The best strategy to defending Singapore Island

[Josef]

Originally Posted by feanor

to Invade It Without Local Bases To Support It, One Would Need A Very Formidable Navy. We Can Number Off Potential Invaders On The Fingers Of One Hand.

who Will Invade Singapore?

Why Do Yah Promote That The Philippines Purchase The Most Ancient Armored Personnel Carriers In Youtube And Philippines Defense Forum?

Are U A Friend Of Adroth?


Don't U Know The Philippines Is An Ally Of The U.s. Since Ww2?


What Will U Do If Taiwan Is Returned To Beijing?

[OPSSG]

Firn, as usual, thank you for the interesting responses.

Originally Posted by Firn

From a "post-modern" point of view he is unable to satisfy the rigour of analytical philosophy or modern scientific methodology and ends up with a work in which is far from scientific in a modern sense...

I would be equally happy if we could just say the looking back from the present, Clauswitz is "unable to satisfy the rigour of analytical philosophy or modern scientific methodology and ends up with a work in which is far from scientific in a modern sense."

Do you need the concept of a 'post-modern' point of view? This concept is subject to some academic debate. Further, my understanding of the idea of a 'post-modern' point of view is not what you have described. I don't really want to debate the idea of what is 'post-modern' if it is not essential to the point you are driving at.

Originally Posted by Firn

The key characteristics of Singapore are:

- wealthy, independent city-state with a population of roughly 4 mill. citizen
- heavily urbanized tiny peninsular/island
- key economic and financial hub of SE-Asia and of the international trade

....

If I may, I would like to qualify your basis of analysis further on 2 minor points for your consideration:

(i) Singapore has over 3 million citizens and close to 1 million PRs or professionals on employment passes working in Singapore. We have a very low reproduction rate, such that, population growth has been achieved by net immigration. So our natural talent pool available for defence is small and we work on the long term assumption of a declining birth rate.

(ii) Singapore has a self imposed cap on defence spending at 6% of our GDP and historically we have spent around 5% of our GDP on defence. Fortune has favoured our economy since independence, which has allowed our defence spending to enjoy constant real growth, especially from the 1980s onwards. From a planning perspective, in the late 1960s and the 1970s, we initially did not expect to outspend our neighbours in defence matters - outspending our neighbours in defence is a phenomenon that is only self evident after the 1997 Asian economic crisis.

Originally Posted by Firn

To be continued.

BTW what do you think about the format

I am reading with interest and I await further posts from you.

[Firn]

I would be equally happy if we could just say the looking back from the present, Clauswitz is "unable to satisfy the rigour of analytical philosophy or modern scientific methodology and ends up with a work in which is far from scientific in a modern sense."

I agree that the term post-modern is a best confusing and that is far better to state simply that from a present point of view his work doesn't meet the "present" criterias of the social sciences.

The first minor point addresses an error of mine, as I wrote 4 million citizien instead of resident. The second minor one excaberates in conjunction with the key characterstic of a very shallow available and relative pool of manpower.

The point on the percentage spent on defense is a very enlighting one.


A Grand Strategy for Singapore


Given the inherent complexity of the geopolitical landscape of SE-Asia this can only be very limited, very sketchy and perishable interpretation of what a effective grand strategy of Singapore might look like.



The key characteristics of Singapore are:

- wealthy, indipendent city-state with a population of roughly 4 mill. residents
- heavily urbanized tiny peninsular/island
- key economic and financial hub of SE-Asia and of the international trade



The strategic dimensions

This inherent characteristics combined with those of neighbouring nations shape the strategic dimensions of the state:

a) a general lack of strategic depth, absolute and relative to its immediate neighbours
b) an easily disruptable economy with immediate dire consequences
c) a relative shallow pool of directly available manpower and ressources
d) a relative high wealth and a high education and technological level
e) a stabile democracy and a efficient state

Note: To a certain extent the position of Athen, especially in the Poleponnesian Wars showed similar characteristics.

I will analyse the points one by one:


a) The relative strategic depth

The strategic depth is overall shallow but varies according to the origin and form of the threat considerably. I use the word strategic depth in a broad way to analyse/describe to which degree the geopolitical scape influences the ability of an external state/actor to achieve a decisive victory.

(I) Against Malaysia the SD on land is very, very limited. The channel offers an excellent defensive line though. Every inch of Singapore's territory is in possible artillery and SAM reach. However even while Malaysia has far greater SD it's ability to supply itself over land with the ressources needed for war are very limited and depend on Thailand.

Same goes for the SD of air and sea against the main peninsula, while it is good against the Malayisan part situated on the island. Malaysia is unable to sustain war with its domestic production and ressources expect food and water and trades over the sea. All this routes and the necessary facilities of trade might be endangered by a superior navy and airforce.

(II) SD against Indonesia

(III) SD against the PRC

(IV) SD



b) An easily disruptable economy

The deep reliance on external trade for the most basic of goods and for comparable wealth of the city-state of Singapore combined with the shallow strategic depth make it potentially very suscitable to an external attempts to disrupt,severe or block this flow by sea, land and air. The means to do so are many and far from only achievable with military forms.

However the importance of state as a trade hub and its strategic position increase also the importance of its peaceful existence in the eyes of those interested in free, open and undisturbed trade, transforming this intrinisc weakness into an important pillar of strenght. Out of necessity political, economical and military support are indirectly or directly even present at times of peace. It is quite probable that an external aggressor might have to face the economic and/or military power of various other actors of this region, among those the USA.

c) A shallow pool of manpower

The low number of citizien and the low reproduction make the available pool of manpower very shallow relative to most states in the region. A conflict relative close to the ideal of an absolute war against the most states in the region is unwinnable in the long run.

d) A high level of education and technological know-how

This allows Singapore to operate (and partly to develop) cutting-edge military hardware in an efficient and effective way and to integrate conscripts/reservists even into demanding roles with relative ease and speed-
It creates also closer bonds with regional and international partners due to habitual cooperation.

e) A efficient democracy

A highly functional and efficient state is able to manage complex tasks and concentrate his forces on objects of his choosing. This holds true for the entire spectrum of services offered by the state to his citizien and residents.


Synthesis - A tentative approach of an grand strategy


So how could one look like?

The Politik of the Grand Strategy

The deep non-aligned military, political and economical cooperation with both "solid" and cooperation in differing forms with "difficult" partners.


(i) Making Singpore irreplacable for the wider net of "solid" partners and "difficult" partners alike. This means strenghening the already existing and mentioned strenghts of this state. A "neutral" fabric which keeps the web of commerce and finance togheter might be for some an attractive prize to win, but it is also for many more a terrible knot to loose. This investments may be the most fruitful and efficient in the long term.


(ii) Inform international partners about the importance of the sorrounding tradeflow in general and of city-state in spefic and try to influence the perceptions of their institutions and policy-makers. This can be done in a great many ways and is IMHO a very cost-effective way to vastly increase the "strategic depth" of the state.


(iii) Cooperate closely with the regional partners to increase the security of the tradeflow and the economic and political freedom. There will be much friction and disaccord as Singapore is widely seen as the great profiteer, but it must be undertaken to decrease the chances of low-level and limited attemps to harass and disrupt the lifelines of Singapore.


(iv) Inform and influence the perceptions of the surrounding populations and decision makers in your favor by acting as a helping hand in times of crisis for te former and by offering excellent non-binding treatment to the latter



The Military in the Grand Strategy


b) A solid military force with the capability to dominate/negate the vital sea lanes and airspace and to defeat immediate threads with rapidly mobilized and modern joint armed forces

(i) A large number of military trained citiziens which can be integrated in times of crisis rapidly to form a relative large and effecitve fighting force. This allows for the effective concentration of force in time and space to defend the small territory of Singapore, see Clausewitz (Chapter 8, Superiority in numbers):

"Much more frequently the relative superiority—that is, the skilful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point—has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious direction which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important—that is, to keep the forces concentrated in an overpowering mass. In this, Frederick the Great and Buonaparte are particularly characteristic." 1


(ii) Relative limited manpower and relative high wealth mean that the armed forces will have to rely to a great extent on expensive technology, organisation and training to achieve an efficient military force. A high amount of the "Vernichtungsprinzip" (firepower) in combination with the "Bewegungsprizip" (mobility) has all major conflict been able to ease the need for manpower up to a certain extent.Modern, highly mechanized and networked armed forces with overwhelming firepower are even with relative few men fearsome opponents. This raises the stakes greatly for any potential invader. 2


(iii) A powerful navy and a powerful airforce are able to greatly harrass, disrupt and block the ability of opposing states to operate efficiently, more so in the spefic geopolitical environment of SE Asia. The great importance of trade for the funcition of almost any industrial or even semi-industrial nation is well known. A large number of relative soft targets is needed to allow a modern economy to operate and to sustain the war effort.


(iv) A powerful navy and airforce are also capable to make an sustainable invasion by almost all nations almost impossible and keep the trade routes, the lifelines of Singapore under most conditions open. They are also able to assist the armed forces in limited and rapid offensive actions.


(v) The ability to deliver "surgical" strikes on a large scale and to defend itself against sustained air,land and sea attacks by firepower is of great political importance in a limited conflict as it may allow Singapore to contain limited attacks by external forces without being forced to large land offensives. This is especially important because the all of the tiny surface of the island might be under some condition in artillery or bombing range. A effective, yet limited response increases the chances of goodwill and support by parters and allies.


Notes:

1. It is of course only a part of the whole, even if a very important one. He continues:

"We think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers the importance which belongs to it; it is to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at before all and as far as possible.

But to regard it on this account as a necessary condition of victory, would be a complete misconception of our exposition; in the conclusion to be drawn from it there lies much rather nothing more than the value which should attach to numerical strength in the combat. If that strength is made as great as possible, then the maxim is satisfied; a review of the total relations must then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided for want of sufficient force."

2. See also the following, the concept of which is IMHO timeless (Book V, The relation of the three arms) "Now, if the combination of the three gives the greatest strength, it is natural to inquire what is the best absolute proportion of each, but that is a question which it is almost impossible to answer.

If we could form a comparative estimate of the cost of organising in the first instance, and then provisioning and maintaining each of the three arms, and then again of the relative amount of service rendered by each in war, we should obtain a definite result which would give the best proportion in the abstract. But this is little more than a play of the imagination. The very first term in the comparison is difficult to determine, that is to say, one of the factors, the cost in money, is not difficult to find; but another, the value of men's lives, is a computation which no one would readily try to solve by figures.

Also the circumstance that each of the three arms chiefly depends on a different element of strength in the state—Infantry on the number of the male population, cavalry on the number of horses, artillery on available financial means—introduces into the calculation some heterogeneous conditions, the overruling influence of which may be plainly observed in the great outlines of the history of different people at various periods.

As, however, for other reasons we cannot altogether dispense with some standard of comparison, therefore, in place of the whole of the first term of the comparison we must take only that one of its factors which can be ascertained, namely, the cost in money. Now on this point it is sufficient for our purpose to assume that, in general, a squadron of 150 horsemen, a battalion of infantry 800 strong, a battery of artillery consisting of 8 six-pounders, cost nearly the same, both as respects the expense of formation and of maintenance."

Form the same chapter:

"On the other hand, the nature of a war may have a notable influence on the proportions of the three arms.

First, a national war, kept up by militia and a general levy (Landsturm), must naturally bring into the field a very numerous infantry; for in such wars there is a greater want of the means of equipment than of men, and as the equipment consequently is confined to what is indisputably necessary, we may easily imagine, that for every battery of eight pieces, not only one, but two or three battalions might be raised.

Second, if a weak state opposed to a powerful one cannot take refuge in a general call of the male population to regular military service, or in a militia system resembling it, then the increase of its artillery is certainly the shortest way of bringing up its weak army nearer to an equality with that of the enemy, for it saves men, and intensifies the essential principle of military force, that is, the destructive principle. Any way, such a state will mostly be confined to a limited theatre, and therefore this arm will be better suited to it. Frederick the Great adopted this means in the later period of the Seven Years' War."

@OPSSG: I would once again welcome your criticism.

[Firn]

I will perhaps modify the post further, best if with some input of experienced members.

[OPSSG]

Originally Posted by Firn

The key characteristics of Singapore are:

- wealthy, interdependent city-state with a population of roughly 4 mill. residents
- heavily urbanized island [delete: tiny peninsular]
- key economic and financial hub of SE-Asia and of the international trade

Save for minor modifications or specific comments below in 'blue', I broadly agree with your attempt to analyse the vulnerabilities.

Originally Posted by Firn

The strategic dimensions

This inherent characteristics combined with those of neighbouring nations shape the strategic dimensions of the state:

a) a general lack of strategic depth, absolute and relative to its immediate neighbours
b) an easily disruptable economy with immediate dire consequences
c) a relative shallow pool of directly available manpower and resources
d) a relative high wealth and a high education and technological level
e) a stable democracy and an efficient state

Note: To a certain extent the position of Athen, especially in the Poleponnesian Wars showed similar characteristics.

See my comments below on each point and I hope you will find my comments helpful.

Originally Posted by Firn

a) The relative strategic depth

The strategic depth is overall shallow but varies according to the origin and form of the threat considerably. I use the word strategic depth in a broad way to analyse/describe to which degree the geopolitical scape influences the ability of an external state/actor to achieve a decisive victory.

(I) Against Malaysia the SD on land is very, very limited. The channel offers an excellent defensive line though. Every inch of Singapore's territory is in possible artillery and SAM reach. However even while Malaysia has far greater SD it's ability to supply itself over land with the resources needed for war are very limited and depend on Thailand.

Same goes for the SD of air and sea against the main peninsula, while it is good against the Malaysian part situated on the island. Malaysia is unable to sustain war with its domestic production and resources expect food and water and trades over the sea. All this routes and the necessary facilities of trade might be endangered by a superior navy and air force.

(II) SD against Indonesia

(III) SD against the PRC

(IV) SD

In the discussion on strategic depth, I would simply say that:

Singapore, in physical terms lacks strategic depth viz a viz our immediate neighbours (like Malaysia and Indonesia). Given our small size and population, our country would be logically seen as vulnerable and difficult to defend from a military perspective.

Originally Posted by Firn

b) An easily disruptable economy

The deep reliance on external trade for the most basic of goods and for comparable wealth of the city-state of Singapore combined with the shallow strategic depth make it potentially very susceptible to an external attempts to disrupt,severe or block this flow by sea, land and air. The means to do so are many and far from only achievable with military forms.

However the importance of state as a trade hub and its strategic position increase also the importance of its peaceful existence in the eyes of those interested in free, open and undisturbed trade, transforming this intrinsic weakness into an important pillar of strength. Out of necessity political, economical and military support are indirectly or directly even present at times of peace. It is quite probable that an external aggressor might have to face the economic and/or military power of various other actors of this region, among those the USA.

I broadly agree with your idea but would bring across essentially the same point in a simpler manner:

b) The Singapore economy is dependent on International Trade

Singapore as a city state is not self sufficient in the production of food, energy and raw materials. Given that Singapore is entirely dependent on trade, any disruption in trade flowing through the region would have an adverse effect on Singapore, Singaporeans and our economy. However, given Singapore's geo-strategic importance, external powers would likewise be concerned with any disruption in the trade passing through the region. Singapore has chosen to align her commercial interests with that of the external powers (like the Australia, Japan, US and even China), such that any unilateral attempt by any immediate neighbour to disrupt trade would be viewed unfavourably by the external powers.

Originally Posted by Firn

c) A limited [delete:shallow] pool of manpower

The low number of citizen and the low reproduction make the available pool of manpower very limited [delete:shallow] relative to most states in the region.

d) A high level of education and technological know-how

This allows Singapore to operate (and partly to develop) cutting-edge military hardware in an efficient and effective way and to integrate conscripts/reservists even into demanding roles with relative ease and speed-
It creates also closer bonds with regional and international partners due to habitual cooperation. A conflict relative close to the ideal of an absolute war against the most states in the region is unwindable in the long run.

Delete the last line in 'blue' and insert the following:

If Singapore is drawn into a conflict of attrition with any of our bigger immediate neighbours, such a conflict would not be viewed as conventionally winnable.

Originally Posted by Firn

d) A high level of education and technological know-how

This allows Singapore to operate (and partly to develop) cutting-edge military hardware in an efficient and effective way and to integrate conscripts/ reservists even into demanding roles with relative ease and speed -
It creates also closer bonds with regional and international partners due to habitual cooperation.

Agreed.

Originally Posted by Firn

e) Singapore is a capable state with a capable government[delete:A efficient democracy.]

A highly functional and efficient state is able to manage complex tasks and concentrate his forces on objects of his choosing. This holds true for the entire spectrum of services offered by the state to his citizen and residents.

I believe the modified text above is a more accurate description of Singapore and our government.

Originally Posted by Firn

The Politik of the Grand Strategy

The deep non-aligned military, political and economical cooperation with both "solid" and cooperation in differing forms with "difficult" partners.


(i) Making Singapore irreplaceable for the wider net of "solid" partners and "difficult" partners alike. This means strengthening the already existing and mentioned strengths of this state. A "neutral" fabric which keeps the web of commerce and finance together might be for some an attractive prize to win, but it is also for many more a terrible knot to loose. This investments may be the most fruitful and efficient in the long term.


(ii) Inform international partners about the importance of the surrounding trade flow in general and of city-state in specific and try to influence the perceptions of their institutions and policy-makers. This can be done in a great many ways and is IMHO a very cost-effective way to vastly increase the "strategic depth" of the state.


(iii) Cooperate closely with the regional partners to increase the security of the tradeflow and the economic and political freedom. There will be much friction and disaccord as Singapore is widely seen as the great profiteer, but it must be undertaken to decrease the chances of low-level and limited attempts to harass and disrupt the lifelines of Singapore.


(iv) Inform and influence the perceptions of the surrounding populations and decision makers in your favor by acting as a helping hand in times of crisis for the former and by offering excellent non-binding treatment to the latter

I make no comments here.

Originally Posted by Firn

The Military in the Grand Strategy


b) A solid military force with the capability to dominate/negate the vital sea lanes and airspace and to defeat immediate threads with rapidly mobilized and modern joint armed forces

(i) A large number of military trained citizens which can be integrated in times of crisis rapidly to form a relative large and effective fighting force (but this force is untested in war). This allows for the effective concentration of force in time and space to defend the small territory of Singapore, see Clausewitz (Chapter 8, Superiority in numbers):

"Much more frequently the relative superiority—that is, the skillful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point—has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious direction which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important—that is, to keep the forces concentrated in an overpowering mass. In this, Frederick the Great and Buonaparte are particularly characteristic." 1


(ii) Relative limited manpower and relative high wealth mean that the armed forces will have to rely to a great extent on expensive technology, organisation and training to achieve an efficient military force. A high amount of the "Vernichtungsprinzip" (firepower) in combination with the "Bewegungsprizip" (mobility) has all major conflict been able to ease the need for manpower up to a certain extent.Modern, highly mechanized and networked armed forces with overwhelming firepower are even with relative few men fearsome opponents. This raises the stakes greatly for any potential invader. 2


(iii) A powerful navy and a powerful airforce are able to greatly harrass, disrupt and block the ability of opposing states to operate efficiently, more so in the spefic geopolitical environment of SE Asia. The great importance of trade for the funcition of almost any industrial or even semi-industrial nation is well known. A large number of relative soft targets is needed to allow a modern economy to operate and to sustain the war effort.


(iv) A powerful navy and airforce are also capable to make an sustainable invasion by almost all nations almost impossible and keep the trade routes, the lifelines of Singapore under most conditions open. They are also able to assist the armed forces in limited and rapid offensive actions.


(v) The ability to deliver "surgical" strikes on a large scale and to defend itself against sustained air,land and sea attacks by firepower is of great political importance in a limited conflict as it may allow Singapore to contain limited attacks by external forces without being forced to large land offensives. This is especially important because the all of the tiny surface of the island might be under some condition in artillery or bombing range. A effective, yet limited response increases the chances of goodwill and support by partners and allies.

Save for minor addition in 'blue' above, I make no further comments.

[Firn]

I edited my post due to the changes OPSSG proposed.


A sketchy Grand Strategy for Singapore



The strategic properties

The key characteristics of Singapore are:

- wealthy, interdependent city-state with a population of roughly 4 mill. residents
- heavily urbanized island
- key economic and financial hub of SE-Asia and of the international trade



The strategic dimensions

This inherent characteristics combined with those of neighbouring nations shape the strategic dimensions of the state:

a) a general lack of strategic depth, absolute and relative to its immediate neighbours
b) an easily disruptable economy with immediate dire consequences
c) a relative shallow pool of directly available manpower and resources
d) a relative high wealth and a high education and technological level
e) a stable democracy and an efficient state

Note: To a certain extent the position of Athen, especially in the Poleponnesian Wars showed similar characteristics.



a) General lack of Strategic depth

Singapore, in physical terms lacks strategic depth viz a viz our immediate neighbours (like Malaysia and Indonesia). Given our small size and population, our country would be logically seen as vulnerable and difficult to defend from a military perspective



b) An easily disruptable economy

The deep reliance on external trade for the most basic of goods and for comparable wealth of the city-state of Singapore combined with the shallow strategic depth make it potentially very susceptible to an external attempts to disrupt,severe or block this flow by sea, land and air. The means to do so are many and far from only achievable with military forms.

However the importance of state as a trade hub and its strategic position increase also the importance of its peaceful existence in the eyes of those interested in free, open and undisturbed trade, transforming this intrinsic weakness into an important pillar of strength. Out of necessity political, economical and military support are indirectly or directly even present at times of peace. It is quite probable that an external aggressor might have to face the economic and/or military power of various other actors of this region, among those the USA.



c) A limited pool of manpower

The low number of citizen and the low reproduction make the available pool of manpower very limited [delete:shallow] relative to most states in the region.



d) A high level of education and technological know-how

This allows Singapore to operate (and partly to develop) cutting-edge military hardware in an efficient and effective way and to integrate conscripts/reservists even into demanding roles with relative ease and speed-
It creates also closer bonds with regional and international partners due to habitual cooperation. A conflict relative close to the ideal of an absolute war against the most states in the region is unwindable in the long run.



e) Singapore is a capable state with a capable government

A highly functional and efficient state is able to manage complex tasks and concentrate his forces on objects of his choosing. This holds true for the entire spectrum of services offered by the state to his citizen and residents.



The Politik of the Grand Strategy


The deep non-aligned military, political and economical cooperation with both "solid" and cooperation in differing forms with "difficult" partners.



(i) Making Singapore irreplaceable

Do so for the wider net of "solid" partners and "difficult" partners alike. This means strengthening the already existing and mentioned strengths of this state. A "neutral" fabric which keeps the web of commerce and finance together might be for some an attractive prize to win, but it is also for many more a terrible knot to loose. This investments may be the most fruitful and efficient in the long term.



(ii) Spread the word

Inform international partners about the importance of the surrounding trade flow in general and of city-state in specific and try to influence the perceptions of their institutions and policy-makers. This can be done in a great many ways and is IMHO a very cost-effective way to vastly increase the "strategic depth" of the state.



(iii) Cooperate and help regionally

Cooperate closely with the regional partners to increase the security of the tradeflow and the economic and political freedom. There will be much friction and disaccord as Singapore is widely seen as the great profiteer, but it must be undertaken to decrease the chances of low-level and limited attempts to harass and disrupt the lifelines of Singapore.


(iv) Inform and influence people and nations

Shape the perceptions of the surrounding populations and decision makers in your favor by acting as a helping hand in times of crisis for the former and by offering excellent non-binding treatment to the latter



The Military in the Grand Strategy


A solid military force with the capability to dominate/negate the vital sea lanes and airspace and to defeat immediate threads with rapidly mobilized and modern joint armed forces is a pillar in the grand strategy.



(i) Welltrained and Organized citizien-soldiers

A large number of military trained citizens which can be integrated in times of crisis rapidly to form a relative large and effective fighting force (but this force is untested in war). This allows for the effective concentration of force in time and space to defend the small territory of Singapore, see Clausewitz (Chapter 8, Superiority in numbers):



(ii) Networked Hightech - capable Soldiers

Relative limited manpower and relative high wealth mean that the armed forces will have to rely to a great extent on expensive technology, organisation and training to achieve an efficient military force. A high amount of the "Vernichtungsprinzip" (firepower) in combination with the "Bewegungsprizip" (mobility) has all major conflict been able to ease the need for manpower up to a certain extent.Modern, highly mechanized and networked armed forces with overwhelming firepower are even with relative few men fearsome opponents. This raises the stakes greatly for any potential invader. 2



(iii) Keep the lifelines open

A powerful navy and a powerful airforce are able to greatly harrass, disrupt and block the ability of opposing states to operate efficiently, more so in the spefic geopolitical environment of SE Asia. The great importance of trade for the funcition of almost any industrial or even semi-industrial nation is well known. A large number of relative soft targets is needed to allow a modern economy to operate and to sustain the war effort.



(iv) Deny invasions by Sea and Air

A powerful navy and airforce are also capable to make an sustainable invasion by almost all nations almost impossible and keep the trade routes, the lifelines of Singapore under most conditions open. They are also able to assist the armed forces in limited and rapid offensive actions.



(v) Precise and Effective Firepower

The ability to deliver "surgical" strikes on a large scale and to defend itself against sustained air,land and sea attacks by firepower is of great political importance in a limited conflict as it may allow Singapore to contain limited attacks by external forces without being forced to large land offensives. This is especially important because the all of the tiny surface of the island might be under some condition in artillery or bombing range. A effective, yet limited response increases the chances of goodwill and support by partners and allies.

[Firn]

After having written "A sketchy Grand Strategy for Singapore" I also understand why Israeli were considered to be the best trainers and advisers for the creation of the armed forces of Singapore.

[OPSSG]

Originally Posted by OPSSG

17 Feb 2009, marks 30 years since the Sino-Vietnam war (which theoretically lasted till 16 March 1979) and Vietnam's border conflicts with China and Thailand lasted till the late 1980s. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (which many agree did not go well for the PLA in 1979), continued warfare and infiltration along the border kept these two neighbors in a state of low-level warfare till 1987 or thereabouts...

Note: I am not a China nor a Vietnam expert, so I cannot answer the above question. I would appreciate input.

Territorial disputes between neighbouring countries like Vietnam and China, if mishandled can lead to armed conflict. In this case, Vietnam shares a 1,400 km land border with China and both parties signed a bilateral land-border treaty (LBT). On 1 Jan 2009, both parties signed an aide memoir on the completion of the land border demarcation, which has significantly reduced the chance of armed conflict between Vietnam and China over their joint land border. RSIS has issued a working paper on 'The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty: Bilateral and Regional Implications' and I have enclosed the link if for those are interested in China-ASEAN developments.

[Firn]

I gave it a quick look, perhaps a more closer one will follow.

Such territorial disputes are a constant source of uneasiness and may be like the rough surface of a matchbook in times of crisis. It seems that the treaty has smoothened it considerably.

[G00dEgg]

Not to challenge anyone's view in this very long and meaningful thread. My view is somehow different from most. (At least I think so.)

To put is simple, Singapore is nothing but a piece of rock. If you going to look at the whole region (put singapore in the middle and draw a perfect circle of around 35 nautical miles.) If talking about the land available to be developed into something like singapore. We could put Johor, bintan, tebing tinggi and riau island in the radar. All it takes is determination.

Can someone tell me honestly that if Singapore is really irreplaceable? My answer to this question is that Singapore is expensive to replace.

I believe that the post Sketchy Grand Strategy is very comprehensive one and a good strategy. Which basicaly it is based on the fundamental of Total Defense.

All the talking is based on the traditional warfare that all of us can remember from movies like saving private ryan. A full scale war like that can escalate. only if the following chain of event happens.

1. North Korea carry on firing its satelites that normally fail to orbit and drop off the sea of korea and japan. With NK naval vessals carry on harassing South Koreas fishing vessals.
2. Japan is increasingly irritated by the move and eventually decided to send some warships to check out on the activity of the lanuch. China is unhappy of such high performance naval vessel coming too close to China and suspect them of doing surveillance.
3. Korea peninsula conflict is imminent as NK threaten to use untested and unproven Nuclear tech.
4. US companies like Lockheed Martin will try to push Taiwan to buy expensive system by using the Korea conflict as an environment to justify the purchase. If Taiwan disagree, LM will make it a public matter.
5. With such progression, the two carrier battle group will be activated to oversee the progress of the Korea peninsular and Taiwan's conflicy. China will view this as a chance to take Taiwan using military might when US military influence is at the weakest point.
6. With no Carrier presence in SEA. Things will be interesting.

Above senario will unlikely to happen but highly possible. Unlikely is because the Obama administration is trying hard to avoid this.

So can we rely on the Americans on Singapore Defense issue? Well it had been pointed out in previous post that Singapore is not intending to do so.

Conventional warfare is highly not possible in the next 20 years. With Malaysia thinking of biting Singapore. Thailand would start to react againest the South Thailand Muslim Radicals as Malaysia would be highly involved with the fight with Singapore. If Indonesia wants to join the fun will have a strong tug on the eastern side where Australia is. Australia will join the fun too from the Papua N.G side.

No matter whose flag fly in the end. Singapore will perish for sure. Because a war torn Malaysia can slowly get back on its feet with its support from internal consumption and internal production. War Torn Indonesia could face problems like seperatist movement out of control. Still Indonesia would still be Indonesia.

The best strategy for Singapore to survive is no doubt a strong Defense Force. It is important for Singapore to get ASEAN going with these few important factors.
1. Build the foundation of the ASEAN economy to be inter reliant. We could build industries that are interreliant. For eg. Ship building, Ship protection
- As I know that Malacca straits has characteristic that not all dry bulk could pass thru due to depth limits and such. We could have a Ship coy just to address this problem and create new limits for bigger ship to transverse this strait so that such trade can benefit all members
2. We have to draft an ASEAN human rights standard into the constitution that is on par with the Western World. We need absolute determination to do this and once it is done actually we have no fear that burma and vietnam wouldn't comply. It is like EU dealing with eastern European pro soviet nations. If trading as ASEAN member is attractive enough burma problem could be solved.

Bottomline. Singapore Survival is basically based on the whole Asia's military balace and stablility. Any Taiwan or Korea or Both conflict could jeopardise Singapore's survival. Our Military force is based on a model that no one can threaten us with Military might. And any Military might against us could worst case become a Mutally Assured Destruction with WMD and nuclear is not used.

I wonder who will read this lengthy post of mine. . . . .

[FutureTank]

Originally Posted by Firn

[FONT="Verdana"]


A sketchy Grand Strategy for Singapore

Singapore need not be attacked territorially, or even militarily to be attacked.
Its value is primarily in its strategic position relevant to global trade networks. Blockading this position will affect a large number of global actors, but primarily China and Japan, but also India. However, breaking this blockade would require fixed wing air support, and neither Japan nor China currently possess this capability. On the other hand neither Malaysia nor Indonesia have the naval capability to conduct a naval blockade opposed by either Japan or China. So who does?

India is the only state in the region that has the capability to conduct a naval blockade, and to oppose either Japan or China in relief of such a blockade. India can do so by blockading the Great Channel exit from the Andaman Sea without even having the need to challenge Malay or Indonesian navies, and forcing the Singaporean naval forces to negotiate operations through Malay or Indonesian territorial waters, a precarious political situation.

Who has interest in the demise of Singapore? Only a state that sees itself as a potential replacement of Singapore. Neither Indonesia (in Ache), nor Malaysia or Thailand have the money to create such an infrastructural replacements. On the other hand India can make this infrastructure investment in the Andamans, and if it concludes some sort of agreement with China, a logistic hub can be created in Yangon to allow the entire trade lane to be moved from sea to land, bypassing Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and making Japan, South Korea and Vietnam and of course Taiwan dependent on the Chinese land route connected to Hong Kong and Shanghai. Strategically it would be a considerable economic shift in regional power positions, particularly from Chinese perspective, and would bring India as a far more relevant participant in the economics of South and East Asia than it is now.

When the Chines start building high capacity high speed railway lines into Burma, and India announces expansion of the port facilities on the Andaman islands Singapore should consider the campaign to have begun. Until then there is no reason to worry about Singapore's "Grand Strategy"

[Wooki]

Originally Posted by FutureTank

Who has interest in the demise of Singapore? Only a state that sees itself as a potential replacement of Singapore. Neither Indonesia (in Ache), nor Malaysia or Thailand have the money to create such an infrastructural replacements. On the other hand India can make this infrastructure investment in the Andamans, and if it concludes some sort of agreement with China, a logistic hub can be created in Yangon to allow the entire trade lane to be moved from sea to land, bypassing Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and making Japan, South Korea and Vietnam and of course Taiwan dependent on the Chinese land route connected to Hong Kong and Shanghai. Strategically it would be a considerable economic shift in regional power positions, particularly from Chinese perspective, and would bring India as a far more relevant participant in the economics of South and East Asia than it is now.

This is flat wrong.

Singapore is important because it sits on the global trade"Mother" SLOC--- period. India and the Andamans sit on the same SLOC, so a "blockade" of that SLOC also destroys India and the Andaman's ability to take advantage of it. They feed off the same oxygen. Cut it off they both suffer.

As to political difficulties in going through Indonesian waters; there are none as there is a thing called "free passage" in International law. Look it up, as it disqualifies your position.

As to unloading a ship and railing it across country only to be reloaded in Hong Kong, so it can get to Japan (as that is where the SLOC goes) It is inefficient in the extreme and will never happen.

The only place on the global mother SLOC (that circumnavigates the globe) where unloading; transit across land; and then reloading to continue on the journey is in the USA where cargo is unloaded at Longbeach and then reloaded at Newark for transit to Europe or the other way for transit to Japan.

This rail link has to compete with the Panama Canal. It has only become competitive since Maersk bought our Sealand, but now there are plans to expand the Panama Canal and Oh, the Chinese (COSCO) have created a hub 50 miles offshore from Miami.

In other words if you don't rail, you have two options:

1. Panama Canal
2. Drake's Passage

In your scenario you have Selat Sunda and every other strait to Torres Strait that will out perform your high speed rail link to everywhere except the Western Chinese Provinces.

Rail, even though it delivers at approx. 430 ton miles per Gallon, cannot compete against a 100Kton mother ship on a liner trade that delivers same cargo at approx. 3500 ton miles per gallon. In other words the ship can afford to sail around your "blockade" of Singapore.

Therefore your premise is incorrect and your thought process ill informed.

Let's talk about something you know about; For example: Making plastic models. I have a passing interest and I am sure you can make a better contribution to the DT community if you actually start discussing a topic that is within your skillset.

cheers

w

[FutureTank]

Originally Posted by Wooki

This is flat wrong.

It seems to me you misunderstood

Originally Posted by Wooki

Singapore is important because it sits on the global trade"Mother" SLOC--- period. India and the Andamans sit on the same SLOC, so a "blockade" of that SLOC also destroys India and the Andaman's ability to take advantage of it. They feed off the same oxygen. Cut it off they both suffer.

"Mother" SLOC? You forget how Singapore was created. It was created to allow European trade to reach Asia, and European, or British power to be projected in Asia. Singapore doesn't serve either role now, particularly so in the last decade at least.
The "oxygen" you speak of used to be pumped in, and now it largely flows out.

Originally Posted by Wooki

As to political difficulties in going through Indonesian waters; there are none as there is a thing called "free passage" in International law. Look it up, as it disqualifies your position.

I was talking about warships going through Indonesian waters in time of war.

Originally Posted by Wooki

As to unloading a ship and railing it across country only to be reloaded in Hong Kong, so it can get to Japan (as that is where the SLOC goes) It is inefficient in the extreme and will never happen.

Oh really? Its a lot easier to power trains with electricity derived from Chinese or Indian nuclear reactors than to have ships sailing around the Malay Peninsula and the coast of Vietnam.

Originally Posted by Wooki

The only place on the global mother SLOC (that circumnavigates the globe) where unloading; transit across land; and then reloading to continue on the journey is in the USA where cargo is unloaded at Longbeach and then reloaded at Newark for transit to Europe or the other way for transit to Japan.

In case you had not noticed, the traffic is increasingly FROM China and India, so the transloading done in Singapore is often minimal. What Singapore does provide is administrative, technology support and logistic services to the vessels. There is also the refinery business. And of course Singapore is a significant exporter itself. However, mostly it is a competitor to China and India. A smaller competitor, but one none the less that provides an additional distraction to SE Asia where India used to be the economic core before the arrival of the British and other Europeans.
China on the other hand is more interested in bringing Taiwan, South Korea and other East Asian states, maybe even Japan, into its sphere of economic power, as it was before European arrival.

Originally Posted by Wooki

This rail link has to compete with the Panama Canal. It has only become competitive since Maersk bought our Sealand, but now there are plans to expand the Panama Canal and Oh, the Chinese (COSCO) have created a hub 50 miles offshore from Miami.

So explain why this rail link will compete with the Panama Canal? The PC was built in a different age.

Originally Posted by Wooki

In other words if you don't rail, you have two options:

1. Panama Canal
2. Drake's Passage

In your scenario you have Selat Sunda and every other strait to Torres Strait that will out perform your high speed rail link to everywhere except the Western Chinese Provinces.

Surely you jest! Drake's Passage? Are you familiar with modern port technology? Containers can be offloaded onto rail and be off to Shanghai in a matter of 3-4 hours after vessel's arrival, moving overland that is largely independent of weather the vessels have to cope with. More important is the pressure this will place the other states in the region to cou-tau to China and India.

Originally Posted by Wooki

Rail, even though it delivers at approx. 430 ton miles per Gallon, cannot compete against a 100Kton mother ship on a liner trade that delivers same cargo at approx. 3500 ton miles per gallon. In other words the ship can afford to sail around your "blockade" of Singapore.

I'll check your figures unless you would like to quote your sources.

Originally Posted by Wooki

Therefore your premise is incorrect and your thought process ill informed.

Your opinion...

[OPSSG]

G00dEgg, welcome to DT. You should take a moment to post an intro on your background, so that the other DT members can get to know you. If you are inclined to read more to further inform your posts, I would recommend 2 additional articles including:

(i) a 2004 article called 'Straits, Passages and Chokepoints' by Jean-Paul Rodrigue on the topic of petroleum distribution; and

(ii) a older article called 'Chokepoints: Martime Ec Concerns in SE Asia' by John Noer with David Gregory prepared for the US National Defense University / Institute for National Strategic Studies.

These articles are recommended readings by a blogger called Eaglespeak.

The Strait of Malacca supports the bulk of the maritime trade between Europe and Pacific Asia, which accounts for 50,000 ships each year. The strait is approximately 800 km long and between 50 to 320 km wide (2.5 km at its narrowest point) and has a minimum channel depth of 23 metres (roughly 70 feet). It is the longest strait in the world used for international navigation. Close to 30% of the world’s trade and 80% of petroleum imports to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan transit through the strait. As the main passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Malacca is an unavoidable bottleneck, with the Strait of Sunda (Indonesia) being the closest alternative.