Blamey. blamey was a decent staff officer and had fought in North Africa and Greece where manny subordinates such as Rowell thought he was incompient. This led to manny personal problems between Australian field commanders and the removal of Potts (i think, i get him and rowell mixed up???) who led the brilliant retreat and was unquestionall and outstanding field commander. i wonder if MacArthur felt cheated that he didn't command in the strategically vital theater? He seems to have had his "thunder" stolen by ike and Nimitz.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I wouldn't classify any theater more important than another. Maybe the Austrailians felt used in a secondary campaign in Borneo, but there are many Amerians who felt the entire Italian campaign was a wasted effort, the priority should have been the second front in France. I feel every campaign in which bullets were flying towards you as important and honorable, even for those who took part in the back and never saw action had a hand in victory.

Your right North western Europe was the pivotal theater but the Medditerainian was still strategically vital. it allowed the Allies to face the Whermacht in a low risk theater, weed out inferior commanders like Aukinlec and Wavell and find competent ones like Bradley, Patton and Montgomery. And led to the defeat of italy and the capitulation of 250 000 Axis troops in "tunisgrad" (Tunisia). And prevented operation Sledghammer (the invasion of france in 1942) from becoming the worst military disaster that the allies would suffer. However once New Guinea had been secured and the USN was savaging the Japanese merchant marine campaigns in the Dutch east indies were strategically irellevent. We just went there because we had to go somewhere. i'm not saying that they were any less honorable and that Japanese and Australian dead were any less dead or couragouse, just that its interesting to contemplate the motives behind MacArthurs reasoning.

 

[Sea Toby]

Frankly, the oil resources were valued at Borneo. I also think the Japanese could have bombed the southern Philippines from Borneo, something America would not stand. I honestly believe he gave Borneo to the Australians because they hadn't been used for a while, and he wanted to keep them sharp for the invasion of Japan.

Since the Australians played a major role at Borneo, I believe it helped the confidence of Australia's army post war.

In my mind Borneo had a much more military value than the fog bound and windswept Aleutians. The American division sent to take them suffered the worst casualties of the war, mostly weather related.

Yes, MacArthur wasn't afraid to sack anyone. He sacked American Generals Brett and Harding too. You'll notice that I mentioned earlier that Papua New Guinea was not the best terrain to be fighting battles.

As I recall on 11 August 1942 the Japanese bombed the airport at Port Moresby and destroyed many Allied aircraft. Before the weather cleared on 22 September, after stealing Dutch aircraft and rebuilding of ours, the fifth air force took off and flew through the Owen Stanleys in a cloudbank to hit the Japanese air strips as their weather cleared, which was the turning point of the air war. The Japanese were taking off and were going to hit us again that same day.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

The Borneo oilfields were important, to the allies anyway. they were useless to the Japanese however. And since Borneo was the only option in the area that had some strategic value i guess it's the logical choice. Tarakan was the first time the Australian Army launched an amphibiouse offensive that was largely indipendant for the U.S. or the Brittish. So your right it was a great confidence builder for the Aussies. I guess the only reason for going after the Alutions was the it was the only U.S. soil occupied (correct me if i'm wrong here, is there any differance between the Alutions and say Guam or Wake Island???) and the propaganda/moralle value, not really worth the lives lost!

 

[Sea Toby]

Edwin P. Hoyt, an American historian who has written many books of World War II, says it best. While Nimitz and the navy marched through the Central Pacific with the Orange War Plans, their leading navy role diminished.

When President Roosevelt flew out to Honolulu after accepting his fourth Democratic Party nomination in the summer of 1944, the Navy wished to continue their drive across the Pacific to Formosa (Taiwan). MacArthur seized upon the opportunity to turn the Orange War Plans against the Navy, with the full support of the Army.

You see, once the Phillipines were liberated, the war against Japan would become predominately an Army affair, especially the invasion of Japan. The Navy's role would become secondary, as the Navy had already won its war against the Japanese fleet.

MacArthur may have lost some Washington battles early on getting the men and supplies from the US, but MacArthur never lost sight of liberating the Phillipines and to carry on the war against Japan. While crossing the Pacific may have been a naval affair, Japan itself was an army affair. And he knew it.

In many of the island campaigns across the Pacific, one Army division, I believe a National Guard division from Minnesota, fought alongside the Marines. When the Marine General Howland Smith dismissed the Army General in Saipan, and gave this General hell beforehand, that was the final straw for the US Army General Staff. General Marshall, a die hard member of the European cartel, was all Army.

While MacArthur may have ran into a few trees in the forest, MacArthur never lost sight of the entire forest. While Blamey may have had differences with MacArthur, Curtin knew MacArthur understood Washington, and backed him. From their very first meeting MacArthur was postive of victory, whereas the Australian staff were negative.