Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 1
By Dr. Michael Knights
Dec 18, 2003, 12:08
Orders of battle, platform procurement, and technological developments often figure disproportionately in assessments of the capabilities of modern air forces. Building and maintaining an air arm requires careful consideration of the threat profile facing a state, the level of financial commitment, and constraints on the skilled manpower base and available technologies. With growing downward pressures on defence spending and increasing focus on counter-terrorism, as opposed to conventional warfighting capabilities, development of effective air forces requires increasing ingenuity at the dawn of the 21st century.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – present a revealing case study of how small and medium-sized regional states are adapting to changes in the procurement and operational environments. Despite landmark air operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, the Gulf was the crucible of air warfare in the 1990s. GCC militaries have hosted and closely interacted with western air forces for over a decade. The result has been a quiet shift from building fleets and inventories, to building and maintaining capabilities. Long-considered one of the least likely candidates for reform in its military procurement and force planning policies, the activities of GCC air forces now provide key pointers to future trends.
Effective threat assessment, focusing on both the national threat and specific air warfare threat environment, is vital to the development of air power procurement and employment options. Despite this, threat assessment has not always been an integral part of GCC force planning. The early development of GCC air forces was instead primarily driven by a number of socio-economic and political factors. Air and air defence-led deterrent postures were eminently suitable for the GCC states, complementing their low populations and high government revenues. Large transfers of modern aircraft cemented western security guarantees and acted as symbols of national pride and growing modernity. Following two decades of conflict in the Gulf, however, threat assessment has become an increasingly important driver in the development of GCC air and air defence forces. The importance of maintaining effective air defences both over cities and maritime arteries was harshly driven home to the combatant and non-combatant Gulf States alike during the Iran-Iraq war, the associated ‘tanker war’, the Gulf War, and the militarised containment of Iraq that followed.
Like many small and medium sized regional states outside Europe, the end of the Cold War did not radically alter the threat spectrum and air force mission profiles facing GCC states. Post-Cold War readjustment stressed expeditionary warfare – ‘out-of-area’ deployments and voluntary involvement in ‘wars of choice’. ‘Wars of necessity’ involving conventional military homeland defence receded in incidence. As vital interests are not at stake in typical western interventions, the ‘western way of war’ calls for minimal exposure of friendly troops and non-combatants to risk, and as air opposition is low in many interventions, air-to-air capabilities are firmly second-place to air-to-ground capabilities. Interventionist countries no longer face a single monolithic threat from either NATO or the eastern bloc and thus require strategic airlift capabilities and ship-borne carrier aviation to meet the geographically dispersed threats of tomorrow.
The strategic context of the Gulf States has not changed as radically nor in the same ways as that of western powers.
• Homeland defence and the maintenance of navigable sea-lanes remains the primary focus of GCC armed forces, despite improving relations between GCC states and their regional neighbours.
• Expeditionary warfare is not a major factor, as states remain focused on the regional military balance.
• Cold-War style overland invasion by armoured forces remains a serious threat in the Gulf.
• Early warning remains a vital force multiplier - defensive forces must be able to fight from a ‘cold start’ in the case of warning failure. In the case of the GCC states, lack of sufficient strategic depth demands that rapid results are achieved at the early stage of any invasion, the so-called ‘Halt Phase’.
• No Gulf State can assume that it will begin a conflict with air superiority and few will manage to attain air supremacy without western assistance. Air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities remain of great importance in the Gulf States.
The GCC states have found themselves vulnerable to a broadening range of military and paramilitary threats, however, expanding the spectrum of potential threat agents beyond the state’s geographic neighbours.
• The threat radii of Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli strategic missile forces continue to grow, as have the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of these states. Other states such as the are developing long-range strike capabilities that extend beyond the 150km range of the Missile Technology Control Regime by marrying stand-off heavy air-launched cruise missiles to long-range strike aircraft. The sanctuary of range is fast disappearing for Gulf States.
• Sub-state actors and covert destabilization campaigns remain important proxy weapons in interstate warfare, particularly between Iran and Iraq, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Other sub-state actors may be largely transnational and apolitical but nonetheless represent a serious national security threat (such as narcotics, goods, or people-smuggling criminal organizations).
Yet while the offensive capabilities ranged against the Gulf States are increasing, it can be argued that hostile intentions are likely to decline due to drivers such as the rise of moderates in Iran since 1997, the cessation of various border disputes between GCC states, and the possibility of regime change in Iraq. This reduces the likelihood of major armed conflict, particularly between Iran and the GCC states, but does not necessarily reduce the political utility of well-balanced deterrent armed forces in the region. The fluid, incrementally changing balance of power in the Gulf involves long-term battles of perception concerning the identification of regional leaders, revolving around issues such as the contribution of forces during the resolution of crises and the relative willingness of certain states to back their words with actions. As democratic civil society develops in the Gulf, history dictates that nationalistic tensions, posturing, and inter-state clashes will accompany the nation-state building process. Though issue resolution through arbitration and negotiation has enjoyed some success in recent years, there is ample evidence that once issues become politicised, they quickly become resistant to non-violent resolution (e.g., the Iranian-occupied Tunb islands and Abu Musa). In such cases, military capability represents a key bargaining chip.
In designing their air arms, the GCC states thus face a dilemma. As serious as potential external threats are, Gulf leaders are growing increasingly aware of urgent non-military threats to regime stability and national security. Military deterrence is one vital pillar of national security, but economic and socio-political well being provides the other legs that allow the structure to remain standing. Economic stagnation, oil dependence, foreign debt, and profligate spending have left most GCC members incapable of maintaining defence expenditure and subsidized welfare simultaneously.
Thus, on the one hand, strong pressures are depressing spending on high-intensity armed forces, whilst on the other, the GCC are conscious that peace and stability are a product of deterrent dynamics in the region. Though is difficult to imagine military scenarios where western security guarantees will not prove to be the decisive factor, the GCC states have committed to a common defence policy, and increasingly need to display credible military forces to reduce the leverage and high profile of western security guarantors, and increase the political credibility and potential for independent policy of the regional alliance. Though GCC states and their air forces face many common threats, the varied geography and differential sizes of GCC states has led each state to identify the unique roles and missions of its own air arm.
Average Annual Defence Expenditure in $ millions
Five-year plan..1986-1990.....1991-95.....1996-00
Bahrain................154...........246.........351
Kuwait..............1,342.........6,101.......3,904
Oman................1,442.........1,703.......2,114
Qatar....................842...........580.........1,280
Saudi Arabia....17,371......23,817......20,553
UAE.................1,498.........2,549.......2,711
GCC total.......22,832.......34,999......30,052
Iran...................4,054.........3,171.......4,560
Iraq...................8,869.........3,522.......1,334
Yemen.................683...........569.........439
(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (London: I.I.S.S., 1987-2002)
The outlook for future defence spending varies from state to state. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait remain the key markets. Following heavy spending commitments made in the early 1990s, Saudi may defer major procurements until the 2006-2010 period. Of the $12 billion and $15 billion supplemental funds set aside for their respective rearmament programmes, Kuwait and the UAE each have around $4 billion worth of uncommitted funding remaining. Major Kuwaiti procurement projects frozen during the 1996-2000 five-year plan will be undertaken in the 2001-2005 five-year plan instead. Bahrain and Oman are small markets and will rely heavily on the US to assist with procurement. Oman has initiated a sustained increase in spending, with the Omani government indicating that the 2001-2005 period will see Oman’s major rearmament drive, including expenditure of over $2 billion per year. Following very high per capita spending in the late 1990s, Qatar has completed most of its air and air defence procurement for the foreseeable future.
Row of USAF F-16CGs as seen parked on an Iraqi airfield hit by sand-storm, during operation "Iraqi Freedom", in March 2003. (Photo: USAF)
Procurement practices in the GCC
Five key trends emerge from analysis of the air and air defence procurement practices of the six GCC states:
US vendors are increasing their market shares: As well as dominating traditional markets such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, the US has made key inroads into the UAE and Oman markets. The Bush administration has strongly increased Foreign Military Financing aid to Bahrain and Oman, and may extend aid to other states under the mantle of ‘the war against terror’. The US continues to open markets and maintain market share by transferring large amounts of surplus military equipment (Excess Defence Articles or EDA) to GCC states, capturing future sales in the profitable fields of aerospace parts and technologies, military aircraft engines, avionics, and communications technologies. At the other end of the technology transfer scale, the US is rapidly relaxing restrictive export controls to win business in the GCC states. Once one GCC state is cleared to receive a system, breakout occurs (i.e., GCC states ordering the Raytheon AMRAAM jumped from zero to four in two years). No-restrictions technology transfer was a key European and Eastern Bloc market differentiator in the past, but looks likely to diminish.
GCC states may represent partners in collaborative design: The $2 billion UAE investment in collaborative development of key US technologies (such as the integrated avionics and Agile Beam Radar on the F-16 Block 60) indicates a change in the status of GCC states willing to commit large sums to procurement (for the moment limited to Saudi Arabia).
Buyers are more cautious: Gulf States have slowed the rate of fleet replacement and aerospace spending in general. Buyers are prepared to delay major purchases, push back out of services dates, and mothball large numbers of aircraft, despite the risks posed by capability shortfalls and reduced inventories. It is often considered preferable to break major procurement commitments and delay in-service dates than order cheaper equipment with deleted sub-capabilities. Upgrading current equipment is increasingly acceptable as an alternative to new procurement. New-build models, with longer operational lifespan, are preferred to second-hand equipment despite the price difference. New purchases may rely on part-exchange or resale of retired types (Kuwaiti and Qatari Mirage F-1, Kuwaiti A-4KU, Saudi F-5E/F).
Buyers are more professional: GCC procurement practices have improved greatly during the late 1990s, led by the UAE and Kuwait, who have both instituted strong oversight into arms deals. Bribery, through the use of commissions payments and local fixers (commission agents) continue at reduced levels, but have been largely pushed underground. Closer ties with the US – which considers commissions payments as illegal bribes - have reduced commissions, as have local initiatives. Tendering and selection processes are becoming more effective and more rigorous.
Buyers are more assertive: Even buyers with comparatively little financial clout are growing intolerant towards overpriced and downgraded equipment. Buyers are also ensuring that competitive offset agreements are out in place, guaranteeing that deence companies reinvest a portion of the value of the sale back into investments in the purchasing GCC state. Offset agreements are now approaching 100-115% of the original value of the sale, and may include features such as pre-offset (invested before a sale has even been agreed) or cash offsets (a simple discount, paid in western currency).
Above and bellow: in the last 15 years, most of GCC states proved good US allies and supporters, providing extensive basing facilities - in return for security guarantees. Regardless if at Kuwaiti airfields (see the USAF F-15E above), or at Masirah AB, in Oman (loading of a GBU-31 on an USAF B-1 bomber, bellow), the US servicemen can feel safe so far. In exchange, the GCC states have experienced a period of immense economic development, which mirrored also in the development of their armed forces. As the US influence is increasing, the times when other arms suppliers were delivering large amounts of arms are past: some of the GCC states are now selling even their advanced aircraft of European origin and replacing them by "Made in America" types. (Photos: USAF)
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_397.shtml
GCC should strengthen their ties also with Russia and China .They know that US is also supporting israel then why they are trusting US arm supply lines.
By Dr. Michael Knights
Dec 18, 2003, 12:08
Orders of battle, platform procurement, and technological developments often figure disproportionately in assessments of the capabilities of modern air forces. Building and maintaining an air arm requires careful consideration of the threat profile facing a state, the level of financial commitment, and constraints on the skilled manpower base and available technologies. With growing downward pressures on defence spending and increasing focus on counter-terrorism, as opposed to conventional warfighting capabilities, development of effective air forces requires increasing ingenuity at the dawn of the 21st century.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – present a revealing case study of how small and medium-sized regional states are adapting to changes in the procurement and operational environments. Despite landmark air operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, the Gulf was the crucible of air warfare in the 1990s. GCC militaries have hosted and closely interacted with western air forces for over a decade. The result has been a quiet shift from building fleets and inventories, to building and maintaining capabilities. Long-considered one of the least likely candidates for reform in its military procurement and force planning policies, the activities of GCC air forces now provide key pointers to future trends.
Effective threat assessment, focusing on both the national threat and specific air warfare threat environment, is vital to the development of air power procurement and employment options. Despite this, threat assessment has not always been an integral part of GCC force planning. The early development of GCC air forces was instead primarily driven by a number of socio-economic and political factors. Air and air defence-led deterrent postures were eminently suitable for the GCC states, complementing their low populations and high government revenues. Large transfers of modern aircraft cemented western security guarantees and acted as symbols of national pride and growing modernity. Following two decades of conflict in the Gulf, however, threat assessment has become an increasingly important driver in the development of GCC air and air defence forces. The importance of maintaining effective air defences both over cities and maritime arteries was harshly driven home to the combatant and non-combatant Gulf States alike during the Iran-Iraq war, the associated ‘tanker war’, the Gulf War, and the militarised containment of Iraq that followed.
Like many small and medium sized regional states outside Europe, the end of the Cold War did not radically alter the threat spectrum and air force mission profiles facing GCC states. Post-Cold War readjustment stressed expeditionary warfare – ‘out-of-area’ deployments and voluntary involvement in ‘wars of choice’. ‘Wars of necessity’ involving conventional military homeland defence receded in incidence. As vital interests are not at stake in typical western interventions, the ‘western way of war’ calls for minimal exposure of friendly troops and non-combatants to risk, and as air opposition is low in many interventions, air-to-air capabilities are firmly second-place to air-to-ground capabilities. Interventionist countries no longer face a single monolithic threat from either NATO or the eastern bloc and thus require strategic airlift capabilities and ship-borne carrier aviation to meet the geographically dispersed threats of tomorrow.
The strategic context of the Gulf States has not changed as radically nor in the same ways as that of western powers.
• Homeland defence and the maintenance of navigable sea-lanes remains the primary focus of GCC armed forces, despite improving relations between GCC states and their regional neighbours.
• Expeditionary warfare is not a major factor, as states remain focused on the regional military balance.
• Cold-War style overland invasion by armoured forces remains a serious threat in the Gulf.
• Early warning remains a vital force multiplier - defensive forces must be able to fight from a ‘cold start’ in the case of warning failure. In the case of the GCC states, lack of sufficient strategic depth demands that rapid results are achieved at the early stage of any invasion, the so-called ‘Halt Phase’.
• No Gulf State can assume that it will begin a conflict with air superiority and few will manage to attain air supremacy without western assistance. Air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities remain of great importance in the Gulf States.
The GCC states have found themselves vulnerable to a broadening range of military and paramilitary threats, however, expanding the spectrum of potential threat agents beyond the state’s geographic neighbours.
• The threat radii of Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli strategic missile forces continue to grow, as have the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of these states. Other states such as the are developing long-range strike capabilities that extend beyond the 150km range of the Missile Technology Control Regime by marrying stand-off heavy air-launched cruise missiles to long-range strike aircraft. The sanctuary of range is fast disappearing for Gulf States.
• Sub-state actors and covert destabilization campaigns remain important proxy weapons in interstate warfare, particularly between Iran and Iraq, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Other sub-state actors may be largely transnational and apolitical but nonetheless represent a serious national security threat (such as narcotics, goods, or people-smuggling criminal organizations).
Yet while the offensive capabilities ranged against the Gulf States are increasing, it can be argued that hostile intentions are likely to decline due to drivers such as the rise of moderates in Iran since 1997, the cessation of various border disputes between GCC states, and the possibility of regime change in Iraq. This reduces the likelihood of major armed conflict, particularly between Iran and the GCC states, but does not necessarily reduce the political utility of well-balanced deterrent armed forces in the region. The fluid, incrementally changing balance of power in the Gulf involves long-term battles of perception concerning the identification of regional leaders, revolving around issues such as the contribution of forces during the resolution of crises and the relative willingness of certain states to back their words with actions. As democratic civil society develops in the Gulf, history dictates that nationalistic tensions, posturing, and inter-state clashes will accompany the nation-state building process. Though issue resolution through arbitration and negotiation has enjoyed some success in recent years, there is ample evidence that once issues become politicised, they quickly become resistant to non-violent resolution (e.g., the Iranian-occupied Tunb islands and Abu Musa). In such cases, military capability represents a key bargaining chip.
In designing their air arms, the GCC states thus face a dilemma. As serious as potential external threats are, Gulf leaders are growing increasingly aware of urgent non-military threats to regime stability and national security. Military deterrence is one vital pillar of national security, but economic and socio-political well being provides the other legs that allow the structure to remain standing. Economic stagnation, oil dependence, foreign debt, and profligate spending have left most GCC members incapable of maintaining defence expenditure and subsidized welfare simultaneously.
Thus, on the one hand, strong pressures are depressing spending on high-intensity armed forces, whilst on the other, the GCC are conscious that peace and stability are a product of deterrent dynamics in the region. Though is difficult to imagine military scenarios where western security guarantees will not prove to be the decisive factor, the GCC states have committed to a common defence policy, and increasingly need to display credible military forces to reduce the leverage and high profile of western security guarantors, and increase the political credibility and potential for independent policy of the regional alliance. Though GCC states and their air forces face many common threats, the varied geography and differential sizes of GCC states has led each state to identify the unique roles and missions of its own air arm.
Average Annual Defence Expenditure in $ millions
Five-year plan..1986-1990.....1991-95.....1996-00
Bahrain................154...........246.........351
Kuwait..............1,342.........6,101.......3,904
Oman................1,442.........1,703.......2,114
Qatar....................842...........580.........1,280
Saudi Arabia....17,371......23,817......20,553
UAE.................1,498.........2,549.......2,711
GCC total.......22,832.......34,999......30,052
Iran...................4,054.........3,171.......4,560
Iraq...................8,869.........3,522.......1,334
Yemen.................683...........569.........439
(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (London: I.I.S.S., 1987-2002)
The outlook for future defence spending varies from state to state. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait remain the key markets. Following heavy spending commitments made in the early 1990s, Saudi may defer major procurements until the 2006-2010 period. Of the $12 billion and $15 billion supplemental funds set aside for their respective rearmament programmes, Kuwait and the UAE each have around $4 billion worth of uncommitted funding remaining. Major Kuwaiti procurement projects frozen during the 1996-2000 five-year plan will be undertaken in the 2001-2005 five-year plan instead. Bahrain and Oman are small markets and will rely heavily on the US to assist with procurement. Oman has initiated a sustained increase in spending, with the Omani government indicating that the 2001-2005 period will see Oman’s major rearmament drive, including expenditure of over $2 billion per year. Following very high per capita spending in the late 1990s, Qatar has completed most of its air and air defence procurement for the foreseeable future.
Row of USAF F-16CGs as seen parked on an Iraqi airfield hit by sand-storm, during operation "Iraqi Freedom", in March 2003. (Photo: USAF)
Procurement practices in the GCC
Five key trends emerge from analysis of the air and air defence procurement practices of the six GCC states:
US vendors are increasing their market shares: As well as dominating traditional markets such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, the US has made key inroads into the UAE and Oman markets. The Bush administration has strongly increased Foreign Military Financing aid to Bahrain and Oman, and may extend aid to other states under the mantle of ‘the war against terror’. The US continues to open markets and maintain market share by transferring large amounts of surplus military equipment (Excess Defence Articles or EDA) to GCC states, capturing future sales in the profitable fields of aerospace parts and technologies, military aircraft engines, avionics, and communications technologies. At the other end of the technology transfer scale, the US is rapidly relaxing restrictive export controls to win business in the GCC states. Once one GCC state is cleared to receive a system, breakout occurs (i.e., GCC states ordering the Raytheon AMRAAM jumped from zero to four in two years). No-restrictions technology transfer was a key European and Eastern Bloc market differentiator in the past, but looks likely to diminish.
GCC states may represent partners in collaborative design: The $2 billion UAE investment in collaborative development of key US technologies (such as the integrated avionics and Agile Beam Radar on the F-16 Block 60) indicates a change in the status of GCC states willing to commit large sums to procurement (for the moment limited to Saudi Arabia).
Buyers are more cautious: Gulf States have slowed the rate of fleet replacement and aerospace spending in general. Buyers are prepared to delay major purchases, push back out of services dates, and mothball large numbers of aircraft, despite the risks posed by capability shortfalls and reduced inventories. It is often considered preferable to break major procurement commitments and delay in-service dates than order cheaper equipment with deleted sub-capabilities. Upgrading current equipment is increasingly acceptable as an alternative to new procurement. New-build models, with longer operational lifespan, are preferred to second-hand equipment despite the price difference. New purchases may rely on part-exchange or resale of retired types (Kuwaiti and Qatari Mirage F-1, Kuwaiti A-4KU, Saudi F-5E/F).
Buyers are more professional: GCC procurement practices have improved greatly during the late 1990s, led by the UAE and Kuwait, who have both instituted strong oversight into arms deals. Bribery, through the use of commissions payments and local fixers (commission agents) continue at reduced levels, but have been largely pushed underground. Closer ties with the US – which considers commissions payments as illegal bribes - have reduced commissions, as have local initiatives. Tendering and selection processes are becoming more effective and more rigorous.
Buyers are more assertive: Even buyers with comparatively little financial clout are growing intolerant towards overpriced and downgraded equipment. Buyers are also ensuring that competitive offset agreements are out in place, guaranteeing that deence companies reinvest a portion of the value of the sale back into investments in the purchasing GCC state. Offset agreements are now approaching 100-115% of the original value of the sale, and may include features such as pre-offset (invested before a sale has even been agreed) or cash offsets (a simple discount, paid in western currency).
Above and bellow: in the last 15 years, most of GCC states proved good US allies and supporters, providing extensive basing facilities - in return for security guarantees. Regardless if at Kuwaiti airfields (see the USAF F-15E above), or at Masirah AB, in Oman (loading of a GBU-31 on an USAF B-1 bomber, bellow), the US servicemen can feel safe so far. In exchange, the GCC states have experienced a period of immense economic development, which mirrored also in the development of their armed forces. As the US influence is increasing, the times when other arms suppliers were delivering large amounts of arms are past: some of the GCC states are now selling even their advanced aircraft of European origin and replacing them by "Made in America" types. (Photos: USAF)
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_397.shtml
GCC should strengthen their ties also with Russia and China .They know that US is also supporting israel then why they are trusting US arm supply lines.